EASTON GAZETTE.

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REPORT ON THE VETO.

Mr. ADAMS rose, and, in a firm and distinct tone of voice, audible in every part of the Hall, read his report, as follows:

The Select Committee, to whom was referred the Message of the President of the United States returning to this House the act, which originated in it, to 'provide revenue from imports, and to change and modify existing laws imposing duties on imports, and for other purposes,' with his objections to it, with instructions to report thereon to the House, have attended to that service, and respectfully report:

The message is the last of a series of Executive measures the result of which has been to defeat and nullify the whole action of the Legislative authority of this Union, upon the most important interests of the nation.

At the accession of the late President Harrison, by election of the People, to the Executive chair, the finances, the revenue, and the credit of the country were found in a condition so greatly disordered and so languishing, that the first act of his Administration was to call a special session of Congress to provide a remedy for this distempered state of the great body politic. It was even then a disease of no sudden occurrence, and of no ordinary malignity.—Four years before, the immediate predecessor of Gen Harrison had been constrained to resort to the same expedient, a special session of Congress, the result of which had only proved the first of a succession of palliatives purchasing momentary relief at the expense of deeper seated disease and aggravated symptoms, growing daily more intense through the whole four years of that Administration. It had expended, from year to year, from eight to ten millions of dollars beyond its income, absorbing in that period nearly ten millions pledged for deposite with the States, eight millions of stock in the Bank of the United States from five to six millions of trust funds, and as much Treasury notes: and was sinking under the weight of its own improvidence and incompetency.

The sentence of a suffering People had commanded a change in the Administration, and the contemporaneous elections throughout the Union had placed in both Houses of Congress majorities, the natural exponents of the principles which it was the will of the People should be substituted in the administration of their Government, instead of those which had brought the country to a condition of such wretchedness and shame. There was perfect harmony of principle between the chosen President of the People and this majority, thus constituted in both Houses of Congress, and the first act of his Administration was to call a special session of Congress for their deliberation and action upon the measures indispensably necessary for relief to the public distress, and to retrieve the prosperity of the great community of the nation.

On the 31st day of May, 1841, within three months after the inauguration of President Harrison, the Congress assembled at his call. But the reins of the Executive were already in other hands. By an inscrutable decree of Providence the chief of the People's choice in harmony with whose principles the majorities of both Houses had been constituted, was laid low in death. The President who had called the meeting of Congress was no longer the President when the Congress met. A successor to the office had assumed the title, with totally different principles, though professing the same at the time of his election, which far from harmonizing, like those of his immediate predecessor, with the majority of both Houses of Congress were soon disclosed in diametrical opposition to them.

The first development of this new, and most unfortunate condition of the General Government, was manifested by the failure, once and again, of the first great measure intended by Congress to restore the credit of the country, by the establishment of a National Bank—a failure caused exclusively by the operation of the veto power by the President. In the spirit of the Constitution of the United States, the Executive is not only separated from the Legislative power but made dependent upon and responsible to it.—Until a very recent period of our history, all reference in either House of Congress to the opinions, or wishes of the President, relating to any subject in deliberation before them, was regarded as an outrage upon the rights of the deliberative body, among the first of whose duties it is to spurn the influence of the dispenser of patronage and power. Until very recently, it was sufficient greatly to impair the influence of any member to be suspected of personal subserviency to the Executive; and any allusion to his wishes in debate was deemed a departure not less from decency than from order. An anxious desire to accommodate the action of Congress to the opinions and wishes of Mr. Tyler had led to modifications of the first bill for the establishment of a National Bank, presented to him for his approval, widely differing from the opinions entertained of their expediency by the majority of both Houses of Congress, but which failed to obtain that approval for the sake of which they had been reluctantly adopted. A second attempt ensued, under a sense of the indispensable necessity of a fiscal corporation to the revenues and credit of the nation, to prepare an act, to which an informal intercourse and communication between a member of the House, charged with the duty of preparing the bill, and the President of the United States himself, might secure by compliance with his opinions a pledge in advance of his approval of the bill, when it should be presented to him. That pledge was obtained. The bill was presented to him in the very terms which he had prescribed as necessary to obtain his sanction, and it met the same fate with its predecessor: and it is remarkable that the reasons assigned for the refusal to approve the second bill are in direct and immediate conflict with those which had been assigned for the refusal to sign the first.

Thus the measure, first among those deemed by the Legislature of the Union indispensably necessary for the salvation of its highest interests, and for the restoration of its credit, its honor, its prosperity, was prostrated, defeated, annulled by the weak and wavering obstinacy of one man, accidentally, and not by the will of the People, invested with that terrible power, as if prophetically described by one of his own chosen ministers, at this day, as, 'the right to deprive the People of self government.'

The first consequence of this Executive legislation was not only to prostrate the efforts of the Legislature itself, to relieve the People from their distress, to replenish the exhausted Treasury and call forth the resources of the country, to redeem the public faith to the fulfilment of the national engagements, but to leave all the burdens and embarrassments of the public Treasury brought upon it by the improvidence of the preceding Administration, bearing upon the People with aggravated pressure. The fatal error of the preceding Administration had been an excess of expenditure beyond its income. That excess had been an average of eight millions of dollars a year, at least, during the four years of its existence. The practical system of its fiscal operations had been a continued increase of expenditures and diminution of revenues, and if left as a bequest to its successor no effective reduction of expenses, but a double reduction of revenue to the amount of millions, to occur of course, by the mere lapse of time, unless averted, within fifteen months, by subsequent legislation.

By the double exercise of the Presidential interdict upon the two bills for establishing a National Bank this legislation was prevented. The excess of expenditures beyond the revenue continued and increased. The double reduction of revenue, prescribed by the compromise of 1833 was suffered to take its full effect—no reduction of the expenditures had been prescribed; and in the course of eighteen months since the inauguration of President Harrison, and addition of at least fifteen millions to the enormous deficit already existing in the Treasury at the close of the last Administration, is now charged upon the prevailing party in Congress, by those who had made it the law, while the exercise of the veto power alone disabled the Legislature itself from the power of applying the only remedy which it was within the competency of legislation itself to provide.

The great purpose for which the special session of Congress had been called was thus defeated by the exercise of the veto power. At the meeting of Congress at the regular annual session, the majorities of both Houses, not yielding to the discouragement of disappointed hopes and baffled energies, undertook the task of raising, by impost duties, a revenue adequate to the necessities of the Treasury, and to the fulfilment of the National obligations.

By the assiduous and unremitting labors of the committees of both Houses charged with the duties of providing for the necessities of the revenue, and for the great manufacturing interests of the Northern, Central and Western States, which must be so deeply affected by any adjustment of a tariff, to raise exclusively a revenue adequate to the necessary expenses of the Government from duties on imports, a tariff bill believed to be nearly, if not wholly sufficient for that purpose, was elaborated and amply discussed through a long series of weeks in both branches of the Legislature. The process of gestation to which alone such a complicated system could be organized, necessarily consumed many months of time; nor [illegible] es or the House [illegible] which [illegible] ecutive upon [illegible] straint from [illegible] casioned by [illegible] investigation of [illegible] the appropriate [illegible] mittees. As the period approached when the so called compromise tariff was to be consummated, leaving the Government without any revenue tariff sanctioned by the law, the prudence of Congress, without precipitating their decision upon the permanent system which they fondly hoped to establish, provided and sent to the President a temporary expedient limited in its operations to the space of one month, during which to avoid, as they thought, the possibility of a collision with the apprehended antipathies of the President, they had suspended for the same month the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of public lands, which, by a previous law, was to take effect the day after the expiration of the compromise. Not only was this most conciliatory measure contemptuously rejected, but, in total disregard of the avowed opinions of his own Secretary of the Treasury, concuring with those, nearly unanimous, of all the most eminent lawyers of the land, in solitary reliance upon the hesitating opinion of the Attorney General, he has undertaken not only to levy taxes to the amount of millions upon the People, but to prescribe regulations for its collection, and for ascertaining the value of imported merchandise, which the law had, in express terms, reserved for the legislative action of Congress.

And now, to crown this system of continual and unrelenting exercise of Executive legislation by the alternate gross abuse of constitutional power and bold assumption of powers never vested in him by any law, we come to the Veto Message referred by the House to this committee.

A comparative review of the four several vetoes, which, in the course of fifteen months, have suspended the legislation of this Union, combined with that amphibious production, the reasons for approving and signing a bill, and at the same time striking by, judicial construction, at its most important enactment, illustrated by contemporaneous effusions of temper and of sentiment divulged at convivial festivals, and obtruded upon the public eye by the fatal friendship of sycophant private correspondents, and stripped to its naked nature by the repeated and daring assumption both of legislative and of judicial power, would present anomalies of character and conduct rarely seen upon earth. Such an investigation though strictly within the scope of the instructions embraced in the reference to this committee, would require a voluminous report, which the scantiness of time will not allow, and which may not be necessary for maturing the judgement of the House upon the document now before them.

The reasons assigned by the President for returning to the House of Representatives, with his objections, the bill to provide revenue from imports, and to change and modify existing laws imposing duties and for other purposes, are preceded by a brief dissertation upon the painful sensations which ANY INDIVIDUAL invested with the veto power must feel in exercising it upon important acts of the Legislature. The paragraph is worded with extreme caution, and with obvious intent to avoid the assertion, made in such broad and unqualified terms in the letter read at the Philadelphia Independence-day dinner party, that Congress can enact NO LAW without the concurrence of the Executive. There is in this paper a studious effort to save ANY INDIVIDUAL from the imputation of asserting the unqualified independence of the Executive upon the Legislature, and the impotence of Congress to enact any law without him.—That assertion, made in so explicit and unqualified terms, in the Philadelphia letter, is here virtually disclaimed and disavowed. The exercise of SOME independence of judgement, in regard to all acts of legislation by any individual invested with the veto power, is here curtailed and narrowed down to the mere privilege of not yielding his well considered, most deeply fixed, and repeatedly declared opinions on matters of great public concernment, to those of a co-ordinate department, without requesting that department seriously to re-examine the subject of their difference. The co-ordinate department TO the Legislature is no longer the co ordinate branch OF the Legislature. The power of Congress to enact a law without the co-operation of any individual Executive is conceded, not merely by unavoidable inference for the closing paragraph of the message, recurring again to the same troublesome reminiscence, observes that, after all the effect of what he does is substantially to call on Congress to RECONSIDER the subject. If, on such reconsideration, a majority of two-thirds of both Houses should be in favor of this measure, it will become a law notwithstanding his objections. The truism of this remark may perhaps be accounted for by the surmise that it was a new discovery, made since the writing of the Philadelphia dinner-party letter; and the modest presumption ascribed to the Constitution that the [illegible] ecutive can comm[illegible] of [illegible] e th[illegible] fully acquiesce in [illegible] be precisely the same [illegible] acquiesced in it or not. The [illegible] ification of any [illegible] this hypothetical position may be estimated by the calculation of the chances that the contingency which it supposes is within the verge of possibility.

The reasons assigned by the President for his objections to this bill are further preceded by a narrative of his antecedent opinions and communications on the subject of distributing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands. He admits that at the opening of the extra session he recommended such a distribution, but he avers that this recommendation was expressly COUPLED with the CONDITION that the duties on imports should not exceed the rate of 20 per cent. provided by the compromise act of 1833.

Who could emagine that, after this most emphatic COUPLING of the revenue from duties of impost with revenue from proceeds of the sales of the public lands, the first and paramount objection of the President to this bill should be that it unites two subjects, which so far from having any affinity to one another, are wholly incongruous in their character—which two subjects are identically the same with those which HE had coupled together in his recommendation to Congress at the extra session? If there was no affinity between the two parties, why did he join them together? If the union was illegitimate, why was he the administering priest of the unhallowed rites? If is objected to this bill that it is both a revenue and appropriation bill.—What then? Is not the act of September 4, 1841, approved and signed by the President himself, both a revenue and an appropriation bill? Does it not enact that, in the event of an insufficiency of impost duties not exceeding twenty per cent. ad valorem, to defray the current expenses of the Government, the proceeds of the sales of the lands shall be levied as part of the same revenue, and appropriated to the same purposes? The appropriation of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands to defray the ordinary expenditures of the Government is believed to be a system of fiscal management unwise, impolitic, improvident, & unjust: it is precisely for that reason that the bill now before the House provides that they shall NOT be so appropriated. The public lands are the noble and inappreciable inheritance of the whole people. The sale of them to individuals is not a tax upon the purchaser, but an exchange of equivalents scarcely more burdensome to the grantee than if he should receive it as a gratuitous donation. To appropriate the proceeds of the sales to defray the ordinary expenses of the Government is to waste and destroy the property. This property is held by Congress in trust. Mr. Tyler speaks of the distribution as if it was GIVING AWAY the property. It is precisely the reverse. It is restoring it to the owner. To appropriate the proceeds to defray the current expenditures is to give it up to dilapidation and waste. It is in political economy precisely the same as if an individual landholder should sell off year after year, parcels of his estate, and consume its proceeds in the payment of his household expenses. The first principle of political economy necessary for a nation is to raise by TAXATION within the year the whole sum required for the expenditures of that year. Every departure from this principle is a step in the path of national bankruptcy and ruin. The daily demands of the Treasury must be supplied by the income derived from taxation by the year, and not by the dissipation of the common property.

The second reason of the President for objecting to the passage of this bill is not more ponderous than the first.—It is the destitute and embarrassed state of the Treasury, and the impolicy, if not unconstitutionality, of GIVING AWAY a fruitful source of revenue, which if retained may be seized by the Government and applied to meet its daily wants. But the President had just told us that this fruitful source of revenue was a subject wholly dissimilar in its character from that of revenue raised by the duties of impost—so dissimilar that the union of them formed in his mind an insurmountable objection to the passage of the bill. "I most respectfully submit (says 'the message) whether this is a time 'to GIVE AWAY the proceeds of the land 'sales, when the public lands constitute 'a fund which of all others may be made 'most useful in sustaining the public credit.' And how could it be made thus useful? Precisely by *giving them away*. By giving them away forever! For if the principle be once established that the proceeds of the sales of the public lands shall be substituted in the place of revenue by taxation to defray the ordinary annual expenses of the National Government, never more will the people of any State in this Union have the benefit of one dollar from this richest of mines of inexhaustible wealth, bestowed upon them by their bountiful Creator for the improvement of their own condition.—But *given away*—yes, to the last cent *given away*, forever, to pamper the reckless extravagance of a Government forever pr[illegible] nchment and econ[illegible] billion upon [illegible] ck' [illegible] that [illegible] he proceeds of the sales of the public lands to the ordinary annual expenditures would be the only effectual and irretrievable *giving away* of that great and inestimable inheritance of the American People:—That, if once that growing and inexhaustible fund shall be doomed to form the whole or any part of the *ways* and *means* for the annual estimates of the receipts and expenditures of the National Government, the People may bid farewell, a long farewell, to every hope of ever receiving a dollar's useful improvement from that gift of God to them, thus cruelly and perfidiously wrested from their hands.

Nineteen of the States of this Union, in the ardent, perhaps, in some cases, inconsiderately ardent, pursuit of this improvement of their own condition, have become involved, some of them heavily involved, in debt. The greatest portion of this debt has been contracted for the accomplishment of stupendous works to expedite and facilitate the intercourse of travel and of trade between the remotest extremes of this great Republic, swarming, from year to year, with redoubling millions of population. It is no exaggerated estimate of the value of these works to say, that the saving of time, of labor, of expense to individual citizens of the Union employing the benefit of these public works, more than repays, in every single year, the whole cost of their construction.

But, while these immense benefits have been thus secured to the People, as a community of individuals, the States which authorized them have contracted a burden of liabilities heavier than they are able to bear. They need the assistance of a friendly and powerful hand and where should they find it but in the sympathies of the National Government? in their fidelity to the trust committed to their charge in this immense and almost boundless public domain? The application of the proceeds of the public land to alleviate the burden of these debts pressing upon the people of almost all the States, is, if not the only, the most unexceptionable mode of extending the mighty arm of the Union to relieve the People of the States from the pressure of the burthen bearing upon them—a relief consisting only of the distribution among them of their own property—a relief furnishing them the means of paying to the United States themselves no inconsiderable portion of the debts due from the States to them: so that by one and the same operation the People of the States will be relieved from the intolerable pressure of their debt, and the common Treasury of the Union will receive back in payment of debt no small part of the same sums allotted to the States as their respective portions of the distribution.

The committee regret that the shortness of the time which they have allowed themselves for the preparation of this report constrains them to pass over numerous other considerations amounting to the clearest demonstration that the distribution among the States of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands will be infinitely more conducive to the ends of justice and to the relief of the People from their embarrassments, than the devotion of the same funds to be swallowed up in the insatiate gulph of the ordinary annual expenses of the Federal Government—to perish in the using like the nine millions of the fourth instalment promised to the States, the seven or eight millions of stock in the Bank of the United States, and the five or six millions of Indian trust and Navy pension funds all sunk, during the Van Buren Administration, without leaving a wreck behind.

This review of the reasons of the President for objecting to the passage of the bill might be extended far more into detail, and all leading to the conclusion that they are feeble, inconsistent, and unsatisfactory. It remains only for the House to take, by yeas and nays, the question upon the final passage of the bill, and as the majority of the committee cannot indulge, even hypothetically, the absurd hope of a majority either in this or the other House of Congress competent to the enactment of the bill into a law, they leave the House to determine what further measure they may deem necessary and practicable by the legislative authority in the present calamitous condition of the country.

They perceive that the whole legislative power of the Union has been for the last fifteen months, with regard to the action of Congress upon measures of vital importance, in a state of suspended animation, strangled by the five times repeated stricture of the Executive cord. They observe that, under these unexampled obstructions to the exercise of their high and legitimate duties, they have hitherto preserved the most respectful forbearance [illegible] e Executive chief; that while [illegible] after time, annulled b[illegible] will their commi[illegible] to enact laws [illegible] ey have [illegible] heir re[illegible] ults and [illegible] a high [illegible] g to the [illegible] medies fo[illegible] had too long [illegible] will of one man has frustrated all their labors and prostrated all their powers. The majority of the Committee believe that the case has occurred in the annals of our Union, contemplated by the founders of the Constitution by the grant to the House of Representatives of the power to impeach the President of the United States; but they are aware that the resort to that expedient might, in the present condition of public affairs, prove abortive. They see that the irreconcilable difference of opinion and of action between the Legislative and Executive Departments of the Government is but sympathetic with the same discordant views and feelings among the People. To them alone the final issue of the struggle must be left. In the sorrow and mortification under the failure of all their labors to redeem the honor and prosperity of their country, it is a cheering consolation to them that the termination of their own official existence is at hand; that they are even now about to return to receive the sentence of their constituents upon themselves; that the legislative power of the Union, crippled and disabled as it may now be, is about to pass, renovated and revivified by the will the People, into hands, upon whom will devolve the task of providing that remedy for the public distempers which their own honest and agonizing energies have in vain endeavored to supply.

The power of the present Congress to enact laws essential to the welfare of the People has been struck with apoplexy by the Executive hand. Submission to his will is the only condition upon which he will permit them to act. For the enactment of a measure earnestly recommended by himself he forbids their action unless COUPLED with a CONDITION declared by himself to be on a subject so totally different that he will not suffer them to be coupled in the same law.—With that condition Congress cannot comply. In this state of things he has assumed as the Committee fully believe, the exercise of the whole legislative power to himself, and is levying millions of money upon the people without any authority of law. But the final decision of this question depends neither upon legislative nor executive, but upon judicial authority, nor can the final decison of the Supreme Court upon it be pronounced before the close of the present Congress.—In the the meantime the abusive exercise of the constitutional power of the President to arrest the action of Congress upon measures vital to the welfare of the People, has wrought conviction upon the minds of a majority of the Committee that the veto power itself must be restrained and modified by an amendment of the Constitution itself, a resolution for which they accordingly here with respectfully report.

John Quincy Adams,
John M. Botts,
James Cooper,
K. Raynor,
Thos. J. Campbell,
Truman Smith,
F. Granger,
H. S. Lane,
Jeremiah Morrow,
J. A. Pearce.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring therein, That the following amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in the seventh section of the first article, be recommended to the Legislatures of the several States which on the adoption of the same, by three fourths of the said Legislatures, shall become part and parcel of the Constitution:

Instead of the words 'two thirds,' twice repeated in the second paragraph of the said seventh section, substitute, in both cases, the words 'a majority of the whole number.'

TALKING OF WOMEN AND DANCING.

'I sincerely believe a woman would do a great deal for a dance,' said Dr. Growling—'they are immensely fond of saltatory motion. I remember once in my life I used to flirt with one who was a great favorite in a provincial town where I lived, and she was invited to a ball there and confided to me she had no silk stockings to appear in, and without them her presence at the ball was out of the question.

'That was a hint to you to buy the stockings,' said Dick.

No—you're out,' said Growling. 'She knew I was poor as herself—but though she could not rely on my purse she had every confidence in my taste and judgment, and consulted me on a plan she formed for going to the ball in proper twig. Now what do you think it was?

'To go in cotton, I suppose,' returned Dick.

'Out again, sir—you'd never guess it and only a woman could have hit on the expedient. It was the fashion in those days for ladies in full dress to wear pink stockings, and she proposed *painting her legs*!

'Painting her legs!' they all exclaim-

[illegible] ir,' said the Doctor, 'and she [illegible] for telling her if the cheat [illegible] sful'—

[illegible] was it?' asked Durfy.

'Don't be in a hurry, Tom. I com-

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