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cation, and if wholly absorbed and sunk, would in no way weaken the military power of the U.S. On the other hand, our mistakes and omission to use the means at our disposal, were so flagrant and numerous as to make it unnecessary to name them but it has occurred to me, that the greatest and except on other, perhaps the only mistake made by the undoubtedly great Gen. Scott in the beginning of the late War grew out of his experience and views derived from the War of 1812. That was, his want of appreciation of the uses and convenience of Cavalry. In the War of 1812 it was used only for videttes and messengers. Its power to strike quickly and at will long lines of communication and destroy the enemy's means of subsistence, its power to appear in any unexpected place as Infantry, and fight on foot, to befog the enemy and mask the real movement of the body of an Army until the moment comes to strike the decisive blow, its power to feel the enemy and ascertain his exact strength and position was lost sight of, so that when our first grand Army was formed, the essential element of a mounted force was overlooked; not so the Adversary. Partly from judgment, but most likely because in the Southern country this arm of service was popular, and it was more easy to raise Cavalry, he had from the outset a full proportion, but we did not until we had learned its use from the experience of the 1st Peninsular campaign in '62. But, I am going ahead of my narrative and will return to it.

My first instruction was from private tutors at home, with no other schoolmates than my sisters and brothers who were numerous, and I still recollect the horrors of my first days at school; accustomed to roam at large, over the broad fields, and still broader waters, and extensive forest, with a negro boy just a few years older, and perfectly subservient to my wishes, but