the farmer and against the latter measure? On the contrary several members of this description unequivocally deny that it could have had such effect. They have gone further, and even said that it confirmed their convictions of the soundness of the measure adopted. Who on this point, and are the most to be relied on—those who are competent to decide from their own conviction, which must be relatively to their own conduct, unerring; or those who undertake to pronounce on the *probable* convictions of others, in doing which they almost necessarily blend their own feelings with those of others.

Further—Had this document any effect on the Senate? Did it produce a different vote in that branch of the legislature from that which obtained in the house? On the contrary, the bill passed by a considerable majority. We have here, then, another strong presumption that the contents of it would not have had the effect ascribed to them.

This presumption is still further corroborated by an assurance we have received, on which we place the most implicit reliance, that the Senate obtained a copy of the dispatches, which have been alledged to be thus important, and that although they lay on their table during the whole period of the discussion that ensued on the bill making an appropriation of two millions, they were considered so little relevant to our affairs with Spain, that they were scarcely, if at all, noticed.

Further—Why did the President, if he dreaded the effect of this letter communicate it at all? Had he dreaded its impression of the House of Representatives, he could not the less have dreaded its effects on the Senate; and if he had dreamt that the non-communication of it at an earlier period would have justly exposed him to the reproach of intentionally withholding it, surely the same impure motive that led him to this would have suggested the policy of keeping out of view the means of inevitable detection.

Further—Whence did this document come? From Mr. Munroe, resident in London, and engaged in conducting a negociation with the British government. Is it to be presumed that any *new facts* relative to our affairs with Spain would be disclosed by a document emanating from such a place, and dated at a period so remote from the discontinuance of our negociations with the government of Spain? Is it not most probable that it contained, on this point, little more than mere opinion, and that this opinion bore as much, if not more, on British than Spanish relations?

We violate no confidence when we express the belief, derived from what we have heard, that these dispatches contained no facts relative to Spain not before known to the legislature.

That they contained opinions, whose justness however, undisputed when they were expressed, had from a material change of circumstances, become extremely doubtful.

That they were considered as so irrelevant to the pending discussions as to have rendered the propriety of their communication to Congress extremely questionable.

And that it is owing to those circumstances alone that they were not communicated at an earlier period.

But why, it will be enquired, were they although received in December, not communicated before the 17th of January, the day subsequent to the passage of the bill making an appropriation for the purchase of the Floridas in the House of Representatives?—For this plain and satisfactory reason.—The papers relative to Spain were communicated in the first instance, and when they had been acted upon, and not before, the President submitted to the House of Representatives the papers relative to Great Britain, *of which number were these celebrated dispatches*, written by our minister, not at Madrid but a London, on our differences with the British government, and only incidentally noticing our affairs with Spain.

Let these circumstances be duly weighed; connect with them the unblemished integrity of the President of the United States and the secretary of state; the folly of surreptitiously withholding from one branch of the legislature (until they had decided) a paper, which was given to the other at the commencement of their discussions, and the certainty of the detection and exposure of any unworthy conduct by the Senate; and we have no hesitation to declare our firm belief that the conduct of the Executive in this instance has been strictly correct.

III. It has been said that the money appropriated for the purchase of Spanish territory is intended for France, and it has been insinuated, if not affirmed, that France has made such a demand, or that we have made a proposition to her to this effect; thereby passing by the rightful owner, and unjustly giving money to France for the property of Spain.—Such a subserviency to what have been denominated the base views of France is represented as conclusive evidence of the disposition of the government to crouch to the power of France, howeever it may be exerted in violation of moral principle.

How such an allegation or insinuation came to be made is to us a matter of extreme astonishment. On a point so serious we have thought it our duty to seek for the best information within our reach. And on this information we do not hesitate to pledge ourselves in saying—that no money has been directly or indirectly demanded by France of the United States; that none has been offered, or is now intended to be offered to France;—that no other intention has existed, or any measure been taken by the Executive of the United States, except for the purchase from Spain of her possessions east of the Missisippi;—and that the only interposition which can be expected from France must consist in the GOOD OFFICES she may tender, resulting from her general relative situation with the two countries, from her peculiar connections by treaty with Spain, and from her having been the party from whom we purchased Louisianna.

That this is the fair and honest path trodden by the government of the United States, appears indeed from those circumstances which have already been disclosed to the public.

If we examine the Journal of the secret proceedings of the House of Representatives, we shall find that the two resolutions passed, and presented to the President as indicative of its views, expressly recognise, one of them, "the purchase of the Spanish territories lying on the Atlantic ocean and Gulf of Mexico, and eastward of the Missisippi"—and the other "the exchange of territory between the United and Spain"—as "the most advantageous made of settlement of existing differences between the United States and the court of Madrid. And so circumspect were the house of Representatives on this point, that as if not satisfied with the terms of these resolutions pointed as they are on sending their bill to the Senate they expressly say, "we transmit you a bill which has passed this House entitled "An act making provision for defraying any extraordinary expences attending the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations," and in which we request your concurrence.—This bill has been passed by us to enable the president of the U. S. to commence with the more effect a negociation for *the purchase of the Spanish territories*, lying on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf Mexico, and eastward of the river Missisippi." It is true that the bill making the appropriation specifies the territory to be purchased, or the power with whom the negociation is to be conducted; but silence on this point probably arose from the expectation that, although the preliminary proceedings might be kept secret, the act of appropriation, would be made public, and might, in it specified the object, frustrate a negociation to the successful issue of which secrecy was then deemed essensial. It is also to be observed that a similar course was pursued in the year 1803, on which occasion the resolution passed by the House was *specific*, and the bill *general*. This precedent may have had considerable influence. These facts sufficiently manifest the views of the legislature.

Secondly—The nomination of Mr. Armstrong & Bowdoin, who were named commissioners to negociate with Spain, and not with France, furnishes equally exclusive evidence of the intentions of the executive.

We have remarked that the only interposition, which can be expected from France must consist in the good offices she may tender, resulting from her general relative situation with the two countries from her peculiar connections by treaty with Spain, and from her having been the party from whom we purchased Louisianna." Such an interposition might originate in either of the causes assigned without the slightest departure from the ordinary course pursued by independent nations. The general good understanding of France towards the U. States and Spain might naturally lead a government even less powerful and active than the former, to offer her mediation to adjust her differences between her mutual friends; and this is, in fact, an event which constantly takes place and is far from being an uncommon mode of restoring a good understanding between powers temporanly alienated from each other.

But, in addition to this consideration the existing treaty stipulations between France and Spain require the interposition of mutual *good offices*. According to these—"The two contracting powers reciprocally guarantee, without any reservation, or exception all the estates, territories, islands, and places which they respectively possess, or may possess," and if either power "finds itself under any pretext whatever, menaced or attacked, the other promises, engages, and obliges itself to assist with its GOOD OFFICES."

And lastly, France having been the party from whom we purchased Louisianna, it is natural to infer, as a large share of our controversy with Spain has arisen out of that purchase, and more especially that part of it which respects boundaries, not only that we should look to France for aiding us with her good offices in securing to us the undisterbed enjoyment of rights acquired from her, but that France herself would be solicitous to give validity to her engagements with us.

But we are told, on this head, that the money for the purchase of Spanish territory will inevitably go to France; that France will have it; that we know this, and that under the cover of paying Spain money for her property, we are in fact bribing France to bully Spain out of it.

The whole force of this argument rests on the assumed fact that Spain is under the control of France. For if she is not, she is an independent nation, a free agent, and may consequently do what she pleases with the price of the purchase, or altogether decline acceding to it. But if she is thus completely under the control of France, and is consequently not free to act as she sees fit, are we on that account to remain eternally embroiled with her, and are our hands thereby tied against every effort to adjust our differences? To what absurd lengths would not this argument carry us? She does us an injury. But we are told she has no will of her own, and ought not to be answerable for consequences; that she is impelled by France. Are we then, passing her by, instantly to retaliate on France? When one nation menaces us, are we with more than Quixotic indiscretion to attack another? If the argument be sound, instead of proposing to repel any Spanish, inroad on our frontier, we ought to have sent an invading army to France.

The true answer to such remarks is, that so long as Spain asserts the character of an independent nation, she must submit to all the consequences that follow in its train. If she commits outrages on others, she must expect retaliation from them; and if she is called upon to make an arrangement which will greatly advance the interests of another, she has a right to expect a correspondent benefit. Having received the boon, it is with her either to keep it herself, to participate it with another, or entirely to part with it. Whether in the last case, she receives an equivalent, must rest exclusively with her to judge. If in the present instance, it be true that France has a control over her, whence can this influence arise but from the great importance to her of the protecting arm of France; and whether she pays for this in money drawn from her own mines, or from a purchase made by us, is altogether immaterial. We are bound to pursue our interests. Let her pursue hers.

IV. France has been represented as having threatened us with war in case we engaged in hostilities with Spain; and this allegiation is set forth in the shape of an argument against any further negociation with Spain, which is contended, would, under such circumstances, be in the highest degree humiliating. Under what circumstaces the alledged threat was made, or whether it was enqualified, we are not informed.—We have however, no hesitation in averring that no such threat has been made by France, and in saying that what has been distorrted into a threat was nothing more than a candid answer of the French government to an application from ourselves, as to what she might do, in case of a war between the United States and Spain; which we knew before as necessarily resulting from her treaty with Spain. By that treaty we find, after laying down, generally, the assistance which each government shall have a right to demand from the other, the following conclusive stipulation, which is so applicable as to seem to have been provided for the present case.

"The required power shall likewise furnish, on the demand of the requiring power within the term of three months from the requisition, eighteen thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry, with a proportionable train of artillery, to be employed solely in Europe or in defence of the colonies, which the contracting powers possess in the gulf of Mexico."

When then the question was put to the minister of France, if the United States go to war with Spain, what part will you take, what other reply could he make than that a war with the one power would produce a war with both. It was a question which need not have been asked; but being put, the answer given so far from being a threat, was the only answer which could, with sincerity, have been rendered. It announced the truth, and nothing but the truth in a style neither arrogant nor offensive.

V. A distinguished member of the executive government has been charged with having made an application to the Secretary of the Treasury for money to aid in the negociation for the purchase of the Floridas, previous to any appropriation having been made for this purpose by Congress.

This is indeed a serious charge. Were it true, it would have become the representatives of the people, the guardians of the national treasure to have instituted a rigid enquiry. We will not undertake to say that there are not cases in which it would not be the duty of the executive to lay this hand, without a legislative sanction, on every dollar in the treasury. Such cases not only may exist, but actually have occured. They are, however, such as involve the dearest interests of the country, and they can only spring from those great and critical emergencies in which deep and impending evils are ready unless averted by immediate and decisive measures, to burst with destuctive fury on communities. No one will pretend to say that the Florida purchase was of this description. But is the charge true? Let any man read the following extracts from the journals of the House of Representatives and judge for himself.

The charge was made—when Mr. Jackson offered the following resolution, which was agreed to:

Resolved, That the secretary of the treasury be requested to communicate to this House any information which he may possess in relation to an application said to have been made to draw money from the treasury for the purchase of the Floridas before an appropriation made by law for that purpose.

A few days afterwards the following letter was received from the secretary of the treasury;

Treasury Department, April 15, 1806.

Sir,

In answer to the request contained in the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 8th instant, I have the honor respectfully to state, that "no application has been made to draw money from the treasury for the purchase of the Floridas before an appropriation made by law for that purpose."

The circumstances, which may have produced an impression that such an application had been made, being unconnect i with any matter pertaining to the duties of the office of the secretary of the treasury, are not presumed to come, within the scope of the information required from this department by the House.

I have the honor to be,
With great respect,
Sir, your obedient servant,
Albert Gallatin.

The honorable,
the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

So far from any such application having been made, it appears from a statement before us made by a member of Congress to his constituents, "that in a consultation of the members of administration on public affairs, a proposition was made, whether under the favorable circumstances for negociating with Spain, presented by the then war in Europe, it would not be well to give immediate instructions to our minister to commence negociation, on the ground of purchase, & depend on Congress for giving effect to the stipulations for money, which might be made. "This," adds the writer, "the executive had the most undeniable constitutional power to do; but it was decided to be most advisable to defer the instructions till they could be backed by the concurrence of the legislature."

Alexandria, May 14.

We are favored with the following account of the death of Bowles, by a friend who received it from a passenger, late from the Havannah.

The celebrated partizan major Bowles, died in the cells of the Morro Castle, Havannah, early in last month. He was a brother to the famous Carrington Bowles, of Print Shop memory, on Ludgate Hill, London. The major had lived so long among the Canadian tribes of Indians as to become more than half savage himself. Long employed by the American ministers and their American governors, he had perpetrated a number of mischiefs & cruelties on the peaceful & defenceless frontier inhabitants of the United States; went to England for a few years, after the revolutionary war; was again noticed and employed, and but a few years back was landed out of a British sloop of war on the shores of the Bay of Mobille, made his way towards our southern frontier, and, after alternately committing many excesses on the subjects of the U. States, urging the savages to war, and committing open hostilities againft the Spaniards, he was betrayed, and taken up by a party of his follow savages and delivered to the Spanish commandant, who soon had him confined in the Morro Castle. He was there shut out from light or air, and fed upon bread and water only, until being deprived of all hope of delivery he refused any kind of sustenance whatever and died in April, 1806.

From the National Intelligencer.

THE INDIA TRADE.

The late notices of our trade to India in the British Parliament merit attention. It seems as if it were sincerely considered as a partiality to us to allow the American ships and capitalists to assist the British East India settlements, *to find a market for their own India manufactures!* We allow Great Britain to export every article from this country, to every place as freely as ourselves.—The fair principle of reciprocity, therefore, would forbid complaint, at our exporting, from their India possessions, their own *manufactures*, even if it were a benefit to us. Were we to make the experiment of prohibiting the importation of their India cotton manufactures into this country, and into Europe, we should gain a full share of the carrying trade of our own raw cotton wool to the European manufactures and we might at the same time, import cotton goods and silk goods from China. The greatest existing injury to the cotton growers of the United States is perhaps the bringing the cotton goods of British India to the American and European markets. That importation is equally injurious to the manufactures of Europe, and of the U. S. Let us compute the cotton requisite to make a quantity of European manufactures equal to the British East India cottons and silks, and then a proof will be in our hands of *the injury to our agriculture* from our partaking in the transportation those British India goods to any market. *No commerce is good for America, which injuries its agriculture.*—This is the soundest maxim in the political economy of the U. States. The computation of the cotton, which would be requisite to make all the India manufactures consumed in Europe, and America will be, at the same time a computation of the quantity of American cotton wool, which we should carry to the Europe manufactures, if the British India goods were left on their hands, for want of our purchases, and transportation.—This transportation of our cotton would be a surer and more valuable branch of the carrying trade. The indirect benefits of the cotton cultivation are immense. If we keep up and increase the cultivation of cotton, the prices of rice, indigo, Louisianna sugar, wheat, corn, cattlo, and horses will be better supported. For the division of so many lands and cultivators from grain farms, grass farms, &c. prevents an overstock of grain of all kinds, cattle, &c. It is notorious that our exports of indigo, rice, flour and tobacco have decreased since cotton has been so miraculously increased and so profitably cultivated. The reason is plain. The land and planting and farming laborers cannot yield 45 millions of pounds of cotton, and, yield, indigo, grain, cattle and &c. in their wonted quantities. Such produce made more scarce commands higher prices. It is the interest of the *British manufactures* themselves, and of the American planters, farmers and manufacturers, that the British East Indians should raise sugar, coffee, cocoa, pimento, ginger and other articles of tropical produce and that they should not send *cotton manufactures* in any ships to the whole world to rival European manufacturing industry and American planting industry. The more G. Britain impedes the India piece goods trade, the better for our *agriculture* and for *their manufactures*. The benefits which would result to their ships and to our ships from the East India exports being changed from compact manufactures to bulky tropical productions would manifestly be very great. Many more ships would be wanted to bring our supplies of coffee, sugar, cocoa, ginger, pimento, pepper &c. than to bring our supplies of *manufactured* bale goods. These ideas are thrown out with calm feelings and reasonable dispositions at a moment when British legislation and mutual negociations seem likely to be turned to the India trade.—Erroneous opinions on either side may beget erroneous conduct, and inconvenient prejudices.

A FRIEND TO PEACE.

Mr. Custis' agricultural meeting and annual sheep sheering, took place at Arlington, on Wednesday, the 30th ult. and was attended by the gentlemen from the adjoining counties. The annual premium for the finest ram lamb of one year old, was adjudged to a lamb bred by Ludwell Lee, Esq. of Belmont, in the county of Loudoun. The judges were very minute in their inspections, and we hope succeeding years will produce increasing exertion in the improvement of this valuable race of domestic animals.

The prize lamb possesses fine proportions, with a fleece of good quality, close and well packed, though rather short. His gross weight 161 pounds; weight of fleece seven pounds three quarters. Fleeces weigh very light this season, owing to the mildness of our winter.—Arlington prime ewes average five pounds.

The annual premium will continue for eight years yet to come; together with a valuable privilege annexed, viz. Any person obtaining a premium has a right, within the time just mentioned to demand a lamb of the improved stock, free of charge.

We truly hope that success may crown these early efforts in the cause of domestic economy; as experience shews that it is becoming in a republic like ours to be independent of all nations especially for those things we most want and can most easily obtain at home. Providence has wisely gifted man with the power of supplying his wants from the means within his reach. We are endued with a portion of every soil and climate, and having foreign example before us are incited to use the same industry to effect as useful purposes. *Alex. Adv.*

Captain Haff, of the ship Actress, arrived at New York, states that it was reported at Gibralter the 3d of April that Sir Sidney Smith, was bound to Algiers, intending to bombard it.