wanted nothing *for ourselves*, no, not we. That was not in our nature. What we wanted was, the *deliverance of Europe*. But, now, behold, when Europe is delivered, and the powers of Europe declare what will satisfy them, we start up and say: 'Aye, but that will not satisfy us!'——It is useless to continue the subject further at present. A short time will show what the real views of the several governments are, and we shall then have something more authentic whereon to comment.

FROM NILES'S WEEKLY REGISTER.

THE ARMED NEUTRALITY OF 1780.

The Editor of the REGISTER believes that the following important papers, which should belong to this work of *reference*, will, at the present moment, be doubly acceptable to his readers.

"*The declaration of the King of Denmark and Norway to the Courts of London, Versailles and Madrid.*

"If the most exact and perfect neutrality, with the most regular navigation, and the most inviolable respect to treaties, could have exempted the commerce of the subjects of the king of Denmark and Norway from the inroads of the powers with whom he is at peace, and kept it free and independent, it would not be necessary to take measures to insure to his subjects that liberty to which they have the most incontrovertible right. The king of Denmark has always found his glory, and his grandeur, upon the esteem and confidence of other nations.——It has been his rule, from the beginning of his reign, to testify to all the powers, his friends, a conduct the most capable of convincing them of his pacific intentions, and of his desire to contribute to the general happiness of Europe. His proceedings have always been conformable to these principles, against which nothing can be alleged, he has, till now, only addressed himself to the powers at war, to obtain a redress of his grievances; and he has never wanted moderation in his demands, nor acknowledgements when they received the success they deserved; but the neutral navigation has been too often molested, and the most innocent commerce of his subjects too frequently disturbed; so that the king finds himself obliged to take proper measures to assure to himself and his allies the safety of commerce and navigation, and the maintenance of the inseparable rights of liberty and independence. If the duties of neutrality are sacred, the law of nations has also its rights avowed by all impartial powers, established by custom, and founded upon equity and reason. A nation independent and neutral, does not loose by the war of others the rights which she had before the war, because peace exists between her and all the belligerent powers. Without receiving or being obliged to follow the laws of either of them, she is allowed to follow, in all places (contraband excepted) the traffic which she would have a right to carry on, if peace existed with all Europe, as it exists with her. The king pretends to nothing beyond what the neutrality allows him. This is his rule, and that of his people: and the king cannot accede to the principle, that a power at war has a right to interrupt the commerce of his subjects. He thinks it due to himself, and to his subjects, the faithful observers of these rules, and to the powers at war themselves, to declare to them the following principles, which he has always held, and which he will always avow and maintain, in concert with the empress of the Russias, whose sentiments he finds entirely conformable with his own.

"I. That neutral vessels have a right to navigate freely from port to port, even on the coasts of the powers at war.

"II. That the effects of the subjects of the powers at war shall be free in neutral vessels, except such as are deemed contraband.

"III. That nothing is to be understood under the denominations of contraband, that it is not expressly mentioned as such in the third article of his treaty of commerce with G. Britain in the year 1670, and the 26th and 27th articles of his treaty of commerce with France, in the year 1742; and the King will equally maintain these rules with those powers with whom he has no treaty.

"IV. That he will look upon that as a Fort blocked up, into which no vessel can enter without evident danger, on account of vessels of war so stationed there as to form an effectual blockade.

"V. That these principles shall serve for rules in law proceeding, and that justice shall be expeditiously rendered, by the maritime regulations, conformably to treaty and usage received.

"VI. His majesty does not hesitate to declare, that he will maintain these principles with the honor of his flag, and the liberty and independence of the commerce and navigation of his subjects; and that it is for this purpose he has armed a part of his navy, although he is desirous to preserve, with all the powers at war, not only a good understanding, but all the friendship of which the neutrality can admit. The king will never recede from these principles, unless he is forced to it: he knows his duties and his obligations, he respects them as he does his treaties, and desires no other than to maintain them. His majesty is persuaded, that the belligerent powers will acknowledge the justness of his motives; that they may be as averse as himself to do any thing that will oppress the liberties of mankind, and that they will give their orders to their admiralty and to their officers, conformably to the principles above recited, which tend to the general happiness and interest of all Europe.

"*Copenhagen, July 9, 1780.*

"*A copy of the maritime treaty between the Empress of Russia and the King of Denmark, acceded to by the King of Sweden, and the States General of the United Provinces.*

"I. Their respective majesties are fully and sincerely determined to keep upon the most friendly terms with the present belligerent powers, and preserve the most exact neutrality: they solemnly declare their firm intention to be, that their respective subjects shall strictly observe the laws forbidding all contraband trade with the powers now being, or that may hereafter be, concerned in the present disputes.

"II. To prevent all equivocation or misunderstanding of the word contraband, their imperial and royal majesties declare, that the meaning of the said word is solely restrained to such goods and commodities as are mentioned under that denomination in the treaties subsisting between their said majesties and either of the belligerent powers. Her imperial majesty abiding principally by the Xth and XIth articles of the treaty of commerce with Great Britain; the conditions therein mentioned, which are founded on the right of nations, being understood to extend to the kings of France and Spain; as there is at present no specific treaty of commerce between the two latter and the former. His Danish majesty, on his part, regulates his conduct in this particular by the first article of his treaty with England, and XXVIth and XXVIIth of that subsisting between his said majesty and the king of France, extending the provisions made in the latter to the Catholic king; there being no treaty *ad hoc*, between Denmark and Spain.

"III. And whereas by this means the word *contraband*, conformable to the treaties now extant, and the stipulations made between the contracting powers, and those that are now at war, is fully explained; especially by the treaty between Russia and England of the 20th June, 1766; between the latter and Denmark, of the 11th of July, 1670; and between their Danish and most christian majesties of August 25d, 1742; the will and opinion of the high contracting powers are, that all other trade whatsoever shall be deemed and remain free and unrestrained.

"By the declaration delivered to the belligerent powers, their contracting majesties have already challenged the privileges founded on natural rights whence springs the freedom of trade and navigation, as well as the right of neutral powers; and being fully determined not to depend in future merely on an arbitrary interpretation devised to answer some private advantages or concerns, they have mutually covenanted as follows:

"First, That it will be lawful for any ship whatever to sail freely from one port to another, or along the coast of the powers now at war.—2ndly, That all merchandize and effects belonging to the subjects of the said belligerent powers, and shipped on neutral bottoms, shall be entirely free; except contraband goods.—3dly, In order to ascertain what constitutes the blockade of any place or port, it is to be understood to be in such predicament, when the assailing power has taken such a station as to expose to imminent danger any ship or ships that would attempt to sail in or out of the said ports.—4thly, No neutral ships shall be stopped without a material and well grounded cause: and in such cases justice shall be done to them without loss of time; and besides indemnifying, each and every time, the party agrieved, and thus stopped without sufficient cause, full satisfaction shall be given to the high contracting powers for the insult offered to their flag.

"IV. In order to protect officially the general trade of their respective subjects, on the fundamental principles aforesaid, her imperial, and his royal majesty have thought proper, for effecting such purpose, each respectively to fit out a proportionate quota of ships of war and frigates. The squadron of each of the contracting powers shall be stationed in a proper latitude, and shall be employed in escorting convoys according to the particular circumstances of the navigators and trades of each nation.

"V. Should any of the merchantmen belonging to the subjects of the contracting powers sail in a latitude where shall be no ships of war of their own nation, and thus be deprived of the said protection; in such case, the commander of the squadron belonging to the other friendly power shall, at the request of such merchantmen, grant them sincerely, and *bona fide*, all necessary assistance. The ships of war and frigates, of either of the contracting powers, shall thus protect and assist the merchantmen of the other: provided nevertheless, that under the sanction of such required assistance and protection, no contraband be carried on, nor any prohibited trade contrary to the laws of the neutrality.

"VI. The present convention cannot be supposed to have any relative effect; that is, to extend to any differences that may have arisen since its being concluded; unless the controversy should spring from continual vexations which might tend to aggrieve and oppress all the nations of Europe.

"VII. If notwithstanding the cautious and friendly care of the contracting powers, and their steady adherence to an exact neutrality, the Russian and Danish merchantmen should happen to be insulted, pillaged, or captured, by any of the armed ships or privateers belonging to any of the belligerent powers: in such case the ambassador or envoy of the aggrieved party, to the offending court, shall claim such ship or ships insisting on a proper satisfaction, and never neglect to obtain a reparation for the insult offered to the flag of his court. The minister of the other contracting power shall at the same time in the most efficacious and vigorous manner, defend such requisition, which shall be supported by parties with unanimity. But in case of any refusal, or even delay in redressing the grievances complained of; then their majesties will retaliate against the power that shall thus refuse to do them justice, and immediately agree together on the most proper means of making well founded reprisals.

"VIII. In case either of the contracting powers, or both, at the same time, should be in any manner aggrieved or attacked, in consequence of the present convention, or for any reason relating thereto; it is agreed, that both powers will join, act in concert for their mutual defence, and unite their forces in order to procure to themselves an adequate and perfect satisfaction, both in regard to the insult put upon their respective flags, and the losses suffered by their subjects.

"IX. This convention shall remain in force for and during the continuance of the present war; and the obligation enforced thereby, will serve as the ground work of all treaties that may be set on foot hereafter: according to future occurrences, and on the breaking out of any fresh maritime wars which might unhappily disturb the tranquility of Europe. Meanwhile, all that is hereby agreed upon shall be deemed as binding and permanent, in regard both to mercantile and naval affairs, and shall have the force of law in determining the rights of neutral nations.

"X. The chief aim and principal object of the present convention being to secure the freedom of trade and navigation, the high contracting powers have antecedently agreed, and do engage to give it to all other neutral powers free leave to accede to the present treaty, and, after a thorough knowledge of the principles on which it rests, share equally in the obligations and advantages thereof.

"XI. In order that the powers, now at war, may not be ignorant of the strength and nature of the engagements entered into by the courts aforesaid; the high contracting parties shall give notice, in the most friendly manner, to the belligerent powers, of the measures by them taken; by which, far from meaning any manner of hostility, or causing any loss or injury to other powers, their chief intentions is to protect the trade and navigation of their respective subjects.

"XII. This convention shall be ratified by the contracting powers, and the ratifications interchanged between the parties in due form, within the space of six weeks, from the day of its being signed, or even sooner if possible. In witness whereof, and by virtue of the full powers granted us for the purpose, we have put our hands and seals to the present treaty.

"Given at Copenhagen, July the 19th, 1780.

(Signed)
CHARLES D'OSTEN, called SOKEN.
S. SCHACK RATLAU,
A. P. COMPTE BERNSTORFF,
O. THOFT,
H. EIKSTEDT.

"Acceded to, and signed by the Plenipotentaries of the court of Sweden, at Petersburgh, the 21st of July, 1780, and by the States General accepted November 20, 1780, and signed at Petersburgh, January 5, 1781, with the addition only of article

"XIII. If the respective squadrons, or ships of war, should meet or unite, to act in conjunction, the command in chief will be regulated according to what is commonly practised between the crown heads an the republic."

BATTLE WITH THE CREEKS.

Copy of a letter from Gen. JACKSON, of the Tennessee Volunteers to General Pinckney.

Head Quarters, Fort Strother,
January 29, 1814.

Maj. Gen. Thos. Pinckney.

SIR—I had the honour of informing you in a letter of the 31st ult. forwarded by Mr. M'Candless [express] of an excursion I contemplated making still further in the enemy's country, with the new raised volunteers from Tennessee. I had ordered these troops to form a junction with me on the 10th inst. but they did not arrive until the 11th. Their number, including officers, was about 800; and on the 15th I marched them across the River to graze their horses. On the next day I followed with the remainder of my force consisting of the Artillery Company with one 6 pounder, one Company of Infantry of 48 men, two companies of spies, commanded by Capts. Gordon and Russel, of about 30 men each, and a company of Volunteer Officers, headed by Gen. Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men, and who still remained in the field awaiting the order of the government: making my force, exclusive of Indians, 930.

The motives which influenced me to penetrate still farther into the enemy's country, with this force, were many and urgent. The term of service of the new raised volunteers was short, and a considerable part of it was expired; they were expensive to the government, and were full of order to meet the enemy. The ill effects of keeping soldiers of this description long stationary and idle, I had been made to feel but too sensibly already—other causes concurred to make such a movement not only justifiable but absolutely necessary. I had received a letter from Capt. M'Alpin of the 5th inst. who commanded at Fort Armstrong in the absence of Col. Snodgrass, informing me, that 14 or 15 towns of the enemy, situated on the waters of the Tallapoosa, were about uniting their forces and attack that place, which had been left in a very feeble state of defence. You had in your letter of the 24th ult. informed me that Gen. Floyd was about to make a movement to the Tallapoosa near its junction with the Coosee; and in the same letter and recommended temporary excursions against such of the enemy's towns or settlements as might be within striking distance, as well to prevent my men from becoming discontented as to harrass the enemy. Your ideas corresponded exactly with my own, and I was happy in the opportunity of keeping my men engaged, distressing the enemy, and and at the same time making a diversion to facilitate the operations of General Floyd.

Determined by these and other considerations, I took up the line of march on the 17th inst. and on the night of the 18th encamped at Talledaga Fort, where I was joined by between 2 and 300 friendly Indians: 65 of which were Cherokees, the balance Creeks. Here I received your letter of the 9th inst. stating that General Floyd was expected to make a movement from Cowetau the next day, and that in 10 days thereafter he would establish a firm position at Tuckabatchee; and also a letter from Col. Snodgrass, who had returned to Fort Armstrong, informed me that an attack was intended to be soon made on that Fort by 900 of the enemy. If I could have hesitated before, I could now hesitate no longer. I resolved to loose no time in meeting this force, which was understood to have been collected from New Yoreau, Oakfuskee and Ufauley towns, and were concentrated in a head of the Tallapoosa, near the mouth of a Creek called Emuckfau, and on an Island below New Yoreau.

On the morning of the 20th your letter of the 10th inst. forwarded by M'Candless, reached me at the Hillabee creek, and that night I encamped at Emuckfau.—Here I began to perceive very plainly how little knowledge my spies had of the country, of the situation of the enemy, or the distance I was from them. The insubordination of the new troops, and the want of skill in most of their officers, also became more and more apparent. But their order to meet the enemy was not diminished; and I had a sure reliance upon the Guards, and the company of old Volunteer officers, and upon the Spies, in all about 125.—My wishes and my duty remained united, and I was determined to effect, if possible, the objects for which the excursion had been principally undertaken.

On the morning of the 21st, I marched from Enotachepco, as direct as I could for the bend of the Tallapoosee & about 2 o'clock, P. M. my spies endeavored to overtake them, but failed. In the evening I fell in upon a large trail, which led to a new road, much beaten, and lately travelled. Knowing that I must have arrived within the neighborhood of a strong force, and it being late in the day, I determined to encamp, and reconnoitre the country in the night. I chose the best scite the country would admit, encamped in a hollow square, sent out my spies and pickets, doubled my centinels and made the necessary arrangements before dark for a night attack. About 10 o'clock at night, one of the pickets fired at 3 of the enemy, and killed one, but he was not found until the next day. At 11 o'clock, the spies whom I had sent out, returned with the information, that there was a large encampment of Indians, at the distance of about 3 miles, who, from their whooping and dancing, seemed to be apprized of our approach.——One of these spies, an Indian, in whom I had great confidence, assured me that they were carrying off their women and children, and that the warriors could either make their escape, or attack me before day.—Being prepared at all points, nothing remained to be done but to await their approach, if they meditated an attack, or to be in readiness, if they did not, to pursue and attack them at day light. While we were in this state of readiness, the enemy, about 5 o'clock in the morning, commenced a vigorous attack on my left flank, which was vigorously met; the action continued to rage on my left flank, and on the left on my rear for about half an hour. The brave Gen. Coffee, with Col. Sittler, the Adjt. Gen. and Col. Carroll, (the Inspector General) the moment the firing commenced, mounted their horses and repaired to the line, encouraging and animating the men to the performance of their duty. So soon as it became light enough to pursue, the left wing having sustained the heat of the action, and being somewhat weakened, was reinforced by Capt. Ferrill's company of infantry, and was ordered and led on to the charge by Gen. Coffee, who was well supported by Col. Higgins and the Inspector General, and by all the officers and privates who composed that line.—The enemy was completely routed at every point, and the friendly Indians joining in pursuit, they were chased about 2 miles with considerable slaughter.

The chase being over, I immediately detached Gen. Coffee, with 400 men and all the Indian force, to burn their encampment; but it was said by some, to be fortified. I ordered him, in that event, not to attack it, until the artillery could be sent forward to reduce it. On viewing the encampment and its strength, the General tho't it more prudent to return to my encampment and guard the artillery thither. The wisdom of this step was soon discovered——in half an hour after his return to camp, a considerable force of the enemy made its appearance of my right flank, and commenced a brisk fire on a party of men who had been on picket guard the night before, and were then in search of the Indians they had fired upon, some of whom they believe had been killed. General Coffee immediately requested me to let him take 200 men and turn their left flank which I accordingly ordered; but, tho' some mistake, which I did not then observe, not more than 54 followed him, among them were the old volunteer officers. With these, however, he immediately commenced an attack on the left flank of the enemy; at which time I ordered 200 of the friendly Indians, to fall in upon the right flank of the enemy, and co-operate with the General. This order was promptly obeyed, and in the moment of its execution, what I expected was realized. The enemy had intended the attack on the right as a feint, and, expecting to direct all my attention thither, meant to attack me again, and with their main force on the left flank, which they had hoped to find weakened and in disorder.——They were disappointed. I had ordered the left flank to remain firm to its place, and the moment the alarm gun was heard in that quarter, I repaired thither, and ordered Captain Ferrill, part of my reserve, to support it. The whole line met the approach of the enemy, with astonishing intrepidity, and having given a few fires, they forthwith charged with great vigor—The effect was immediate and inevitable.——The enemy fled with precipitation, and were pursued to a considerable distance, by the left flank and the friendly Indians, with a galling & destructive fire. Col. Carroll, who ordered the charge, led on the pursuit, and Col. Higgins and his regiment, again distinguished themselves.

In the mean time, General Coffee was contending with a superior force of the enemy. The Indians who I had ordered to his support, and who had set out for this purpose, hearing the firing on the left, had returned to that quarter, and when the enemy were routed, there entered into the chase. That being now over, I forthwith ordered Jim Fife, who was one of the principal commanders of the friendly Creeks, with 100 of his warriors, to execute my order; so soon as he reached General Coffee, the charge was made, and the enemy routed; they were pursued about 3 miles, and 45 of them slain, who were found. Gen. Coffee was wounded in the body, & his aid-de-camp, A. Donaldson, killed together with 3 others. Having bro't in and buried the dead, and dressed the wounded; I ordered my camp to be fortified, to be the better prepared to repel any attack that might be made in the night; determined to recommence a return march to Fort Strother the following day.——Many causes concurred to make such a measure necessary, as I had not set out prepared, or with a view to make a permanent establishment.

I considered it worse than useless to advance and destroy an empty encampment. I had, indeed, hoped to have met the enemy there, but having met and beaten them a little sooner, I did not think it necessary or prudent to proceed further: Not necessary, because I had accomplished all I could expect to effect by marching to their encampment—and because if it was proper to contend with and weaken their forces still further, this object would be more certainly attained by commencing a return, which, having to them the appearance of a retreat, would inspirit them to pursue me: Not prudent, because of the number of my wounded—of the reinforcements from below, which the enemy might be expected to receive—of the starving condition of my horses, they having had neither corn nor cane for two days and nights—of the scarcity of supplies for my men, the Indians who joined me at Talledega having drawn none, and being wholly destitute; and because, if the enemy pursued me, as it was likely they would, the diversion in favour of Gen. Floyd would be more complete and effectual. Influenced by these considerations, I commenced my return march at half after ten on the 23d, and was fortunate enough to reach Enotachepco before night, having passed without interruption, a dangerous defile, occasioned by a hurricane. I again fortified my camp, and having another defile to pass in the morning, across a deep creek, and between two hills, which I had viewed with attention as I passed on, and where I expected I might be attacked, I determined to pass it at another point, and gave directions to my guide and fatigue men accordingly. My expectation of an attack in the morning was increased by the signs of the night, and with it my caution. Before I moved the wounded from the interior of the camp, I had my front and rear guards formed, as well as my right and left columns, and moved off my centre in regular order, leading down a handsome ridge to Enotachopco creek, at a point where it was clear of reed, except immediately on its margin. I had previously issued a general order, pointing out the manner in which the men should be formed in the event of an attack on the front or rear, or on the flanks, and had particularly cautioned the officers to halt and form accordingly, the instant the word should be given.

The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering the creek, when an alarm gun was heard in the rear. I heard it without surprize, and even with pleasure, calculating with the utmost confidence on the