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THE VETERAN TO HIS SWORD.

Dear art thou still, my trusty sword,
Though dimm'd is now thy shine;
Thou art my soul's cherish'd hoard,
My deeds are blent with thine.
There's rust upon thy gleaming blade;
Thy stain will not depart;
And I have felt the same dark shake,
But mine is on my heart.

We've fought in many a goodly field
Amid the combat's yell;
And proud was I a blade to wield
Which wrought its part so well.
Now—thou art but a harmless thing,
Which women dare to touch,
And smile, amid their marvelling,
That men are slain with such!

Back to thy sheath—the day may come,
That I shall grasp thee yet,
To strike for my own hearth and home,
Where armed hosts are met.
What! though our brightest years are o'er,
Let but the trumpet peal,
We'll blithely to the field once more,
My old, my rusty steel!

MR. EVERETT TO THE COMTE. DE SARTIGES.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1, 1852.

SIR:—You are well acquainted with the melancholy circumstances which have hitherto prevented a reply to the note which you addressed to my predecessor on the 8th of July.

That note and the instruction of M. de Turgot of the 21st March, with a similar communication from the English minister, and the *project* of a convention between the three powers relative to Cuba, have been among the first subjects to which my attention has been called by the President.

The substantial portion of the proposed convention is expressed in a single article in the following terms: "The high contracting parties hereby, severally and collectively, disclaim now and hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and they respectfully bind themselves to discountenance all attempt to that effect on the part of any power or individual whatever."

"The high contracting parties declare, severally and collectively, that they will not obtain nor maintain for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same."

The President has given the most serious attention to this proposal, to the notes of the French and British ministers accompanying it; and to the instructions of M. de Turgot and the Earl of Malmesbury, transmitted with the project of the convention; and he directs me to make known to you the view which he takes of this important and delicate subject.

The President fully concurs with his predecessors, who have on more than one occasion authorized the declaration referred to by M. de Turgot and Lord Malmesbury, that the United States could not see with indifference the island of Cuba fall into the possession of any other European government than Spain; not, however, because we should be dissatisfied with any natural increase of territory and power on the part of France and England. France has, within twenty years, acquired a vast domain on the northern coast of Africa, with a fair prospect of indefinite extension.—England, within half a century, has added very extensively to her empire. These acquisitions have created no uneasiness on the part of the United States.

In like manner, the United States have, within the same period, greatly increased their territory. The largest addition was that of Louisiana, which was purchased from France. These accessions of territory have probably caused no uneasiness to the great European powers, as they have been brought about by the operation of natural causes, and without any disturbance of the international relations of the principal States. They have been followed, also, by a great increase of mutually beneficial commercial intercourse between the United States and Europe.

But the case would be different in reference to the transfer of Cuba from Spain to any other European power. That event could not take place without a serious derangement of the international system now existing, and it would indicate designs in reference to this hemisphere which could not but awaken alarm in the United States.

We should view it in somewhat the same light in which France and England would view the acquisition of some important island in the Mediterranean by the United States—with this difference it is true; that the attempt of the United States to establish themselves in Europe would be a novelty, while the appearance of a European power in this part of the world is a familiar fact. But this difference in the two cases is merely historical, and would not diminish the anxiety which, on political grounds, would be caused by any great demonstration of European power in a new direction in America.

M. de Turgot states that France could never see with indifference the possession of Cuba by *any* power but Spain, and explicitly declare that she has no wish or intention of the appropriating the island to herself; and the English minister makes the same avowal on behalf of his government. M. de Turgot and Lord Malmesbury do the government of the United States no more than justice in remarking that they have often pronounced themselves substantially in the same sense. The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States; at the same time, he considers the condition of Cuba as mainly an American question. The proposed convention proceeds on a different principle. It assumes that the United States have no other or greater interest in the question than France or England; whereas it is necessary only to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote are the relations of Europe, and how intimate those of the United States, with this island.

The President, doing full justice to the friendly spirit in which his concurrence is invited by France and England, and not insensible to the advantages of a good understanding between the three powers in reference to Cuba, feels himself, nevertheless, unable to become a party to the proposed compact for the following reasons:

It is, in the first place, in his judgment, clear (as far as the respect due from the executive to a co-ordinate branch of the government will permit him to anticipate its decision) that no such convention would be viewed with favor by the Senate. Its certain rejection by that body would leave the question of Cuba in a more unsettled position than it is now. This objection would not require the President to withhold his concurrence from the convention if no other objection existed, and if a strong sense of the utility of the measure rendered it his duty, as far as the executive action is concerned, to give his consent to the arrangement, such, however, is not the case.

The convention would be of no value unless it were lasting: accordingly its terms express a perpetuity of purpose and object. Now, it may well be doubted whether the constitution of the U. States would allow the treaty making power to impose a permanent disability on the American government, for all coming time, and prevent it, under any future change of circumstances, from doing what has been so often done in times past. In 1803 the U States purchased Louisiana of France; and in 1819 they purchased Florida of Spain. It is not within the competence of the treaty making power in 1852 effectually to bind the government in all its branches, and for all coming time, not to make a similar purchase of Cuba. A like remark, I imagine, may be made even in reference both to France and England, where the treaty making power is less subject than it is with us to the control of other branches of the government.

There is another strong objection to the proposed agreement. Among the oldest traditions of the federal government is an aversion to political alliances with European powers. In his memorable Farewell Address, President Washington says: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connexion as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop." President Jefferson, in his inaugural address in 1801, warned the country against "entangling alliances." This expression, now become proverbial, was unquestionably used by Mr. Jefferson in reference to the alliance with France of 1778—an alliance, at the time, of incalculable benefit to the United States, but which, in less than twenty years, came near involving us in the wars of the French revolution, and laid the foundation of heavy claims upon Congress, not extinguished to the present day. It is a significant coincidence that the particular provision of the alliance which occasioned these evils, was that under which France called upon us to aid her in defending her West Indian possessions against England. Nothing less than the unbounded influence of Washington rescued the Union from the perils of that crisis, and preserved our neutrality.

But the President has a graver objection to entering into the proposed convention. He has no wish to disguise the feeling that the compact, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal in substance.—France and England, by entering into it, would disable themselves from obtaining possession of an island remote from their seats of government, belonging to another European power, whose natural right to possess it must always be as good as their own—a distant island in another hemisphere, and one which by no ordinary or peaceful course of things could ever belong to either of them. If the present balance of power in Europe should be broken up, if Spain should become unable to maintain the island in her possession, and France and England should be engaged in a death struggle with each other, Cuba might then be the prize of the victor. Till these events all take place, the President does not see how Cuba can belong to any European power but Spain.

The United States, on the other hand, would by the proposed convention, disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the natural order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States.—It bars the entrance of that great river which drains half the North American Continent, and with its tributaries forms the largest system of internal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish Crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames, and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume.

The opinions of American statesmen, at different times and under varying circumstances, have differed as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Territorially and commercially it would, in our hands, be an extremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies it might be almost essential to our safety. Still, for domestic reasons, on which, in a communication of this kind, it might not be proper to dwell, the President thinks that the incorporation of the island into the Union at the present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war with Spain, (should an event so greatly to be deprecated take place,) as a disgrace to the civilization of the age.

The President has given ample proof of the sincerity with which he holds these views. He has thrown the whole force of his constitutional power against all illegal attacks upon the island. It would have been perfectly easy for him, without any seeming neglect of duty, to allow projects of a formidable character, to gather strength by connivance. No amount of obloquy at home, no embarrassments caused by the indiscretions of the collonial government of Cuba, have moved him from the path of duty in this respect. The captain general of that island, an officer, apparently of upright and conciliatory character but probably more used to military command than the management of civil affairs, has, on a punctilio in reference to the purser of a private steamship, (who seems to have been entirely innocent of the matters laid to his charge,) refused to allow passengers and the mails of the United States to be landed from a vessel having him on board. This certainly is a very extraordinary mode of animadverting upon a supposed abuse of the liberty of the press by the subject of a foreign government in his native country. The captain-general is not permitted by his government, three thousand miles off, to hold any diplomatic intercourse with the United States. He is subject in no degree to the direction of the Spanish minister at Washington; and the President has to choose between a resort to force, to compel the abandonment of this gratuitous interruption of commercial intercourse, (which would result in war,) and a delay of weeks and months, necessary for a negotiation with Madrid, with all the chances of the most deplorable occurrences in the interval—and all for a trifle, that ought to have admitted a settlement by an exchange of notes between Washington and Havana. The President has, however, patiently submitted to these evils, and has continued faithfully to give to Cuba the advantages of those principles of the public law under the shelter of which she has departed, in this case, from the comity of nations. But the incidents to which I allude, and which are still in train, are among many others which point decisively to the expediency of some change in the relations of Cuba; and the President thinks that the influence of France and England with Spain, would be well employed in inducing her so to modify the administration of the government of Cuba as to afford the means of some prompt remedy for evils of the kind alluded to, which have done much to increase the spirit of unlawful enterprise against the island.

That a convention such as is proposed, would be a transitory arrangement, sure to be swept away by the irresistible tide of affairs in a new country, is, to the apprehension of the President, too obvious to require a labored argument. The project rests on principles applicable, if at all, to Europe, where international relations are, in their basis, of great antiquity, slowly modified, for the most part, in the progress of time and events; and not applicable to America, which, but lately a waste, is filling up with intense rapidity, and adjusting on natural principles these territorial relations which, on the first discovery of the continent, were in a good degree fortuitous.

The comparative history of Europe and America, even for a single century, shows this. In 1752, France, England, and Spain were not materially different in their political position in Europe from what they now are. They were ancient, mature, consolidated States, established in their relation with each other and the rest of the world—the leading powers of western and Southern Europe. Totally different was the state of things in America. The United States had no existence as a people: a line of English colonies, not numbering much over a million of inhabitants, stretched along the coast. France extended from the Bay of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, and from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi; beyond which, westward, the continent was a wilderness, occupied by wandering savages, and subject to a conflicting and nominal claim on the part of France and Spain. Everything in Europe was comparatively fixed—everything in America provisional, incipient, and temporary, except the law of progress, which is as organic and vital in the youth of States as of individual men. A struggle between the provincial authorities of France and England for the possession of a petty stockade at the confluence of the Monongahela and Alleghany, kindled the seven years' war; at the close of which the great European powers, not materially affected in their relations at home, had undergone astonishing changes on this continent.—France had disappeared from the map of America, whose inmost recesses had been penetrated by her zealous missionaries and her resolute and gallant adventurers; England had added the Canadas to her Trans-Atlantic dominions; Spain had become the mistress of Louisiana, so that, in the language of the Archbishop of Mexico, in 1770, she claimed Siberia as the Northern boundary of New Spain.

Twelve years only from the treaty of Paris had elapsed, and another great change took place, fruitful of still greater changes to come. The American revolution broke out. It involved France, England, and Spain, in a tremendous struggle; and at its close the United States of America had taken their place in the family of nations.—In Europe the ancient States were restored substantially to their former equilibrium; but a new element, of incalculable importance in reference to territorial arrangements, is henceforth to be recognized in America.

Just twenty years from the close of the war of the American revolution, France, by a treaty with Spain—of which the provisions have never been disclosed—possessed herself of Louisiana, but did so only to cede it to the United States; and in the same year, Lewis and Clark started on their expedition to plant the flag of the United States on the shores of the Pacific. In 1819 Florida was sold by Spain to the United States, whose territorial possessions in this way, had been increased three-fold in half a century. This last acquisition was so much a matter of course, that it had been distinctly foreseen by the Count Aranda, then Prime Minister to Spain, as long ago as 1783.

But even these momentous events are but the forerunners of a new territorial revolution still more stupendous. A dynastic struggle between the Emperor Napoleon and Spain, commencing in 1808, convulsed the Peninsula. The vast possessions of the Spanish Crown on this continent—vice royalties and captain-generalships filling the space between California and Cape Horn—one after another asserted their independence. No friendly power in Europe at that time was able, or, if able was willing, to succor Spain, or aid her to prop the crumbling buttresses of her colonial empire. So far from it, when France, in 1823, threw an army of one hundred thousand men into Spain to control her domestic politics, England thought it necessary to counteract the movement by recognizing the independence of the Spanish provinces in America. In the remarkable language of the distinguished minister of the day, in order to redress the balance of power in Europe, he called into existence a New World in the west—somewhat overrating, perhaps, the extent of the derangement in the Old World, and not doing full justice to the position of the United States in America, or their influence on the fortunes of their sister republics on this continent.

Thus, in sixty years from the close of the seven year's war, Spain, like France, had lost the last remains of her once imperial possessions on this continent. The United States, meantime, were by the arts of peace and the healthful progress of things, rapidly enlarging their dimensions and consolidating their power.

The great march of events still went on. Some of the new republics, from the effect of a mixture of races, or the want of training in liberal institutions, showed themselves incapable of self-government. The province of Texas revolted from Mexico by the same right by which Mexico revolted from Spain. At the memorable battle of San Jacinto, in 1836, she passed the great ordeal of nascent States, and her independence was recognized by this government, by France, by England, and other European powers. Mainly peopled from the United States, she sought naturally to be incorporated into the Union. The offer was repeatedly rejected by Presidents Jackson and Van Buren, to avoid a collision with Mexico. At last the annexation took place. As a domestic question, it is not fit subject for comment in a communication to a foreign minister; as a question of public law, there never was an extension of territory more naturally or justifiably made.

It produced a disturbed relation with the government of Mexico; war ensued, and in its results other extensive territories were, for a large pecuniary compensation on the part of the United States, added to the Union. Without adverting to the divisions of opinion which arose in reference to this war, as most always happen in free countries in reference to great measures, no person surveying these events with the eye of a comprehensive statesmanship can fail to trace in the main results the undoubted operations of the law of our political existence. The consequences are before the world. Vast provinces, which had languished for three centuries under the leaden sway of a stationary system, are coming under the influences of an active civilization. Freedom of speech and the press, the trial by jury, religious equality, and representative government, have been carried by the constitution of the United States into extensive regions in which they were unknown before. By the settlement of California, the great circuit of intelligence round the globe is completed.

The discovery of the gold of that region—leading, as it did, to the same discovery in Australia—has touched the nerves of industry throughout the world. Every addition to the territory of the American Union has given homes to European destitution and gardens to European want.—From every part of the United Kingdom, from France, from Switzerland, and Germany, and from the extremest north of Europe, a march of immigration has been taken up, such as the world has never seen before. Into the United States—grown to their present extent in the mannar described—but little less than half a million of the population of the Old World is annually pouring, to be immediately incorporated into an industrious and prosperous community, in the bosom of which they find political and religious liberty, social position, employment, and bread. It is a fact which would defy belief, were it not the result of official inquiry, that the emigrants to the United States from Ireland alone, besides having subsisted themselves, have sent back to their kindred, for the three last years, nearly five millions of dollars annually; thus doubling in three years the purchase money of Lousiana.

Such is the territorial developement of the United States in the past century. Is it possible that Europe can contemplate it with an unfriendly or jealous eye? What would have been her condition in these trying years but for the outlet we have furnished for her starving millions?

I will but allude to an evil of the first magnitude: I mean the African slave trade, in the suppression of which France and England take a lively interest—an evil which still forms a great reproach upon the civilization of Christendom, and perpetuates the barbarism of Africa, but for which it is to be feared there is no hope of a complete remedy while Cuba remains a Spanish colony.

But, whatever may be thought of these last suggestions, it would seem impossible for any one who reflects upon the events glanced at in this note to mistake the law of American growth and progress, or think it can be ultimately arrested by a convention like that proposed. In the judgment of the President, it would be as easy to throw a dam from Cape Florida to Cuba, in the hope of stopping the flow of the gulf-stream as to attempt, by a compact like this, to fix the fortunes of Cuba "now and for hereafter," or as expressed in the French text of the Convention, "for the present as for the future," (pour le present comme pour l'avenir)—that is, for all coming time. The history of the past—of the recent past—affords no assurance that twenty years hence France or England will even wish that Spain should retain Cuba; and a century hence, judging, of what will be from what has been, the pages which record this proposition will, like the record of the family compact between France and Spain, have no interest but for the antiquary.

Even now the President cannot doubt that both France and England would prefer any change in the condition of Cuba to that which is most to be apprehended, viz: an internal convulsion which should renew the horrors and the fate of San Domingo.

Spain, meantime, has retained of her ex tensive dominions in this hemisphere but the two islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. A respectful sympathy with the fortunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, with whom the United States have ever maintained the most friendly relations, would, if no other reason existed, make it our duty to leave her in the undisturbed possession of this little remnant of her mighty trans-Atlantic empire. The President desires to do so; no word or deed of his will ever question her title or shake her possession. But can it be expected to last very long? Can it resist this mighty current in the fortunes of the world? Is it desirable that it should do so? Can it be for the interest of Spain to cling to a possession that can only be maintained by a garrison of twenty-five or thirty thousand troops, a powerful naval force, and an annual expenditure for both arms of the service of at least twelve millions of dollars? Cuba, at this moment, cost more to Spain than the entire naval and military establishment of the United States costs the federal government. So far from being really injured by the loss of this island, there is no doubt that, were it peacefully transferred to the United States, a prosperous commerce between Cuba and Spain, resulting from ancient associations and common language and tastes, would be far more productive than the best contrived system of colonial taxation. Such, notoriously, has been the result to Great Britain of the establishment of the independence of the United States. The decline of Spain from the position which she held in the time of Charles the Fifth is coeval with the foundation of her colonial system; while within twenty-five years, and since the loss of most of her colonies, she has entered upon a course of rapid improvement unknown since the abdication of that emperor.

I will intimate a final objection to the proposed convention. M. de Turgot and Lord Malmsbury put forward as the reason for entering into such a compact, 'the attacks which have lately been made on the island of Cuba by lawless bands of adventurers from the United States, with the avowed design of taking possesion of that island.' The President is convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty, instead of putting a stop to these lawless proceedings, would give a new and powerful impulse to them. It would strike a death blow to the conservative policy hitherto pursued in this country toward Cuba. No administration of this government, however strong in the public confidence in other respects could stand a day under the odium of having stipulated with the great powers of Europe, that in no future time under no change of circumstances, by no amicable arrangement with Spain, by no act of lawful war, (should that calamity unfortunately occur,) by no consent of the inhabitants of that island, should they, like the possessions of Spain on the American continent, succeed in rendering themselves independent; in fine, by no overruling necessity of self preservation should the United States ever make the acquisition of Cuba.

For the reasons which the President has thought it advisable, considering the importance of the subject, to direct me to unfold at some length, he feels constrained to decline respectfully the invitation of France and England to become parties to the proposed convention. He is persuaded that these friendly powers will not attribute this refusal to any insensibility on his part to the advantages of the utmost harmony between the great maratime States on a subject of such importance. As little will Spain draw any unfavorable inference from the refusal; the rather, as the emphatic disclaimer of any designs against Cuba on the part of this government, contained in the present note, affords all the assurance which the President can constitutionally, or to any useful purpose, give of a practical concurrence with France and England in the wish not to disturb the possession of that island by Spain.

I avail myself, sir, of this opportunity to assure you of my distinguished consideration.

EDWARD EVERETT.

THE GOVERNOR'S BED-FELLOWS.

Among the many ludicrous mistakes and occurrences which have been related as growing out of the extreme plainness and simplicity of the dress, appearance, habits and tastes of Thomas Chittenden, the first Governor of Vermont, the following was told us by one of the Governor's contemporaries many years ago, and subsequently by another, with so much minuteness as to remove at once all doubts of its authenticity:—

One Fall, when the Legislature was to meet at Norwich, we think it was, the Governor, who lived in Williston, took it into his head to go on foot to his post of official duty, a distance of about eighty miles. Accordingly, making up his pack, he started off on foot and alone to his destination, and brought up at night at the log-house of a new settler, into which he entered and craved lodgings for the night.

"Well, stranger," said the settler in reply, after eyeing the new comer an instant, "we havn't much to eat, and but one bed for myself and wife; but you look as if you might put up with a dish of bread and milk, and could sleep on the floor without hurting you.

"Oh, certainly," said the Governor, "as hungry and tired as I am, with a night so dark as this without, I shall be thankful to stay even at that."

In pursuance of this arrangement, the Governor, without making himself known, partook of the proffered meal, camped down on the floor with his pack for a pillow, and was soon buried in slumber.

During the night there was a driving shower, which though it did not awaken any of the hard sleepers within, was yet so severe as to route an old sow, with a litter of pigs, from their rest in the yard; when the restless animal, in search of dry quarters, began rooting at the door, which she at length forced open wide enough for an entrance, and, coming in, lay down, with her well washed brood, by the side of the still unawakened Governor, who snored on till daylight, when he awoke, and for the first time became aware of the presence of his bed-fellows. He did not disturb them, however, or his human entertainers, but silently strapping on his pack, and leaving a half-crown, for his lodgings, on the table, proceeded on his journey.

The settler was considerably mortified when he arose and saw how matters had been, but thought not much about it, till two days after, when having concluded to go himself to "Lection" and having reached the place just as the ceremonies were commencing, who should he see at the head of the procession, but the plain-looking foot-pad who had fared so oddly at his house.

"Who—what is that man walking there with the big-bugs in front?" he eagerly asked of an acquaintance.

"Why, don't you know? That is the Governor."

"The Governor? Governor Chittenden?"

"Yes, but what is there about him that disturbs you so much?

"Oh, nothing—only a strange circumstance—and, by the hokey! what will my wife say?"

"Why, what is it?"

"Well, considering, I guess, if the Governor don't tell on't I won't."

And he did not, said our informant, but the Governor did, and had many a hearty laugh about it.—*Green Mountain Freeman.*

A DECIDED HIT.—The Providence *Journal*, noticing the statement that there will be no business transacted by Congress till after the holidays, wittily remarks:—"There are two periods at which Congress does no business. One is, 'before the holidays,' and the other is 'after the holidays.'"

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