here, although predicted and expected by those who knew any thing of the Indian character. I intended to make some remarks upon the conduct of our wicked and incompetent government at Washington, but have no room. Let me say only that nothing can be more absurd than to suppose a treaty made with any one chief to be binding on the Seminoles. They are radicals, democrats and Tammany Hall men. They are divided into small and independent families, and acknowledge no allegiance except to the centre of their little circles. Another absurd thing is to suppose that regular troops, commanded by men who bring smelling bottles and cambric handkerchiefs, can fight Indians. Experience, from the time of Braddock to the present time tells but one story. If the Executive would entrust the war to Governor Call, and authorize him to pay volunteers well, the end might come. As it is, the prospect before us is gloomy in the extreme. I understand that an express has been sent on to the war department, but if this letter reaches you early enough to be news, you are at liberty to use the facts.

THE CILLEY DUEL.

The following extract from a speech recently delivered by Mr. Graves to his constituents of Louisville, and reported in the Louisville Journal, throws a strong light upon the unhappy duel which was the subject of so much speculation at the time it occurred:

"I met Col. Webb one day in Washington, and, having experienced the most marked and unremitted civilities from him some time before in New York, during my visit to that city, I naturally felt disposed to extend to him that courtesy which one gentleman owes to another under similar circumstances. After talking to him for some time, he said that he had a favor to ask of me. I replied, that any thing which one gentleman might ask of another, and which I had it in my power to grant, I would cheerfully do for him. He then handed me a paper, and said he would feel greatly obliged if I would deliver that from him to Mr. Cilley. Aware of Mr. Cilley's previous remarks on Col. Webb; it instantly struck me that the paper was a challenge, and I hesitated to take it. I asked Col. Webb whether it was a challenge, and told him that, if it was, I should decline having any thing to do with it, being opposed, in principle, to duelling myself, and acting as the Representative of a District which I believed to be opposed to it. I also told him that I was totally ignorant of the etiquette of duelling, and therefore a very unfit person, on that account, if I even had not insurmountable objections of another kind to prevent me from interfering. Col. Webb then assured me that the paper was not a challenge; that it was merely a note of inquiry, to which a definite answer was required. He also assured me that, if a challenge should subsequently be found necessary, he would employ some other person than myself to bear it. Upon these assurances, totally unconscious, as I was, that any possible mischief could arise out of my carrying a simple paper of interrogation from one gentleman to another, I took the note and went to THE HOUSE. I sent one of the attending boys for Mr. Cilley, who came out to me, and I then told him that Col. Webb had requested me to hand him that paper. He said he supposed it was a challenge, and that he could not receive any thing of the kind from Col. Webb. I told him that Col. Webb had assured me it was not a challenge, and with this assurance I had become the bearer of it; that I would not have consented to be the bearer of a challenge to him, as I had the kindest feelings towards him, and was opposed to duelling; but that I hoped he would consent to take the note, as I feared that his refusal would place me in an embarrassing situation. I added that I was wholly ignorant of the etiquette in such cases, and had never contemplated or thought of such an event as his refusal to take the communication. He said he should be glad to have time to consult some friends on the propriety of his taking the communication: and I thinking it advisable that I myself should inquire into the etiquette of my situation, agreed to receive next morning his answer whether he would take the paper or not. I left him then, and consulted my friends Mr. Menefee, Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Wise &c. on the subject. To my extreme regret, those gentlemen all confirmed my painful suspicions of the responsibility that would devolve upon me in the event of Mr. Cilley's persisting in his refusal to take from my hands the communication of which I had innocently and unsuspectingly consented to be the bearer. The next morning I waited on Mr. Cilley for his answer. He told me that his friends had advised him not to accept any communication from Col. Webb; but he added that he had no objection to saying to me that he had no personal disrespect for Col. Webb, and had only spoken of him in debate according to the privileges of the house, without intending any thing of a personal or private nature. I conscientiously thought that this ought to be sufficient to satisfy Col. Webb, and so expressed myself to Mr. Cilley. I left him and consulted my friends, and was never more happy in my life than when they agreed with me in opinion that the declaration of Mr. Cilley ought to be regarded as satisfactory.

"We soon found, however that some of Mr. Cilley's most violent political friends were impeaching my personal veracity by denying that he had made any admission at all to me in regard to his intention of offering no personal disrespect to Col. Webb. They denied his having said to me that his refusal to receive Col. Webb's note was predicated upon grounds having no connexion with the character and standing of that gentleman. I, therefore, in accordance with the advice of all my friends, again spoke to Mr. Cilley, and told him that what had passed between him and me had not been in the presence of a third person, and that I thought it might be proper that he should commit to writing what he had said to me in regard to Colonel Webb, and place it in my hands. He said that he had not the slightest objection to doing so, and that he would retire to his room and send me the required writing forthwith. I took my seat in the House and waited several hours, but did not receive the expected communication. Still resolved, however, to have every thing amicably adjusted, if possible, I again waited on Mr. C. in person, to remind him that he had neglected to send to me the promised memorandum of what he had said to me. He then told me that he had concluded, upon mature deliberation, that the better way would be for me to address him a note making an inquiry as to the conversation that had passed between us upon the occasion in question; & that if I would do this, he would make the promised response promptly and cheerfully. Without a moment's hesitation I consented to do this, & instantly wrote the proposed inquiry in as few words as possible, and, waiving all ceremony, (for I sincerely thought and fervently hoped that all difficulty was at an end,) presented in person my note, marked in the testimony No. 1, to Mr. Cilley. He said he would forward me his reply as speedily as possible. Soon afterwards I saw him in conversation with Dr. Duncan and others, and, subsequently, his reply, marked No 2 in the testimony, was handed to me by Dr. Duncan.

"Upon receiving that most unexpected note, I read its contents in the face of Dr. Duncan as distinctly as I afterwards read them in the note itself. I saw that Mr. Cilley, notwithstanding all his verbal promises to me, was disposed to countenance an imputation upon my veracity, and hence I felt it my duty again to consult my friends. Acting entirely under their guidance—the guidance of men whose honor whose pacific disposition, and whose aversion to blood the world has never doubted—I wrote the note marked No. 3 in the testimony. I charged my friends and advisers, while they were framing that note to consult my honor, and through me, the honor of the State which I represented, without any reference whatever to my personal safety, which I could not in the slightest degree allow to be consulted when my honor and that of my State were concerned They and I felt equally that I could not take any other steps than those actually adopted, without backing out of the affair disgracefully and dishonorably. I had fully learned the responsibility of my situation. Gentlemen of the highest honor had informed me of the etiquette, which, till then I was ignorant of; and I could not for a moment hesitate between the alternatives of honor and disgrace. I then felt, as I now feel, that it would be far better for me to lay down my life than to risk my own honor and the honor of Kentucky. (great cheering.) I still feel that it would have been far better for me and for you that I should have fallen on that occasion than that one foul stain should have been reflected on you through your representative, (great cheering.) True I was, and am—I have always been—opposed in principle to duelling. I was wholly inexperienced—totally ignorant of its etiquette and code; but those on whose experience and high sense of honor I could faithfully rely, were my advisers, and I did not hesitate one instant in placing myself entirely at their disposal. I promptly told those friends not to suffer their conduct in the business to be influenced in the slightest degree by any thing that could in the most remote manner tarnish my fame or the or the credit of that State which had honored me with its confidence and trust. I had never handled a duelling pistol with hostile views in my life. I had ever detested the idea of practising with pistols to acquire dexterity in their use, from a feeling of decided disapprobation. From my very boyhood I had been imbued with a detestation of the practice. And with regard to rifle shooting, I do not think I had ever fired half a dozen shots without a rest, and even with that I had but indifferent success: My opponent on the contrary, was well-skilled with both weapons, and confident of success. The chances were entirely against me, yet I did not hesitate one moment. We met at a time, place, and distance, and with weapons, all of his own choosing, and the result is known to all; it would be painful to dwell upon it longer. If I erred in what I did, it was because I could not see how it was possible for me to act otherwise. I felt assured, and I still feel assured however deeply I deplore, and must ever deplore the fatal event, that the steps I was compelled to take were in conformity with the best advice and opinions of great men, whose sense of honor and propriety is unquestioned.

"I thank you, fellow citizens, for the patience and attention with which you have honored me. If you think that you can still repose in me the same confidence and the same trust as heretofore, I shall not fail, on my part, to merit that confidence, and to preserve your honor with my own, or yield up your trust when I cannot maintain both untarnished. (Great cheering.)

A GOOD TOAST.—PASS IT ON.—We find the following in the United States Gazette:

At a small private party, embracing gentlemen of all parties, the conversation ran upon the relative speed and safety of steam ships, as also the relative qualifications of Presidential candidates, steam and politics—when the following toast was drank by way of a clincher.

'THE GREAT WESTERN—HENRY CLAY.'

From the Nashville Republican Banner.

A CANDID APPEAL

To my old Jackson Friends in Tennessee.

The vote we shall be called upon to give, in a few days, at our State elections, will probably with a few exceptions, be influenced by our views of *National Politics* That we may be the better able, therefore, to discharge this high duty creditably to ourselves and advantageously to the country, let us, in a spirit of candid inquiry, go back to the origin of our association as a political party, and see what were the objects of that association, and how far they have been accomplished.

When you brought forward General Jackson as a candidate for the Presidency, in 1823, there were three other candidates already in the field, namely John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and William H. Crawford. These gentlemen you all recognised and treated as *Republicans*. The address of the Jackson Committee of Davidson county to the citizens of the United States, which was issued in August, 1823, says, explicitly, *'there is no federal Candidate;* they ARE ALL REPUBLICANS.' This committee consisted of John M'Nairy, R Whyte, John Overton, John Haywood, Edward Ward, and Ephraim H. Foster, some of whom had always belonged to the old Federal party.

Of the candidates for the Presidency, Mr. Adams was decidedly the second choice of a very large majority of you. He had zealously and ably defended General Jackson's conduct in the Seminole campaign. Mr. Crawford was your last choice. He was believed to have been at the bottom of the proceedings which were had in the Cabinet and in Congress in reference to that campaign Mr. Clay was also obnoxious to us on account of the course he pursued on that occasion. As Mr. Crawford was the the last choice of General Jackson's friends, so was General Jackson the last choice of Mr. Crawford's friends. You remember that the *Richmond Enquirer*, the leading Crawford paper in the South, deprecated the General's election as 'a curse upon the country,' while the *Albany Argus*, the leading Crawford paper in the North, and enjoying Mr. Van Buren's unlimited confidence, proclaimed that *Mister* Jackson was quite too, 'summary' in his proceedings—'that he had not one feeling in common with the Republican party—and that, independently of the disclosures of his political opinions, he could not be the Republican candidate' In fact, the Argus then regarded General Jackson as no better than a *Federalist*!

The election came on—Mr. Clay cast his influence in the scale of Mr. Adams, who was consequently elected, and the friends of Mr. Crawford and General Jackson, chagrined at the result, were prepared to believe there had been 'bar gain, intrigue, and corruption.'

I am not going now to enter into any *defence* of Clay's conduct in reference to that election Like you all, I was egregiously disappointed, and said and thought many hard things of the gentleman, because he did not vote for our candidate. At this distance of time however, some reflections naturally suggest themselves

1. Had Mr. Clay voted for Gen. Jackson and elected him, we should all here have regarded the thing as perfectly right; and, farther, it would no doubt have appeared to us quite suitable and proper that Mr Clay should have constituted one of the General's Cabinet—But in that event, the friends of Mr Crawford and Mr. Adams would have had just as much ground for charging 'corruption' as we had—Mr. Clay having been, if any thing, upon worse terms with Gen. Jackson than he was with Mr Adams!

2. Mr Clay preferred Mr Adams to Gen. Jackson and to Mr. Crawford under the circumstances of the latter's bad health Well, Gen. Jackson preferred Mr Adams to Mr. Clay and Mr. Crawford. So that, in assigning to Mr. Adams the first place, themselves out of the question, both Gen. Jackson and Mr Clay were bearing the strongest testimony to Mr Adams's merits.

3. Suppose, at the time of Mr. Adam's election, we could have looked forward as we can now look back; suppose we could have foreseen the results of Gen. Jackson's administration—the increase of the public expenditures from twelve to thirty millions—the ruinous effects of his experiments upon the currency—his open interference with the freedom of elections, and his appointment of a successor—his estrangement from all of his original friends, and his throwing himself into the arms of those who were his bitter enemies and revilers, particularly such men as Kendall and Blair—I say, my old Jackson friends, if we could have foreseen these things 1825 do you think we should have thought so badly of Mr. Clay's vote as we did? Sincerely do I trust that the consequences of Gen. Jackson's election, and the influences his administration has exercised and will continue to exercise upon the country, may not ultimately prove that Mr. Clay evinced more judgment than we did on that occasion. Very soon after his election, indications were exhibited of a 'coalition' of Gen. Jackson's and Mr. Crawford's friends, between whom much bitterness of feeling had previously existed. The state of Mr. Crawford's health rendered it absolutely certain that he would not be run again; and the eyes of all who were disappointed and displeased at Mr. Adams's election were naturally turned towards Gen. Jackson as the only individual of sufficient strength and popularity to turn him out. This change of circumstances, naturally enough, began to work a corresponding change of feeling among the old Jackson party towards Mr. Crawford and his friends. By and by, we began to think Mr. Crawford not so bad a man, after all, as we had deemed him: and when it was known that Gen. Jackson had actually paid him a visit, and found him very friendly disposed, he rose immeasurably in our estimation. We discovered that we had done him injustice, and readily acknowledged the error. We might have done Mr Clay injustice, too; but, as he would not join our ranks, and was in the General's way somehow or other we were never able to see any error we had fallen into with regard to the purity of *his* motives and the propriety of *his* conduct. As Old Stapleton would say, however, this was *'human natur.'*

Gradually the 'coalition' between the original Jackson and Crawford parties was consummated, Mr. Van Buren being amongst the last to commit himself. It was for a time doubtful whether General Jackson would be able to oust Mr. Adams, and, if he did, it was well known that De Witt Clinton would occupy the first seat in the Cabinet. But that great man, unfortunately for the country, died, and thus was removed one great obstacle to the support of the Tennessee candidate by Mr. Van Buren. When, therefore, from that cause, and from the daily and rapid rise of Jackson stock, Mr. Van Buren was satisfied he could make a profitable investment, he joined his political fortunes with those of the original Jackson party, and very shortly afterwards came to be regarded by us as a 'pretty clever fellow.' Had he taken sides against us, however, and supported Mr. Adams, I dare say we should, to this day, have continued blind to his great merits.

I wish now to call your attention to the grounds upon which we supported General Jackson in 1824, and the reasons we assigned to our fellow-citizens throughout the Union why they also should support him.

Independently of his merits and qualifications, we urged and with much effect the expediency of selecting a President *fresh from the People*. In the Davidson county Address, already spoken of, the policy of selecting candidates from the Cabinet of the Executive is strongly deprecated, as enabling the President, in fact, to 'appoint his successor.' This practice, it was elsewhere contended, created 'an artificial principle of heirship to the Executive chair.' It was highly important that the election of President should proceed from the unbiassed will of the People, free from 'all extraneous influence.' Elected under such circumstances, General Jackson, we argued, would present to the country and to the world the *beau ideal* of a wise, economical, and purely *Republican* Administration.

Such were the leading considerations which induced you, in 1824, to press upon your fellow-citizens throughout the Union the election of Gen. Jackson.—They produced a powerful impression, but did not entirely succeed. Mr. Adams was elected by the House of Representatives, and in the course of his administration *additional* grounds were assumed by you in support of Gen. Jackson.—Some of these the General himself, if you recollect, was the first to suggest. In his celebrated letter to the Legislature of Tennessee, in 1825, resigning his seat in the Senate of the U. States, he declared himself decidedly and warmly in favor of so amending the Constitution of the United States as to render members of Congress ineligible to office under the General Government during the terms for which they were elected, and for two years thereafter. The effect of this amendment, he said, would be to free Congress from that connexion with the Executive department which then gave strong grounds for apprehension and jealousy on the part of the People; whereas, if this connexion remained, and members of Congress continued to receive appointments from the Executive, it required no depth of thought to perceive that 'corruption would become the order of the day.' Feeling it due to himself to practice upon the maxims he recommended to others, Gen. Jackson felt constrained, he said, to resign from the Senate. He resigned accordingly, and *jealousy of the influence exercised over Congress by the President, through the patronage under his control, became a cardinal tenet of the Jackson creed.* The appointment of members of Congress to office by Mr. Adams was denounced in the strongest terms, and Gen. Jackson's election was urged in order that he might put a stop to so *corrupting* a practice.

RETRENCHMENT in the expenditures of the Government constituted another important item which was adopted in the Jackson creed after the election of Mr. Adams. It was contended that *his* administration was not sufficiently *economical*.

CURTAILMENT OF EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE also became a rallying cry with the the Jackson party throughout the Union. You no doubt recollect the celebrated report of Mr. Van Buren, Colonel Benton, and others, in 1827, which convinced us all that Mr. Adams had a most dangerous and alarming extent of patronage under his control, which, if not speedily cut down, would convert this Republic into a Monarchy. For remedy whereof, we urged stronger than ever the election of General Jackson.—He was the man, we assured our fellow citizens of the other States, who, if elected would set this matter right. So great was our alarm about this time on the subject of Executive patronage, that Col. Polk, then a member of the House of Representatives, took fright at the power possessed by the Secretary of State of disbursing *thirty thousand dollars* annually amongst the newspapers he might select in each State to publish the Acts of Congress, and earnestly argued that so dangerous a power ought to be lodged elsewhere.

Soon after he came into office under Mr. Adams, Mr. Clay transferred the publication of the Acts of Congress from several Jackson papers to others which were friendly to the Administration.—This, you remember, we Jackson men viewed and denounced as a high handed exercise of power. A resolution was even offered in Congress, and supported by the Jackson party, calling upon Mr. Clay to give his reasons for such an anti-republican procedure!

PROSCRIPTION FOR OPINION'S SAKE was accordingly written down by us as a most odious, tyrannical, and dangerous stretch of power in the President, and we proclaimed to our fellow citizens throughout the Union that, if they would aid us in electing Gen. Jackson, he would order things differently.

It was strongly suspected that under Mr. Adam's administration sundry officers of the Government had become careless and neglectful, if not corrupt, in the discharge of their official duties. This caused another item to be added to the Jackson creed.

A RIGID ACCOUNTABILITY on the part of all public officers, and REFORM in all cases where there was the slightest indication of faithlessness in the performance of their duties, became the order of the day. "Elect General Jackson," we said, "and *he* will cleanse the Augean stables by turning out of office all the lazy, incompetent drones who are living on the public treasure, and supply their places with honest, industrious men."

Whilst Mr. Adams was President, it was alleged that some of his subordinates used their official influence to promote the election of their political friends—This you all regarded as a most reprehensible practice, which, unless discontinued, would inevitably overthrow our republican institutions.

FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS, therefore became a prominent feature in the old Jackson doctrines. "Just elevate the Old Chief to the Presidency," we, in Tennessee, said to the People of the United States, "and our word for it, he will take the most prompt and efficient measures for preventing the patronage of the Government from coming into conflict with the freedom of elections."

Thus my old Jackson friends, have I briefly referred you to the great and leading principles upon which General Jackson went into office. He was not elected to put down the United States Bank and to better the currency. I appeal to you, if one in a hundred of you knew what his opinions were about the United States Bank until his first message to Congress, and if, at the time he was elected, you were not *all* satisfied with the currency?

Nor was Gen. Jackson elected to put down the tariff. So far from it, you all knew that he had voted for the tariff of 1824, & that he omitted no suitable occasion afterwards of referring to that vote as a correct index to his opinions on that subject. He was supported by the great tariff States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky, expressly on the ground of his friendship to the manufacturing interest. The same remarks will apply to the subject of internal improvements.

Taking up, then, one by one, the old Jackson principles, those upon which he came into office, let us see to what extent they have been carried out.

You supported Gen. Jackson in preference to Mr. Crawford, in part, because the latter had been nominated by a Congressional caucus. Mr. Van Buren, the leading member of that caucus, is now President of the United States; Mr. Forsyth, another member of the same caucus, is his Secretary of State; and the Government is essentially in the hands of the old Crawford caucus party, and administered upon their principles!

You supported General Jackson in the maintenance of your right to vote for whom you choose, regardless of any 'extraneous influence' or dictation from any quarter; and he afterwards turned round and denounced many of you as no better than Federalists, Nullifiers, and new born Whigs because you dared to support his and your old friend, Judge White on precisely the same grounds!

You supported General Jackson because you thought he would act upon the maxims he recommended to others, and put a stop to the corrupting practice of the Executive rewarding the partisan services of Members of Congress with appointments. Well, this corrupting practice has been carried to an immeasurably greater extent *since* his election than before! Not only that, but it has become quite common for the President to reward such members of Congress as the People discard, and because they do discard them—as in the case of Mr. Grundy, Mr. Gholson, of Mississippi, Ely Moore, of New York, and many others. Corruption has, indeed, become the order of the day.

You supported General Jackson because you were jealous of the influence exercised over Congress by Mr. Adams You have seen that influence incalculably increased and unscrupulously resorted to by this same Gen. Jackson and his "illustrious" successor!

You supported Gen. Jackson in order to have the expenditures of the Government reduced. They have been increased from twelve to thirty millions!

You supported General Jackson because you believed he would cause a rigid accountability to be instituted among all the officers of the Government, and appoint and retain in office none but diligent, faithful, competent, honest officers. Behold the enormous and unparalled list of defalcations that have lately come to light. Read the correspondence of Harris, Boyd, and others, with the Treasury Department, and General Jackson himself.

You supported General Jackson because you deemed it a great outrage in Mr. Adams to proscribe any man for opinion's sake. It has now become the most important item in the political creed of the dominant party, that 'to the victors belong the spoils,' and that public offices, filled by honest, capable men may and ought to be vacated, solely for the purpose of rewarding brawling partisans!

You elected General Jackson to cleanse the Augean Stables at Washington; but when the People wished to have them examined, Colonel Polk, General Jackson's Speaker of the House of Representatives, appointed a committee that he *knew* would not make the examination. General Jackson, moreover, declared the 'stables' should *not* be opened; saying every thing was right, at the very moment that Swartwout, Price, Harris, Boyd, and others, were squandering the People's money by hundreds of thousands!

You elected General Jackson to prevent the patronage of the Government from being brought into conflict with the freedom of elections. He used his official influence and patronage to elect Mr. Van Buren, openly denounced all who voted for Judge White, and by his example and appointments, encouraged all the office-holders in the Government to interfere in elections. In a late report to the Senate of the United States, which embodies the views of the Van Buren party on this subject, officers of the Federal Government are openly encouraged to take an active part in elections, directly in opposition to the circular of Mr. Jefferson, which made such interference cause of removal from office.

You see, then, my old Jackson friends, that not one—no, not *one*—of the great principles upon which you originally supported General Jackson, is acted upon by the present Administration. Yet they are the principles upon which this Government *must* be administered, or it cannot endure. We must then abide by them. In all the conflicts of party, *they* must not be lost sight of. Could we have succeeded in electing Judge White, these great principles would have been now diffusing their wholesome influences throughout our entire system of government. But we failed. We failed in consequence of these very principles having been trampled under foot by General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren. The latter openly repudiates them, by administering the Government upon principles directly the reverse. Him, therefore, we cannot support. Honor, consistency, the dearest interests of our country forbid it. If we vote for him, we not only give up *our* principles, but we adopt *his*, and debar ourselves from the privilege of opposing his administration, though conducted on principles to which we are opposed.

On the other hand, if we vote for an individual pledged to carry out our principles, and he should after his election depart from them, we shall be in a condition to wage instant and effective war upon his administration. And these really are the principles involved in the present contest. Our opponents talk much about Federalism and Republicanism. This is all a humbug, got up to deceive you. You heard nothing of it in 1824. Then you proclaimed to the world that Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams were Republicans.

You also hear much said about a United States Bank and the dangers of such an institution. But you heard no such talk as this from 1823 up to 1828, when General Jackson was elected. He wanted the bank charter modified. So did you. The true *Jackson* doctrine in Tennessee, even so late as 1831, was the re-charter of the United States Bank with modifications, or some sort of a National Bank to regulate the currency, and keep the State banks within proper bounds. I need not cite evidence to prove this fact. *You* know it to be *true*. But one thing led on to another, until Gen. Jackson made the war so hot, and assumed such a position towards the bank, that one or the other had to go down, and his friends in Tennessee, attaching more importance to the great principles upon which they had originally supported General Jackson, than they did to the United States Bank, and still believing that he would carry out those principles, sided with him, and saw the bank go down. For the same reason they acquiesced in other public acts of his which they did not wholly approve of—thinking it better and more patriotic to sustain him for the sake of the great principles he stood pledged to carry out, than to endanger those principles by raising up opposition to him, and thus contributing to his defeat. His old friends in Tennessee did not despair of seeing their principles fully carried out and permanently established, until he openly abandoned them in order to secure Mr. Van Buren's election. Having become estranged from his old and original friends, and thrown himself into the arms of those who had been his bitter enemies, it is not surprising that he should gradually have abandoned his old *principles*, and adopted those of the men by whom he was surrounded.

On a memorable occasion he said that the motto of Tennessee was 'Principles, not Men.' That is true, and Tennessee has always adhered to it. Had she not, she would have followed *his* lead when he insisted upon her support of Mr. Van Buren—she would have followed *him* to whom she had been so warmly attached, in *his* abandonment of the principles they had in common entertained.

'Principles, not Men!' With that motto inscribed on our banner, and with the old Jackson war-cry of Freedom of Elections, Accountability in Public Officers, Economy in the Public Expenditures, Curtailment of Executive Patronage, Retrenchment and Reform, let us, at the approaching election, march in one solid, impenetrable phalanx, and overwhelm, then and forever, the SPOILS PARTY IN TENNESSEE, and thus prove to General Jackson and to the world that *we practice* upon the maxims *we preach*, and that neither at his bidding, nor for any consideration, will we abandon the principles upon which we aided in elevating him to office.

The connection of Mr. George L. M'Nier with the Somerset Herald has ceased;—and the paper will hereafter be printed and published by Mr. Robert Waller.

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