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BALTIMORE: *SATURDAY, Dec.* 10.

REPORT

Of the Committee appointed on the twenty third of September last to enquire into the Causes and Particulars of the Invasion of the City of Washington, by the British forces, in the month of August, 1814.

Nov. 29—Read and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday, the 19th of December next.

REPORT.

The Committee charged with an enquiry so intimately concerning the character of administration, the sensibility of the nation, and the honor of its arms, as the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprizes against this metropolis, &c. have endeavored to combine dispatch with effect, in the manner in which they have collected the facts and views presented in the following statement:

Proceedings of the Cabinet of 7th June, 1814.

Previously to the 2d of July, this city composed a part of military district No. 5. Early in June last, the secretary of war furnished the president, at his request, with a general report of the strength of the regular troops and militia then in the service of the United States, and their distribution; which was submitted to the heads of departments by the president on the 7th of June. The secretary of the navy had furnished the president with a similar estimate of our naval forces; that which was applicable to the limits of military district No. 10, will hereafter appear. By a reference to the estimate of the land forces it appears, that the aggregate number of troops stationed in district No 5, on the 7th of June, amounted to 2 208, of which there were 2 154 effectives stationed as follows: At Norfolk, 224 artillerists, the 20th, 35th and 1st battalion of the 38th regiment of infantry, amounting to 912; at Baltimore, 111 artillerists, 2d battalion of the 38th regiment of infantry, amounting to 316, sea fencibles 173; at Annapolis, 40 artillerists; at Fort Washington, 82 ditto; St. Mary's 36th regiment of infantry, 350. The meeting of the cabinet on the 7th, and the estimates of land and naval forces, had no particular relation to the defence of any part of military district No. 5; but for measures generally, and particularly in regard to the campaign on our territorial frontiers in the north and northwest. Nor does it appear that this city had excited more than ordinary attention at this time.

Proceedings of the Cabinet the 1st July.

But soon after, certain intelligence being received of the complete success of the allies in the subjugation of France, the President believed that the enemy had the inclination and the power to increase his military and naval forces against the United States; and in that event he believed that a variety of considerations would present this city as one of the prominent objects of attack. On the 26th of June, despatches were received from Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard, confirming the views of the president, which induced him to convene the heads of departments on the first of July; at which time he presented a plan of a force immediately to be called into the field, and an additional force to be kept in readiness to march without delay in case of necessity It seemed to be his object that some position should be taken between the Eastern branch and Patuxent, with two or three thousand men, and that an additional force of ten or twelve thousand millitia and volunteers should be held in readiness in the neighboring states, including the militia of the district of Coulmbia, and that convenient depots of arms and military equipments should be established. The measures suggested were approved by the heads of departments; or, in other words, it does not appear that any dissent was expressed.

Correspondence of the Secretary of War and General Winder.

The next day, July the 2d, by a general order of the war department, the 10th military district was created, to embrace the state of Maryland, the district of Columbia, and that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannoc and Potomac, under the command of brigadier gen. Winder, who being then in Baltimore, was advised of the fact by a letter from the secretary of war of the same date. On the 4th of July, a requisition was made on certain states for a corps of 93,500 men, designating the quota of each, with a request to the executive of each state to detach and hold in readiness for immediate service their respective detachments, recommending the expediency of fixing the places of rendezvous with a due regard to points the importance or exposure of which would most likely attract the views of the enemy. Of that requisition, 2000 effectives from the quota of Virginia 5000 from that of Pennsylvania, 6000, the whole quota of Maryland, and 2000, the estimated number of the militia of the district of Columbia, were put at the disposition of the commanding general, as hereafter appears, making the aggregate number of 15000, exclusive of the regular troops, viz. the 36th regiment, one battalion of the 38th, two troops of dragoons, two companies of the 10th infantry, one company of the 12th, and two companies of sea fencibles, supposed to amount to 1000 men, besides the artillerists composing the garrisons of forts M'Henry and Weshington.

On the 9th of July general Winder, in a letter to the secretary of war, on the subject of the duties which devolved upon him as commander of the 10th military district, a previous conversation is alluded to as having taken place between them, in consequence of the request of the secretary in his letter of the 2d of July. Gen Winder appears to have understood the intention of the secretary of war to be, that the militia force proposed for the 10th military district should be drafted and designated, but that no part of it should be called into the field until the hostile squadron in the Chesapeake should be reinforced to such an extent as to render it probable that a serious attack was contemplated; states the difficulty of collecting a force in an emergency, sufficient to retard the advance of the enemy; and suggests the expediency of calling out 4000 of the militia, with a view to station them in equal proportions between South River and Washington, and in the vicinity of Baltimore.

On the 12th of July the secretary of war, in a letter to general Winder, encloses a circular addressed to the governors of certain states, requiring a body of militia to be organized, equipped and held in readiness for future service, and authorises him, in case of actual or menaced invasion of the district under his command, to call for a part or the whole of the quota assigned to the state of Maryland; and in another of the 17th of July, the secretary authorizes general Winder to draw from Virginia 2,000 men, from Pennsylvania 5,000 men, and informs him that the whole of the militia of the district of Columbia, amounting to about 2,000, was in a disposable state, and subject to his order; making, together with the six thousand from Maryland, the estimate of 15 000 militia. On the 15th of July the secretay of war advised general Winder, that general Porter had communicated the fact of the arrival of the van of Cochrane's fleet at Lynhaven bay, and that the agent at Point Look out had represented that 2 seventy fours, 2 frigates, an armed sloop and brig ascended the bay at half past 5, p. m. on the 14th; that he considered it proper to call into service the brigade of militia which had been for some time held in readiness at Baltimore, and not knowing whether general Winder was at Baltimore, or Annapolis, he had instructed the major general under whose orders they were organized, to call them out.

Gen. Winder, in a letter of the 16th July to the sec. of war, among other things, expresses his embarrassment in relation to the situation of Annapo. and gives it as his opinion that a large force and many additional works would be necessary to defend it against a serious attack by land and water; states its importance to the enemy, and the ease with which it might be maintained by them with the command by water, and an entrenchment of 7 or 800 yards protected by batteries; represents Fort Madison as exposed, and unhealthy in the months of August and September, provided with two 50 lb. columbiads, 2 twenty-fours, 2 eighteens, 1 twelve and 1 tom, which might be turned with success against Severn; that these guns should be removed and arrangements made to blow up the fort, and represents the importance of defending the town if the means could be obtained; states the governor of Maryland and council had taken the necessary steps to comply immediately with the requisition of the general government. On the 7th July, a letter from general Winder to the secretary of war states that information, that he deemed credible, was received that the enemy was ascending the river in considerable force; that he had ordered the detachment of regulars to Nottingham, had sent out the alarm to assemble a militia force, and suggests the propriety of sending to that place the maritime corps and all the militia that could be procured from the district of Columbia. The secretary on the same day acknowledges the receipt of the above letter, and states that the marine corps was not under his command; but had sent the request to the president, and, as the authority to call the militia was vested in the commanding general, he had transmitted his requisition upon the district to general Van Ness; he also reminds him that the two regiments near Baltimore had been called into actual service, and expresses the wish of the president that not less than two nor more than 3,000 of the drafts, under the requisition of the fourth of July, should be embodied and encamped at some middle point between Baltimore and this city.

From the letter of general Winder, of the 20th July, it appears that the enemy proceeded up the Patuxent to Hunting creek, landed and committed some depredations in Calvert county, and returned down the river Three companies of city volunteers had marched from this district, in obedience to the call of general Winder, which he had halted at the Wood yard, and the detachments of the 36th and 38th regiments at Upper Marlboro, while he proceeded to Annapolis, to arrange with the governor the calling out the Maryland militia; which he states will be immediately attended to by the governor. He states that he had called for the largest number directed by the president, viz. 3000, expecting thereby to get 2000, the lowest number; that he forbore to dismantle fort Madison, as it might alarm the people, and produce disagreeable sensations; preferring rather to risque it in case of attack. On the 23d of July, general Winder informs the secretary of war that the governor of Maryland had issued his order for calling out 3000 of the drafts under the requisition of the 4th of July, and had appointed Bladensburg as the place of rendezvous according to his suggestion In another letter of the same date, general Winder informs the secretary of war, that he had deemed it expedient to direct captain Davidson with the city volunteers, to return to the city of Washington, from the two fold consideration that the facility with which they could turn out and proceed to any point, rendered them nearly as effective as if kept in the field, and the importance to them individually of attending to their private concerns. That the rifles used by captain Doughty's company were very defective, and that captain Burch's artillery were without swords. He recommends that the camp equipage should be left in charge of the company officers to facilitate their march. On the 25th of July, general Winder, in a letter to the secretary of war, dated at Warburton, near fort Washington, represents that fort in several respects to be incomplete in its preparation for defence; encloses a representation of lieutenant Edwards on the subject; makes a requisition of ammunition and requests that colonel Wadsworth may cause the platform to be enlarged so as to make the battery more effectual. The report of lieutenant Edwards speaks of the necessity of mounting heavy artillery in the Block house; states that the 18 lb. columbiads were not mounted, and that the garrison wanted means to mount them, being destitute of gin and tackle; represents the width of the platform, which ought to be 21 feet, to be only 14, and that the heavy guns at their first discharge would recoil to the hurtois, and on being heated would run over it; that five excellent long 18's were mounted on the water battery, which would be very useful in case of attack; but there was not a single pound of ammunition for them, and that some of the gun carriages in the fort were quite out of order.

This statement of lieutenant Edwards was referred upon its receipt to colonel Wadsworth, with orders to supply what was wanting at the fort, of which the secretary advised general Winder, bearing date 28th July; and col. Wadsworth, in a representation about the same date, states, that two hands had been ordered from Greenleaf's point on the Monday previous, to execute the necessary repairs of the gun carriages; that the platform as well as the parapet was too narrow, but not so narrow as lieutenant Edwards had stated, for it was directed to be made 20 or 22 feet wide, and that the disadvantage of too narrow a platform could be obviated with no great difficulty, by means of an elastic handspike introduced between the spokes of the wheels, which would prevent them from turning, and thus check the recoil of the piece. Further states, that two hundred rounds of shot and cartridges for the eighteen's could be sent down if ordered; that he had long since directed some grape shot to be prepared for the 18 lb. columbiads; that a takle and fall to mount the guns in the block house should be prepared; that captain Marsteller had just informed him, that a good takle and fall were at the fort when he left it, and that the platform was upwards of 20 feet wide. General Winder, in a letter of the 26th July, from Piscataway, advises the secretary of war, that the enemy had descended both the Potomac and Patuxent rivers; that he expected him up the bay, and should not be surprised to find Annapolis his object, which he feared would fall before 500 men; and that he should return to Marlborough as soon as he could ascertain the movements of the enemy. On the 27th of July, general Winder, in two letters to the secretary of war from Piscataway, states the force under general Stewart at 800; colonel Beall's regiment at Port Tobocco from 300 to 350 infantry, and 40 dragoons; colonel Bowen's regiment at Nottingham at 300; and the detachment of regulars under command of lieutenant colonel Scott, was also at Nottingham; and from general Winder's letter to the secretary of war of the 1st of August, from Port Tobacco, it appears that he had the detachment under lieutenant colonel Scott, at Piscataway.

Correspondence of general Winder, with the governor of Pennsylvania.

In relation to the quota of Pennsylvania under the requisition of the 4th of July, and more especially as it regards the 5000 men subject to the call of general Winder, and assigned to his command, it appears that general Winder wrote to the governor of Pennsylvania, on the 6th of August advising him that the secretary of war had destined a part of that quota to act under his command, in defending the country embraced in the 10th military district, and requesting that he might be informed of the place or places of rendezvous which would be fixed for such troops, and recommending places most contiguous to the cities of Washington and Baltimore. On the 8th of Aug. Gen. Winder writes again to the governor of Pennsylvania, stating that since his first communication he had read a letter from the secretary of war, dated the 17th of July, which had not reached him at an earlier period in consequence of his having been in constant motion since that time; which informed him that of the quota of militia of Pennsylvania under the requisition of the 4th of July, 5000 were destined for the 10th military district, subject to his call as commanding officer, and requested that as great a proportion of the detachment as possible should be riflemen.

On the 11th of August, secretary Boileau, under the direction of the governor of Pennsylvania, in answer to general Winder, states, that in consequence of the deranged state of the militia system, great difficulties occurred to the executive in relation to the quota required to be held in readiness for the service of the United States. The only effort that could be made towards a compliance with the requisition, was to have ordered a designation for the service of the requisite troops, under the militia law of 1807, and before the expiration of that law: which order had been issued by the governor, and was in a course of execution; that the militia law of 1807, expired on the 1st of Aug. and that all commissions, under it became void, except of such officers as might be in service on that day; and that, by an oversight in the legislature, no complete organization of the militia could be legally made in Pennsylvania, until the 4th Monday in October, when a classification was to take place.

On the 17th of August, general Winder makes a requisition on the Governor of Pennsylvaaia, for one regiment, to march forthwith to the city of Washington; and on the day following, in consequence of large reinforcements of the enemy in the mouth of the Patuxent, he calls for the whole 5000 Pennsylvania militia, by virtue of his previous authority. The 5000 were ordered out, to rendezvous at York, in Pennsylvania, on the 5th of September; of course, not in time to give any aid on the occasion for which they were called, nor was general Winder's letter of the 18th received by the governor of Pennsylvania until the evening of the 23d.

Correspondence of the secretary of war and general Winder.

On the 13th of August, general Winder, in a letter to the secretary of war, states, that in consequence of the acceptance of the 2d regiment drafted from general Smith's division, under the requisition of April, for part of the requisition of the 4th of July, the impracticability, besides impropriety, of calling any portion of the drafted militia from the eastern shore of Maryland, and the necessity of leaving all the men immediately upon the bay, and low down on the rivers of the western shore, for local defence; the remaining portion of the Maryland drafts to be assembled at Bladensburgh, instead of being 3000 would not much exceed as many hundred—yet he would require the governor to order out all the drafts that could possibly be spared from the 3 lower brigades on the western shore; but as the whole number drafted on the western shore, exclusive of the brigade drawn from general Smith's division, did not amount to 1500 men, he did not expect more than 1000 under the second order of the government, that of the 4th of July. The most immediate and convenient resource to supply this deficiency, was to take the militia drawn out under the state authority and assembled at Annapolis, to the amount of 1000, into the service of the U. States, and to call on Pennsylvania for one regiment, which would make his militia between 2 and 3000 men, besides the 2 regiments from gen. Smith's division.

In answer to this letter, the secretary of war, in a letter of the 16th of August, authorises general Winder to take into the service of the U. States, the Maryland militia then at Annapolis, or elsewhere, that had been called out under the state authority, as part of the quota required by the order of the 4th of July.

Correspondence of the secretary of war with the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia.

On the 27th of July the governor of Maryland states, in a letter to the secretary of war, that in conformity to the request of the president of the U. States, communicated in the requisition of the 4th, a detachment of 5,500 infantry and 600 artillery was directed to be organized and held in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and in order to comply with the requisition of general Winder, for calling into the field 3000 drafts of the Maryland militia, by direction of the president, the whole of the drafts from the western shore, about 3500 infantry, had been ordered to embody. He speaks of the exposed situation of the western shore, bordering upon the bay, and presumes that the drafts from that section of the country would not not be drawn away, and expects Baltimore will be unwilling to have any force withdrawn from that place, by which any aid might be expected.—These considerations had induced the order for the 3500 men; this force was to be embodied and moved on the shortest route to Bladensburg; that the artillery of the state was about 900 men, two thirds in Baltimore, it would create uneasiness to take from that place 400, the proportion, and he had suspended that order until gen. Smith should have some communication with the secretary of war. In a letter of the 20th July, general Winder made the requisition on the governor of Maryland for the 3000 militia, urging the necessity of having them assembled and in service with the least possible delay, and on the 5th of August the governor of Maryland informed gen. Winder, by letter, that his demand for 3000 drafts could not be complied with without the brigade in service at Baltimore, from gen. Smith's division, that the drafts from one brigade alone were under marching orders, the orders for the march of those lying on the Chesapeake and Potomac having been suspended.

On the 14th of July, Mr. Boileau, secretary of state for Pennsylvania, acknowledges the receipt of the communication from the war department, containing the requisition of the 14th of July, for 14,000 Pennsylvania militia, which was forwarded by express to the Governor, who was absent at Selim's Grove, with assurances that the governor would execute with promptness the requisition of the general government. On the 25th the governor of Pennsylvania directs the secretary Boileau to inform the secretary of war, that general orders had been issued in compliance with the requisition of the 4th of July; explains, as before, the difficulties resulting from the militia laws of Pennsylvania, and relies on the patriotism and voluntary services of the people.

On the 14th of July the deputy adjutant general of Virginia, acknowledged the receipt of the communication from the war department, containing the requisition of the 4th, and enclosed to the secretary of war the general orders issued by the governor of Virginia on the 22d of June, placing in readiness a provisional force of 15,000 men and upwards to repel sudden invasions, and for the purpose of defence, and the points of rendezvous designated, but not organized upon the military establishment of the U. States, nor for a longer term than three months, which, with other considerations, prevented the acceptance of any part of those state troops as a compliance with the requisition of the general government. The secretary of war was apprized in this letter also, that the whole of the Virginia troops, then held in readiness, would be furnished with arms and ammunition by the state of Virginia—and on the eighteenth the secretary of war informs the governor of Virginia that 2,000 of the requisition upon the Virginia militia would be placed at the disposition of gen. Winder, as commander of the 10th military district.

Having presented a condenced view of the measures of the cabinet; the correspondence between the cemmanding officer and the war department, the governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland and the commanding general; the correspondence with the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, and the secretary of war, in regard to the requisition of the 4th of July, it will now be proper to present some facts connected with the movements and arrangements of the commanding general up to the revocation of his command.

Towards the close of the month of June, the secretary of war gave to gen. Winder the first intimation that it was in contemplation to constitute a new military district, embracing the country now composing the 10th military district, and that the president intended to invest him with its commahd. On the 4th and 5th of July, he received notice of his appointment to the 10th military district, and the order creating it; proceeded to Washington and called on the secretary of war, who enumerated the regular force as before supposed to amount to 1000 or 1200; the residue of his command to be composed of militia to be drafted, and was shewn the circular to certain states, making the requisition of the 4th. He then returned to Baltimore, and after writing the letter of the 9th proceeded to Annapolis, to examine it, and to explore the 10th military district generally—The letter of the 12th from the secretary of war, was not received until he went to Annapolis, to Upper Marlborough and back to Annapolis. On the 17th, at Nottingham, received intelligence that the enemy was proceeding up the Patuxent; wrote to the secretary of war, and to gen. West, advising him to call out the militia of the county. The detachment of the 36th and 38th regts. was ordered from South River to Nottingham, and 3 companies of city militia were despatched to him promptly. On the 25th visited Washington; and on the 1st of August fixed his permanent head quarters at the city of Washington; viewed and inspected the district militia. The people of St. Mary's and Charles had become importunate for aid and protection, and in obedience to the wish of the president, the 36th and 38th were ordered down to unite with gen. Stewart; but the enemy having retired, this detachment was encamped at Piscataway. He underssood by letters from Gen. Smith of Baltimore, and the governor of Maryland, that Stansbury's brigade, upon application of gen. Smith, had been accepted by the secretary of war, as part of the quota of Maryland militia, under requisition of the fourth of July. On the morning of the 18th of Aug. Thursday, intelligence was received from the observatory at Point Look Out, that on the morning of the 17th, the enemy's fleet off that place had been reinforced by a formidable squadron of ships and vessels of various sizes. The commanding general immediately made requisitions on the governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland, various officers of militia, and the militia of the district of Columbia were ordered out en masse

On the 19th gen. Winder, in a letter to the secretary of war, submitted several propositions to the president:—1st. Would it be expedient, under the direction of the navy department, to have vessels ready to be sunk in the Potomac, at fort Washington or other points, at a moment's warning, to obstruct the navigation? 2d. Would it not be proper to put all the boats, which can be propelled by oars, that are at the city of Washington, under the control of the navy department at fort Washington, to transport troops as events may require? 3d Would it not be convenient to put the marine corps into service? at all events, to cause them to be in readiness to reinforce fort Washington at a moment's notice, or to be applied as events require to any point of defence?—4th That the force under Com. Barney, may co operate with the commanding general, in case of the abandonment of the flotilla. On the same day the secretary of war, in a letter, states that the propositions had been submitted to the president, and gen. Winder is referred to the navy department on the subject of the propositions relating to the means in that department. Gen. Winder's call upon the militia en masse, is approved; and on the same day, the secretary of war, in a letter to gen. Winder, advises that the cavalry be pushed into the neighborhood of the enemy without delay, if he indicated an attack upon the city of Washington, for the purpose of driving off all horses and cattle, and all supplies of forage, &c. in their route. Not a moment was to be lost. Col. Monroe, with capt. Thornton's troop of horse, proceeded to find and reconnoitre the enemy on Friday the 19th; on the same day the militia of Georgetown and the city of Washington, under gen. Smith, were mustered. On Saturday the 20th, this and some other forces commenced their line of march towards Benedict about one o'clock, and encamped that night about 4 miles from the Eastern Branch Bridge, on the road to Upper Marlboro'. On this day col Monroe communicated the intelligence of the arrival of the enemy at Benedict in force. Same day col. Tilman and captain Caldwell, with their commands of horse, were ordered and dispatched to annoy the enemy, impede his march, to remove and destroy forage and provisions before the enemy.

On Sunday morning, the 21st, the troops were mustered and the articles of war read to them. At 12 o'clock the marines under capt. Miller joined the army; the regulars of the 36th and 38th also joined at the Wood-yard, seven miles in advance, to which the main body of our troops marched and encamped on Sunday night Two letters from Col. Monroe, on the 21st, one stating that he had viewed the enemy near Benedict, enumerating 27 square rigged vessels, some bay craft and barges; the other dated from Nottingham, stating the advance of the enemy upon that place by land and water; and recommending the commanding gen. to dispatch 500 or 600 men to fall upon the enemy. Col. Monroe and Col. Beall both joined the army at night, and gave an account that the enemy had been viewed by them. Col. Beall calculated that he had seen 4000, without supposing he had seen all. Col. Monroe estimated the enemy at about 6000: capt Herbert joins with his troop; col. Lavall had joined with two companies of cavalry on the day previous; the enemy remained at Nottingham, except an advance detachment about 3 miles from town. Monday the 22d, early in the morning a light detachment was ordered to meet the enemy, composed of the 36th and 38th; lt. col. Scott, col. Lavall's cavalry, and 3 companies from the brigade of General Smith, under command of maj. Peter, viz. his own company of artillery, capt. Stull's rifle corps and capt. Davidson's light infantry. This detachmeet marched on the road to Nottingham, about 9 o'clock; the remainder of the army marched about one mile in advance to an elevated position; the commanding general with his staff, accompanied by col. Monroe, proceeded in advance, to reconnoitre the march of the enemy. Com. Barney had joined the army with his flotilla men, besides the marines under capt. Miller; the horse preceded the advance detachment of our forces, met the enemy and retired before them This induced the advance corps to take a position to impede the march of the enemy; but the advance detachment was ordered to retrogade and join the main body of the army that had remained some hours in line of battle, expecting the enemy to come that route to the city, but took the road to Upper Marlboro, turning to his right after having come within a few miles of our forces; upon which the commanding general fell back with his whole forces to the Battallon Old-fields, about 8 miles from Marlboro and the same distance from the city of Washington: At this time heavy explosions in the direction of Marlboro announced the destruction of the flotilla under command of com. Barney. The enemy arrived at Upper Marlboro about 2 o'clock, and remained there until late next day, to be joined, it is presumed, by the detachment of the enemy which had been sent against the flotilla.

The commanding general proceeded to Marlboro, and found the enemy encamped; several prisoners taken, gave information that the enemy would remain in that position until next day; and after making observations of the enemy, till the close of the day, Gen. Winder returned to the army. Late in the evening of this day the president, with the secretaries of war and navy and the attorney general, joined Gen. Winder at the Battalion Old Fields, and remained with him till the evening of the 23d. In the morning the troops were drawn up and reviewed by the president. The most contradictory reports prevailed as to the movements and force of the enemy, and it was doubtful in camp whether Annapolis, fort Washington, with a view to co-operate with his naval forces, or the city of Washington, was his object. As to numbers, rumors vibrated from 4,000 to 12,000; the best opinion was from 5 to 7000. Our forces at this time at the Old Fields, are variously estimated, with no material difference, at about 3,000 men, in the following corps: about 400 horse, under the command of the following officers; lieut. col. Lavall, col. Tilman, capts. Caldwell, Thornton, Herbert, Williams. &c. 400 regular troops, under the command of lt. col. Scott, viz: 36th, 38th, and capt. Morgan's company of tha 12th infantry; 600 marines and flotilla men under com Barney and capt. Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillery two 18 pounders and three 12 pounders. 1,800 militia and volunteers, gen. Smith's brigade of Georgetown and city militia, and Maryland militia under col. Kramer, of which there were two companies of artillery under capt. Burch and major Peter, with six 6 pounders each, making an aggregate of 3,200, with 17 pieces of artillery. The enemy was without cavalry, and had 2 small field pieces and one howitzer, drawn by men; and the whole country well calculated for defence, skirmishing, and to impede the march of an enemy.

The enemy remained at Upper Marlboro till after 12 o'clock; about which time, gen. Winder again ordered the detachment under lt. col. Scott and major Peter to advance and meet the enemy if he should be found advancing, or to attack his positions. About this time, 12 o'clock, some prisoners were taken, and from the information given by them and the observations of the videts, gen. Winder was induced to believe that the enemy intended to remain stationary for the day, which induced him to think of uniting with him the forces at Bladensburg, and despatched orders to gen. Stansbury, and other corps at Bladensburg, to move direct for Up