EASTON GAZETTE.

WHERE THE PRESS IS FREE—"Literature, well or ill-conducted, is the Great Engine by which all Popular States must ultimately be supported or overthrown."
RELIGION purifies the Heart and teaches us our Duty—Morality refines the Manners—Agriculture makes us Rich—and Politics provides for the enjoyment of all.

VOL. XII. EASTON, MARYLAND, SATURDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 28, 1829. NO. 9.

PRINTED & PUBLISHED EVERY SATURDAY EVENING
BY ALEXANDER GRAHAM,
At TWO DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS Per Annum, payable half yearly in advance.

ADVERTISEMENTS
Not exceeding a square inserted three times for ONE DOLLAR; and TWENTY FIVE CENTS for every subsequent insertion.

APPEAL

To the Citizens of the United States.

The following Appeal is made to you because the charges which have rendered it necessary were exhibited by your highest public functionary, in a communication designed for the eyes of all; and because the citizens of every State in the Union have a deep interest in the reputation of every other State.

It is well known, that, during the embargo,—and the succeeding restrictions on our commerce, and also, during the late war with Great Britain, the State of Massachusetts was sometimes charged with entertaining designs, dangerous, if not hostile, to the Union of the States. The calumny, having been engendered at a period of extreme political excitement, and being considered like the thousand others which at such times are fabricated by party animosity, and which live out their day and expire, has hitherto attracted very little attention in this State. It stood on the same footing with the charge against Hamilton, for peculation; against the late President Adams, as being in favor of monarchy and nobility, and against Washington himself, as hostile to France, and devoted to British interests. Calumnies which were seldom believed by any respectable members of the party which circulated them.

The publication by the President of the United States, in the National Intelligencer of October last, has given an entirely new character to these charges against the citizens of Massachusetts. They can no longer be considered as the anonymous slanders of political partisans;—but as a solemn and deliberate impeachment by the first magistrate of the United States, and under the responsibility of his name. It appears also that this denunciation, though now for the first time made known to the public, and to the parties implicated, (whoever they may be,) was contained in private letters of Mr. Adams, written twenty years ago, to members of the general government; and that he ventures to state it as founded on unequivocal evidence within his own knowledge.

It was impossible for those who had any part in the affairs of Massachusetts during the period in question, to suffer such a charge to go forth to the world, and descend to posterity, without notice. The high official rank of the accuser, the silent, but baneful influence of the original secret denunciation, and the deliberate and unprovoked repetition of it in a public journal, authorized an appeal to Mr. Adams, for a specification of the parties, and of the evidence, and rendered such an appeal absolutely imperative. No high minded honorable man, of any party, or of any State in our confederacy, could expect that the memory of illustrious friends deceased, or the characters of the living, should be left undefended, through the fear of awakening long extinguished controversies, or of disturbing Mr. Adams' retirement. Men who feel a just respect for their own characters, and for the public esteem, and who have a corresponding sense of what is due to the reputation of others, will admit the right of all who might be supposed by the public to be included in Mr. Adam s' denunciation, to call upon him to disperse the cloud with which he had enveloped their characters. Such persons had a right to require that the innocent should not suffer with the guilty, if any such there were; and that the parties against whom the charge was levelled, should have opportunity to repel and disprove it. Mr. Adams had indeed admitted that his allegations could not be proved in a court of law, & thereby prudently declined a legal investigation; but the persons implicated had still a right to know what the evidence was which he professed to consider as "unequivocal," in order to exhibit it to the tribunal of the public, before which he had arraigned them. He had spoken of that evidence as entirely satisfactory to him. They had a right to ascertain whether it would be alike satisfactory to impartial, upright, and honorable men.

It being determined that this denunciation could not be suffered to pass unanswered, some question arose as to the mode in which it should be noticed. Should it be by a solemn public denial, in the names of all those who came within the scope of Mr. Adams' accusation, including, as it does, all the leaders of the Federal party from the year 1803 to 1814? Such a course indeed would serve in Massachusetts,—where the characters of the parties are known most fully to countervail the charges of Mr. Adams; but this impeachment of their character, may be heard in distant States, and in future times. A convention might have been called of all who had been members of the Federal party in the legislature during these eleven years, and a respectable host they would be, in numbers, intelligence, education, talents and patriotism; yet it might then have been said "You mean to overpower your accuser by numbers: you intend to seize this occasion to revive the old and long extinct federal party: your purpose is to oppress by popular clamour a falling Chief;—you are avenging yourselves for his ancient defection from your party; you are conscious of guilt, but you endeavour to diminish the odium of it by increasing the number of your accomplices." These reasons had great weight; and the course adopted after deliberation appeared to be free from all objection.

The undersigned, comprising so many of the federal party, that Mr. Adams should not be at liberty to treat them as unworthy of attention, and yet so few that he could not charge them with arraying a host against him, addressed to him the above letter of November 26th. They feel no fear that the public will accuse them of presumption in taking upon themselves the task of vindicating the reputation of the federal party. The share which some of them had in public affairs during the period over which Mr. Adams has extended his charges and insinuations, and the decided, powerful, and well merited influence enjoyed by their illustrious friends now deceased, most assuredly gave to the undersigned a right to demand the grounds of the accusation; a right which Mr. Adams himself repeatedly admits might have been justly and properly exercised by each of them severally. Their demand was founded on the common principle, recognized alike in the code of honor and of civil jurisprudence, that no man should make a charge affecting the rights or character of others, without giving them an opportunity of knowing the grounds on which it was made, and of disproving it, if untrue.—To this plain & simple demand the undersigned received the answer contained in the above letter of Mr. Adams, dated on the 30th of December.

It will be seen that Mr. Adams altogether refuses to produce any evidence in support of his allegations. The former part of his letter contains his reasons for that refusal; and in the other part he repeats the original charges in terms even more offensive than before. When addressing to him our letter, we thoght we might reasonably expect from his sense of what was due to himself, as well as to us, that he would fully disclose all the evidence which he professed to consider so satisfactory; and we felt assured, that in that event we should be able fully to explain or refute it, or to show that it did not affect any distinguished members of the federal party. And if, on the other hand he should refuse to disclose that evidence, we trusted that the public would presume, what we unhesitatingly believe, that it was because he had no evidence that would bear to be submitted to an impartial and intelligent community. Mr. Adams has adopted the latter course; and if the reasons that he has assigned for it should appear to be unsatisfactory, our fellow citizens, we doubt not, will join us in drawing the above inference. We therefore proceed to an examination of those reasons.

Mr. Adams first objects to our making a joint application to him; acknowledging the right of each alone to inquire whether HE was included in this vague and sweeping denunciation. It is not easy to see why any one should lose this acknowledged right by uniting with others in the exercise of it; nor why this mere change of form should authorize Mr. Adams to disregard our claim. But there are two objections to the course which he has condescended to point out, as the only one in which he could be approached on this occasion. Any individual who should have applied to him in that mode might have been charged with arrogance; and to each of them in turn he might have tauntingly replied, "that the applicant was in no danger of suffering as one of the 'leaders' in Massachusetts, and had no occasion to exculpate himself from a charge conveyed in the terms used by Mr. Adams." The other objection is still more decisive. After allowing to this denunciation all the weight that it can be supposed to derive from the personal or official character of the accuser, we trust there are few citizens of Massachusetts who would be content to owe their political reputation to his estimation of it, and condescend to solicit his certificate to acquit them of the suspicion of treasonable practices.

Mr. Adams next objects, that we make our application as the representatives of a great and powerful party, which, at the time referred to, commanded, as he says, a devoted majority in the legislature of the Commonwealth; and he denies our right to represent that party.—We have already stated the objections to a joint application by all, who might be included in this denunciation, and to a separate inquiry by each individual; and some of the reasons which we thought, justified the course ,which we have pursued. We certainly did not arrogate to ourselves the title of 'leaders;' and Mr. Adams may enjoy, undisturbed, all the advantage which that circumstance can give him in this controversy. But we freely avowed such a close political connexion with all who could probably have been included under that appellation, as to render us responsible for all their political measures that were known to us—and we,—therefore, must have been either their dupes, or the associates in their guilt. In either case, we were interested, and, as we apprehend, entitled to make this demand of Mr. Adams.

As to the suggestion, that he spoke only of 'certain leaders' of the federal party, and not of the party itself; we certainly intended to deny our knowledge and belief that any such plot had been contrived by any party whatever in this State; and it is explicitly so stated in our letter. This language would include any number,—whether large or small, who might be supposed to have leagued together, for the purpose suggested by Mr. Adams. There seems, therefore, to be but little ground for this technical objection, that we do not take the issue tendered by his charge

But we wish to examine a little further this distinction which Mr. Adams relies upon, between a political party and its leaders. From the nature of representative government, it results, that, in conducting the business of their legislative and popular assemblies, some individuals will be found to take a more active and conspicuous part than the rest, and will be regarded as essentially influencing public opinion, whilst they are generally themselves merely impelled by its force. But this influence, in whatever degree it may exist, is temporary, and is possessed by a constant succession of different persons Those who possess it for the time being, are called 'leaders,' and, in the course of ten years, they must amount to a very numerous class. Their measures and political objects must necessarily be identified with those of their whole party. To deny this is to pronounce sentence of condemnation upon popular government. For, admitting it to be true, that the people may be occasionally surprised and misled by those who abuse their confidence, into measures repugnant to their interests and duty, still, if the majority of them can, for ten years together, be duped, and led hoodwinked to the very precipice of treason, by their perfidious guides, without participating in their secret designs, or being privy to their existence,' they show themselves unfit for self-government. It is not conceivable, that the federal party, which at that time, constituted the great Majority of Massachusetts, will feel themselves indebted to the President of the United States, for a compliment paid to their loyalty, at the expense of their character for intelligence and independence.

It is in the above sense only, that a free people can recognise any individuals as leaders—and in this sense, every man, who is conscious of having enjoyed influence and consideration with his party, may well deem himself included in every opprobrious and indiscriminate impeachment of the motives of the leaders of that party. But it would be arrogance to suppose himself 'alone' intended, when the terms of the accusation imply a confederacy of many. And while, on the one hand, it would betray both selfishness and egotism to confine his demand of exculpation to himself:—so, on the other, it is impossible to unite in one application "all" who might justly be considered as his associates.—It follows then that any persons, who, from the relations they sustained to their party, may apprehend that the public will apply to them charges of this vague description, may join in such numbers as they shall think fit, to demand an explanation of charges, which will probably affect some of them, and may affect them all.—The right, upon the immutable principles of justice, is commensurate with the injury, and should be adapted to its character.

Again, who can doubt that the public reputation of high minded men who have embarked in the same cause and maintained a communion of principles; is a common property, which all who are interested are bound to vindicate as occasion may require—the present for the absent—the living for the dead—the son for the father.

If any responsible individual at Washington should declare himself to be in possession of unequivocal evidence, that the leaders of certain States in our confederacy, were now maturing a plot for the separation of the States, might not the members of Congress, now there, from the States thus accused, insist upon a disclosure of evidence and names? Would they be diverted from their purpose by an evasion of the question, on the ground that, as the libeller had not named any individuals, so there was no one entitled to make this demand? or would they be satisfied with a misty exculpation of themselves? This cannot be imagined. They would contend for the honor of their absent friends, of their party, and of their States. These were among our motives for making this call. We feel an interest in all these particulars, and especially in the unsullied good name of friends and associates, who venerable for eminent talents, virtues and public services, have gone down to the grave unconscious of any imputation on their characters.

Mr. Adams admits our right to make severally, the inquiries which have been made jointly;—though in a passage eminent for its equivocation, he expresses a doubt whether we can come within the terms of his charges. On this remarkable passage, we submit one more observation. As Mr. Adams declares, that he "well knew," from "unequivocal evidence," the existence of such treasonable designs, he must have known whether the parties who addressed him were engaged in those designs. Why then resort to the extraordinary subterfuge,—that IF the signers of that letter were NOT leaders, then the charges did not refer to them?

There is then no right on the part of Mr. Adams to prescribe to the injured parties, (and all are injured who may be comprehended in his vague expressions) the precise form in which they should make their demand. And his refusal to answer that which we have made, is like that of one who having fired a random shot among a crowd, should protest against answering to the complaint of any whom he had actually wounded, because they could not prove that his aim was directed at them.

Another reason assigned by Mr. Adams for his refusal to name the individuals whom he intended to accuse, is that it might expose him to a legal prosecution. He certainly had not much to apprehend in this respect from any of the undersigned. As he had originally announced that he had no legal evidence to prove his charge, and the undersigned had nevertheless called on him to produce such as he did possess, he must have been sufficiently assured that their purpose was not to resort to a court of justice, but to the tribunal of public opinion; and that they had virtually precluded themselves from any other resort.

Mr. Adams suggests another objection to naming the parties accused, on account of the probable loss of evidence, and the forgetfulness of witnesses, after the lapse of twenty years.

He undoubtedly now possesses all the evidence that he had in October last, when he published his statement. If he then made this grave charge against certain of his fellow-citizens,—with the knowledge that there was no evidence by which it could be substantiated, where was his sense of justice! If he made it without inquiring, and without regarding, whether he had any such evidence or not, intending, if called upon, to shield himself from responsibility by suggesting this loss of documents and proofs, where was then his self-respect?

But did it never occur to Mr. Adams, that the parties accused might also in this long lapse of time have lost the proofs of their innocence. *He has known for twenty years past that HE had made this secret denunciation of his ancient political friends*; and he must have anticipated the possibility that it might at some time be made public, if he had not even determined in his own mind to publish it himself. He has therefore had ample opportunity, and the most powerful motives, to preserve all the evidence that might serve to justify his conduct on that occasion. On the other hand, the parties accused and especially those venerable patriots, who, during this long interval have descended to the grave, unconscious of guilt, and ignorant that they were even suspected, have foreseen no necessity, and had no motive whatever, to preserve any memorials of their innocence. We venture to make this appeal to the conscience of Mr. Adams himself.

Mr. Adams in one passage appeals to the feelings of the undersigned, and intimates his surprise that they should have selected the present moment for making their demand. He did them but justice in supposing that this consideration had its influence on their minds. Their only fear was that their appeal might be considered as an attack on an eminent man, whom the public favor seemed to have deserted. But the undersigned had no choice. Their accuser had selected his own time for bringing this subject before the world: and they were compelled to follow him with their defence, or consent that the seal should be set on their own reputations, and on those of their deceased friends forever. We said, with truth, that it was not our design nor wish to produce an effect on any political party or question. We were not unaware that our appeal might lead to such measures as would seriously affect either Mr. Adams or ourselves in the public opinion. But whilst we did not wish for any such result, so neither were we disposed to shrink from it.

The necessity of correcting some mistakes in a letter of Mr. Jefferson, which had been lately published, is assigned by Mr. Adams as the reason for his publication. If that circumstance has brought him before the public at a time, or in a manner injurious to his feelings, or unpropitious to his political views and expectations, we are not responsible for the consequences. We would observe, however, that it would have been apparently a very easy task to correct those mistakes, without adding this unprovoked denunciation against his native State.

Finally, Mr. Adams declines all further correspondence with us on this subject; and even intimates an apprehension that he may have already condescended too far, and waved, 'even the proprieties of his situation,' in giving us such an answer as he has given.

He very much misapprehends the character of our institutions, and the principles and spirit of his countrymen, if he imagines that any official rank, however elevated, will authorise a man to publish injurious charges against others, and then to refuse all reparation and even explanation, lest it would tend to impair his dignity. If he is in danger of such a result in the present instance, he should have foreseen it when about to publish his charges, in October last. If 'the proprieties of his situation' have been violated, it was by that original publication and not by too great condescension in answer to our call upon him, for an act of simple justice towards those who felt themselves aggrieved.

We have thus examined all the reasons by which Mr. Adams attempts to justify his refusal to produce the evidence in support of his allegations; and we again appeal with confidence to our fellow citizens throughout the United States, for the justice of our conclusion, that no such evidence exists.

The preceding observations suffice, we trust to show that we have been reluctantly forced into a controversy, which could not be shunned without the most abject degradation; that it was competent to us to interrogate Mr. Adams, in the mode adopted, and that he declines a direct answer for reasons insufficient, and insatisfactory; thus placing himself in the predicament of an unjust accuser.

Here, perhaps, we might safely rest our appeal, on the ground that it is impossible strictly to prove a negative. But though we are in the dark ourselves, with respect to the evidence on which he relies, to justify his allegation of a 'project,' at any time; to dissolve the Union, and establish a northern confederacy, (which is the only point to which our inquiries were directed.) it will be easy by a comparison of dates and circumstances founded on his own admissions, to demonstrate (what we know must be true) that no such evidence applies, to any man who acted, or to the measures adopted in Massachusetts at, & posterior to the time of the embargo. The project itself, so far as it applies to those men and measures, and probably altogether, existed only in the distempered fancy of Mr. Adams.

"This design', (he says) "had been formed in the winter of 1803—4, immediately after, and as a consequence of, the acquisition of Louisiana.—Its justifying causes, to those who entertained it were, that the annexation of Louisiana to the Union transcended the constitutional powers of the government of the United States. That it formed in fact a new confederacy to which the states, united by the former compact, were not bound to adhere. That it was oppressive to the interests, and destructive to the influence of the northern section of the confederacy, whose right and duty it therefore was, to secede from the new body politic, and to constitute one of their own. The plan was so far matured, that a proposal had been made to an individual, to permit himself at the proper time to be placed at the head of the military movements, which it was foreseen would be necessary for carrying it into execution." The interview with Mr. Jefferson, was in March, 1808. In May, Mr. Adams ceased to be a senator. In the winter of 1808—9, he made his communications to Mr. Giles. In August 1809 he embarked for Europe, three years before the war; and did not return until three years after the peace—and he admits the impossibility of his having given to Mr. Jefferson information of negotiations between our citizens and the British, during the war, or having relation to the War—condescending to declare that he had no knowledge of such negociations.

The other measures, to which Mr. Adams alludes, were of the most public character; and the most important of them better known, in their day, to others, than they could be to him, residing in a foreign country; and if the chain by which these measures are connected with the supposed plot shall appear to be wholly imaginary these measures will remain to be supported, as they ought to be, on their own merits. The letter from the Governor of Nova Scotia, as will presently be seen, is of no possible significence in any view, but that of having constituted the only information (as he says) which Mr. Adams communicated to Mr. Jefferson at the time of his first, and only confidential interview. It was written in the summer of 1807, this country being then in a state of peace. The Governor's correspondent is to this hour unknown to us. He was *not*, says Mr. Adams, a 'leader of the Federal party. The contents of the letter were altogether idle, but the effect supposed by Mr. Adams to be contemplated by the writer, could be produced only by giving them publicity. It was communicated to Mr. Adams without any injunction of secrecy. He has no doubt it was shown to others. Its object was, he supposes, to accredit a calumny, that Mr. Jefferson, and his measures, were subservient to France. That the British government were informed of a plan, determined upon by France, to effect a conquest of the British Provinces on this continent, and a revolution in the Government of the United States, as means to which, they were first to produce a war between the United States and England.—A letter of this tenor was no doubt shown to Mr. Adams, as we must believe upon his word. The discovery would not be surprising, that British as well as French officers, and citizens, in a time of peace with this country availed themselves of many channels for conveying their speculations and stratagems, to other innocent ears as well as to those of Mr. Adams, with a view to influence public opinion. But the subject matter of the letter was an absurdity—Who did not know, that in 1807, after the battle of Trafalgar, the crippled navy of France could not undertake to transport even a single regiment across the British Channel? And if the object was the conquest of the British Provinces by the United States alone, how could a revolution, in their government, which must divide, and weaken it, promote that end?

The folly of a British governor in attempting to give currency to a story which savours so strongly of the burlesque, can be equalled, only by the credulity of Mr. Adams, in believing it calculated to produce effect; and if he did so believe, it furnishes a criterion by which to estimate the correctness and impartiality of his judgement concerning the weight and the application of the other evidence which he still withholds, and from which he has undertaken with equal confidence to 'draw his inferences.' After the adjustment of the diplomatic preliminaries, with Mr. Giles and others, Mr. Adams communicated *nothing* to Mr. Jefferson, but the substance of the Nova Scotia letter. If Mr. Adams had then known and believed in the 'project' (the key to all the future proceedings) it is incredible that it should have been deemed worthy of disclosure—*at that time, and on that occasion.*

In this connexion we advert for a moment to the temper of mind, and the state of feelings, which probably gave rise to, and accompanied this communication of Mr. Adams. Circumstances had occurred tending to embitter his feelings, and to warp his judgement.

Mr. Adams, just before the time of his interview with Mr. Jefferson, had voted for the embargo. He had been reproached for having done this on the avowed principle, of voting and not deliberating, upon the Executive recommendation. He had been engaged with his colleague in a controversy on this subject. His conduct, as he affirms, and as was the fact had been censured, in terms of severity, in the public press. The Legislature of Massachusetts had elected another person to succeed him in the Senate of the United States, and had otherwise expressed such a strong and decided disapprobation of the measures which he had supported, that he felt compelled to resign his seat before the expiration of his term. These might be felt as injuries, even by men of placable tempers. It is probable that his feelings of irritation may be traced back to the contest between Jefferson and the elder Adams. It is no secret, that the latter had cherished deep and bitter resentment against *Hamilton*, and certain other 'leaders of the federal party, supposed to be Hamilton's friends. It would not be unnatural that the son should participate in these feelings of the father. When Mr. Adams visited Mr. Jefferson, and afterwards made his disclosures to Mr. Giles and others, having lost the confidence of his own party, he had decided, 'as subsequent events doubtless confirmed,' to throw himself into the arms of his father's opponents. But there was a load of political guilt, personal and hereditary, still resting upon him, in the opinions of the adverse party. No ordinary proof of his unqualified abjuration of his late politics would be satisfactory;—some sacrifice which should put his sincerity to the test, and place an impassable barrier between him and his former party, was indispensable. And what sacrifice was so natural, what pledge so perfect, as this private denunciation! Nor does the effect seem to have been miscalculated or overrated. Mr. Jefferson declares that it raised Mr. Adams in his mind. Its eventual consequences were highly, and permanently advantageous to Mr. Adams. And though he assured Mr. Giles, that he had renounced his party, without personal views; yet this 'denial' considering that he had the good fortune to receive within a few months, the embassy to Russia, 'connected with other circumstances,' which ended in his elevation to the presidency, does indeed, according to his own principles of presumptive evidence, require an effort of 'the charity which believeth all things,' to gain it 'credence.'

To these public, and indisputable facts, we should not now revert, had Mr. Adams given us the names, and evidence, as we requested; and had he forborne to reiterate his injurious insinuations. But as they now rest wholly upon the sanction of his opinion, respecting evidence, which he alone possesses, we think it but reasonable to consider, how far these circumstances may have heated his imagination, or disturbed his equanimity, and given to the evidence, which he keeps from the public eye, an unnatural and false complexion.

We proceed then to a brief examination of the alledged project of 1803—4—of the Northern Confederacy.

In the first place, *We solemnly disavow all knowledge of such a project, and all remembrance of the mention of it, or of any plan analogous to it, at that or any subsequent period.* Secondly, While it is obviously impossible for us to controvert evidence of which we are ignorant, we are all well assured it must be equally impossible to bring any facts which can be considered evidence to bear upon the designs or measures of those, who, at the time of Mr. Adams' interview with Mr. Jefferson, and afterwards during the war, took an active part in the public affairs of Massachusetts.

The effort discernible throughout this letter, to connect those latter events, which were of a public nature, and of which the natural and adequate causes were public, with the mysterious project, known only to himself, of an earlier origin and distinct course is in the last degree violent and disingenuous.

The cession of Louisiana to the United States, when first promulged, was a theme of complaint and dissatisfaction, in this part of the country. This could not be regarded as factious or unreasonable, when it is admitted by Mr. Adams, that Mr. Jefferson and himself entertained constitutional scruples and objections to the provisions of the treaty of cession. Nothing, however, like a popular excitement grew out of the measure, and it is stated by Mr. Adams that this project "slumbered" until the period of the embargo in December 1807. Suppose then for the moment (what we have not a shadow of reason for believing, and do not believe) that upon the occasion of the Louisiana Treaty, "certain leaders," influenced by constitutional objections, (admitted to have been common to Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Adams and themselves,) had conceived a project of separation, and of a Northern Confederacy, as the only probable counterpoise to the manufacture of new states in the south, does it follow that when the public mind became reconciled to the cession, and the beneficial consequences of it were realized (as it is conceded by Mr. Adams, was the case) these same "leaders," whoever they might be, would still cherish the embryo project, and wait for other contingencies, to enable them to effect it? On what authority can Mr. Adams assume that the project merely "slumbered" for years, if his private evidence applies only to the time of its origin.

The opposition to the measures of government in 1808 arose from causes, which were common to the people, not only of New England, but of all the commercial states, as was manifested in New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere. By what process of fair reasoning then can that opposition be referred to, or connected with a plan, which is said to have originated in 1804, and to have been intended to embrace merely a northern confederacy! The objection to the Louisiana treaty was founded on the just construction of the compact between sovereign states. It was believed in New England, that new members could not be added to the confederacy beyond the territorial limits of the contracting parties without the consent of those parties. This was considered as a fair subject of remonstrance, and as justifying proposals for amendment of the constitution. But so far were the Federal party from attempting to use this as an additional incentive to the passions of the day, that in a report made to the Legislature of 1813, by a committee of which Mr. Adams' "excellent friend, JOSIAH QUINCY was Chairman, (Louisiana having at this time been admitted into the Union) it is expressly stated, that "they have not been disposed to connect this great constitutional question with the transient calamities of the day," from which it is in their opinion very apparently distinguished both in its cause and consequences. That in their view of this great consitutional question, they have confined themselves to topics and arguments drawn from the constitution, "with the hope of limiting the further progress of the evil, rather than with the expectation of immediate relief during the continuance of existing influences in the national administration." This report was accepted; and thus the 'project,' instead of being used as fuel to the flame, is deliberately taken out of it, and presented to the people by "the

©Maryland State Archives, msa_sc2940_scm11029-0874.jpg