fates of the rebellious Pasha, till the haughty Mahmoud has found himself reduced to ask "in bondsman's key" for the insidious and dangerous presence of those very Russians, who within less than four years, dictated a peace to him under the threat of storming the capital. The finances of Turkey are utterly disorganized, and her currency is in the last stage of depreciation and uncertainty. Her tribute, for so may be called her debt to Russia, is unliquidated—and the once formidable army which might have paid it in kind, is annihilated, and its very name and memory denounced. Her ancient usages and institutions are thrown down and scorned—exactions and prescriptive bonds of her religion thrown down and severed—and the sanctimonious mystery with which her sovereign and pontiff was wont to be enveloped, is now laid bare to the vulgar gaze in the habit of a Frank hussar.

Whither does all this tend? Is the Turkish Empire about to be dissolved? or, by the renovation of old, or the adaptation of new constitutions and habits, is it, with a diminished territory, about to resume a portion of that high rank it once held in Europe?

CHRONICLE.

SECRET PROCEEDINGS.

From the National Intelligencer of the 3d.

Though the injunction of secrecy was removed from the Executive proceedings of the Senate upon the Message of the President, re-nominating the Government Bank Directors, (again rejected by the vote of 30 to 11,) the permission to make extracts (for which a special order of the Senate is required) was not given until the moment before the adjournment yesterday. We have not been able to obtain a copy of the Journal in relation to this subject, but by great exertion, we are enabled to lay before our readers the Message of the President, and the Report upon it by the Committee on Finance, to which committee it was referred before it was acted upon.

THE MESSAGE.

WASHINGTON, MARCH 11th, 1834.

To the Senate:

I renominate Henry D Gilpin, Peter Wager, and John T. Sullivan, of Philadelphia, and Hugh McEldery of Baltimore, to be Directors of the Bank of the United States, for the year 1834.

I disclaim all pretension, of right, on the part of the President, officially to inquire into, or call in question, the reasons of the Senate for rejecting any nomination whatsoever. As the President is not responsible to them for the reasons which induce him to make a nomination, so they are not responsible to him for the reasons which induce them to reject it. In these respects, each is independent of the other, and both responsible to their respective constituents. Nevertheless, the attitude in which certain vital interests of the country are placed by the rejection of the gentlemen now renominated, require of me frankly to communicate my views of the consequences which must necessarily follow this act of the Senate, if it be not reconsidered.

The characters and standing of these gentlemen are well known to the community, and eminently qualify them for the offices to which I propose to appoint them. Their confirmation by the Senate, at its last session, to the same offices, is proof that such was the opinion of them entertained by the Senate at that time; and unless something has occurred since to change it, this act may now be referred to as evidence that their talents and pursuits justified their selection.

The refusal, however, to confirm their nominations to the same offices shows that there is something in the conduct of these gentlemen, during the last year, which, in the opinion of the Senate, disqualifies them; and as no charge has been made against them as men or citizens, nothing which impeaches the fair private character they possessed when the Senate gave them their sanction at its last session; and as it moreover appears from the journal of the Senate, recently transmitted for my inspection that it was deemed unnecessary to inquire into their qualifications or character; it is to be inferred that the change in the opinion of the Senate has arisen from the official conduct of these gentlemen. The only circumstances in their official conduct, which have been deemed of sufficient importance to attract public attention are the two reports made by them to the Executive Department of the Government; the one bearing date the 22d day of April, and the other the 19th day of August last; both of which reports were communicated to the Senate by the Secretary of the Treasury, with his reasons for removing the Deposites.

The truth of the facts stated in these reports is not, I presume questioned by any one. The high character and standing of the citizens by whom they were made prevent any doubt upon the subject. Indeed, the statements have not been denied by the president of the Bank, and the other Directors. On the contrary, they have insisted that they were authorised to use the money of the Bank in the manner stated in the two reports, and have not denied that the charges there made against the corporation are substantially true. It must be taken, therefore, as admitted, that the statements of the public Directors, in the reports above mentioned, are correct; and they disclose the most alarming abuses, on the part of the corporation, and the most strenuous exertions, on their part, to put an end to them. They prove that enormous sums were secretly lavished, in a manner, and for purposes, that cannot be justified; and that the whole of the immense capital of the Bank has been virtually placed at the disposal of a single individual, to be used if he thinks proper, to corrupt the press, and to control the proceedings of the Government, by exercising an undue influence over elections.

The reports were made in obedience to my official directions; and I herewith transmit copies of my letters calling for information of the proceedings of the Bank. Were they bound to disregard the call? Was it their duty to remain silent, while abuses of the most injurious and dangerous character were daily practised? Were they bound to conceal from the constituted authorities a course of measures destructive to the best interests of the country, and intended gradually and secretly to subvert the foundations of our Government, and transfer its powers from the hands of the people to a great moneyed corporation? Was it their duty to sit in silence at the Board, and witness all these abuses, without an attempt to correct them; or, in case of failure there, not to appeal to higher authority? The eighth fundamental rule authorizes any one of the Directors, whether elected or appointed, who may have been absent when an excess of debt was created, or who may have dissented from the act, to exonerate himself from personal responsibility by giving notice of the fact to the President of the United States, thus recognising the propriety of communicating to that officer the proceedings of the Board in such cases. But, independently of any argument to be derived from the principle recognized in the rule referred to, I cannot doubt for a moment that it is the right and the duty of every Director at the Board to attempt to correct all illegal proceedings, and in case of the failure, to disclose them; and that every one of them, whether elected by the stockholders or appointed by the Government, who had knowledge of the facts and concealed them, would be justly amenable to the severest censure.

But in the case of the public Directors it was their peculiar and official duty to make the disclosures: and the call upon them for information could not have been disregarded without a flagrant breach of their trust. The Directors appointed by the United States cannot be regarded in the light of the ordinary Directors of a Bank appointed by the Stockholders, and charged with the care of their pecuniary interests in the corporation. They have higher and more important duties. They are public officers. They are placed at the Board not merely to represent the stock held by the United States, but to observe the conduct of the corporation, and to watch over the public interests. It was foreseen that this great moneyed monopoly might be so managed as to endanger the interests of the country; and it was therefore deemed necessary, as a measure of precaution, to place at the Board watchful sentinels, who should observe its conduct, and stand ready to report to the proper officers of the Government every act of the Board which might affect injuriously the interests of the people.

The whole frame of the charter, as well as the manner of their appointment, proves this to be their true character. The United States are not represented at the Board by those Directors merely on account of the stock held by the Government. The right of the United States to appoint Directors, and the number appointed, do not depend upon the amount of the stock; for if every share should be sold, and the United States cease to be a stockholder altogether, yet, under the charter, the right to appoint five directors would still remain.—In such a case what would be the character of the directors? They would represent no stock, and be chosen by no stockholder. Yet they would have a right to sit at the board; and to be made acquainted with all the proceedings of the Corporation. They would not, in such a case, be ordinary directors chosen by the stockholders in proportion to their stock. But would be public officers appointed to guard the public interests; and their duties must conform to their office—They are not the duties of an ordinary director chosen by a stockholder; but they are the peculiar duties of a public officer, who is bound on all occasions to protect, to the utmost of his lawful means, the public interests; and, where his own authority is not sufficient to prevent injury, to inform those to whom the law has confided the necessary power. Such then is the character, and such are the duties, of the directors appointed by the United States, whether the public be stockholders or not. They are officers of the United States, and not the mere representatives of the stockholders.

The mode of their appointment, and their tenure of office, confirm this position. They are appointed, like other officers of the Government, and by the same authority. They do not hold their offices irrevocably a year after their appointment; on the contrary, by the express terms of the law, they are liable to be removed from office at any time by the President, when in his judgment the public interests shall require it. In every respect therefore, in which the subject can be considered, it is evident that the five directors appointed by the U. States are to be regarded as public officers; who are placed there in order to observe the conduct of the corporation, and to prevent abuses which might otherwise be committed.

Such being the character of the Directors appointed on behalf of the United States, it is obviously their duty to resist, and in case of failure to report to the President or the Secretary of the Treasury, any proceedings of the Board by which the public interest may be injuriously affected. The President may order a scire facias against the Bank, for a violation of its charter; and the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to direct the money of the United States to be deposited elsewhere, when, in his judgment the public interest require it to be done. The Directors of this Bank, like all others, are accustomed to sit with closed doors, and do not report ther proceedings, to any Department of the government. The monthly return which the charter requires to be made to the Treasury Department gives nothing more than a general statement of its pecuniary condition, and of that but an imperfect one. For, although it shows the amount loaned at the Bank and its different branches, it does not show the condition of its debtors, nor the circumstances under which the loans are made. It does not show whether they are in truth accommodations granted in the regular and ordinary course of business, upon fair banking principles, or from other motives. Under the name of loans, advances may be made to persons notoriously insolvent, for the most corrupt and improper purposes; and a course of proceeding may be adopted, in violation of its charter, while upon the face of its monthly statement, every thing would appear to be fair and correct.

How, then, is the Executive branch of the Government to become acquainted with the official conduct of the public directors, or the abuses practised by the Corporation for its private ends, and in violation of its duty to the public? The power of displacing the public directors, and that of issuing a scire facias, and of removing the deposites, were not intended to be idle and nugatory provisions without the means of enforcement. Yet they must be wholly inoperative and useless unless there be some means by which the official conduct of the public directors, and the abuses of power on the part of the corporation, may be brought to the knowledge of the Executive Department of the Government.

Will it be said, that the power is given to the Secretary of the Treasury to examine, himself, or by his authorized agent, into the conduct and condition of the Bank? The answer is obvious. It could not have been expected or intended that he would make an examination, unless information was first given to him which excited his suspicions; and if he did make such a general examination, without previous information of misconduct, it is most probable, that, in the complex concerns and accounts of a bank, it would result in nothing, whatever abuses might have been practised.

It is, indeed, the duty of every director to give information of such misconduct on the part of the board. But the power to issue a scire facias, and to remove the deposites presupposes that the directors elected by the stockholders might abuse their power; and it cannot be presumed that Congress intended to rely on these same directors to give information of their own misconduct. The Government is not accustomed to rely on the offending party to disclose his offence. It was intended that the power to issue a scire facias, and remove the deposites, should be real and effective. The necessary means of information were therefore provided in the charter; and five officers of the Government appointed, in the usual manner, responsible to the public and not to the stockholders, were placed as sentinels at the board, and are bound, by the nature and character of their office, to resist, and, if unsuccessful, to report to the proper authority every infraction of the charter, and every abuse of power, in order that due measures should be taken to punish or correct it; and, in like manner, it is their duty to give, when called upon, any explanation of their own official conduct touching the management of the institution.

It was, perhaps, scarcely necessary to present to the Senate these views of the power of the Executive, and of the duties of the five directors appointed by the United States. But the Bank is believed to be now striving to obtain for itself the government of the country; and is seeking, by new and strained constructions, to wrest from the hands of the constituted authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter. And, as misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack, I have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate, in a manner not to be misunderstood, the principles on which I have acted.

Entertaining, as I do, a solemn conviction of the truth of these principles, I must adhere to them, and act upon them with constancy and firmness.

Aware, as I now am, of the dangerous machinations of the Bank, it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the rights of the people from the impending danger. And I should feel that I ought to forfeit the confidence with which my countrymen have honored me, if I did not require regular and full reports of every thing in the proceedings of the Bank, calculated to affect injuriously the public interests, from the public directors. And, if the directors should fail to give the information called for, it would be my imperious duty to exercise the power conferred on me by the law, of removing them from office, and of appointing others who would discharge their duties with more fidelity to the public. I can never suffer any one to hold office under me who would connive at corruption, or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw the enemies of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free institutions, and to subject the free people of the United States to the dominion of a great moneyed corporation.

Any Directors of the Bank, therefore, who might be appointed by the Government, would be required to report to the Executive as fully as the late Directors have done, and more frequently, because the danger is more imminent; and it would be my duty to require of them a full detail of every part of the proceedings of the corporation, or any of its officers, in order that I might be enabled to decide whether I should exercise the power of ordering a scire facias, which is reserved to the President by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be doubted that the misconduct of the corporation would never have been brought to light by the aid of a public proceeding at the Board of Directors. The Board, when called on by the Government Directors, refused to institute an inquiry, or require an account; and the mode adopted by the latter was the only one by which the object could be attained. It would be absurd to admit the right of the Government Directors to give information, and, at the same time, deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another mode of enabling the Bank to conceal its proceedings, and practice, with impunity, its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the information, therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to the abuses disclosed, as well as in reporting them, the conduct of the late directors was judicious and praiseworthy; and the honesty, firmness and intelligence which they have displayed, entitle them, in my opinion, to the gratitude of the country

But, if I do not mistake the principles on which the Senate have recently rejected them, the conduct which I deem worthy of praise, they treat as a breach of duty; and, in their judgment, the measures which they took to obtain the information, and their efforts to put an end to the practices disclosed, and the reports they have made to the Executive, although true in all their parts, are regarded as an offence, and supposed to require some decisive mark of strong disapprobation.

If the views of the Senate be such as I have supposed, the difficulty of sending to the Senate any other names than those of the late directors, will be at once apparent. I cannot consent to place before the Senate the name of any one who is not prepared, with firmness and honesty, to discharge the duties of a public director, in the manner they were fulfilled by those whom the Senate have refused to confirm If, for performing a duty lawfully required of them by the Executive, they are to be punished by the subsequent rejection of the Senate, it would not only be useless, but cruel, to place men of character and honor in that situation, if even such men could be found to accept it. If they failed to give the required information, or to take proper measures to obtain it, they would be removed by the Executive. If they gave the information, and took proper measures to obtain it, they would, upon the next nomination, be rejected by the Senate. It would be unjust, in me, to place any other citizens in the predicament in which this unlooked-for decision of the Senate has placed the estimable and honorable men who were directors during the last year.

If I am not in error in relation to the principles upon which these gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence will be that the Bank will hereafter be without Government Directors, and the people of the United States must be deprived of their chief means of protection against its abuses: for whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to the right of the directors, appointed in January, 1833, to hold over until new appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that, whilst their rejection by the Senate remains in force, they cannot, with propriety, attempt to exercise such a power. In the present state of things, therefore, the corporation will be enabled effectually to accomplish the object it has been so long endeavoring to obtain. Its exchange committees, and its delegated powers to its President, may hereafter be dispensed with, without incurring the danger of exposing its proceedings to the public view. The sentinels which the law had placed at its board can no longer appear there.

Justice to myself and to the faithful officers by whom the public has been so well and so honorably served, without compensation or reward, during the last year, has required of me this full and frank exposition of my motives for nominating them again, after their rejection by the Senate. I repeat, that I do not question the right of the Senate to confirm or reject at their pleasure: and if there had been any reason to suppose that [illegible] duced by the causes to which I have attributed it, or if my views of their duties, and the present importance of their rigid performance, were other than they are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced, and attempted to find others who would accept the unenviable trust. But I cannot consent to appoint directors of the Bank to be the subservient instruments or silent spectators of its abuses and corruptions; nor can I ask honorable men to undertake the thankless duty, with the certain prospect of being rebuked by the Senate for its faithful performance in pursuance of the lawful directions of the Executive.

I repeat that I do not claim a right to inquire into, or officially to censure, the acts of the Senate. But the situation in which the important interests of the American people, vested in the Bank of the United States, and affected by its arrangements, must necessarily be left by the rejection of the gentlemen now re-nominated, has made it my duty to give this explanation to the Senate, and submit the matter to their consideration. If it shall be determined by the Senate that all channels of information, in relation to the corrupt proceedings of this dangerous corporation, shall be cut off, and the Government and country left exposed to its unrestrained machinations against the purity of the press, and public liberty, I shall, after having made this effort to avert so great an evil, rest for the justification of my official course, with respectful confidence, on the judgment of the American people.

In conclusion, it is proper I should inform the Senate, that there is now no Government Director appointed for the present year; Mr. Bayard, who was nominated and confirmed by the Senate, having refused to accept that appointment.

ANDREW JACKSON.

REPORT

of the Committee of Finance on the above Message.

IN SENATE, THURSDAY, MAY 1, 1834.

Mr. Tyler, from the committee on Finance, to which was referred the message of the President of the 11th of March, re-nominating Henry D. Gilpin, Peter Wager, John T. Sullivan, and Hugh McEldery, as Directors of the Bank of the United States, submitted the following report:

The committee have bestowed upon the subject the reflection which respect for the Chief Magistrate would at all times command. The President at an early day of the session, submitted the nomination to the Senate, of five persons as directors of the Bank of the U. States. To one of these nominations the Senate assented; and the person nominated was appointed. In regard to the four others, being the same persons now re-nominated to the Senate, no definite decision was made until the 27th day of February, when they were each separately rejected by ayes and noes. The subjects, in the mean time, with which these nominations were in some degree connected, had undergone a full and elaborate discussion in the Senate. The decision, therefore, was well calculated to satisfy the President that the Senate entertained decisive objections to the confirmation of these four persons; and the journals of which the President usually sees a copy, could not fail to show that each and every one of them was rejected by a clear majority of the whole Senate. The precise character of the objections taken by each and every member of the Majority, or even the general character of such objections, it would be presumptuous in the committee to attempt to ascertain. They connot be expected to go into private conference with members, and to interrogate either those of the majority or minority, upon this or any other question, as to the reasons of their votes.

It must be obvious that from the constitution of the Senate; from the manner of its proceedings; from the absolute right of every member to vote for or against particular nominations for reasons of his own, whether others concur with him in those reasons or not, the grounds of the votes of individual members can never be set forth, nor authentically known. The committee cannot undertake any inquiry into such grounds of individual opinion; nor do they know any form in which the Senate itself, if it were so inclined, could compel individuals to state the reasons of their votes. The committee, therefore, do not suppose it proper for the Senate by any proceeding to be adopted on its part, to undertake to set forth the reasons of members for rejecting these persons. It is enough that the Senate in the exercise of an unquestionable constitutional right has refused its advice and consent to the nominations. This has been officially certified to the president, and the committee think there is no ground for further inquiry.

The President disclaims, indeed, in terms, all right to inquire into the reasons of the Senate for rejecting any nomination; and yet the message immediately undertakes to infer, from facts and circumstances, what those reasons, which influenced the Senate in this case, must have been, and goes on to argue, much at large, against the validity of such supposed reasons. The committee are of opinion, that if, as the President admits, he cannot inquire into the reasons of the Senate for refusing its assent to nominations, it is still more clear that those reasons cannot, with propriety be assumed and made subjects of comment.

In cases in which nominations are rejected, for reasons affecting the character of the persons nominated, the committee think that no inference is to be drawn, except what the vote shows; that is to say, that the Senate withholds its advice and consent from the nominations. And the Senate, not be- [illegible] these cases, it is not bound, nor would it be proper for it, as the committee think, to give any answer to remarks founded on the presumption of what such reasons must have been, in the present case. They feel themselves therefore, compelled to forego any response whatever to the message of the President, in this particular, as well by the reasons before assigned, as out of respect to that high officer. The President acts upon his own views of public policy, in making nominations to the Senate; and the Senate does no more when it confirms or rejects such nominations. For either of these coordinate departments to enter into the consideration of the motives of the other would not, and could not fail, in the end, to break all harmonious intercourse between them. This, your committee would deplore as highly injurious to the best interests of the country. The President, doubtless, asks himself, in the case of every nomination for office, whether the person be fit for the office; whether he be actuated by correct views and motives; and whether he be likely to be influenced by those considerations which should alone govern him in the discharge of his duties; is he honest, capable, and faithful? Being satisfied in these particulars, the President submits his name to the Senate, where the same inquiries arise, and its decision should be presumed to be dictated by the same high considerations as those which govern the president, in originating the nomination. For these reasons, the committee have altogether refrained from entering into any discussion of the legal duties and obligations of directors of the Bank appointed by the President and Senate, which form the main topic of the message.

The committee would not feel that it had fully acquitted itself of its obligations, if it did not avail itself of this occasion to call the attention of the Senate to the general subject of re-nomination.

The committee do not deny that a right of re-nomination exists; but they are of opinion, that in very clear and strong cases only, should the Senate reverse decisions which it has deliberately formed and officially communicated to the President. In military and naval appointments it is possible that questions not of personal fitness for office, but of the right of individuals to rank and grade, may arise between the President and Senate; and that nominations may be rejected, pending such questions, which might properly be renewed under other laws or a new state of circumstances. And in regard, too, to diplomatic appointments, the question may perhaps sometimes turn, not on the fitness of the person nominated, but on the propriety of any appointment, or of any such mission as is proposed. If new information should be given, shedding new light satisfactory to the Senate, in such case it may be a proper reason for agreeing to nominations once rejected; nor will the committee say that there may not be other cases in which a person once rejected may be properly again presented to the Senate. But the committee think that in a case in which the decision of the Senate has been deliberately made upon the sole question of the fitness of the persons for the offices to which they are nominated, and its assent has been withheld, it ought not, without very strong and clear reasons, to change that decision upon a re-nomination. The committee has caused the journals of the Senate to be examined in reference to the practice of renomination, and they find that, during the presidential terms of General Washington, Mr. John Adams and Mr. Jefferson no instance of re-nomination to office once occurred; and yet there are not wanting instances of the rejection of nominations made by those illustrious citizens, the motives for which it would be difficult now to ascertain. To illustrate this, it is only necessary to select the case of Colonel Fishburn, a gallant soldier of the revolution, who was nominated by General Washington as the collector of Savannah, and was rejected by the Senate. And, although the President was obviously mortified by the decision, the nomination having been made in a great measure upon his personal knowledge of the individual, he contented himself after the rejection, with addressing a letter to the Senate, containing his reasons for the nomination of Colonel Fishburn, and accompanied that message with the name of another individual.

During the administration of Mr. Madison, two instances occur of re-nominations of the same persons to the same offices to which they had originally been nominated. Abraham Quackenbush was nominated as an ensign and rejected—re-nominated and confirmed. And George Brown was nominated a Collector for the first collection district of Maryland; and after a rejection, was re-nominated and confirmed. What reasons influenced the President to pursue this course in the two instances referred to, or the Senate to concur in it, the committee have now no means of ascertaining. During the administration of Mr. Monroe, the instances of re-nomination became more frequent; but several of them were nominations to military appointments, and, in a majority of the cases, no direct vote rejecting the nominations had passed the Senate. The cases of re-nomination by Mr. Monroe, after a rejection, were James Gadsden, as Adjutant General, and Nathan Towson, as Colonel; Charles Vandeventer, as navy agent, and Duff Green, as Receiver; all of which were rejected on their re-nomination. The two first nominations were purely military, and involved an interesting and difficult question of grade, and, in the opinion of the President, called for the most minute and elaborate investigation. What motives impelled to the re-nomination of the two last, the committee cannot