From the National Intelligencer.

REPORT UPON EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE.—This session of Congress has, so far as the Senate is concerned, been distinguished by some of the most elaborate and able reports ever made in either branch of the National Legislature. Conspicious among them will stand the Report yesterday made by Mr. CALHOUN, from a Select Committee appointed, upon his motion, to inquire into the extent and operation of the constantly increasing patronage of the Executive of the United States. In presenting the Report, Mr. CALHOUN said that it had the unanimous assent of the committee on every point of it but one, and on that one a single member of the committee only dissented.

The Report was read at the Clerk's table, chiefly by Mr. PRESTON and Mr. SOUTHARD. The reading of it occupied more than two hours. Its great length leaves it doubtful when we may be able to publish it at large, and at the same time makes it an impossible task to give, in the brief space of time allotted to us after hearing it read, any thing like a satisfactory condensed view of it. We shall endeavour only, therefore, to trace its general outline, promising that it is a Report *in part* only, and not definitive.

The Report sets out, very properly, with an effort to ascertain the present *extent* of the Executive patronage. For this purpose, the returns of the year 1834, not being complete, they take the year 1833 as the year affording the necessary data, which data are, first, the revenue of the General Government from all sources, secondly, the expenditures of the Government, exclusive of payment of the public debt; & thirdly, the number of persons who, as officers, agents contractors, or in other forms, are in the receipt of the public money. The revenue of 1833, the Report states to have been over thirty-five millions of dollars; the expenditures, exclusive of public debt, to have been nearly twenty-three millions of dollars; and the number of persons who are recipients of the public money to have been sixty thousand two hundred and odd, of whom belong (as nearly as we could catch the numbers) to the Civil List 12,144; to the Military & Indian Departments 9,643; to the Navy (including Marine Corps) 6,499; and to the Post Office 31,917; all of whom derive their places directly or indirectly from the Executive, and, with the exception of the Judicial officers, are subject to removal from office at the will and pleasure of the President. If to these be added thirty-nine thousand five hundred & forty nine pensioners, an aggregate appears of one hundred thousand and seventy-nine persons in the employ of the Government, or in the receipt of money from the public treasury. If to these be added the countless host of those who are seeking to displace the present recipients and beneficiaries, some idea may be formed of the extent of the influence in the country of the patronage resulting from such large disbursements of money, in which so many individuals are interested.

The Report then proceeds to shew the *great increase of the public expenditure* in the eight years, from 1825 to 1833 inclusive, carrying with it a corresponding increase of the number and compensation of agents, officers, contractors, and others, depending for subsistence upon the Government, and of course upon the patronage of the Executive.—Before instituting this comparison, however, the report adverts to the rapid increase, by Indian treaties, of *reservations of lands to Indians* to be disposed of by them only with the consent of the Executive, than which it is difficult to imagine a device better calculated to enlarge the Executive patronage. The practice of *removing from office persons who are well qualified* for and have faithfully performed their duties, in order to introduce others in their stead who are of the party in power—a practice of recent date—is also the subject of grave censure in this view of the Report.—Cases, it is true, may be found in the early stages of this Government in which removals from office have been made, but they are so few in number as to constitute instances rather than a practice; and it is only within a few years, that an opportunity has been afforded of testing the practice *as a system* by its effects.

Formerly, the patronage of the Executive was confined, in point of fact, to the power of nominating persons to fill occasional vacancies in the public offices. Under the contrary practice, the offices of the Government, instead of public trusts, whose faithful execution is mainly to be held in view, come to be considered as the spoils of victory after a political contest—the rewards for faithful service in the ranks of party, the recipients of which become the corrupt and supple instruments of power, &c.—and, by the hope of like reward, is created a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partizans, ready for any service, however corrupt, &c. This practice, therefore, the Report goes on to say, is a system to encourage vice and discourage virtue, and must end, if not reformed, by overturning the Government and raising a despotism on its ruins. Faithful performance of duty being no longer a recommendation to continuance, the public officers consequently feel their dependence on the mere pleasure of the Executive, and resort to all those acts of compliance and subserviency which they learn to consider as recommendations to his favor, &c.

The Report then adverts to the circumstance of the increased power which the Executive has acquired by *the control* which late events have given to him *over the public funds*. Without mooting here the question of the legality or illegality of the action of the Executive in removing the public moneys from deposite in the Bank of the United States, the Committee say that there can be no doubt upon the mind of any man that the removal of the public deposites *has* increased the power of the Executive by placing the public funds under his sole and unlimited control, as they must continue to be until otherwise provided by some action on the part of Congress—if indeed any act of Congress can be passed of greater effect in this respect than that which, at the time the public moneys were removed, directed where they should be kept. The Report goes on to state some facts showing the extent of patronage exercised through this assumed power of controling the deposits of the public money, &c &c

Having thus shewn, by a variety of facts and arguments, of which the above can afford but a very faint idea, the enormous extent of the Executive power, the Report takes some philosophical views of the subject. Patronage, in a Government, says the Report, is at best but *a necessary evil*; the tendency of which, even when comparatively restricted in its extent, is to debase and corrupt the morals of the community. In all well regulated free governments, therefore, no more of it will be retained than is necessary to their healthful existence. The idea that a large Executive patronage is necessary to give efficiency to the Government is combated as a fallacy, demonstrated to be such by a comparison of the present with the past extent of that patronage in this Government. For this comparison the Committee select the years 1825 and 1833, the former year being one in which the extent of the Executive patronage already began to be thought too great, and the latter because it is the latest of which they can obtain correct returns. From this comparison it appears that the income of the Government, including the Post Office, was, in 1825, $28,117,000; in 1833, $36,667,000 (rejecting fractions) That the expenditure of the Government, (exclusive of the public debt) was, in 1825, $12,719,000; in 1833, $25,685000 and that the number of persons receiving emoluments or compensation from the Government, was, in 1825, fifty-five thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven; and in 1833, one hundred thousand and seventy-nine persons.

Measuring the extent of the public patronage by these elements, combined with that of the gross expenditure, without adverting to other circumstances which have been shown still further to enlarge it, the result is as sixty-five to eighty-nine, shewing an increase of patronage between those years of thirty-six per cent. The progressive increase having been much greater within the last four years than within the four yours preceding.

Anticipating the answer to this statement, that the increase of patronage &c has not been greater than the increase in the growth and population of the country the Report goes on to show, by the operation of the several causes already enumerated, that the patronage of the Government has more than doubled within a space of time wherein the growth and population of the country have not probably increased more than 24 per cent. But whilst shewing this the Report denies that there is any substantial reason why the patronage of the government should increase in proportion to its increase of population. This idea, the report goes on to show is an assumption dangerous as well as erroneous. The danger of a patronage, thus increasing with the growth of a country, arises from the great advantage of an organized over an unorganized mass; the great advantage which, in a populous country, power thus acquires over liberty. The Report dilates on the power which such a swelling patronage all wielded by a single individual, gives him to corrupt the virtue of the people and seize on their liberties, &c. Under a continued progressive increase of patronage, keeping pace with the increase of our population liberty itself must certainly be lost. Nothing but Reform can save it. The action of the Government must then, be moderated. This the Report maintains, is the principle on which our political existence depends.

The Report says that the Committee are aware that it may be urged against their statement that since 1833 there has been a great decrease in the public revenue by the operation of the last tariff law. But the revenue is yet as great now that the public debt is extinguished, as it was when the public debt amounted to a hundred millions of dollars. The difference between that time and the present is, that the surplus revenue then went to pay the public creditors; whereas it now goes into the pockets of those who live upon the Treasury.

The Report next proceeds to examine into *the effect* of this enormous extention of Executive patronage. The committee says, it has tended to sap the foundations of the Constitution, to throw a cloud of uncertainty over the future; to substitute a degrading subserviency to power for the attachment to liberty and our free institutions, for which the American People have been heretofore distinguished. There never was a period in our history in short, in which the prospects were more gloomy for liberty, and devotion to party and to power stronger. With this increase of patronage, the whole structure of the Government is undergoing a change. Admitting the necessity of a strong Executive, the Report enters into an argument to show that an Executive has become too strong, when it begins to regard itself as the paramount power in the Government. Nor in our case could the aid of the several States be successfully invoked to resist the approach of despotic power in this form. So far from opposing it, they will be more likely to aid and strengthen the Executive, and, acting in conjuction with it, constitute a joint force difficult to be resisted by any other authority.

For these evils, present and prospective, the Report says there can be but one effectual remedy, and that is, a prompt and great reduction of Executive patronage, into the most expedient mode of effecting which the Committee next proceed to inquire. They begin by laying down as a general principle that it is the duty of a Government to leave the money as far as practicable, in the pockets of the people, from which they say it cannot be removed by the Government except for its essential wants, without a violation of the highest trust of the Government, and manifest injustice to the people.

The report then enters upon an elaborate and comprehensive view of the finances of the county, to show to what extent the revenue of the country may be expected to exceed the amount *necessary* to the support of Government. In pursuing this inquiry the committee go on to shew that, during the existence of the compromise law, so called, regulating duties on imports and after all the reductions which may be made by reducing the duties on articles which do not interfere with protection, there will still be an unavoidable annual surplus in the Treasury of about nine millions of dollars. They do not propose to reduce the income by reducing the price of the public lands, because to reducing the price would not only tempt great speculations therein, and affect the value of all other landed property in the Union, but would have the effect to increase instead of diminishing the income from their sale. As, therefore, it is deemed impossible, during the existence of the compromise act, and without disturbing that act to prevent the annual receipt into the Treasury of a surplus of nine millions even after reducing the expenditures of the Government within proper limits, the Committee go into an inquiry as to the most expedient mode of applying this sum. They protest against its remaining and accumulating in the Banks where it is deposited; and they do not recommend its application to the purposes of internal improvement, the difficulties in the way of which have been increased by the late Executive vetoes, refusing to sanction appropriations for that object.

The Committee, therefore, come to the conclusion that the only, and the least objectionable, mode of desposing of the surplus revenue, is to make an annual *distribution thereof among the several States and Territories, including the District of Columbia*, to continue until the year 1842, which will terminate the existence of the present compromise act, and leave Congress at liberty to reduce the income to the actual wants of the Government. The Committee propose to effect their object by an amendment of the Constitution, giving power to Congress to make such distribution, which a majority of the Committee deem not now within the competency of Congress. For that purpose they report a joint resolution, and propose to divide the annual surplus revenue into such number of shares as there are Senators & Representatives, to be divided among the States in proportion to their representation, with two shares to each Territory and the District of Columbia.

The Committee propose, also, the enactment of a law, for which they report a bill, to regulate the Deposites of the public money; and the enactment of one of the bills reported by a Select Committee in 1826, to regulate the patronage of the Government.

After the reading of the report was finished, the Joint Resolution proposing the distribution of the surplus revenue, and the two Bills, were severally presented and read the first time.

Mr. CALHOUN moved that the Joint Resolution be now read a second time, with the view of making its consideration the order of the day for a particular day.

Mr. BENTON objected to its being now read the second time, and, as it required unanimous consent the second reading did not take place.

The bills were read a second time, by general consent, and, on motion of Mr. CALHOUN, made the special order for Thursday next.

Mr. POINDEXTER then rose, and from an impression of the deep importance of the subject, moved the printing of thirty thousand copies of the report, made to day, and of the Report of 1826 on the same subject. He followed his motion with an animated speech on the state of public affairs.

A debate then arose, which lasted until past five o'clock, when the Senate adjourned after ordering 10,000 copies of Mr. CALHOUN's Report to be printed, and the usual number of Mr. BENTON's Report of 1826, on the same subject.

In the House of Representatives, after the transaction of some minor business, the House entered upon the consideration of the bill to establish the Territory of Wisconsin; upon which a Debate arose which continued till the adjournment, the Debate falling incidentally upon the question of the boundary line between the State of Ohio and the Territory of Michigan, rather than upon the bill actually before the House.

Correspondence of the U. S. Gazette.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 8, 1835.

I mentioned in my letter of yesterday, that I would, if possible, send you a copy of the Post Office Bill. I find it would be impracticable to do this. But, as it is the most important bill which is likely to pass at this session, I have determined to make an abstract of it, as it now stands, and will pass the Senate:

Sect. 1. Appoints a Commissioner of the General Post Office, (by the President and Senate,) to superintend the collection of all debts, and pay them into the Treasury, to audit the accounts of the Postmaster General, &c. and fixes the salary at $3000.

Sect 2. Provides that the Solicitor of the Treasury, shall receive from the Commissioner, certified copies of accounts of debtors, and cause suit to be commenced, making quarterly returns.

Sect. 3. Allows the Commissioner, two clerks at $1750 each; eight at $1200 each; ten at $1000 each, and a messenger at $800, annually.

Sect. 4. Allows the Solicitor of the Treasury, beyond his present establishment, one clerk at $1750, and two clerks, at $1000 each, anually.

Sect. 5. Provides, that on the 10th of March next, the Postmaster General shall deliver over to the Commissioner, all books containing the accounts of the Post Office, and all papers relating thereto, and statements of all sums due, &c. and on the same day, shall deliver to the Solicitor all the delinquent accounts for suit.

Sect. 6. Directs every Postmaster, at the end of every three months, to render an account to the Commissioner, & pay over the balance as the Commissioner may direct. Neglect for one month after the quarter, renders the Postmaster liable to forfeiture of double the amount of the postages received in his office for any one quarter. Neglect for two successive quarters, to furnish such account, to be punished by forthwith dismissal.

Sect. 7. Commissioner in such cases of neglect, to place the account of such delinquent within one month, in the hands of Solicitor for suit.

Sect. 8 Postmasters, where the nett proceeds of the office are $1000 a year or upwards, to be appointed by the President and Senate for four years.—All others to be appointed by the Postmaster General.—Bonds to be hereafter made to the United States.

Sect. 9 Directs the mode of letting mail contracts, to be advertised in the usual manner. Proposals to be opened and registered in the presence of the Postmaster General, or one of the Assistant Postmasters General & the Commissioner or Solicitor of the Treasury. The biddings to be separate for each route, contracts to be separately made.—No combination or consolidation bids to be received. A duplicate of the book in which the bids are registered, to be lodged with the Commissioner, within 30 days after the letting, noting the bids which are accepted; and copies of the contracts within 90 days, together with the original proposals.—The register of biddings to be open for public inspection immediately after the lettings. No contractor to have any compensation until he shall have executed his contract, &c.

Sect. 10. Whenever a new contract is made, or an existing one changed, notice to be given in the newspapers, and new proposals to be received in the usual form.

Sect. 11. Provides restrictions against extra allowances, so that none shall be allowed unless a previous order shall have been made and issued ordering the service, and specifying the allowance, &c.

Sect. 12. Limits the number of clerks in the General Post Office. (Blank not filled.)

Sect. 13 Sum required for the service of the General Post Office, in each year, to be appropriated by law.

Sect. 14 Directs suit to be made in the manner before prescribed against any person who may have received money for pretended services never performed, or for any extra allowances exceeding what is provided by the act, or by fraud, collission, or mistake.

Sect. 15. Directs the expenditures for the mail transportation and all other expenses incident thereto, to be kept within the limit of the revenues of the General Post Office.

Sect. 16. Provides that the books of the Treasury, containing the Post Office accounts, shall be kept separate and distinct, and every warrant for payments relating to the General Post Office, to be signed by the Postmaster General and Commissioner.

Sect. 17. Commissioner to have power to transfer debts due from Postmasters, who do not make deposites in Bank, by drafts in favor of contractors to pay contractors for services previously rendered.

Sect. 18. Specifies the several reports which the Postmaster General still annually makes to Congress within the first ten days of each session, viz.—1st All contracts within the preceding year, in detail, all land and water mails established or ordered other than those let annually. 2d. All allowances to contractors beyond the sums stipulated, and the reasons: all orders creating additional expense beyond the contract price, in the most minute form: and all curtailments of expenses effected by the department.—3d. All the incidential expenses of the department for the year ending the 30th of June preceding, containing every particular, according to a classification prescribed. 4th The Commissioner on the first of November annually to communicate to the Postmaster General, the condition of the Finances of the General Post Office for the year ending the 30th June preceding, shewing the debts to, and liabilities of the General Post Office in manner specified.

Sect. 19. The Postmaster General to furnish to the Deputy Postmaster at the termination of each route, a schedule, specifying the times of arrival and departure at his office of each mail, a copy to be hung up in the office; and also of every change in the arrivals and departures.

Sect. 20. Each Post Master at the termination of a mail rout, or at any other place at which the Posmaster General shall have designated the times at which the mails should arrive, to take the following oath or affirmation before some magistrate—"I (A. B) do swear, (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will truly and faithfully report to the General Post Office, all and every failure to deliver the mail at my office, at the times prescribed by the Postmaster General." The Postmaster General to report annually to Congress each failure, with the names of the contractors, and what proceedings have been taken by him in each case.

Sect. 21. Provides that every Postmaster who shall delay, with intent to prevent their reaching their destination in proper course, any letters, newspapers, documents, &c. in his office, shall, on conviction of the offence, forfeit and pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months.

Sect. 22. Repeals all former acts or provisions inconsistent with this act.

THE POST OFFICE.

In the House of Representatives, on the 13th the bill which has passed the Senate (unanimously) for reforming the administration of the Post Office, received its first and second reading, and referred to the Post Office Committee.

It was a concurrence of circumstances rather remarkable, that, on the same morning, the Committee appointed by the House of Representatives in June last to examine into the affairs of the Post Office, should have brought in its Report. The Report was presented by Mr. CONNOR, the Chairman of the Committee, and, without reading, (because of its great length,) was ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed. Mr. E. WHITTLESEY, on behalf of the Minority of said Committee, who, he said, had not been able to take, in all particulars, the same views as the Majority of the Committee, offered a Report on their part: which was also ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed.

We have not, of course, had it in our power to read any material portion of these important and voluminous documents. But, desirous to see to what conclusions the Majority of the Committee* had arrived as the result of their investigation, we turned to the last pages of their Report, and found them there stated in such frank and manly terms, as to do honor equally to the spirit and intelligence of the Committee, who have dared be honest in the teeth of party. We copy the concluding paragraph of the Majority Report (that of the Minority we have not yet examined)—to which there is no occasion to ask the attention of every reader.—*Nat. Int.*

"The Committee, in concluding this brief analytical review of the result of a very patient and laborious investigation of the condition and proceedings of the Post Office Department, should not consider their duty as fully discharged to the House, and to the country, without frankly submitting the general conclusions, to which their minds have been brought. The few propositions which follow, and which condense these conclusions, this Committee doubt not, it examined in a spirit of candor and impartiality, will be admitted, as just corollaries from this report:

"1st. The finances of this Department have hitherto been managed without frugality, system, intelligence, or adequate public utility. The cardial principles of an enlightened economy have been violated. Ignorance of the real fiscal ability of the Department has long prevailed. Expenses have not been kept within the limits of income. Means have been proportioned to the ends sought to be attained; expenditures to the benefits to be purchased.—The records of the Department, in this vital particular, have not been kept with method and accuracy; for the data they furnish conduct to widely varying results: The accounts of the receipts, expenditures, and losses of the Department do not, in fact, illustrate, with certainty, the actual fiscal condition of the Department. No common test or standard appears, at any time, to have been employed to detect such casual errors as might creep in to derange the balance between receipts and expenditures; and hence the existing unfortunate excess of the latter over the former. The absence of such a test produces the effects, of incertitude and doubt, upon the mind, as to the accuracy of the conclusion which it may reach by any ordinary process of investigation: and upon the practical operations of the Department, of a perpetual liability to fall into error, without any certain mode of its detection. This evil is within the reach of legislation, and should be corrected by establishing a proper system of checks and balances."

2d. The negligent and unsystematic form of making and preserving mail contracts is such, that no human mind could comprehend the whole, and maintain in order so vast and complicated a machine as the General Post Office. The contracts are now, and have, at all times, which have fallen under the observation of the committee, been most loosely constructed. It is occasionally impossible to penetrate their obscurity; often difficult to decipher their interlineations and marginal notes, and always to be doubted whether they are so framed and executed as to be available in law. An ocular inspection of the Mail Contract Books can alone convey an adequate idea of the careless and confused state in which they are kept. Certain it is that the experience of one generation of laborers in this branch of the business of the office cannot be transmitted through them, to another. Knowledge (if acquired) is to be obtained rather from those who keep the books than the books themselves: and the consequence is that the loss of the book keeper is the extinction of all certain light.

The Head of the Department can alone apply the corrective to this evil.

3d. The mode of preparing advertisements for mail contracts has practically inverted the ends of the law, which enjoined it. The law designed it as a great safeguard against fraud & imposition, by bringing the salutary principle of competition into active and beneficial operation, usage of the Department, in conjunction with the highly reprehensible practice of receiving amalgamated bids, has frustrated the wisdom of this precaution, and rendered the system of lettings, in regard to the more important routes, little more than an empty form or a bitter mockery.

The interposition of the legislative power is, in the opinion of the Committee, unnecessary in this instance as they deem the existing enactments adequate to their object.

"4th. The practice of granting extra allowances has at various dates in the history of this Department, run into wild excesses; some illegitimate and therefore without an apolgy; and others legitimate, but very questionable as to their expediency. To this source may be ascribed, without hazard of error, much of the embarrassment of the Department: and, in whatever aspect this committee has had opportunity to examine it, it strikes them that its practical operation has been fraught with much more of evil than of good. Among its other achievements, it has signalized most eminently the too ready faith and too loose business-method of the Department.—The letter of a contractor, suggesting an improvement and soliciting an extra allowance, not unfrequently has served the double office of an authority for the grant, and of a record of its existence. Some dark corner of a contract, or loose scrap of paper, is commonly the only official evidence of the order for large disbursements of money, under the name of extra allowances. It is a puzzling problem to decide, whether this discretionary power, throughout its whole existence, has done most mischief in the character of impostor upon the Department, or seducer to contractors. It has doubtless, been an evil-doer, in both guises.

"The committee have not deemed it within the scope of their authority to prepare a bill.—This duty comes within the province of a standing Committee of the House.

"The committee, in surveying the wide field of their labors, regret only that their reward had not been discoveries of a more pleasing character: They had hoped that their researches would have brought to light the fruits of an enlightened and well directed labor, instead of proofs of error and neglect. But they have finished the task assigned them with an honest purpose, and to the best of their ability. It remains for Congress to give a more perfect organization to this Department and for those who administer it, to bring to its renovation the most efficient and persevering application to practical talent and business like habit; with a general and vigilant personal superintendence."

MR. WEBSTER.

The meeting lately held in Boston which nominated this distinguished individual as a Candidate for the Presidency, appointed a Committee to prepare an Address to the People of the United States—at a subsequent meeting,

Mr. Dexter, from the Committee on the Address, submitted the following, which was unanimously adopted:—

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

FELLOW CITIZENS—

The Whigs of Massachusetts, present for your suffrages, for the high office of President of the United States, the name of DANIEL WEBSTER—a name known and honored wherever the voice of Constitutional Liberty has been heard.

That he is a citizen of our own ancient Commonwealth, cannot be to us personally, a matter of indifference; but it has had no influence in our selection of him as a canditate.—That circumstance has, on the contrary, retarded the nomination, which but for that would long since have burst spontaneously from the people of Massachusetts We have selected him because we believe him to be peculiarly indicated by the character of the times, as a man to lead the friends of the Constitution in their great struggle against the power of patronage and corruption. The living principle of the Whig party is love and reverence for the Constitution; and the great question before the nation, let others disguise it as they will, is whether that sacred charter of Political Freedom shall be overborne by personal influence and ambition.

In this great crisis—on this great question, which involves not only our own, but perhaps the liberties of the world, we call on all friends of liberty throughout the land to discard personal preferences, to surrender local attachments, to bury all minor differences, and to join with us in one great effort to bear up the falling banner of the Constitution. We go for the *Cause*, not for the *Man*; and if another could have been found in the remotest corner of the country who could sustain that standard of our liberties with a firmer hand, who could bring to its defence a sounder head, a purer heart, a more prudent conduct, or a wider experience in public affairs, we should have been the first to rally under his name, and foremost among us for that man would go DANIEL WEBSTER himself. But as we would not sacrifice the cause to the man, though of our own choice, so neither can we sacrifice it to the choice of others. We feel that it is a great trust in our hands; we feel that to the people of this country is committed the keeping of the principles of Constitutional Liberty; that here, where its light first broke forth, it is to be sustained against the powers of political darkness, or to sink without a hope of revival. While in other hands it has to contend with Power, which calls itself conservative & legitimate, it must struggle here with more insidious enemies—with corruption and with licentiousness that takes the name of Liberty. There it may be crushed for a time by a foreign force, but if it falls here, it dies a suicidal death from which there is no resurrection.

Conscious of the magnitude of the trust, we looked impartially through the country for the man to whom we could most conscientiously delegate its highest responsibilities. We have enquired, *Who* has stood longest, who has stood highest, who has stood firmest for the Constitution and for the Constitution alone? To *whom* has that been the pole star from which his eye has never wandered, from which his course has never veered? Through clouds and darkness, *whose* vigilance has never lost, and whose judgment has never mistaken its light? Others have had other duties to perform—and they have discharged them manfully. To him has fallen, by that opportunity which *Providence* presents to men called to great works, the task of defending the Constitution. It is not for us to say that under the same circumstances, others would not have done as well, but it has been assigned to him and none could have done it better.

He has stood for the Constitution, not when nor because it was threatened from any one quarter. He has repelled with one hand the encroachments of the central power, while with the other he has called back those who would have wandered too far from its influence. He has sustained the Executive in its constitutional efforts with the same vigor and promptness with which he has thrust it aside from its unwarranted pretensions. Others have come to his aid in this great contest, and have won for themselves the everlasting gratitude of their country; but he stood in the breach when the storm burst, and none, to say least, have stood before him.

It is this which calls on us, and we think, calls on all the Constitutionalists of the country,—to use every effort to place him where he can exert the most powerful influence. Other questions may arise, or be revived hereafter, in which others will have a right to lead.—Our maxim is, take the man best qualified for the immediate emergency. The Constitution is in imminent peril; and if it had not been deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, it would have been already overthrown.—Executive power has drawn to itself all other power? it waits for the unrestrained exercise of it, only to see how far it will be borne. We have no fear that it will be endured; we believe there is yet in the country the same spirit that has once shaken off oppression, and that usurpation cannot stand before it. But how shall it be resisted? Shall it be met in its principle or in its effects? Shall we now by one united effort restore our paladium, or shall we wait until the indignation of an insulted people shall sweep away the whole fabric of the government? This is the question now presented to the people of the United States; it is an issue vital to the Constitution,—vital to Liberty.

If it be so, if the question be now whether we shall sustain that Constitution against the

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*The committee consisted of Messrs. Connor, Stodderi, E. Whittlesey, H. Everett, Beardsley, Watmough, and Hawes.

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