WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 26.

RODGERS's CRUIZE.

Copy of a letter from Comm. Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy.

United States Frigate President,
Sandy Hook Bay, Feb. 19, 1814.

SIR,

I have to acquaint you that I arrived at my present anchorage last evening at 5 o'clock, after a cruize of 75 days, and now have the honour to detail to you the particulars.

In pursuance of your directions, I sailed from Providence the 5th of December; and although I expected to have run the gauntlet through the enemy's squadron, that was reported to be cruizing between Block Island and Gayhead for the purpose of intercepting the President, I had the good luck to avoid them. The day after leaving Providence, I re-captured the American sch'r Comet, of and bound to New York, with a cargo of cotton, from Savannah, which had been captured by the Ramilies and Loire, and in their possession about 43 hours. In a few hours after recapturing the Comet, a sail was discovered to the eastward, which I felt inclined to avoid, from the circumstance of the weather being hazy, and knowing that I was in the neighbourhood of the enemy's squadron; from an advantage of wind, she was enabled, however, to gain our lee beam at a distance of 3 or 4 miles, owing to which I was induced to shorten sail, with the intention of offering her battle in the morning, should nothing else be in sight, and she not a ship of the line. The weather becoming more obscure at 2 o'clock, prevented our seeing her until daylight, when she stood from us to the N. E. although the President was hove too to let her come up. From this date until the 25th, we did not see a single sail, except the Recovery (a brig belonging and bound to Penobscot, from St. Bartholemew in ballast) until after reaching the long. 35, and lat. 19, being carried that far eastward by a severe S. W. gale, accompanied by such a heavy sea, as to render heaving too impracticable without infinite risk, when two large sails were discovered standing to the northward, and to which I gave chace, believing, as well from the situation in which they were first discovered, as the manifest disposition they afterwards shewed to avoid a separation, that one was a frigate and the other an Indiaman under her convoy; in this I was mistaken, for on a nearer approach I could discover the headmost was a frigate with 7 ports abaft her gangway, and the other a ship of equal or little inferior force; on discovering their decided superiority, and supposing them to be enemy's ships, I endeavoured during the succeeding night to separate them by steering different courses and occasionally shewing a light: but was unable to succeed, for the headmost at one time was so near that she fired a shot over us, whilst her consort was but a few hundred yards astern of her. I now directed our course to be altered, made sail, and continued the remainder of the night to shew them a light occasionally, but to no effect, as at day light they were discovered to be in a situation to unite their force. After this I shaped a course to reach a position to windward of Barbadoes, on a parallel of longitude with Cayenne, and did not meet another vessel 'till the 30th, when falling in with a Portuguese brig, and receiving information that she had been boarded 36 hours before by 2 British store ships bound to the West Indies with 300 troops on board, I crouded sail to the westward in the hope of overtaking them; in this I was again disappointed, and after a pursuit of four days, hauled further southward to gain the latitude of Barbadoes; and in that situation on the 5th of January, captured the British merchant ship Wanderer of 7 guns and 16 men, from London bound to Jamaica, partly loaded with plantation stores, and after taking from her such light articles as were of most value sunk her. In the same position on the 7th, I fell in with the British merchant ship Prince George in the character of a cartel with prisoners, which with four other British vessels had been captured by two French 44 gun frigates, the Medusa and Nymph, the same ships I had fallen in with 14 days before. On board of the Pr. George I sent the prisoners captured in the Wanderer to Barbadoes on parole. On the 9th of January, while still to windward of Barbadoes, I captured the ship Edward of 6 guns and 8 men, from London bound to Laguira, in ballast, which vessel I also sunk. Having learnt from the master of the Edward as those of the Wanderer and Prince George, that they had been separated in the Bay of Biscay from their convoy, consisting of the Queen 74, two frigates, and two sloops of war, I was induced, owing to a belief that the convoy was still to the eastward, to remain to windward of Barbadoes until the 16th of January, when finding they must have passed, I changed my ground and ran off Cayenne, and from thence down the coast of Surinam, Berbicke and Demerara, through between Tobago and Grenada; thence through the Carrabean Sea; along the south east side of Portorico, thro the Mona Passage, down the north side of Jamaica and other leward islands, without meeting a single vessel of the enemy, or any other than 4 Spanish droggers and one Swedish ship, until I got near the Manilla reef; near which, after capturing and sinking the British schooner Jonathan, loaded with rum and dry goods, (the most valuable part of which I took on board) I hauled ever for the Florida shore and struck soundings off St. Augustine, and from thence run on soundings as far as Charleston, passing within 2 or 3 miles of Columbia Island, and as near to Savannah as the weather and depth of water would allow, without meeting a single vessel except a Spanish ship from the Havanna, bound to Spain, but steering for Savannah, in consequence of having sprung a leak.

Arriving off Charleston, (which was on the 11th inst.) I stretched close in with the Bar, and made the private signal of the day to two schooners lying in Rebellion Roads, and which from their appearance I believe to be public vessels. After remaining all day off the Bar with colors hoisted and the beforementioned signal displayed, without being able to communicate with the schooners, I stood to the northward, and at 7 o'clock the next morning discovered and chased a ship to the southward, which, after pursuing 8 or 9 miles, led me to a second sail, (a brig under her topsails, with her top-gallant masts housed and flying-gib boom rigged in) and from thence to the discovery of a third sail, represented from the mast head to be a large frigate; on discovering the third sail, added to the manœuvres of the first and second, I was induced to believe part of an enemy's squadron, and accordingly hauled up and stood for the former, to ascertain her character; and after making her from the deck, perceived she was a frigate as reported. I now tacked and shortened sail, believing that towards night I might be enabled to cut of the ship (which was either a small frigate or large sloop of war) and brig, from the third or largest sail, at this time 9 or 10 miles to windward; in this however, I was not able to effect my purpose, owing to the weather sail (between sunset and dark) bearing down for the others. Judging now from the manœuvres that after dark they would chase, I stood to the eastward under short sail; believing that in the morning I might find them in some disorder; at day light, however, owing to the haziness of the weather, they were not to be seen; consequently, I wore and stood back to the westward to make them again, and in a few minutes discovered two (one on the lee, the other on the weather bow) to which I gave chace, but after chasing them about half an hour, the weather becoming more clear saw two large ships making their appearance (one on the weather and the other on the lee beam) I changed my course to the eastward, when the four immediately crowded sail in pursuit; but, owing to the weather, assisted by the enemy's manner of chasing, I was enabled to get clear of them without difficulty in a few hours. From this I pursued a course on soundings (except in doubling Cape Hatteras) to eighteen fathom water off the Delaware, where, in a fog, I fell in with a large vessel, apparently a man of war. Shortened sail to topsails and cleared ship for action, but she suddenly disappearing and in a few minutes She, or some other vessel near, being heard to fire signal guns, I stood on to the northward, from a belief I was near another squadron. From the Delaware I saw nothing until I made Sandy Hook, when I again fell in with another of the enemy's squadrons, and by some unaccountable cause was permitted to enter the Bay, although in the presence of a decidedly superior force, after having been obliged to remain outside seven hours and a half waiting for the tide.

I am, &c.
JOHN RODGERS.

Hon. WILLIAM JONES,
Secretary of the Navy.

CHILICOTHE, (O.) FEB. 15.

BRITISH PLOT.

On Friday last, information which could be depended on, was received by Col. John B. Campbell, commanding the U. States troops in this State, that the British prisoners encamped in this neighborhood, had laid a plan to rescue their officers from the custody of the Marshal; and with them, to force their way into Canada ---From what we have been able to learn, it appears that a correspondence had been kept up between the officers and the men, ever since the last confinement of the former, in which it had been decided that the latter should rise upon their guard in the night, seize their arms, and after releasing their officers, to set fire to the town, and then proceed to some part of the British dominions. This attempt, desperate as it may appear, might probably have been carried into execution, had it not been for the timely interposition of Providence. Two of the British officers, Lieuts. Stokoe and Purvis, disclosed their intentions, under an injunction of secrecy, to a gentleman of this town, who, being a federalist, they considered as a common friend. This gentleman, however, having collected all the necessary information, acquainted Col. Campbell therewith, who, with the concurrence of Governor Meigs, gave immediate orders to put the British officers in irons; the prisoners' guard was doubled; the militia were called out, and remained on duty the whole night; and every precaution taken to avert the impending danger. These vigorous measures had the desired effect. Order was quickly restored; and the hopes of the prisoners soon vanished. Since the discovery of the plot, the British officers have freely acknowledged it; & say that they gave information thereof to one of our fellow citizens, because they knew that if the attempt was made its consequences would have proved most fatal to themselves. Much credit is certainly due to Col. Campbell for his zeal and activity on this occasion.

Yesterday afternoon, the British officers who were in confinement here, were sent to Frankfort, (Ky.) under a strong escort.

FROM THE BOSTON PALLADIUM.

LETTER FROM MR. DEXTER.

TO THE ELECTORS OF MASSACHUSETTS.

THE delicate propriety established by usage, in our country, forbids that a man, standing as candidate for office, should address the Electors. If the subscriber had consented to being placed in that situation, this rule would bind him to silence. Though he answered while at home, that he was not a candidate for office, republican newspapers in the vicinity of the seat of government, where he now is, have published an opposite statement.

This singular state of things seems to require an explanation. In performing this duty, he may dissent from some favourite doctrines and measures of men, high in influence and respectability in both the political parties that now divide the country. Candid men will not attribute this to any indirect or unworthy motive; the others, when their intellectual optics are stimulated by passion, or darkened by prejudice, will see some mischievous purpose in a mere attempt to be understood in his own conduct, and to explain his objections to that of others.

Hopeless, indeed, would be an effort to acquire influence, by pursuing a course offensive to the leaders of both the parties that convulse the nation. Such active spirits have both power and inclination to diminish any man in public estimation, who opposes the projects of their ambition, while the native *vis inertiæ* of real patriotism prevents support from those quiet citizens, who agree with him in opinion.

The principal subjects, on which politicians at present divide, are the system of restriction on our Commerce, and the war with G. Britain. On the former, the writer differs radically from the party called republican, and he chuses they should know it. At the same time he is utterly unable to reconcile some of the leading measures of Federalists, as to the latter, with the fundamental principles of civil society; and the indispensable duty of every citizen in all countries, but especially in the American Republic, to hold sacred the union of his country. It is this opinion, probably, that has produced the singular fact of his being nominated for the first office in the commonwealth, by a political party, to which he does not belong.

The objections against the restrictive system, which have governed his decision on it, shall be briefly stated, without stopping to offer arguments to prove them. He believes:

1st. That it overleaps the bounds of constitutional power.

2dly. That it is impossible to execute it.

3dly. That the attempt to do so corrupts us, by destroying the correct habits of our merchants, and rendering perjury familiar.

4thly. That it would be ineffectual to coerce foreign nations, if executed.

5thly. That it is unjust and oppressive to the commercial part of the community, as it destroys invaluable interests, which the government is bound to protect.

6thly. That it completely sacrifices our only considerable source of revenue, and reduces us to depend on a meagre supply from internal taxation, or to accumulate an enormous public debt by loans, procured on hard terms, which government has no adequate funds to reimburse.

7thly. That it aims a fatal blow at our unexampled progress in wealth and general improvement.

If these objections be well founded, none will deny that they are sufficient.—The proof of them would be too elaborate for the present occasion. A wise policy would not have resorted to an untried theory, so ruinous and inadequate, for redress of the serious aggressions we have suffered from the belligerent powers of Europe, in full view of the success, which had crowned more magnanimous efforts. Washington, by making firm & temperate remonstrance against the first unequivocal important violation of our national rights, induced Great Britain to make compensation: and during the administration of Adams, the pride of France was humbled by an appeal to arms.

This is the only mode which the experience of nations points out to guard against injury and insult accumulating by submission until the patient suffering country be annihilated or enslaved.

On the other hand, when the government were "kicked into a war," the writer did not feel himself at liberty to practice indiscriminate opposition, to paralize the public energy by degrading the resources and magnanimity of our country, and exaggerating those of Britain, to justice the public enemy in measures that admitted of no excuse, and thus diminish the chance for a speedy and honourable peace and endanger the union of the States. It is a fundamental law of every civil society, that when a question is settled by the constituted authority, every individual is bound to respect the decision. The momentous question, whether war was just and necessary, has been thus settled. Peace can only be restored by a treaty to which G. Britain shall assent, and reasonable terms are not to be obtained from her, by proving to the world that we are unable or unwilling to maintain our rights by the sword. The privilege of every citizen to examine the conduct of rulers is unquestionable, tho' in speaking to his country he may be overheard by her enemies.——But this right, like every other, may be abused. What good effect is to be expected from creating division when engaged in war with a powerful nation that has not yet explicitly shown that she is willing to agree to reasonable terms of Peace?—Why make publications and speeches to prove that we are absolved from allegiance to the national government, and hint that an attempt to divide the empire might be justified? But the writer goes further: he has never doubted that the British Orders in Council, when actually enforced, were a flagrant violation of our rights and national honor, & consequently a just cause of declaring war. As to the best time of performing this painful duty, and the best manner of conducting the war, he has differed from the Government, but surely they are competent to decide on these points, and private opinion, tho' it may be decently expressed, is bound to submit. On such occasions, regret for the refractory principle in our nature, which scatters thro' nations the misery, crimes and desolation of war, will rend the bosom of the benevolent man; but if he be also magnanimous and just, this will not tempt him to violate his duty, or repine at the arrangement of Heaven. The history of civil society proves that it is a terrible necessity, and man must submit to his destiny. Still greater evils are produced by pusillanimous shrinking from conformity to the mysterious law of his present condition.

The ferocious contest that would be the effect of attempting to skulk from a participation of the burthens of war, by severing the Union, would not be the greatest calamity. Yet fierce would be the conflict of enraged partizans, embittered by personal animosity and rivalry, organized under different governments, about equal in number, and viewing each other as traitors.

In Massachusetts, during the revolutionary war, an overwhelming majority silenced opposition, and prevented mutual havoc, but in other parts of the country, where parties were more nearly equal, neighbors often shot each other in their houses, or instantly hanged their prisoners. Divided as New England now is, such probably would be its warfare. Interminable hostility between neighbouring rival nations, would be the consequence of accomplishing such a severance. Foreign faction would convulse each of them; for a weak state can no more maintain its rights against powerful nations without foreign support, than a feeble man can defend himself amongst giants without laws to protect him.——The question would ever be, which powerful nation shall be our ally? G. Britain and France would each have a strong faction, but patriotism would be unknown. The energy of the State would be exhausted in chusing its master. This slavery would be aggravated by despotism at home, for constant wars would require great armies and resistless power in rulers, and these have ever been fatal to liberty.

If the question be asked, what is to be done, when we conscientiously believe that a ruinous course of measures is pursued by our national rulers, & the dearest rights and interests of a great part of the union disregarded and sacrificed, the answer is, examine the conduct and expose the errors of government, without preaching sedition. Give liberal support to their measures when right, that you may be credited when you show that they are wrong. Indiscriminate opposition raises no presumption against them, but it demonstrates that the minority are in fault. Truth is powerful & will command success; but error naturally tends to destruction. In every system, perfect enough to be capable of continued existence, a *vis medicatrix* exists that will restore it if not prevented by improper management. Quackery may prolong disease, and even destroy the political as well as the natural body. It is not difficult to point to the intrinsic principle of convalescence in our body politic; and to show that the redemption of New England is not only possible, but probable. The natural shape and division of political party would be very different from that which now exists. The eastern and southern Atlantic states are made for each other. A man and woman might as reasonably quarrel on account of the differences in their formation.—New England would soon be restored from nullity in the political system, if improper expedients for sudden relief were abandoned. Something may be done to accelerate its progress; but reproach and invective aggravate the raging of passion, & confirm prejudices which are already inveterate. Magnanimous moderation, candid discussion & experience of the evil consequences of Utopian projects, would do much to convince a majority of the community, that commerce is entitled to protection; that it is too valuable to the public to be sacrificed; that it is contradictory and unreasonable for the government to render great expenditures necessary by a declaration of war, and at the same time dry up the only productive source of revenue; to ask for a loan of twenty five millions, and at the same moment destroy the confidence of the commercial parts of the country, where only capital stock exists; to lay taxes sufficient to produce popular odium, but the product of which will be inadequate to relieve the public necessity; and to prosecute, at an enormous expence, a useless & hopeless invasion, without men or money, or credit, & with a disgusted people.—The resources and energy of a powerful nation ought not to be wasted in the wilderness, but thrown on the element where our wrongs were inflicted, and our brave countrymen have already repeatedly triumphed. They are adequate in teaching our enemies to imitate the justice of Jupiter, while they affect to scatter his thunderbolts.

SAMUEL DEXTER.

Washington, Feb. 14, 1814.

CONGRESS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2.

PROPOSED SUSPENSION OF THE EMBARGO.

Mr. *Wright of Md.* rose to submit a motion for consideration. He said, feeling, as he did, a perfect confidence in the sincerity of the administration to effect by negociation at Gottenburgh an honorable peace; and knowing, as he did, that the President had perfect confidence in the Prince Regent in his *own proposition* to meet at Gottenburg to settle by negociation the unhappy differences that subsist between the two nations, upon the *principles* of the *laws of nations* and the *maritime rights* of Great Britain; and from the policy of this government, tested by their proposition through Mr. Russel after the war, upon an agreement to negociate on certain conditions to agree to an armistice, and from the proposition of the British government through Admiral Warren, on our agreement to negociate on certain terms, to agree also to an armistice—he thought he was justified from the conduct of both governments in the belief that an armistice will be agreed to on the commencement of the negociations at Gottenburg, as the practice of all nations, as well as the two powers now negociating, evinces this to be the common usage of nations. It is certainly, said he, one of the first dictates of humanity to spare the effusion of human blood—and during impending negociations, believed to be entered into with sincerity and good faith, it would seem to me to be a measure of primary importance to heal asperities and then lead to a happy termination of the negociation.

If then, sir, the sword shall be sheathed during the negociation by an armistice, that sword that can only wound the enemy, I ask if the two-edged sword, the embargo, ought not, during the negociation, also to be sheathed, that which cuts both friends and foes? And whether it is not our duty to test our devotion to our constituents and to relieve them from all pressure that may not be absolutely necessary? Their patriotic submission to it, while absolutely necessary to press the enemy, entitles them to its removal, while the prospect of peace induces a hope that it may not be necessary as a weapon against the enemy.

Having myself advocated the embargo in the summer session, and the present embargo, and there being no power to suspend it at this time, but by an act of the Legislature, I have thought it my duty to submit the following resolution—but I feel it my duty to the administration to declare, that it is without their consent, and without their knowledge—

Resolved, That a committee be appointed to enquire into the expediency of suspending the Embargo Law during the impending negociation for peace.

Mr. *Wright* appeared to be inclined to let his motion lie on the table for the present; but

Mr. *Crowninshield* said he conceived it was highly proper that the fate of a proposition of this character should be at once known, and therefore moved that the House now proceed to consider the resolution.

Mr. *Seybert* having required the yeas and nays on the question of consideration, which, by the rules of the House, is not to be debated, it was decided as follows:

YEAS.—Messrs. Baylies of Mass. Bayly of Va. Bigelow, Bradbury, Breckenridge, Brigham, Caperton, Culey, Cooper, Cox, Culpepper, Davenport, Davis of Mass. Dewey, Duvall, Ely, Gaston, Geddes, Goldsborough, Grosvenor, Hale, Hopkins of N. Y. Howell, Hufty, Hungerford, Kent of N. Y. Kent of Md. Law, Lewis, Lovett, Macon, M'Kee, Milnor, Mosely, Markell, Oakley, Pickering, Pitkin, Post, Potter, J. Reed, W. Reed, Richardson, Ridgely, Robertson, Ruggles, Sherwood, Shipherd, Smith of N. Y. Stanford, Stockton, Stuart, Sturges, Taggart, Talmadge, Thompson, Vose, Ward of Mass. Wheaton, White, Wilcox, Wilson of Mass. Winter, Wood, Wright—65.

NAYS.—Messrs. Alston, Avery, Bard, Barnett, Beal, Bowen, Bradley, Brown, Burwell, Butler, Caldwell, Calhoun, Chappell, Comstock, Conard, Creighton, Cuthbert, Davis of Penn. Deneveller, Earle, Eppes, Farrow, Forney, Forsythe, Franklin, Griffin, Grundy, Hall, Harris, Hasbrouk, Hawes, Ingersoll, Ingham, Irwin, Jackson of Va. Kennedy, Kerr, Kershaw, Kilbourn, King of N. C. Lafferts, Lyle, M'Coy, M'Lean, Moore, Murfree, Newton, Ormsby, Parker, Pickens, Piper, Pleasants, Rhea of Tenn. Rich, Sevier, Seybert, Skinner, Smith of Penn. Smith of Va. Taunehill, Telfair, Troup, Udree, Ward of N. J. Whitehill, Williams, Yancey—68.

So the House refused to consider the Resolution.

MR. WRIGHT's MOTION

Of yesterday was, we rather think, ill-timed, if not unnecessary in any event. We have so much confidence in the patriotism and general intelligence of this gentleman, that we feel some diffidence in placing our opinion in opposition to his. But, as a power was given to the Executive, in the last section of the law laying an Embargo, to suspend its operation *on a cessation of hostilities*, or in *any other event* which should, in his opinion, a termination of the Embargo *compatible with the public interest*, we cannot conceive that such a motion was at all unnecessary, even if we had the same confidence