EASTON GAZETTE.

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IN SENATE.

MONDAY, Jan. 20.

Mr. Webster presented to the Senate a series of Resolutions, adopted at a numerous meeting of the citizens of Boston, without distinction of party, held at Faneuil Hall, to consider the state of the Currency and finances of the country.

The Resolutions having been read—

Mr. Webster said, he wished to bear unequivocal and decided testimony to the respectability, intelligence & disinterestedness, of the long list of gentlemen, at whose instance this meeting was assembled. The meeting, said Mr. W. was connected with no party purpose whatever. It had an object more sober, more cogent, more interesting to the whole community, than mere party questions. The Senate will perceive, in the tone of these resolutions, no intention to exaggerate or inflame no disposition to get up excitement or to spread alarm. I hope the restrained and serious manner, the moderation of temper, and the exemplary candor, of these resolutions, in connexion with the plain truths which they contain, will give them just weight with the Senate. I assure you, sir, the members, composing this meeting, were neither capitalists, nor speculators, nor alarmists. They are merchants, traders, mechanics, artizans, and others engaged in the active business of life. They are of the muscular portion of society; and they desire to lay before Congress an evil, which they feel to press sorely on their occupations, their earnings, their labor, and their property; and to express their conscientious conviction of the causes of that evil. If intelligence, if pure intention, if deep and wide spread connexion with business, in its various branches, if thorough practical knowledge and experience—if inseparable union between their own prosperity and the prosperity of the whole country authorize men to speak and give them a right to be heard, the sentiments of this meeting ought to make an impression. For one sir, I entirely concur in their opinions. I adopt their fourteen first resolutions, without alteration or qualification, as setting forth truly the present state of things, stating truly its causes, and pointing to the true remedy.

Mr. President, now that *I* am speaking, I will use the opportunity to say a few words, which I intended to say, in the course of the morning, on the coming up of the resolution which lies on the table; but which are as applicable to this occasion, as to that. An opportunity may, perhaps be hereafter afforded me of discussing the reasons given by the Secretary, for the very important measure, adopted by him, in removing the deposits. But as I know not how near that time may be, *I* desire, in the mean while, to make my opinions known, without reserve, on the present state of the country. Without intending to discuss any thing at present, I feel it my duty, nevertheless, to let my sentiments & my convictions be understood. In the first place, then, sir, *I* agree wih those who think there is a severe pressure in the money market, and very serious embarrassment felt in all branches of the national industry. I think this is not local, but general, at least, over every part of the country, where the cause has as yet began to operate, and sure to become, not only general, but universal, as the operation of the cause shall spread. If proofs were wanted, in addition to all that is told us by those who know, the high rate of interest, now at 12 per cent, or higher, where it was hardly 6, last September—the depression of all stocks, some ten, some twenty, and some thirty per cent,—and the low prices of commodities, are proofs abundantly sufficient to shew the existence of the pressure. But, sir, labor—that most extensive of all interests—American manual labor—feels, or will feel, the shock more sensibly, far more sensibly, than capital or property of any kind.—Public works have stopped, or must stop great private undertakings, employing many hands, have ceased, and others must cease.—A great lowering of the rates of wages, as well as a depreciation of property, is the inevitable consequence of causes now in full operation. Serious embarrassments in all branches of business do certainly exist.

I am of opinion, therefore, that there is, undoubtedly, a very severe pressure on the community, which Congress ought to relieve if it can; and that this pressure is not an instance on the ordinary re-action, or of the ebbing and flowing of commercial affairs; but is an extraordinary case produced by an extraordinary cause.

In the next place, sir, I agree entirely with the 11th Boston resolution, as to the causes of this embarrassment. We were in a state of high prosperity, commercial and agricultural. Every branch of business, and especially manufacturing, was pushed far, and the credit, as well as the capital of the country employed to near its utmost limits. In this state of things, some degree of overtrading doubtless took place, which, however, if nothing else had occurred, would have been seasonably corrected by the ordinary and necessary operations of things. But, on this palmy state of things, the late measure of the Secretary fell, and has acted on it with powerful and lamentable effect.

And I think, sir, that such a course is entirely adequate to produce the effect: that it is wholly natural; and that it ought to have been foreseen that it would produce such effect.—Those must have looked at the surface of things only, as it seems to me, who thought otherwise, and who expected that such an operation could be gone through with, without producing a very serious shock.

The Treasury, in a very short time, has withdrawn from the Bank 8,000,000 dollars, within a fraction. This call, of course, the Bank has been obliged to provide for, and could not provide for without more or less inconvenience to the public. The mere withdrawing of so large a sum from hands actually holding and using it, and the transferring of it, through the Bank collecting, and through another Bank loaning it, if it can loan it, into other hands, is itself an operation, which, if conducted suddenly, must produce considerable inconvenience. And this is all the Secretary seems to have anticipated. But this is not the one hundreth part of the whole evil. The great evil arises from the new attitude in which the Government places itself towards the Bank. Every thing is in a false position. The Government, the Bank of the U. S., the State Banks, are all out of place. They are deranged, and separated, and jostling against each other.—Instead of amity, reliance; and mutual succor, relations of jealousy, of distrust, of hostility even, are springing up between these parties. All act on the defensive—each looks out for itself—& the public interest is crushed between the upper and the nether mill stone. All this should have been foreseen. It is idle to say that these evils might have been prevented by the Bank if it had exerted itself to prevent them. That is mere matter of opinion; it may be true, or it may not: but it was the business of those who proposed the removal of the Deposites, to ask themselves how it was probable the Bank would act; when they should attack it, assail its credit, and allege the violation by it of its charter, and thus compel it to take an attitude, at least, of stern defence. The community have certainly a right to hold those answerable, who have unnecessarily got into this quarrel with the Bank, and thereby occasioned the evil, let the conduct of the Bank, in the course of the controversy, be what it may.

In my opinion, sir, the great source of the evil is the shock which the measure has given to confidence in the commercial world. The credit of the whole system of the currency of the country seems shaken. The State Banks have lost credit and lost confidence. They have suffered vastly more than the Bank of the United States itself, at which the blow was aimed.

The derangement of internal exchanges is one of the most disastrous consequences of the measure. By the origin of its character, by its unquestioned solidity, by the fact that it was *at home every where*, and in perfect credit every where, the Bank of the United States accomplished the internal exchanges of the country with vast facility and at an unprecedented cheap rate. The State banks can never accomplish this: for the reasons given in the Boston Resolutions. they cannot act with the same concert, the same identity of purpose. Look at the Prices Current, and see the change in the value of the notes of distant banks in the great cities. Look at the depression of the stock of the State banks deposite banks and all. Look at what must happen the moment the Bank of the U States, in its process of winding up or to meet any other crisis, shall cease to buy domestic bills, especially in the Southern, Southwestern, and Western markets.—Can any man doubt what would be the state of exchange when that takes place? or can any one doubt its necessary effect on the price of produce? The Bank has purchased bills to the amount of sixty millions a year, as appears by documents, heretofore laid before the senate. A great portion of these, no doubt, was purchased in the South, and West, against shipments of the great staples of those quarters of the country.—When the Bank shall cease to buy, as it must cease, consequences cannot but be felt, much severer even than those now experienced—This is inevitable. But sir *I* go no farther into particular statements. My opinon, *I* repeat, is; that the present distress is immediately occasioned; beyond all doubt, by the removal of the deposites; and that just such consequences might have been and ought to have been foreseen from that measure, as we do now perceive and feel around us.

Sir, I do not believe, nevertheless, that these consequences where foreseen. With such foresight; the deposites, *I* think, would not have been touched. The measure has operated more deeply and more widely, than was expected. We all may find proof of this; in the conversations of every hour. No one, who seeks to acquaint himself with the opinions of men, in and out of Congress, can doubt that, if the act were now to be done, it would receive very little encouragement or support.

Being of opinion that the removal of the deposites has produced the pressure, as its immediate effect, not so much by withdrawing a large sum of money, as by alarming the confidence of the community, by breaking in on the well adjusted ralations of Government and the Bank, *I* agree again, with the Boston Resolutions, that the natural remedy is a restoration of the relation in which the Bank has heretofore stood to the Government.

I agree, sir, that this question ought to be settled, and to be settled soon. And yet if it be decided that the present state of things shall exist—if it be the determination of Congress to do nothing in order to put an end to the unnatural, distrustful, half belligerent, present condition of the Government and the Bank, I do not look for any great relief to the community, or any early quieting of the public agitation. On the countrary, I expect increased difficulty, and increased disquietude

The public moneys are now out of the Bank of the *U. S.* There is no law regulating their custody, or fixing their place. They are at the disposal of the Secretary of the Treasury, to be kept where he pleases, as he pleases, and the place of their custody to be changed as often as he pleases.

Now, sir, *I* do not think this is a state of things in which the country is likely to acquiesce.

Mr. President, the restoration of the deposites is a question distinct and by itself. It does not necessarily involve any other question. It stands clear of all controversy and all opinion about re-chartering the Bank, or creating any new Bank.

But I wish, nevertheless, sir, to say a few words of a bearing somewhat beyond that question. Being of opinion that the country is not like to be satisfied with the present state of things, I have looked earnestly for the suggestion of prospective measures—some system to be adopted as the future policy of the country. Where are the public moneys hereafter to be kept? In what currency is the revenue hereafter to be collected? What is to take the place of the Bank in our general currency system? How are we to preserve a uniform currency, a uniform measure of the value of property, and the value of labor, a uniform medium of exchange and payments? How are we to exercise that salutary control over the national currency, which it was the unquestionable purpose of the Constitution to devole on Congress.

These, sir; appear to me to be the momentous questions before us, and which we cannot long keep out of view. *In* this question, every man in the community, who either has a dollar, or expects to earn one, has a direct interest.

Now, sir, I have heard but four suggestions or opinions, as to what may hereafter be expected or attempted.

The first is, that things will remain as they are—the Bank be suffered to expire, no new Bank created, and the whole subject left under the control of the Executive Department.

I have already said, that I do not believe the country will ever acquiesce in this.

The second suggestion is that which was made by the honorable member from Virginia, (Mr. Rives.) That honorable member pledges himself to bring forward a proposition having for its object to do away with the paper system altogether, and return to an entire metalic currency

I do not expect sir, that the honorable member will find much support in such an undertaking. A mere gold and silver currency, and the entire abolition of paper, is not suited to the times. The idea has something a little too antique, too Spartan, in it; we might as well think of going to iron at once. If such a result as the gentleman hopes for, were even desirable, I regard its attainment as utterly impracticable and hopeless. I lay that scheme, therefore, out of my contemplation.

There, is, then sir, the re-chartering of the present Bank: and lastly, there is the establishment of a new Bank. The first of these received the sanction of the last Congress, but the measure was negatived by the President. The other, the creation of a new Bank, has not been brought forward in Congress, but it has excited attention out of doors, and has been proposed in some of the State Legislatures. *I* observe, sir, that a proposition has been submitted for consideration, by a very intelligent gentleman, in the Legislature of Massachusetts, recommending the establishment of a new Bank, with the following provisions:

'1. The capital stock to be fifty millions of dollars.

'2. The Stock holders of the present United States Bank be permitted to subscribe an amount equal to the stock they now hold.

'3. The United States to be stock holders to the same extent they now are and to appoint the same number of Directors.

'4. The subscription of the remaining fifteen millions, to be distributed to the several States in proportion to federal numbers, or in some other just and equal ratio, the instalments payable either in cash or in funded stock of the State, bearing interest at five per cent.

'5. No branch of the Bank to be established in any State, unless by permission of its Legislature.

'6. The Branches of the Bank established in the several States, to be liable to taxation by those States respectively, in the same manner and to the same extent only, with their own Banks.

'7. Such states as may become subscribers to the stock to have the right of appointing a certain number, not exceeding one-third, of the Directors in the Branch of their own state.

'8. Stock not subscribed for, under the foregoing provisions, to be open to subscription by individual citizens.'

A project, not altogether dissimilar, has been started in the Legislature of Pennsylvania. These proceedings show, at least a conviction of the necessity of *some* Bank created by congress. Mr. President, on this subject I have no doubt whatever. I think a National Bank proper and necessary. *I* believe it to be the only practicable remedy for the evils we feel, and the only effectual security against the greater evils which we fear. Not, sir, that there is any magic in the name of a Bank; nor that a National Bank works by any miracle or mystery. But looking to the state of things actually existing around us—looking to the great number of State Banks already existing, not less than three hundred and fifty, or four hundred—looking to the vast amount of paper issued by those Banks; & considering that, in the very nature of things this paper must be limited and local in its credit and in *its* circulation, I confess *I* see nothing but a well conducted National Institution, which is likely to afford any guard against excessive paper issues, or which can furnish a sound and uniform currency to every part of the United States. This, sir, is not only a question of finance, it not only respects the operations of the Treasury, but it rises to the character of a high political question. It respects the currency, the actual money, the measure of value of all property, and all labor, in the United States. If we needed not a dollar of money in the Treasury, it would still be our solemn and bounden duty to protect this great interest. It respects the exercise of one of the greatest powers, beyond all doubt, conferred on Congress by the constitution. And I hardly know any thing less consistent with our public duty & our high trust not any thing more likely to disturb the harmonious relation of the States, in all affairs of business and life than for Congress to abandon all care and control over the currency, and to throw the whole money system of the country into the hands of four and twenty State Legislatures.

I am, then, sir, for a bank; and am fully persuaded that to that measure the country must come at last.

The question, then, is between the creation of a new Bank, and the rechartering of the present Bank, *with modifications* I have already referred to the scheme for a new Bank proposed to the Legislature of Massachusetts by Mr. White. Between such a new Bank as his propositions would create, and a rechartering of the present Bank, *with modifications*, there is no very wide, certainly no irreconcilable difference. We cannot, however, create another Bank before March 1833. This is one reason for preferring a continuance of the present. And, treating the subject as a practical question and looking to the state of opinion, and to the probability of success, in either attempt, *I* incline to the opinion that the true course of policy is to propose a re-charter of the present Bank with modifications.

As to what these modifications should be, I would only now observe; that while it may well be infered, from my known statements, that I should not myself deem any alterations in the charter, beyond those proposed by the bill of 1832, highly essential; yet it is a case in which, I am aware, nothing can be effected for the good of the country, without making some approaches to unity of opinion. I think, therefore, that in the hope of accomplishing an object of much importance, liberal concessions should be made. I lay out of the case all consideration of any especial claim, or any legal right of the present stockholders to a renewal of their charter. No such right can be pretended, doubtless none such is pretended. The stockholders must stand like other individuals, and their interest regarded so far, and so far only, as may be judged for the public good.—Modifications of the present charter, should, I think, be prepared, such as may remove all reasonable grounds of jealousy, in all quarters; whether in States, in other institutions, or in individuals. Such, too, as may tend to reconcile the interests of the great city where the Bank is, with those of another great city; and, if it be possible, that the question should be met with a sincere disposition to accomplish, by united and friendly counsels, a measure which shall allay fears, and promote confidence, at the same time that it secures to the country a sound, creditable, uniform currency; and to the Government a safe deposite for the public treasure, and an important auxiliary in its financial operations.

I repeat, then, sir, that I am in favor of renewing the charter of the present Bank, with such alterations as may be expected to meet the general sense of the country.

And now, Mr. President, to avoid all unfounded inferences, I wish to say that these suggestions are wholly my own. They are made without the knowledge of the Bank, and with to understanding or concert with any of its friends. I have not understood indeed, that the Bank itself proposes to apply, at present, for a renewal of its charter. Whether it does or not, my suggestions are connected with no such or any other purpose of the bank. I take up the subject on public grounds purely and exclusively.

And sir, in order to impel all inferences of another sort, I wish to state, with equal distinctness, that *I* do not undertake to speak the sentiments of any individual, heretofore opposed to the Bank, or belonging to that class of public men, who have generally opposed it I state my own opinions; if others should concur in them, it will be only because they approve of them, and will not be the result of any previous concert or understanding whatever.

Finally, Mr. President, having stated my own opinions, I respectfully ask those who propose to continue the discussion now going on, relative to the Deposites, *to let the country see their plan for the final settlement of the present difficulties.* If they are against the Bank, and against all Banks, *what do they propose?* That the country will not be satisfied with the present state of things seems to me certain. *What state of things is to succeed it?* To these questions I desire to call, earnestly, the attention of the Senate and of the country. The occasion is critical, the interests at stake momentous: and, in my judgment, Congress ought not to adjourn till it shall have passed some law, suitable to the exigency, and satisfactory to the country.

Mr. Silsbee rose & said, that he, also as one of the representatives of the State of Massachusetts, on that floor, had received a copy of the resolutions, and had intended to address to the Senate a few remarks in presenting them; but, as his colleague had so amply and so ably expressed his views on the subject to which these resolutions had reference, and as he entirely concurred in those views, he should refrain from taking up the time of the Senate.

Maj. Downing's Correspondence.

To my old friend, Mr. Dwight, of the New York Daily Advertiser.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6, 1834.

You remember I telled you a spell ago, that after we got the message done, we was obliged to take it all to bits, and nock out a good many things about the accounts, and run the chance of lettin Congress skip em over; and I telled you too, that I would to rights git the Gineral's specs, and give em a twist round to a plain sight, and let him take a look at things jest as they be, without a bit of "*glory*" about em. Well, among them accounts we had got in the Message, was the Post Office accounts. I did'nt like the look on em a bit at the time, but as every body said money was plagy scarce every where, the Gineral thought it was natural enuf to find it pretty scarce in the Post Office too. Now, says *I*, Gineral my notion is, that we best let Major Barry tell his own story about it; for as he has done so much in reforming things, and as we have got now a pretty good majority in Congress, he may get out of the scrape. Well the Gineral thought that was about the best way; and Major Barry made his report, and telled a pretty considerable of a cute story about his havin found an error in the Post Office accounts, that had been over-looked ever since Gineral Washington's time. I began to think for a spell, that would stump Congress, about as much as though there had been a fire in the Post Office, pretty much like that one in the Treasury last spring.—But, some how or other, some of the plagy Senators have been smellin round, and got on a track that led em right up to the fact, that the Post Office is head and ears all over in debt; and that it has been borrowin money for over two years now, and never said a word on't to Congress. And I am peskily afeard, that seein the Law says none of our folks shall borrow money without consent of Congress, (and which upon the hull, is a pretty safe law, for Congress could't tell otherwise how the money was goin) I am, I say, peskily afeard we can't get the Post Office folks out of this scrape, without reformin some on em out of office.—But as they are all our best friends, and have done more for glory and reform than most folks, we shall let some on em resign, and then apint em to some office abroad, or get em into some place where they can git a livin without workin for it: for the Gineral wont let any on em suffer ony way.

When the Gineral come to hear what the Senate was ater, says he, Major, will them accounts of the Post Office stand the racket, or not? Why, says I, Gineral its hard tellin; but as nigh as I can calklate, says I, I guess they wont in the way *Congress settles accounts—things look plagy crooked*, says I; *and the worst on't is, them accounts have been so twisted, first one way, and then agin another way, that I am afeard now they wont stand* twistin any more. The only way says I is to straiten em, and that's all I can do about em. But, says *I*, if they break to bits in straitenin on em, *I* can't help it. Well, says he, Major, I wish you'd try it; for says the Gineral, if we can't keep Barry up, there's no tellin what will become on us, for it seems to me, ever since Mr. Van Buren got the Post Office Department into the Cabinet, we have been able to do more in "rewardin our friends and punishin our enemies," than in all the rest of the departments put together.—Well, says I Gineral, I'll try it, says I, and so the Gineral went to bed, and I got my slate, and I got all the Post Office accounts from the time Judge McLean left the office, and Major Barry came into it. It took me a good spell to git em all strung out in regular order, and just as I was beginnin to sifer up, the Gineral he riz up in bed, and says he Major, I reck on I can help you along. Well says I Gineral, I want all the help you can give me. I'm thinkin, says he, you best say that its all owin to Biddle, for he is crampin all the people he can, and that he makes money so scarce, folks cant pay postage; and that if we had not taken the deposits away from him, things be twice as bad now. Well, says I Gineral, that is a good notion, and I'll see to rights how it will work among figers. *I* tho't I'd just tell you Major, says Gineral afore I forgot it, for the notion jest struck me as I was goin to keep; and so the Gineral laid down, and *I* went sifer in again.

It was most daylight afore I got thro' and I finish'd off with the sums Major Barry says he has been borrowin, and left a blank to put in the amount he says the post office has overdrawn the banks where the postages are kept: for as he don't know yet what that amount is, I can't tell myself; tho' I suppose I could, upon a pinch, make nigh upon as good a guess at it as he could or any one else. But *I* thought I wouldn't guess at nothin. I never guess when I get hold of my slate—I sifer on one side, and then chalk down the sum on tother—so there can't be no mistake. When I come to figer up the hull amount the post office has gone astern since Judge M'Lean left it I begun to bile up like one of old Capt. Banker's steam kittles; and I was glad the Gineral was snorin, for I don't like to let people see me when my steam is up; but if I don't do somethin, I suppose I should blow up jist like a steam boat on the Massissippy—and so I got my ax, and down stairs I went with a light to the wood house, and split up more than three cord and a half of hickory afore *I* got in a good temper, and afore I thought it was safe to go to bed; and then I went to bed, and slept like a top till breakfast time.

The next mornin, when the Gineral come into the Cabinet room—well, says he Major, did you finish them plagy accounts? Yes, says, I, Gineral, I did, and split up wood enuf to last us a month in the bargain. And I just tell'd the Gineral a leetle about it to perpare him—Now, says I, Gineral, let me have your specs, says *I*, a minit—and *I* took em to the window, and give the screw a twist, and tried 'em on; and seein every thing look'd natural, I handed 'em to the Gineral, and then he and I took the slate and went over the figers; both on us standin up by the table side by side—First, says I, there is the printin account and stationary of the post office, when Mr. Adams was President; and here is the account since we've ben in—here is the amount of contracts for a spell, and there is the number for another—and here is the cost of wages and sallarys of the post office when Mr. Adams was President—and here is the cost since our time—plagy deal of difference, Gineral, says I, aint it? The Gineral he didn't say nothing—he kept his eyes on the slate, and his mouth nigh upon wide open—ony once in a while he'd calklate on his fingers a spell. And now says I, there is the sum Judge M'Lean left in the post office when he went out on't—and *there* says *I*, is the sum of what is *now wanting* in the post office, to make things square there, to say nothin of the sum Major Barry says the post office has overdrawn from the banks—and as he don't know what the amount is' *I* don't nother—and *I* don't care about guessin at it—for it's bad enuf without guessin. The Gineral put his eye on the last line of figers [it was hard upon a million of dollars agin the office] and look'd, and blink'd, and began to close his mouth up slowly, just for all the world like shuttin up a safety valve; and he began to swell, and breathe plagy hard. I see the steam was gittin up. The Gineral he look'd at me; and I look'd at him; and then we both look'd at the slate again. Bime-by the Gineral he opened the valve, and let off the steam and sich awhizzin you never heard in your born days. *He took my slate, and was jest a goin to smash it into a thousand atoms, but I got it afore it struck the floor.* He then got his hickory and thrash'd round a spell with that. But that didn't do no good. So says he to rights; "Major, what is to be done about it?" Why says I, Gineral, I don't see nothin else, says I, but to take my ax, and do as *I* did last night; there is a good deal of hickory wants splitin in the wood-house yet. And with that *I* handed the Gineral my axe, and he slatted about the chamber with it for a spell;; & if any of our folks had come in then, I guess they'd found more to fear than when *I* frightened 'em so a few days ago.

I never know'd the Gineral blow off steam so long as he did this time; and I was peskily afear'd the boiler would burst ater all. And so I went to work puttin out the fire; and the only way was to get the specs, and screw 'em back to "Glory" again; and as soon as I did that, we got our pipes, and sot down and talked over the matter.

Now, says I, Gineral, tho' this is a bad business, it is not so bad as it first looks. In the first place, says I, if Major Barry had borrowed the money of Squire Biddle Congress would have known it two years ago, and the Post Office reports wouldn'nt a been as slick as they have been, and we'd a had more trouble to git so many of our folks in last election. And then agin, by borrowin the money of other Banks, on interest, it made them Banks, the keener to get hold of the deposits; for if congress wouldn't pass a law to pay the mony borrow'd by our folks, to make their accounts look square; why the deposit banks could pay themselves; and now gettin our money away from Squire Biddle, who was bound by law to make a regular report to Congress of every thing, and puttin in other Banks, our folks can square off a good many accounts, & won't know nothin on't; for it wid take a pretty spry siferer to figur out all the accounts with so many new deposit banks,—for we've got 'em now pretty well mix'd up with what the Treasury calls "centingent drafts" and "transfer checks," and "Treasury warrants;" and Zekel Bigelow says he could in three days with the power the Government has got now, *warrant*, and *transfer*, and *contingent*, away, between so many pockets, nigh upon the hull of the deposits and no body could never find nothin about it.

And then, again, says I, here is another thing—the people wanted "Glory," and they wanted 'Reform," and they have had both now over five years: & if they expected it warnt a goin to cost nothin, they was mistakin. And that aint all—there was that plagy "surplus money" business—every body said, a spell ago, if somethin warnt done about it, the country would all go to smash

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