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BALTIMORE: *TUESDAY*, Dec. 13.

REPORT

Of the Committee appointed on the twenty-third of September last to enquire into the Causes and Particulars of the Invasion of the City of Washington, by the British forces, in the month of August, 1814.

NOV. 29—Read and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday, the 19th of December next.

[*Continued.*]

RECAPITULATION.

This statement of facts has brought the committee to a recapitulation of the prominent circumstances in this part of the transaction. Without entering into the consideration of the means in the power of the administration, and the equal claims of every part of the extensive maritime and teritorial frontier of the U. States, in proportion to its importance and exposure, to defensive measures, the committee are of opinion that the means authorised for the security of the 10th military district by the President of the U. States, in a cabinet council of the first of July, were ample and sufficient as to the extent of the force, and seasonable as to the time, when the measures were authorised. On the 2d of July the 10th military district was constituted and the command given to general Winder. On the fourth of July the requisition upon the states for 93,500 men was made. On the 14th of July the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia acknowledged the receipt of the reception of the requisition of the 4th, and promised promtitude. About the tenth of July the governor of Maryland was served with the requisition, and took measures to destinate a corps of 6,000 men, the whole quota from that state. On the 12th of July gen. Winder was authorised, in case of menanced or actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of Maryland. On the 17th gen. Winder was authorised to call into actual service not less than 2 nor more than 3,000 of the drafts assigned to his command, to form a permanent force to be stationed in some central position between Baltimore and the city of Washington. On the same day 17th of July, general Winder was authorized to call on the state of Pennsylvania for 5,000 men; on Virginia, 2,000; on the militia of the district of Columbia, in a disposible state, 2,000; together with the 6,000 from Maryland, making an aggregate force of 15,000 drafted militia, 3,000 of which *authorized* to be called into actual cervice, the residue in case of actual or menaced invasion, besides the regular troops estimated at 1,000, making 16,000, independent of marines and flotilla men. This was the measure of defence contemplated for the military disrict No. 10, and the measures taken by the War department up to the 17th of July in execution of it.

In relation to the collection of this force several unfortunate circumstances intervened to produce a great and manifest failure. 1st. On the 17th of July general Winder was authorised, in consequence of his own suggestions and in conformity to the wishes of the President, to call into actual service as many as 6000, and not less than 2,000 of the drafts, under the requisition of the 4th of July, assigned for the operations of his district, as a permanent corps and rallying point with his other forces in a central position as before stated, to protect Baltimore, the city of Washington &c. in case of invasion. General Winder, upon the receipt of this authority, proceeded direct to Annapolis, and made this requisition upon the governor of Maryland for the actual service of 3,000 men; and on the 23d of July, 32 days previous to the battle at Bladensburgh, general Winder informs the secretary of war that the arrangement for this force had been made, orders had issued and Bladensburgh fixed as the place of rendezvous; and encourages expectation that the collection of the forces would be prompt and certain. On the 27th, the governor of Maryland informs the secretary of war that measures had been taken to comply with the requisition of the 4th July, and his orders had issued calling into actual service 3,500 men, to rendezvous at Bladensburgh, to comply with the demand of general Winder, in conformity to the wishes of the president. In the mean time Stansbury's brigade had been called into service at Baltimore, on acconnt of the alarm about the 15th of July, by the secretary of war; and although this force constituted a part of the Maryland quota of six thousand, by the consent of the secretary of of war, it was to make no part of the 3,000 to be called into actual service for the purposes mentioned.

To Form a correct estimate of this failure, which did not bring as many hundred men into the field in the words of general Winder, it may be proper to state, that at all times the marines, flotilla men and regular troops, including the different garrisons, amounted to upwards of 1,000 men. The militia of the district of Columbia amounted to 2,000 men. These were always in a disposable state, and acknowledgde by general Winder, in his letter of the 23d, to be almost as efficient as if an actual service, and the event proved this to be correct. The disposable force at Baltimore, including Stansbury's brigade, amounted to upwards of 2,000 men, as the event proved, making an efficient force of at least 8,000 men if the call for 3,000 had been complied with. To this add the designated force assigned to the 10th military district, and the force to be raised on the spur of the occasion by calls upon the militia and population of the country en masse, and whose disposition is always operated upon more or less in proportion to the prospect of success. On the 13th of August, 21 days after the secretary of war was informed that this arrangement had been made, gen. Winder advises him that there would be almost a total failure in relation to the call for the 3000 men, and as a temporary remedy proposes the acceptance of certain state troops supposed to be about 1000, unders cols. Beall and Hood, then in service at Annapolis, which was authorised; and these troops came to the battle ground, as before stated, about one half hour before the action of the 24th of August. The reasons which operated to produce this failure have been detailed, and there can be no object in having them repeated, as the committee do not consider it a duty to discuss the merit of those considerations.

2ly. On the 17th of July, the secretary of war, by letter, authorised the commanding gen. to call on Pennsylvania for 5,000 men, on Virginia for 2000 men, etc. as before stated. This letter was not received by general Winder until about the 8th of Aug. as appears by his correspondence with the gov. of Penn. after a lapse of about 23 days. In explaining the delay in the receipt of this letter, gen Winder says it originated from his being in constant motion in traversing and examining the situation and various military positions of his command, and the letter had gone the circuit with him without having recevied it. It is impossible for the committee to say what particular influence this circumstance had upon the collection of the troops: and it may be proper here to state, that the difficulties explained in relation to the militia laws of Pennsylvania had no bearing upon the failure of our arms, as no specific call was made upon that state till the 17th of August, when one regiment was demanded, and on the 18th the whole 5000 were demanded, but this requisition was not received by the governor of Pennylvania until the evening of the 23d, at which time the Pennsylvania detachment had been designated under the requisition of the 4th, and ready for the call which was made upon it.

3dly. The unfortunate circumstances which delayed the arming of a Virginia regiment under col. George Minor, consisting of 600 infantry and 100 horse, who arrived in the city of Washington late on the evening of the 23d. Colonel Minor called on the secretary of war, after early candle light, for orders.—Col. Carberry had been charged with supplying the various corps with arms, ammunition, &c Col. Minor was directed to report himself to colonel Carberry early next morning, who would furnish him Col. Minor was in pursuit of Col. Carberry from very early in the morning until late in the forenoon, without finding him; and after obtaining an order from gen. Winder, marched his regiment to Greenleaf's point to the arsenal and magazine; where he again met with difficulties as before stated, which delayed his march and prevented him from being in the action.——Having made this recapitulation of facts, the military question is presented for consideration; and having furnished the most ample means to the house, to form correct opinions on this part of the inquiry, and as most of the communications from military characters enter more or less into this military view, the committee take it for granted that they have discharged their duty, by the view they have taken, and submit this question to the consideration of the house.

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

As it regards the part taken by the Secretary of the navy, including the destruction of the navy-yard, &c. the solicitude of the president, in anticipation of the probable designs of the enemy against this city and the adjacent country, induced the secretary of the navy to cause 3 12 pounders to be mounted on field carriages, and completely furnished for field service, in the month of May last, and the marines trained to act as infantry or artillery. Previous to the reinforcement of the enemy in the Patuxent, he caused to be mounted 2 long 18 pounders on field carriages, and prepared for field service, to be given to Com. Barney, in case of emergency, to co-operate with the land forces, and com. Barney was instructed to prepare for this eventual service in case he had to abandon his flotilla. On the 18th of August, the secretary received the first intelligence of the reinforcement of the enemy, the day on which they landed at Benedict. Com. Barney was ordered to destroy his flotilla whenever it appeared certain that it would otherwise be captured, and to unite and co operate with the forces under command of gen. Winder.—Letters were dispatched to com. Rodgers and capt. Porter, with orders to repair with their forces towards the city of Washington, with the utmost expedition, with every exertion, com. Rodgers was unable to reach the city by the 24th. The enemy entered our waters on the 16th, it was known in this city on the 18th; marched from Benedict on the 20th, and entered this city on the 24th, and left it precipitately on the evening of the 25th. The Secretary of the navy called on Gen. Winder on the 20th; pointed out the volunteer mechanics of the navy-yard, then in his army, who were good axe-men, and would act with effect as pioneers. It was understood that a large squadron of the enemy's fleet had passed the principal obstacle in the navigation of the Potomac, and was ascending to co-operate with their land forces. The secretary of the navy expressed solicitude for fort Washington, and proposed to throw into that fort the marines and part of the seamen for its defence; the commanding general did not think it expedient to lessen his force by the abstraction of a part so efficient as the marines and seamen.

The secretary of the navy visited the navy yrd on the 21st, enquired the means of transportation and the assistance left in the yard. The mechanics of the yard had been with the army from the first alarm; four officers and a few of the ordinary, chiefly blacks, remained, two of the old gun boats, the only craft for transportation. The waggons of this district had been pressed for the army, and the blacks usually in the market for hire, were employed at the works at Bladensburg. Orders were given for every means of transportation to be used. The public vessels afloat were, the new sloop of war Argus, the new schr. Lynx, 3 barges, and 2 gun boats. On the hip, the frigate Columbia, of the largest class, nearly ready for launching, her equipments generally made and ready, or in great forwardness. Besides the buildings, engines, fixtures, shop furniture, of the several mechanical branches in the navy yard, there were about 100 tons of cordage, some canvass, considerable quantity of salt petre, copper, iron, lead, block-tin, naval and military stores, implements, and fixed ammunition, with a variety of manufactured articles in all the branches—1743 barrels of beef and pork, 279 barrels of whiskey, some plank and timber.

The secretary states, that he had no means left to transport the sloop Argus, nor place of safety, in his opinion, if the enemy took possession of the city. He ordered the barges to the Little Falls. On the morning of the 24th the secretary visited the head-quarters of gen. Winder, near the *Eastern branch bridge*.——The President and some of the heads of departments were present. The secretary of the navy presented to the president the consideration of the navy yard, in presence of the secretaries of war and treasury. The public vessels and property were described; the importance of the supplies and shipping to the enemy, and no doubt seemed to be entertained of the union of the squadron and the land forces, should the enemy succeed in the capture of the city of Washington, general Winder having distinctly stated that morning that fort Washington could not be defended. In this event nothing could be more clear than the plunder and destruction of the public buildings and property of the navy-yard; and whether a junction was formed, or the land forces alone took the city, the loss of the navy yard and public property was certain. Upon this representation the secretary of the navy, in his report, says, it was distinctly understood, as the result of the conversation, that the public shipping, naval and military stores and provisions at the navy yard, should be destroyed in the event of the enemy's obtaining possession of the city. It appears that the articles to be destroyed were in store and could not be separated from those establishments which might have been left—one of the barges was sent to Alexandria and remained there until taken by the enemy; one gun boat, with salt provisions, has been recovered, the other was laden with provisions and gun powder, but run aground and was plundered by the inhabitants about the navy yard. The powder and part of the provisions have been recovered. The new schr. Lynx escaped the flames and remains without much injury. The metallic articles are chiefly all saved, and the timber in dock and that which is partly consumed will be useful. The machinery of the steam engine is not much injured, the boiler is perfect.—The buildings, with the exception of the house of the commandant, the lieutenant of the guards, the guard houses, the gateway, and one other building, are all destroyed; the walls of some appear entire. The monument to perpetuate the memory of the naval heroes who fell in the attack upon Tripoli, is a little defaced. The issuing store of the yard and its contents, which escaped the original conflagration, were destroyed by the enemy on the 25th.

The following estimate of the public property and buildings is the most accurate that the committee have been able to obtain, and which to them is as satisfactory and as accurate as the nature of the inquiry would admit, viz.

The capitol, from its foundation to its destruction, including original cost, alterations, repairs, &c.	787,163 28
The president's house, including all costs,	334,334 00
Public offices, treasury, state, war and navy,	93, 613 82
Dolls.	1,215,111 10
The buildings have been examined by order of a committee of the senate. The walls of the capitol and president's house are good, and require repairs only. The walls of the public offices are not sufficient. It is supposed that the sum of $460,000 will be sufficient to place the buildings in the situation they were in previous to their destruction,	460,000 00
Loss sustained at the navy yard,	
In moveable property,	417,745 51
In buildings and fixtures,	91,425 53
Dolls.	969,171 04
To this sum must be added the public library, estimated at	
An estimate of the expence of rebuilding, in a plain and substantial manner, the navy yard, so as to carry on all the public works with as much advantage and convenience as previous to its destruction,	62,370 00

RECAPITULATION.

No.		Original Value.	Value Recovered.	Real Loss.
1	Frigate Columbia,	116,123 05		
2	Sloop of war Argus,	75,000		
3	One large row-galley,	4,500		
4	Two small do.	6,000		
5	One armed scow,	1,610 54		
6	One do.	1,096 29		
7	Gunboats, row-boats, &c.	6,553 34		
8	Boat-builder's shop,	2,962 98		
9	Blacksmith's and plumber's shop	4,532 80		
10	Cooper's shop,	7,689 75		
11	Gun carriage shop, &c.	535		
12	Painter's shop,	869 97		
13	Block-maker's shop,	1,610 84		
14	Medical store,	2,679 84		
15	Ordnance stores, &c.	18,769 90		
16	Naval stores, cordage, &c.	78,262 25		
17	Copper, iron, lead, &c. &c.	49,965 27	42,522 40	
18	Navy store-keeper's stores,	20,431 77	2,921 80	
19	Ordnance small arms,	173,284 97	163,926 22	
20	Provisions and contingencies,	46,962 04	4,071 44	
21	Timber, plank, knees, &c.	45,00	45,000	
22	Anchors,	12,400 94	13,400 94	
23	Miscellaneous articles,	1,380 13	648 85	
		678,810 71	26,465 20	417,745 51

THE CAPTURE OF ALEXANDRIA.

In relation to the conduct of the corporation of Alexandria, and its capture by the enemy in his recent enterprise, the committee have been furnished with various documents and information, and to which the committee refer: but in justice to the town and to the public, a brief retrospect may not be deemed improper, as connecting certain events with the surrender of the town on the 29th of August. October, 1812, a volunteer company was raised in Alexandria, amounting to about 70, including officers; cloathed by voluntry aid and donation from the citizens of Alexandria, intended for the lines, but stationed at Fort Washington; remained in garrison till December—ordered to Annapolis, and there discharged. March, 1813, captain Marstellar's company of artillery stationed at Fort Washington for upwards of three months. 21st of March, 1813, corporation, by committee, called on the secretary of war for arms, &c. for the defence of Alexandria. 8th of May, corporation, by committee, waited upon the president to apprize him of the defenceless state of the town: president acknowledged that attention was due to the representation of respectable men, and the proper attention should be given, and at the same time apprized the committee of the impossibility, in the nature of things, to give complete protection to every assailable point of the country. 11th of May, committee of vigilance appointed to co-operate with the committee of Georgetown and city of Washington—a deputation from the three committees waited upon general Armstrong, and represented the necessity of additional fortifications at fort Washington: colonel Wadsworth was ordered to attend the committee, examine and report upon their suggestion. The examination was made, and colonel Wadsworth reported that the battery at fort Washington was in such a state, and it so effectually commanded the channel of the Potomac, that it was not to be apprehended that the enemy would not tempt to pass it while its present defences remain entire. Its elevated situation should prevent dread of a cannonading from ships—that in case of designs against the district of Columbia, an assault by land was most probable; to guard against this some inconsiderable work on the land was recommended; an additional fort in the same neighborhood was considered unnecessary. On the 5th and 13th of August, 1814, the corporation loaned to the U. States 35,000 dollars, upon condition that it should be expended south of Alexandria.—After the defeat of general Winder at Bladensburg, the corporation, by committee, waited upon the British commander at this city, to know what treatment was to be expected, provided Alexandria should fall into his hands. Admiral Cockburn assured the deputation that private property should be respected; that probably some fresh provisions and flour might be wanted, but they should be paid for. Without firing a gun, on the 27th, fort Washington was blown up and abandoned by the commanding officer, captain Dyson, who has been dismissed from the service of the United States by a sentence of a court martial, in consequence of it.

On the 28th, after the enemy's squadron passed the fort, the corporation, by deputation, proceeded to the ship commanded by captain Gordon, who commanded, and requested to know his intentions in regard to Alexandria—which he proposed to communicate when he should come opposite the town, but promised that the persons, houses and furniture of the citizens should be unmolested, if he met with no opposition. Next day, the 29th, the British squadron was drawn up in line of battle, so as to command the whole town. There were two frigates, the Seahorse, 38 guns, and Euryalus, 36 guns, 2 rocket ships of 18 guns each, 2 bomb ships of 8 guns each, and a schr. of 2, arranged along the town. The committee will not attempt to condense the correspondence and terms of surrender, but refer to it as a part of the report. One hour was allowed the corportion to decide. It was stated to the British officer that the common council had no power to compel the return of merchandise carried to the country, nor to compel the citizens to aid in raising the sunken vessels; these two points were yielded by the enemy. The enemy was requested to explain what was included in the term merchandize which was to be taken, and in answer it was stated that it would embrace such as was intended for exportation, such as tobacco, cotton, flour, bale goods, &c. The plunder of the enemy was indiscriminate and not confined to any particular class of individuals, and included alike non residents and inhabitants. The plunder of the enemy was confined principally to flour, cotton and tobacco.

Estimate of the loss: 3 ships, 3 brigs, several bay and river craft, some vessels burnt, 16,000 barrels flour taken, 1,000 hogsheads of tobacco, 150 bales of cotton, 5,000 dollars worth of wines, sugar, &c. In relation to a letter written by admiral Codrington to captain Gordon, the committee will refer to the entire letter of gen. John Mason, who gives a satisfactory account of this transaction; and to complete this part of the subject reference is had to the statement of gen Hungerford, giving the movements of his troops, and explains the interviews he had with the deputation from Alexandria, on his march to the city of Washington.

CONCLUSION.

In the inquiry into the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprises against this metropolis and the neighbouring town of Alexandria, &c. the committee consulted a mode of investigation least embarrassing to themselves and to others. They determined that as i was indispensable to resort to some of the parties for information, not derivable from other sources, it would be equally their duty to hear as far as practicable those who were deeply concerned as to character and reputation from the agency they had in this unfortunate transaction, with a determination, that in the event of any contradictions in material circumstances, to resort to impartial sources for explanation or correction. In the meantime the committee called upon those who may be considered as impartial observers for statements, that a just comparison might be made of different allegations and representations. If, therefore, the committee have failed to call upon persons in possession of any additional facts and views not submitted, it has not been through a want of inclination to receive all that could be important but from a want of knowledge of such persons and such facts. It was a question with your committee at its earliest meeting, whether personal examinations before the committee should be adopted, or whether resort should be had, in the first instance, to call for written communications to views and interrogatories submitted by the committee, and best calculated to extract every important fact.—Several considerations induced the adoption of the latter mode.

It gave the committee command of part of their time to attend to other public duties equally imperious and obligatory. It incurred no expense to government or individuals, who were not interrupted in either their private concerns or public duties. The committee knew the anxiety of the house to have this inquiry closed as soon as possible, and which by a different course would have taken up the whole of the session, and encumbered with more useless and irrelevant matter and views than will be found in the communications. The committee feel therefore confident, that the house will be satisfied with the manner in which the subject has been developed; and to correct any possible error, and to receive any important fact or additional matter, although it is not very probable that much can remain, the committee will ask leave to report, with a reservation of a right to make any other communication that may be found necessary to an impartial examination of this subject.

APPENDIX.

IN addition to the report of the committee, in order to give a more satisfactory view and detail upon the main subjects of inquiry, and a variety of incidental matter which has arisen from the investigation, the following communications are referred to as an appendix:

1. In relation to the measures adopted by administration, and the part taken by the president and heads of departments, the committee refers to the letters from the secretaries of state, war, navy, and the attorney general: one is also expected from the secretary of the treasury which shall be communicated when received.

2. In relation to the steps taken and measures adopted by the secretary of war, the committee refers to the correspondence with the commanding general, the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, the letter of colonel Tayloe, two reports from the ordnance office, as to arms, military stores, &c.

3. The conduct of the commanding general, the collection and dispositions of the forces, and the conduct and movements of different corps, the committee refers to the narrative of general Winder, his correspondence with the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, the war department and various officers, the reports of general Smith, gen. Young, general Stansbury, col. Sterrett, maj. William Pinkney, general Douglass, colonel Minor, col. Beall, and Commodore Barney's official letter.

4. In relation to the measures and arrangements and acts of the navy department, including the destruction of the navy yard and the public property, as well as the destruction of the public buildings in the city, the committee refers to a report from the secretary of the navy, a report from commodore Tingey, and a report from Mr. Monroe superintendant of the public buildings.

5. In relation to the capture and capitulation of Alexandria, the committee refer to the proceedings of the court matial upon capt Dyson; the correspondence between him and the secretary of war; as to the abandonment of the fort; the report of the corporation of Alexandria; including the terms of surrender, &c. and the letter from general Mason, relating to a letter from admiral Codrington.

6 In relation to general information and incidental topics, the committee refers to Mr. Law, general Van Ness, and doctor Catlett.

HERKIMER, (N. Y.) Dec. 1.

Between 50 and 60 sick and wounded American soldiers, and about 50 British prisoners, passed this place for the eastward on Monday.

CHARLESTON, Dec. 3.

LATEST FROM THE ENEMY ON THE SOUTHERN COAST.

Extract of a letter, dated at St. Simons' Island, Sunday, Nov. 27—4 o'clock, P. M.

"While I write, the enemy are just making their way out of our Sound.—There are now within sight 1 frigate, 1 brig and 1 schr. the frigate standing in.—They sent in 7 barges this morning to St. Andrew's Sound, and two coasters were seen to go over the bar—the barges were seen no more; but about an hour and a half ago, a very heavy cannonading was heard towards Jekyl Creek, in about a S. W. direction from our light house, and also a constant firing of musketry. I had just arrived on the beach to ascertain in what the firing was, when five barges turned Jekyl S. Point. They have probably suffered a loss of 2 barges in the engagement, (with, I presume the Gun-Boats, as a fleet was expected on every moment) as 7 were seen to enter St. Andrews, and but 5 came through our Sound to make their escape."

A letter from Potosi, (Geo.) dated 27th ult. says, "A boat from this place for Sapelo Island, with several passengers on board, was taken two days since by ten barges from the *Lacedemonian* frigate, commanded by Lieutenants More and Barret—the boat was soon released and the passengers allowed to proceed to their place of destination. One of the passengers writes:—We were prisoners when they took two vessels from Savannah, with cotton; they had sent out four more before we got down, and a fifth, (a fine schooner from Charleston) went out same day. I shall always feel pleasure in doing justice to the uniform politeness of the several officers commanding the boats, as well as the civility of the men—we did not receive the smallest insult or injury from any one, nor was an offensive observation made in our hearing. One of the officers mentioned, that the schooner William, from Charleston bound to Combabee, belonging to Dr. Lynch, had been taken some time before by the boats of that frigate and burnt; and that had not the negroes composing her crew deserted her, the furniture and other private property on board her would have been given up to them.

From Dorien, (Georgia) 28th Nov.—"Two days since, four of us, (Charleston vessels) bound there and to Savannah very narrowly escaped capture, by making gun boat signals, taking a fair chase and running to this place for safety. We saw the enemy off, their boats were in, our signals called them off, and we came in here. At the same time they captured 4 or 5 vessels and 2 or 3 row boats. Yesterday the gun boats had an engagement with 7 barges in St. Andrew's Sound and, it is said, captured two, or sunk them, and 5 made their escape. The particulars are not known; we have many rumours of their being in the sounds along the coast."

SAVANNAH, Nov. 29.

FROM ENGLAND.

Last evening came over the bar, the Russian ship Hazard, of Archangel, capt. Jongkees, with a full cargo of dry goods from Liverpool, 57 days passage in distress, having a deficiency of four of her crew who landed at Cape Look Out Light House to procure a pilot, and were unable to return the surf being too great; and with loss of two cables and anchors.

Passenger—Mr. Charles Blanchard, jun. of Boston

SAUCY JACK'S CRUISE.

Arrived, yesterday at this port the fine fast sailing privateer schooner Saucy Jack, John P. Chazel, commander, from a cruise of 70 days—with her prize the British schr. Jane, with rum, sugar, shrub, &c. The Saucy Jack has had a very severe engagement with a bomb ship, in which she lost 8 men killed and 15 wounded, among the latter is Mr. Johnston, her first lieut.* She has a full cargo of British dry goods, taken out of a large ship she had captured, bound to Aux Cayes from Greennock. The probable value of the goods brought in is said to be between seventy and eighty thousand dollars. The Saucy Jack has also brought in twenty prisoners and paroled three times that number, during her cruise.

Captain Chazel has politely furnished the Editor of the Republican with a file of Jamaica papers to the 10th instant from which very interesting extracts will be found in this day's paper.

* See the British account published to-day.

From the Log Book of the Saucy Jack.

Sept. 26 captured the English schr. Supply from New Providence to Crooked Island, laden with corn and flour, and ordered for a port in the Island of Cuba, which was afterwards recaptured by the English brig Fresh, Oct. 11, 7 o'clock A. M. captured an English sloop in ballast from Lucia, to Falmouth; at half past 7, saw a man of war brig standing in chase took some sails and rigging out of the sloop, and after detaining five prisoners gave her up to the passengers—at nine, lost sight of the brig. Oct. 12th, boarded the English