TWELFTH CONGRESS.

INTERESTING DEBATE.

Washington, December 27.

SIR—Great solicitude has been expressed by several gentlemen of Congress, for the publication of the Speech of the Hon. Mr. Giles, on the bill to raise an additional military force, reported to the Senate by its committee of foreign relations. The public, so far as they have been apprized that an able speech was delivered by him, have, it is believed, participated in that solicitude — The Reporter for the Baltimore American would therefore be extremely thankful to Mr. Giles for as diffuse a sketch of his remarks, as time, notes and memory may enable him to furnish. He has communicated through the American, intelligence of the speech now respectfully requested, a character of which he derived from gentlemen who heard it; and he believes that an opportunity to peruse it would be highly gratifying to the good people of Maryland, and to those of Baltimore especially.

Respectfully, sir,
I have the honour to be,
Your humble servant,
J. NORVELL.

Hon. W. B. Giles, Esq. S. U. S

SIR—In compliance with the request contained in your note of the 27th ult and with other similar requests, I now send you as full a sketch of the remarks alluded to, as I have been able to prepare from the materials in my possession. They are essentially correct in spirit and substance if not in manner and form; they are believed in these respects not to be materially variant. You are personally acquainted with the domestic affliction which has prevented an earlier compliance

Be pleased sir, to accept,
My respectful compliments &c.
Wm B. GILES.

Mr. J. Norvel.

IN SENATE OF THE U. STATES.

Dec. 17, 1811.

The Bill for raising an additional military force being under consideration; on motion of the hon. Mr. *Anderson* to strike out the word "*ten*," for the purpose of inserting a smaller number of regiments, Mr. GILES rose, and submitted, *in substance*, the following observations.

Mr. GILES said he found himself, in a very unprepared state, called upon to oppose a very unexpected motion. The object of the mover had not been very precisely expressed, but he had mentioned the number of twelve thousand infantry as preferable to twenty thousand, about the number provided for by the bill. Mr. Giles said it was also understood that a force of ten thousand men of every description would more correspond with the executive views, and fully answer the executive requisition. This, he believed, was the fact, and should so consider it in the course of the observations he proposed to make.—Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, considering the late occurrences on our western frontiers, and the feelings of the western people so justly excited thereby, &c. he acknowledged that the motion had come from the most unexpected quarter of the union, and from a gentleman the most unexpected to him of all those who represent the western portion of the United States; because from the long course of military services honourably rendered by that gentleman during the revolutionary war, he must have become well acquainted with the absolute necessity of a due degree of momentum in military affairs.

Mr. Giles said he did not purpose to go into a full exposition of our foreign relations at this time; yet the motion furnished a most extensive scope for observation, because if it should unfortunately succeed, it would essentially derange as he conceived, the whole views of the committee, who had reported the bill. He would therefore present to the senate, the most prominent & important considerations, which he presumed had operated on the committee, and had certainly on himself, to induce the recommendation of twenty five thousand men, as the smallest possible quantum of force demanded by the crisis; to demonstrate the advantages of a force at least to that extent, over that which seemed to be contemplated by the honorable mover, & still more over that which is said to consist with the executive project.

In the consideration of this subject, it is important to turn our attention to the *objects* for which a military force is demanded, to enable us the better to apportion the means to the objects intended to be effected. For this purpose he begged the most serious attention of the Senate to the President's message at the commencement of the session.

"I must now add, observes the President, that the period is arrived, which claims from the legislative guardians of the national rights a system of more ample provisions for maintaining them. Notwithstanding the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation, and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States to substitute for the accumulating dangers to the peace of the two countries, all the mutual advantages of re-established friendship and confidence; we have seen that the British cabinet perseveres, not only in withholding a remedy for other wrongs so long and so loudly calling for it; but in the execution brought home to the threshold of our territory, of measures which, under existing circumstances, have the character, as well as the effect, of war on our lawful commerce.

"With this evidence of hostile inflexibility in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, congress will feel the duty of putting the U. S. into an armour, and an attitude demanded by the crisis and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.

"I recommend accordingly, that adequate provision be made for filling the ranks and prolonging the enlistments of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force to be engaged for a more limited term; for the acceptance of volunteer corps whose patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services; for detachments as they may be wanted, of other portions of the militia, and for such a preparation of the great body as will proportion its usefulness to its intrinsic capacity."

Here we find, in the first place, the most solemn and imperious call upon Congress in the character of "*the legislative guardians* of the national rights, for a system of more ample provisions for maintaining them."—The President then very properly and emphatically proceeds to tell us why he makes this solemn call upon the legislative guardians of the nation at this time. He tells us in substance, that notwithstanding "the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation, & the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States," to induce Great Britain to recede from her hostile aggressions upon their essential sovereign rights, so far from yielding to these polite and pathetic invitations, she had increased her aggressions, & had adopted "measures which, under existing circumstances, have the *character*, as well as the *effect*, of *war* upon our lawful commerce;" & that these measures are, in their execution, "brought home to the threshold of our Territory. Could the President have chosen language more emphatic to shew the imperious character of the call made upon Congress to furnish him with adequate physical means to retrieve the honor and redress the wrongs of the nation? Lest there might be some possible mistake on the part of Congress, he tells us explicitly that the aggressions of Great Britain have the *character, as well as the effect of war* upon our lawful commerce, and that *this war* is *bro't home to the threshold of our territory*.

But, sir, the President does not stop here. He tells us that notwithstanding our protracted moderation, &c. &c. Great Britain, with hostile inflexibility, perseveres in trampling on essential sovereign rights; rights at least, "which no independent nation can relinquish." Here then, it is evident, the President conceives, that our independence, as a nation, is brought into question, & put at hazard. Can any subject present a more awful and imperious call upon Congress to exert and apply the whole energies of the nation, than a question of INDEPENDENCE?—The plain English of all this communication, he understood to be, that all the inefficient measures, which have been adopted in relation to the belligerents for three years past, had not answered the expectations of their projectors; but instead of the expected recession, had produced, on the part of Great Britain at least, inflexible hostility. This was a very natural result, and one which he had always anticipated, as was well known to this honorable body. But the administration having learnt wisdom by these feeble experiments, had now determined to change its course, & for the purpose of rendering this hostility more flexible, had at length resolved, instead of commercial restrictions, to try the effect of physical force. An adequate force is therefore demanded by the executive; & the adequacy of that force is very properly referred to Congress, where the responsibility is placed by the Constitution; where it ought to rest; and for one, he was willing to take his full share of it. But, sir, the President goes on further. After designating the objects, he points out the standard for ascertaining the adequacy of the force demanded for their effectuation. In his official responsible message, he tells us that "Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armour, and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations." The standard here pointed out for calculating the quantum of force to be supplied is "The Crisis," which had been previously described in the most solemn and imposing terms, and "*the national spirit and expectations.*" Whether the committee had reported too great a force for subduing the crisis, he was willing to submit to the verdict of the *national spirit and expectations*.

But it is now said or intimated in substance, that this official responsible standard is only ostensible, and that the true standard for estimating the quantum of force demanded, must be derived from the decrepid state of the treasury, and the financial fame of the gentleman at the head of that department. This subject will require a distint consideration; but in the mean time, it is sufficient to say, that the committee unanimously refused to be influenced by any considerations, but those resulting from the official responsible communication, and their own reflections upon the state of the nation as disclosed thereby. They unanimously rejected informal inofficial communications.

It will be observed too, in the message, the President, in his more specific recommendations, after designating the kinds of force suited to the occasion, leaves the quantum of each to be judged of, and decided by Congress, where the responsibility did and ought to rest; and he was unwilling, by receding from his constitutional duty, to revert this responsibility upon the executive.

It thus appearing, said Mr. Giles, that the force demanded, was for the purposes of war, if unfortunately we should be driven by Great Britain to that last resort; and that although the war would be undertaken upon principles strictly defensive; yet in its operation, it must necessarily become offensive on our part; and that Congress was to determine exclusively upon the adequacy of the means for conducting it; he would now proceed to inquire more particularly, 1st, whether the committee had recommended a force more than adequate to the purposes of the war; and 2d, whether it was within the capacity of the U. States to supply the force thus recommended?

Mr. G. said, that in estimating the quantum of force demanded by the existing crisis, it appeared to him, gentlemen had not given sufficient consideration to the attitude assumed by the United States in relation to the Floridas, to the extension of our southern & western frontiers, to the late hostile acts and threatenings in that quarter; nor to the importance of Orleans; its exposed position and defenceless situation.—These circumstances, however, entered deeply into the consideration of the committee, and induced it to conclude that the whole military establishment now authorized by law, if completed, would not be more than sufficient, perhaps insufficient, to answer the necessary objects of the government in the scenes just described: it was therefore intended that the whole of that force should be left free to act therein according to circumstances, and that the additional force now recommended, should act exclusively in the northern and eastern portion of the union. This force no gentleman will pretend can be too great for our objects in that quarter, in the event of war, unaided by the existing establishment. Hence it was matter of great surprize to him, that the western gentlemen should wish to diminish the number of men now proposed to be raised; because he believed, that every man deducted from the proposed force, would take one from the force intended by the committee to protect our southern & western frontiers. These gentlemen, he presumed, must be better judges than himself, how many of these men they can generously spare from their own protection; but for his part he thought there was not one to spare from these objects, and the committee were willing to give the whole of them that destination.

With respect to protection of Orleans, he knew it was the expectation of the late administration, that in the event of war, G. Britain would possess herself of that city; and it was not their intention to incur the expense of being constantly prepared to repel the first incursion of the enemy: he did not know the intention of the present administration in that respect, but presumed it was acting on the same policy. In case the British should take possession of Orleans, the western people must necessarily be called on to drive them out, & he doubted very much whether it would be either a very acceptable occupation, or a very easy task. He had always disapproved of this policy, and in the event of war, he thought it wise, not only to be prepared for defence at all points, but to give the first blow. He believed, in the end, it would be found, not only the wisest, but the most economical policy, both in blood and treasure.

Having presented to the senate the objects to which the existing military establishment ought to be assigned, according to the views of the committee, he would proceed to inquire, whether the additional force recommended, would be more than competent to the objects to which it must necessarily be assigned, and which ought unquestionably to be effected by it. In case of war, an event he deprecated as much as any gentleman present, the new army would have to man your fortifications on the sea board from Norfolk to the extremities of our territory north and east, and to occupy Canada. These are the contemplated and indispensable objects of this army, in the estimation of the executive and the honorable mover, as well as of the committee.—The question will therefore turn upon the accuracy and correctness of their respective calculations as to the quantum of force necessary to effect these objects.

(Mr. Giles' Speech to be Continued.)

FROM THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER—EXTRA.

Washington City, Jan. 17, 1812.

The following Message was yesterday transmitted by the President to both houses of Congress:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

I communicate to Congress a letter from the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Great Britain to the secretary of state, with the answer of the latter.

The continued evidence, afforded in this correspondence, of the hostile policy of the British government against our national rights, strengthens the considerations, recommending and urging the preparation of adequate means for maintaining them.

JAMES MADISON.

Washington, Jan 16, 1812.

MR. FOSTER TO MR. MONROE.

Washington, December 17, 1811.

SIR—I did not mean to have written to you at this moment on the subject of our late correspondence, but I have had the mortification to perceive statements, circulated from highly respectable sources, which gave a view of the pretensions of Great Britain relative to the United States, not warranted by any of the letters which I had the honor to address to you, and which at a time when dissussions are continuing so important to the two countries, might, if left unrectified, produce an effect highly to be lamented by both the American and British governments, inasmuch as by creating unnecessary irritation, they might throw obstacles in the way of restoration of a friendly understanding between them.

I find it asserted in the statement referred to, that I have, in the name of my government, demanded that the United States government should pass a law for the introduction of British goods into the American ports, and also that the United States should undertake to force entrance to receive into her harbors British manufactures.

I beg permission, sir, to declare that neither of these demands have been made by me, and that my meaning must not have been understood, if such was conceived to have been its import. I could not have demanded the passage of such a law as above stated, because my government does not pretend to interfere with the internal government of a friendly power, nor did I mean to demand that America should force France to receive our manufactures.

All I meant to say was, that the admission of French commerce while that of England has been excluded from the United States' ports, was regarded by Great Britain as highly unfriendly in America, and that a continuance of such policy would be retaliated upon by Great Britain, with similar restrictions on her part, which was so far merely an offering of like for like. But while the American non importation act excludes British trade from the United States' ports, it must be recollected that it goes still further and excludes also British armed ships from American ports, while it admits those of the enemies of Great Britain. "A neutral nation is responsible for the equality of its rules of conduct towards the belligerent powers" (to use the words of an American secretary of state in the year 1796) and therefore the part of the law which establishes an inequality was justly an object of more serious complaint on the part of Great Britain. You are aware, sir, of the advantages which his majesty's enemies have derived from this state of inequality, which enables them, though possessing no port in this hemisphere, continually to prey on the trade of his majesty's subjects, secure of a refuge for their cruizers and their prizes.

The prohibition of entry to his majesty's ships under these circumstances, might, perhaps, justify Great Britain in asserting, that whatever reason she may have for repealing or modifying her orders in council, so as to lessen or entirely remove the pressure now unavoidably laid on the trade of America as a neutral nation, she might yet refuse to enter into any discussion on that subject with the United States, until either by the revocation of the prohibition above stated, or the placing all the belligerents under the same prohibition, America should cease to violate the duties of a neutral nation.

With respect however, to the supposed demand that America should force the entry of British manufactures into France it is most particularly necessary that I should explain myself, as a total misconception appears to have taken place upon this point. The question of retaliation on the French Decrees is directly one between England and France. In consequence of the extraordinary blockade of England, we have in our defence been obliged to blockade France & prohibit all trade in French articles in return for the prohibition of France of all trade in English articles.—This measure of retaliation, it is wished, should operate on France alone, but from the trade carried on with France by America, it unavoidably operates also on her; it is a measure to destroy the French trade in return for similar measures of France on which it is retaliatory, and its acting on neutrals is an incidental effect of it, consequent upon the submission of neutrals to the original measures of the enemy against Great Britain. It is, indeed, melancholy that the unnatural situation of Europe should produce such a result, but I cannot see how this can be considered as war on American commerce, when all other American trade but that which is carried on with our enemy's ports in defiance of a blockade authorised by the laws of nations is unaffected by it. We complain that America does not resist the regulations of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, and object to permitting the French to trade with her during their continuance against the commerce of England; but this is not exacting, as has been represented, that America should force British manufactures into France, it is pursuing only a just course of retaliation on our enemy. If America wishes to trade with France, if French commerce is of importance to her; we expect she would exact of France to trade with her as she has a right to demand in her quality of neutral; but if she does not chuse to exercise this right, all we ask is, that she should abstain from lending her assistance to the trade of France, & not allow her commerce to be a medium of undermining the resources of Great Britain.

I have thought it necessary thus to endeavor to set these two points in their true light, the repeal of the law was asked, as being an unfriendly measure, partial in its operation against Great Britain, and a prospect of retaliation was held out on its commercial operation if continued. This is no demand on the United States to admit British manufactures; they are at liberty to continue that law, only as it is of an unfriendly nature, some restrictions of a similar kind was to be expected from England; and with respect to the alledged demand for forcing British goods, the property of neutrals, into French ports, if the United States are willing to acquiesce in the regulations of the French Decrees unlawfully affecting England, thro' them they cannot surely be surprised if we consider ourselves as at liberty to refuse permission to the French to profit by that acquiescence.

I will now, sir, take the opportunity of stating to you, that I have received from his majesty's secretary of state, the correspondence of which you did me the honor to transmit to me a copy in your letter dated October 17. My government have not been able to see in it satisfactory proof of the repeal of the French Decrees, and doubt whether the trade carried on by licences between France and America will not be regarded, even here, as proof of the continuation of them in their fullest extent, for if they were to any extent repealed, to that extent at least no licences should be necessary, a licence being given to allow what but for that licence would be prohibited.

The continued absence hitherto of any instrument by which the repeal has been effected, is a matter also of surprise, for if there were any fair dealing in the transaction, no reason can be given by France for not producing it; it is very desirable that it should be produced, if such an instrument be in existence, in order that we may know to what extent the Decrees have been repealed, if they really have been so in any respect. Mr. Russell, however, does not appear to have been in possession of it at the date of his letter of last July. It is indeed become particularly interesting, that we should see this instrument, since the publication of Mr. Russell's correspondence with his own government, by which it appears that really, and in fact, the French government did not release any American ships taken after November 1, until they had become acquainted with the President's proclamation and that vessels have been taken so late as December 21, in the direct voyage from this country to London; for until a copy of such instrument is produced, it is impossible to know whether any other trade is allowed by France, than that between her own dominions and the ports of the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.
AUG. J. FOSTER.

MR. MONROE TO MR. FOSTER.

Department of State Jan. 14, 1812.

SIR—I have had the honor to receive your letter of Dec. 17th, and I embrace the first moment that I could command, to make the observations which it suggests.

It would have afforded great satisfaction to the president, to have found in the communication, some proof of a disposition, in the British government to put an end to the differences subsisting between our countries. I am sorry to be obliged to state, that it presents a new proof only of its determination to adhere to the policy, to which they are imputable.

You complain that the import of your former letters has been misunderstood in two important circumstances: that you have been represented to have demanded of the United States, a law for the introduction of British goods into their ports, and that they should also undertake to force France to receive British manufactures into their harbors.

You state that on the first, point, it was your intention to remonstrate against the non-importation act, as partial in its operation, and unfriendly to Great Britain, on which account its repeal was claimed, and to intimate that if it was persevered in, Great Britain would be compelled to retaliate on the United States, by similar restrictions on her part. And on the second point, that you intended only to urge, that in consequence of their extraordinary blockade of England, your government had been obliged to blockade France, and to prohibit all trade in French articles, in return for the prohibition by France of all trade in English articles.