culture of the crop, we refer to our last month's number, and particularly direct your attention to the article therein on the subject of a preventive of the rot.

Barley.—It is time that this crop should be put in, therefore if you intend sowing any, bestir yourself. For our views upon its culture we refer you to our remarks in last month's number. The soil best adapted to its culture is a deep sandy loam, in good heart, which should be neither too wet nor yet dry. On such lands 40 bushels to the acre have often been grown, though *thirty* may be set down as a more probable quantity to be raised.

Quantity of Seed per acre.—About 2 bushels to the acre is about the right quantity.

Harvesting.—It should be cut before it is dead ripe, if left till then it is very apt to shatter.

Sowing Clover seed.—Though it is full late, Clover seed may still be sown—and let us tell you that all fields in which fall grain may have been sown should have clover seed sown on them, although you may intend to plough them up for next year's culture.

Hemp and Flax.—It is time that these crops were gotten in.

Milch Cows—and Cows in Calf,—Let these receive daily allowances of nutritious slops in addition to their fodder.

In-pig Sows and Sows with pigs.—See that these receive additional care.

Ewes in Lamb—Ewes with young lambs.—Let these in addition to their long feed, receive daily allowances of meal of some kind, oats or roots—a gill a day of the two former, or about a pound of the latter per head.

Working Horses, Mules and Oxen.—As the time has come when you will be calling upon these generous patient animals to strain their every muscle for your advantage, let us urge it upon you as an act of justice as well as of interest, to have them liberally supplied with food, well cleaned and properly lodged. By such increased attention you will increase their physical ability to perform their daily toils.—Nay, that is not all—you will find your reward in the pleasurable feelings which the consciousness of having been kind to them will impart.

Outhouses of all kinds should be cleansed and white washed.

Chickens—Our experience teaches us to believe that if young chickens were fed with the crumbs of bread soaked in milk much fewer would die. It has always struck us that the raw dough of Indian meal was an improper food for them, as from its tendency to become sour when operated upon by heat it must necessarily impair their digestive organs.

LATER FROM MEXICO.

The U. S. brig Somers, Commander Ingraham, arrived at Pensacola on the 28th ult., having sailed from Vera Cruz on the 22d ult. The Pensacola Democrat says—for the following extract of a letter from an officer on board the Somers, which embraces all the most important items of news:

On the 16th Mr. Dimond was informed by a letter from Mr. Parrott of the U. S. Legation that Mr. Slidell had demanded his passports, having been refused reception as a Minister, although the Mexican Cabinet expressed a perfect willingness to treat with a Commissioner on the Texas question. He also wrote that Mr. Slidell would be in Vera Cruz in the course of a week, and would immediately take passage therefrom for the U. S. The St. Mary's was in readiness for his accommodation when we left.

On the 18th Com. Conner received a letter from Mr. Black, our Consul in Mexico. He appeared to be somewhat exhilarated by the cheering intelligence brought from England by the Cambria, which he had just received. He writes that if this news had been sooner received Mr. Slidell would have been received, and throws out a suggestion that our mission may be accepted at the latest moment. Although Mr. Black's location should give him many advantages for forming accurate opinions, I do not think we have much reason for hoping that his hopes will be realized, although most any thing may be expected from the unstable councils of Mexico.

Mr. Slidell has certainly demanded his passports at a fortunate moment when the news from England and the state of the country, & more especially the fears of our squadron are conspiring to act on the irresolution of Mexico. The people of Vera Cruz are awfully frightened, and are, as will be seen by the newspapers, moving out of the city. The Mexican navy been taken in tow of the steamers, to a place of absolute safety, far up one of the neighbouring rivers.

The people of Vera Cruz wish to see the question between us settled, and having never been very warmly attached to the revolutionary government, threaten a pronunciamente, unless their wishes are regarded. Upon the whole I have never seen the sentiment of the people so favorable to us at the present. The discussion of the monarchy question has, I am persuaded, done much for us. Nine tenths of the people of Mexico are ardent Republicans; it is only a few of the high class and aristocracy who support the views of the Royal party. There is an interesting article on this subject in the last papers.

The British Minister, writing to the English Commander on the station, says that he cannot persuade these people that England will not co-operate with them against the United States—they have the greatest confidence that England is going to interfere to prevent their being bullied by us; that he has unequivocally intimated that their hopes would not be realized.

In the last papers will be found a notice of the flagrant attack by Gen'l. Parades on the freedom of the Press, and the persons of the editors and printers. This is a dangerous proceeding on the part of the President, and must arouse strong resentment and fearful opposition.

A large part of the troops under Gen. Ampudia, have mutinied.

We have received reports from Jalapa that the Northern Provinces are about to recede from the confederacy.

Another account says—

Gen. Ampudia's army which had been ordered to the frontier of Texas had revolted and about 1000 refused to march any further in that direction, and the remainder, about 2,000, not being very desirous to proceed themselves, would not force the others; so they came to a halt.

THE DEBATE IN THE SENATE—

Mr. Webster's Speech.—The National Intelligencer furnishes the following report of the speech of Mr. Webster, yesterday, on the resolution of Mr. Clayton, calling on the President for any further correspondence that may have taken place with Great Britain about Oregon:

Mr. Webster rose and said: I shall advise my honorable friend, the member from Delaware, to forbear from pressing this resolution for a few days.

There is no doubt that there are letters from Mr. McLane; but, as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations opposes this motion, I am to presume that the Executive Government finds it inconvenient to communicate those letters to the Senate, at the present moment.

Yet, it is obvious, that as the Senate is called on to perform a legislative act, it ought, before the hour of its decision came, to be put in possession of every thing likely to influence its judgment; otherwise, it would be required to perform high legislative functions on mere confidence.—There is certainly some embarrassment in the case. If the Executive Government deems the communication of the correspondence inconvenient, it can only be because negotiation is still going on or, if suspended, is expected to be resumed. So far as negotiation is concerned, the communication, or publication, of the correspondence may very properly be thought inconvenient. But, then, the President has recommended the passage of a law, or resolution, by the two Houses of Congress. In support of this recommendation, he himself sent us, unasked, at the commencement of the session, the correspondence up to that time. Now, if that was necessary, the rest is necessary. If we are entitled to a part, we are entitled to the whole.

In my opinion, the mistake was in calling on Congress to authorize notice to England of the discontinuance of what has been called the joint occupation until negotiation had been exhausted. Negotiation should have been tried first, and when that had failed, and finally failed, then, and not till then, should Congress have been called upon.

I now go on the ground, of course, that the notice for discontinuing the joint occupancy is properly to be given by authority of Congress; a point which I do not now discuss.

It is said, indeed, that notice is to be used as a weapon, or an instrument, in negotiation. I hardly understand this.—Negotiation. A weapon seems to imply, not a facility, or mere aid, but the means either of defence against attack, or of making an attack. It sounds not altogether friendly and pacific. I doubt exceedingly whether, under present circumstances, notice would hasten negotiation; and yet such are those circumstances that there may be as much inconvenience in standing still as in going forward.

The truth is, that great embarrassment arises from the extreme pretensions and opinions put forward by the President, in his inaugural address, a year ago, and in his message last December. But for these, notice would have been harmless, and perhaps would have been authorized by both Houses without much opposition, and received by England without dissatisfaction. But the recommendation of the notice, coupled with the President's repeated declarations that he held our title to the whole of the territory to be "clear and unquestionable," alarmed the country. And well it might. And if notice were required, in order to enable the President to push these extreme claims to any and every result, then notice ought to be refused by Congress, unless Congress is ready to support these pretensions at all hazards. Here lies the difficulty. Congress is not prepared, and the country is not prepared, as I believe, to make the President's opinion of a clear & unquestionable right to the whole territory an ultimatum. If he wants notice for such a purpose, he certainly must see that it becomes a grave question whether Congress will grant it.

It was a great, a very great mistake, to accompany the recommendation of notice with so positive an assertion of our right to the whole territory. Did the President mean to adhere to that, even to the extremity of war? If so, he should have known that, after what has happened in years past, the country was not likely to sustain him. Did he mean to say this, and afterwards recede from it? If so, why say it at all? Surely the President could not be guilty of playing so small a part, as to endeavor to show himself to possess spirit, and boldness, and fearfulness of England, more than his predecessors, or his countrymen, and yet do all this in the confident hope that no serious collision would arise between the two countries. So low an ambition, such paltry motives ought not to be imputed. When the President declared that, in his judgment, our title to the whole of Oregon was "clear and unquestionable," did he mean to express an official or a mere personal opinion? If the latter, it certainly had no place in an official communication. If the former—if he intended a solemn official opinion, upon which he was resolved to act officially, then it is a very grave question how far he is justified, without new lights, or any change of circumstances, to place the claims of this country, in this respect, on other grounds than those on which they had stood under his predecessors, and with the concurrence of all branches of the Government, for so many years; for it is to be doubted that the United States Government has admitted, through a long series of years, that England has rights in the northwestern parts of this continent which are entitled to be respected.

Mr. President, one who has observed attentively what has transpired here and in England, within the last three months, must, I think, perceive that public opinion, in both countries, is coming to a conclusion that this controversy ought to be settled; and is not very diverse, in the one country and the other, as to the general basis of such settlement. That basis is the offer made by the United States to England in 1826.

There is no room to doubt, I think, that this country is ready to stand by that offer, substantially and in effect. Such is my opinion at least, and circumstances certainly indicate that Great Britain would not, in all probability would not, regard such a proposition as unfit to be considered, I said, some weeks ago, that I did not intend to discuss titles at length, and certainly not to adduce arguments against our own claim. But it appears to me that there is a concurrence of arguments, or considerations, in favor, of regarding the 49th parallel as the just line of demarcation, which both countries might well respect. It has for many years been the extent of our claim. We have claimed up to 49°, and nothing beyond it. We have offered to yield every thing north of it. It is the boundary between the two countries on this side the Rocky Mountains, and has been since the purchase of Louisiana from France.

I do not think it important either to prove or disprove the fact, that commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht established the 49th parallel as the boundary between the English and the French possessions in America. Ancient maps and discriptions so represent it; some saying that this line of boundary is to run "indefinitely west," others saying, in terms, that it extends "to the northwestern ocean."—But, what is more important, we have considered this boundary as established by the treaty of Utrecht, at least on this side of the Rocky Mountains. It was on the strength of this that we drove back the British pretensions, after we had obtained Louisiana, north, from the head waters of the Mississippi to this parallel of 49°.

This is indubitable. We have acted, therefore, and induced others to act, on the idea that this boundary was actually established. It now so stands in the treaty between the United States and England. If, on the general notion of *contiguity*, or *continuity*, this line be continued "indefinitely west," or is allowed to run to the "northwestern ocean," then it leaves on our side the valley of the Columbia, to which, in my judgment, our title is maintainable on the ground of Gray's discovery.

The Government of the United States has never offered any line south of forty-nine, (with the navigation of the Columbia,) and it never will. It behoves all concerned to regard this as a settled point. As to the navigation of the Columbia, permanently or for a term of years, that is all matter for just, reasonable, and friendly negotiation. But the 49th parallel must be and not to be departed from for any line further south. As to all straits, and sounds, and islands in the neighboring sea, all these are fair subjects for treaty stipulation. If the general basis be agreed to, all the rest, it may be presumed, may be accomplished by the exercise of a spirit of fairness and amity.

And now, Mr. President, if this be so why should this settlement be delayed?—Why should either Government hold back longer from doing that which both, I think can see must be done, if they would avoid a rupture? Every hours delay is injurious to the interests of both countries. It agitates both, disturbs their business, interrupts their intercourse, and may in time seriously affect their friendly and respectful feeling towards each other.

Having said this, Mr. President, it would be needless for me, even if it were proper, to add more. I have expressed my opinions plainly and without disguise. I think I see clearly where this business must end if it is to end without serious collision; and I earnestly hope that those in whose hands power is on both sides, will exercise that power promptly, in removing the great evils produced on both sides by the pendency of this unfortunate, disturbing, and dangerous controversy.

It is not a case in which either Government should stand on matters of form or etiquette. The interests at stake are too important for that. It is not humiliation, it is not condescension even, for either Government to signify to the other its readiness to do at once what it sees must be done ultimately. Thus far the dispute does not touch the honor of either Government. Let, then the propitious moment be seized; let candor, and fairness, and prudence rule the hour; and let these two great nations be restored to the full enjoyment of their vast useful and harmonious intercourse.

Mr. Allen here made some remarks in opposition to those of Mr. Webster, and against the adoption of the resolution. He closed with moving to proceed to the orders of the day.

Mr. A. withdrew the motion at the request of—

Mr. Webster who said: It is very true that I expressed with premeditated precision my sentiments on this question. It is an important question; it has respect to the interests of two nations—and that in a considerable exigency between them. It is inportant, under such circumstances, to be precise; and I may perhaps be permitted to say that I do not think it would be very far out of the way if some other gentlemen would adopt a little of the like care to make their language on a great national question like this somewhat correct and accurate.

The gentlemen sees fit to consider that this proceeding will be regarded as a national humiliation. I rather fancy not.—I question whether the effect will not be directly opposite; and, if any countenance in Great Britain whether in high or low station, shall wear either a pout or a sarcastic smile, whether it is not more likely to be originated by what has passed on the other side of the chamber than on this.

But one word on a matter more important. The gentleman says that I have offered as a boundary the river Columbia.—Pray, let me be understood. Such a misapprehension of my words and meaning as this shows, it seems to me, that I was not very far out when I took the precaution of reducing what I intended to say to writing. What I said was (and I presume not to dictate to the Senate or to speak as *excathedra*) that in my judgment public opinion in both countries tended to a union on the general basis of the proposal made by this Government to that of England in 1826. And I now ask the Gentleman from Ohio whether he does not think so himself? [Mr. Allen expressed dissent.] Well then, does not he think that in *this* country public opinion is in favor of taking as a basis of settlement the parallel of 49°?

Mr. Allen, in reply, said: I have no idea that public opinion in this country has fixed or will fix on any line south of the Russian boundary. (A general laugh.) The supposition that the public mind, in both nations, is in favor of the proposition of 1826, will be considered as amounting to this, that we are willing to give up the navigation of the Columbia river.

Mr. Webster resumed. Well if my opinion is so very far wrong, if it is so wide from the truth as all that, why, of course, it will go for nothing. In relation to what the gentleman last said, I beg leave to state that what I said, with cautious care, was, that public opinion was settling on the line of 49 as a *general basis* of agreement. I did not say the precise basis of all that was offered in 1826, because I immediately added that, taking the parallel of 49 as a *general basis*, that then the navigation of the Columbia, either permanently or for a term of years, and that of the straits and sounds and islands on the coast, might all be made a matter of friendly negotiation. I did not recommend that we should decide either one way or the other as to the use of the Columbia river. Not at all. What I meant, and what I said, was that if 49 should be agreed on as a *general basis*, I was satisfied to negotiate about all the rest. But the gentleman from Ohio and the Senate will do me the justice to allow that I said as plainly as I could speak or put down words in writing, that England *must not expect any thing south of forty nine degrees.* I said so in so many words.

It is in my opinion—I may be mistaken—but to me it is as clear as the sun at noonday that the strong tendency of public opinion is, that we ought to stand by our own offer made in 1826, in substance, in effect. And was not that the doctrine put forth by the honorable Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun) the other day? And has it not been proved that that has always been the extent of our claim? I think there are reasons why it should be.

But I rose to explain. I am of opinion that this question must be settled, and settled shortly, on the parallel of 49. As to the navigation of the Columbia, and the straits, and sounds, and islands—all that is a fit subject for negotiation. But England is not to expect any thing so nth of that boundary. And I am persuaded that the forty of them—are content now to abide by what their Government offered to Great Britain in 1826.

MR. BENTON'S SPEECH.—We give below from the National Intelligencer's report such portions of Mr. Benton's Speech in the Senate on Wednesday as relate to the establishment by the treaty of Utrecht of the parallel of forty nine, as the boundary line between the British and French possessions in North America:

Mr Benton said he did not rise to make any speech, but merely to vindicate history, and the intelligence of the Senate, from an error into which the Senator from Michigan, not now in his seat, (Mr. Cass,) had fallen yesterday, in relying on Mr. Greenhow's book on Oregon. That book maintained that the commissaries had never acted under the treaty of Utrecht; had never established the limits between the British and French possessions in North America; had done nothing on the subject. And the Senator from Michigan, holding Mr. Greenhow to be right, had adopted his opinion, and laid so much stress upon the fact of the action of these commissaries, as to make his future conduct upon the Oregon question dependent upon it. If Mr. Greenhow was wrong, and the commissaries had acted and established the parallel of 49°, and this fact was proved, he (Mr. B.) understood the Senator from Michigan to say that he would give up the Russian limit of 51° 40', and never say any thing more about Oregon north of 49°.

This is a penalty which Mr. B. would not have imposed; it was given to the line of the treaty of Utrecht a consequence and importance which he would not have attributed to it. But the senator from Michigan had judged for himself, and judged deliberately; for his speech was well prepared, and it was his own act to make his future conduct dependent upon the correctness of Mr. Greenhow's opinion, which he had quoted and adopted. Mr. B. would show by the highest evidence, that the commissaries did act; that they did establish the limits between France and Great Britain in North America; and that the 49th parallel was one of the lines established; and, having shown this, he would make no argument upon it, would make no application of the fact, but content himself with vindicating history at an essential point and leave it to the Senator from Michigan to give it the influence upon his own conduct which he should think proper.

Mr. B. then made a statement introductory to the proofs which he meant to introduce, and showing how the treaty of Utrecht had become applicable to this question of boundary between the United States and Great Britain. It grew out of the purchase of Louisiana and was coeval with that purchase. It was known to every body that the northwestern corner of the United States could not be closed, because there was an impossible call in the treaty of 1783. It called for a due west course from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, when such course would never strike the Mississippi—the lake being north of the head of that river. Upon the supposition that the line due west from the lake would stride the river, the right to its free navigation was granted to the British by the treaty of peace; but on finding that the line would not strike the river the struggle began between the two countries—on the part of the British to deflect the line, to turn it down southwest, & thus to get the river, and with this arrival upon that stream come to the enjoyment of its navigation. The struggle on the part of the United States was to prevent this consequence—to close the line without yielding the navigation; and this contest had continued twenty years, when a treaty was signed in London to terminate this contest. It was in the year 1803, Mr. Jefferson being president, and Mr. Rufus King Minister in London; for, in those days Ministers were not so rapidly changed upon a change of Administration as has sometime since occurred.

The fifth article of the treaty then signed deflected the line so as to reach the Mississippi on the shortest course; and this was done in conformity to instructions from the Government of the United States. This treaty was signed in the spring of 1803; and it so happened that about the same time—namely, twelve days before the signature of the treaty in London—the treaty without the knowledge of Mr. King, for the sale of Louisiana to the United States was signed. The two treaties arrived in the United States together, and Mr. Jefferson immediately saw the advantage which the Louisiana treaty gave him in cutting off forever the British, both from the navigation of the Mississippi and from the whole valley of that river.

The most accomplished diplomatist in America—perhaps equal to any in Europe—he saw at once that the acquisition of Louisiana put us in the shoes of the French in all their treaties applicable to that province; that it especially made us a party to the treaty of Utrecht; gave us the benefit of the line 49, established under that treaty; and he immediately determined to recommend to the Senate the rejection of the 5th article of the treaty signed at London, and to rely afterwards upon the Utrecht treaty as a matter of *right* to force the British out of the valley of the Mississippi. The Senate concured with him. They rejected the fifth article of the treaty; and then the double duty presented itself to be performed at London.

The rejection of the article of the treaty was to be justified; the treaty of Utrecht was to be plead against the British, to put an end to their darling desire to obtain the navigation of the Mississipi. The first was a delicate duty. The nonratification of a treaty, concluded under instructions, except for good cause, is, by the law of nations, an injury to the adverse Power, implying a breach of faith but little short of the enormity of violation the same treaty after its ratification. To show this good cause—to justify ourselves for a seeming breach of faith—was the immediate care of Mr. Jefferson; and immediately after the Senate had acted upon the two treaties, namely, on the 14th of February, 1804, Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Monroe (Mr. King having asked leave to return when he had concluded his treaty) to bring up delicate business before the British Government, and satisfy them at once upon the point of the non-ratification of the fifth article. The treaty of Utrecht furnished the justification, and Mr. Monroe was instructed to urge it accordingly.

Mr. B. said this extraordinary statement brought him to the production of his authorities. He would now have recourse to the language of others, and would read a paragraph from the first letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Monroe on this subject:

"If the fifth article be expunged, the 'north boundary of Louisiana will, as is 'reasonable, remain the same in the hands 'of the United States as it was in the hands 'of France, and may be adjusted and established according to the principals and authorities which in that case would have 'been applicable. There is reason to believe that the boundary between Louisiana 'and the British territories north of it were 'actually fixed by commissioners appointed under the treaty of Utrecht, and that 'this boundary was to run from the Lake 'of the Woods westwardly, in latitude 49 'degrees; in which case the fifth article 'would be nugatory, as the line from the 'Lake of the Woods to the nearest source 'of the Mississippi, would run through territory which, on both sides of the line, 'would belong to the United States.

"Annexed is a paper stating the authority on which the decision of the commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht rests, 'and the reasoning opposed to the construction, making the 49th degree of latitude 'the northern boundary of Louisiana, with 'marginal notes in support of that construction. This paper will put you more readily into possession of the subject, as it 'may enter into your discussions with the 'British Government. But you will perceive the necessity of recurring to the 'proceedings of the commissioners, as the 'source of authentic information. These 'are not within our reach here, and it must, 'consequently, be left to your own researches and judgment to determine the proper 'use to be made of them."

Mr. B. remarked upon the language of this extract. The fact of the commissaries having acted was assumed for certain: the precise terms of their act, and the construction of those terms, was not exactly known: and Mr. Monroe was directed to examine the proceedings of the commissaries in London—to ascertain the particulars—and to act according to his judgment. Mr. Monroe did so, and found not the least difficulty on either branch of his duty. The justification for the non-ratification of the boundary clause seems to have been admitted without a word; nor did the other branch of the subject encounter the least difficulty. The Utrecht treaty carried all through. But let Mr. Monroe speak for himself. In his letter to Mr. Madison, of September 8, 1804, he says:

"We then proceed to examine the convention respecting the boundaries in the 'light in which the ratification by the President presented it. On that subject, also 'I omitted nothing which the documents in 'my possession, enabled me to say; in aid 'of which I thought it advisable, a few days 'afterwards, to send to his lordship a note 'explanatory of the motives which induced 'the President and Senate to decline ratifying the fifth article. As the affair had become by that circumstance in some degree 'a delicate one, and as it was in its nature 'intricate, I thought it improper to let the 'explanation which I had given rest on the 'memory of a single individual. By committing it to paper, it might be better understood by Lord Harrowby, and by the 'Cabinet, to whom he would doubtless submit it."

In this extract (resumed Mr. B.) Mr. Monroe shows that he held a conversation with Lord Harrowby, the British Secretary of State, and used the Utrecht treaty for both the purposes for which he had been instructed to use it and with perfect success. He also shows that, unwilling to leave such an important matter to the memory of an individual, he drew up the substance of his conversation in writing, and delivered it to Lord Harrowby, that he might lay it before the Cabinet. The production of this paper, then is the next link in the chain of the evidence to be laid before the Senate; and here it is:

"*Paper respecting the boundary of the United States, delivered to Lord Harrowby, September 5, 1804.*

"By the tenth article of the treaty of U-'trecht, it is agreed 'that France shall restore to Great Britain the bay and straits of 'Hudson, together with all lands, seas, sea-'coasts, rivers & places situate in the said bay 'and straits which belong thereunto,' &c. It is also agreed 'that commissaries shall 'be forthwith appointed by each, Power to 'determine, within a year, the limits be-'tween the said bay of Hudson & the pla-'ces appertaining to the French; and also 'to describe and settle, in like manner, the 'boundaries between the other British and 'French colonies in those parts.'

"Commissioners were accordingly appointed by each Power, *who executed the stipulations of the treaty in establishing the boundaries proposed by it.* They fixed 'the northern boundary of Canada & Lou-'isiana by a line beginning in the Atlantic 'at a cape or promontory in 58° 30' north 'latitude; thence, southwestwardly, to the 'Lake Mistasin; thence, further southwest, to the 'latitude of 49° north from the e-'quator, and along that line indefinitely."

Mr. B. stopped the reading, & remarked upon the extract as far as read. He said this was a statement—a statement of fact—made by Mr. Monroe to Lord Harrowby, & which, of itself, established the two fold fact, that the commissaries did act under the treaty of Utrecht, and established the 19th parallel as the boundary line between France and Great Britain; from the Lake of the Woods indefinitely West. How unfortunate that the Senator from Michigan had not looked to authentic documents, instead of looking to Mr. Greenhow's book and becoming its dupe and its victim. If so, he never could have fallen into the serious error of denying the establishment of the line under the treaty of Utrecht; and the further serious error of saying that Mr. Monroe had added nothing to Mr. Madison's statement, and had left the question as doubtful as he found it.

In point of fact, Mr. Monroe added the *particulars* of which Mr. Madison had declared his ignorance; added the beginning the courses, and the ending of the line; and stated the whole with the precision of a man who had taken his information from the proceedings of the commissaries. And to whom did he deliver this paper? To a British Secretary of State, to be laid before the King in Cabinet Council, & to be used against the Power who was a party to the treaty! And what did Lord Harrowby say? Deny the fact, like the Senator who is so unfortunate as to follow Mr. Greenhow, or even resist the argument resulting from the fact? Not at all. He made no objection to either the fact or the inference; and Mr. Monroe thus proceeded to apply his facts, and to urge the exclusion of the British from the navigation of the Mississippi and its entire valley, as a matter of right under the Utrecht treaty, and by the provisions of which they could hold no territory south of 49.

The argument of Mr. Monroe was simply to the effect that the fifth article of the convention with Great Britain had become nugatory by reason of the cession made by the treaty with France; that all the territory South of forty-nine now clearly belonged to the United States; that Great Britain had no portion of it; and that the line proposed by the fifth article would run through a territory no longer doubtful; but exclusively in the possession of one of the parties.

This reasoning was admitted, and, in the course of the negotiations which followed, both parties proposed articles adopting the Utrecht line from the Lake of the Woods, *with a proviso against its application to the country West of the Rocky Mountains.* There were some difficulties in the way of concluding a full settlement of all the points in controversy, and it was not until 1818 that the forty-ninth parallel was established formally as the boundary between the United States and Great Britain in that region.

The St. Louis papers announce the death of ex-Governor Miller, of Missouri.

Confession of Tirrell. The Boston Star says that Tirrell has confessed that he murdered Mrs. Bickford.

Gold Dollar.—A committee of the House of Representatives has reported against coining any gold of the value of one dollar.

A colored man named Wm. Smallwood, died near Emittsburgh, Md., recently, at the very advanced age of one hundred and seventeen years.

☞"Did you see the Balloon, Patrick?"

"Yes boney, I watched it half an hour after it was out of sight."

It is said however well young ladies may be versed in grammar, but very, few of them can decline matrimony.

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