In Senate of the United States.

FEBRUARY 16, 1803.

MR. MORRIS—IN CONTINUATION.

It remains to notice the advantage of this country to the United States, as it may relate to our power, our peace, our commerce, and above all to our freedom. As to our power something has already been said on the peaceful influence which results from the dependence of colonies belonging to the great nations of Europe; add to this that the product of those colonies must pass by our doors and be exposed to our cruizers. A further advantage is to be found in the ready means of invasion (in concert with the troops of others) if driven to the necessity of war. The possession of power will give us not only security but peace. Peace indeed can never be safe, but by the aid of power. Our disposition is pacific. It is our interest to be at peace, and the form of our government while it secures to us the enjoyment of as much liberty as is possible, renders it particularly imprudent to risk in war any change of the constitution. Grant us these provinces and we can dictate the conditions of our commerce with the islands. Possessed of them it will be doubly lucrative, and without them wholly uncertain. There is another stream of profitable trade which will then flow in our channels. The risk and difficulty which Spain experiences in bringing home her treasures when she is at war, will naturally suggest the advantage of remitting them through this country. The produce of the Mexican mines may then be shipped directly to Asia. It will be paid to Spain by bills on the commercial nations, and thus furnish to her the easy means of obtaining the supplies she may stand in need of. The bullion will be so much the more valuable, as the danger and expence of transportation are diminished. This, therefore, would have a beneficial result upon the whole commercial world. It would more especially emancipate Spain from her present thraldom. It would give a happy change to all her anterior administration, and increase both her absolute and relative force. Let me say here that it is our interest to preserve the authority of Spain over her American territory. We have enough of our own. We can have no wish to extend our dominion. We want men, not land. We are therefore the natural and the safe guardians of Spain. On us she may rely with perfect confidence. We can derive from that commerce, which it is her interest to permit, all the advantage we ought to ask. But great as are the benefits which will result from the possession of the Floridas and New-Orleans, great as is their tendency to advance our power, secure our peace, and extend our commerce, there is a consideration in comparison with which commerce, peace, and power are of but slight avail. These provinces will fortify the defences of our freedom. My honorable colleague has stated to you his apprehensions from standing armies. And yet, sir, if we be not possessed of this territory, standing armies become necessary. Without an imposing military force, the inhabitants of the western country will be in such immediate danger, that they must league with a neighbor who will have every thing to offer, and from whom they will have every thing to fear. This will lead to the worst of all wars, to civil war, and when that shall happen, liberty will soon be lost.—The army which has defeated one half the nation will easily lend itself to enslave the other. Such is the history, and such will ever be the fate of man. In this view then, above all others, is that possession most precious. When it is in our hands we need no standing army. We can turn our whole attention to naval defence, which gives compleat security both at home and abroad. When we have 20 ships of the line at sea, and there is no good reason why we should not have them, we shall be respected by all Europe. The sense of security resulting from such force must give a new spring to industry and encrease the stock of national wealth. The expence, compared with the benefit, is moderate, nay, trifling. And let me here say one word as to national expence. Sir, whatever sums are necessary to secure the national independence must be paid. They will not amount to one half of what it must cost us to be subdued. If we will not pay to be defended, we must pay for being conquered. There is no medium, and but the single alternative. In the proper expenditure for defence, therefore, is true economy, and every pitiful saving inconsistent with that object, is the worst, the most profligate profusion.

Having now considered, in its various relations, the importance of these provinces the way is open to estimate our chance of obtaining them by negociation. Let me ask on what ground you mean to treat? Do you expect to persuade? Do you hope to intimidate? If to persuade, what are your means of persuasion? Every gentleman admits the importance of this country. Think you the first consul, whose capacious mind embraces the globe, is alone ignorant of its value? Is he a child whom you may win by a rattle to comply with your wishes? Will you, like a nurse, sing to him a lullaby? If you have no hope from fondling attentions and soothing sounds, what have you to offer in exchange? Have you any thing to give which he will take? He wants power. You have no power. He wants dominion. You have no dominion. At least none that you can grant. He wants influence in Europe. And have you any influence in Europe? What, in the name of Heaven, are the means by which you would render this negociation successful? Is it by some secret spell? Have you any magic power! Will you draw a circle and conjure up devils to assist you? Or do you rely on the charms of those beautiful girls with whom the gentleman near me says the French grenadiers are so incorporate? If so, why don't you send an embassy of women? Gentlemen talk of the principles of our government, as if *they* could obtain for us the desired boon. But what will these principles avail? When you enquire as to the force of France, Austria, or Russia, do you ask whether they have a habeas corpus act or a trial by jury? Do you, to estimate their power, discuss their interior police? No. The question is, How many battalions have they? What train of artillery can they bring into the field? How many ships can they send to sea? These are the important circumstances which command respect and facilitate negociation. Can you display these powerful motives? Alas! Alas! To all these questions you answer by one poor word—confidence—confidence—confidence—Yea, verily, we have confidence—We have faith and hope: aye, and we have charity too. Well—Go to market with these christian virtues, and what will you get for them? Just nothing. Yet in the face of reason and experience you have confidence: but in whom? Why, in our worthy president. But he cannot make the treaty alone. There must be two parties to a bargain. I ask if you have confidence also in the first consul? But whither, in the name of Heaven, will this confidence lead, and to what does it tend? The time is precious. We waste, and we have already wasted moments which will never return. You have already tried negociation. I say you have tried it, because I know you have a minister in France, and I am sure the first magistrate of our country cannot have been so negligent as not to pay attention to a subject which is confessedly of such magnitude. You have then negociated. And with what success? Why, instead of defeating the cession you have closed the river. Instead of obtaining any advantage by a new treaty, you have lost the benefit of an old one—such are the results of your negociation in Europe. In this country you have negociated to get back the privilege you are robbed of—and what follows? A prohibition to touch their shores. Instead of restoring the rights of treaty, they cut you off from the rights of humanity. Such is your splendid success from negociation; and yet gentlemen tell us we must continue to negociate. The honorable member from Kentucky says, that great lengths are gone in enquiring into and rectifying the irregular procedure. He tells us a minister is just appointed and it would therefore be inconsistent to fight just now: that moreover it would degrade the president's authority, and defeat his measures.

The gentleman from Georgia says, we have no right to go to war till there shall be a refusal on the part of Spain; and my honorable colleague assures us that if our wrongs are redressed by negociation we can have no complaint. As to the lengths which are gone, it is for those gentlmen to appreciate their value who know what they are. I profess my ignorance, and judging by effects, must withhold my confidence. If we must wait for a pointed refusal before we do ourselves right, I venture to predict a delay fatal to the peace of this country. But, sir, what is it we are to ask, the refusal of which will justify war? Is it (as my honorable colleague supposes) a mere restitution of a privilege wrongfully taken away? Sir, I answer in the words of the resolutions moved by my friend. "It does not consist with the dignity of this country to hold a right so important by a tenure so uncertain." But the honorable member from Maryland has told us that we need not cross the Atlantic to seek for precedents, that we have enough on our own archives; and he has had the goodness to mention our humble petitions presented to the king of Great-Britain in 1775. We sent, says he, petition after petition. I am sure that honorable member has no wish that a minister should be sent to bear our humble petitions to the footstool of the first consul's throne. But, sir, whether we treat or pray, it will end as it did in 1775, by war, unless we are determinded to give us that independence which we then fought to establish. Let us consider a moment the natural course of this negociation. It is the interest of France to foster in us a hope from treaty until she has put herself in a condition to frustrate all other hope. There can be no question therefore that she has avoided, and will avoid a direct refusal. And as long as we are content to accept of smooth speeches, general assurances, vague assertions and loose evasions, we shall have no want of that court currency. But why (it may be said) has she not already taken possession? Because her original plans have been greatly deranged. St. Domingo presented obstacles unexpected, and that enterprize must not be abondoned, for though the island may not in itself be of much consequence, though it must be ruined before it can be conquered, yet conquered it must be, for the world must continue to believe that the first consul cannot fail in what he has undertaken. Much of his power rests on that opinion, and it must therefore be maintained. But there are other incidents beside those of St. Domingo which have had the same tendency. There followed on the general peace a serious discussion of the German indemnities; then the affairs of Italy; lately of Switzerland; and during the whole momentous period it was doubtful how far England would bear a continued invasion of the liberties of Europe. And it was evident that should the war recommence with England, the force sent to this country would be totally lost. It was important therefore to gain time; and for that very reason we should have insisted on an immediate decision. Such then is the state of this treaty, so fondly desired. A treaty by which we are to ask much and offer nothing. A negociation in which we have no means to persuade. Have we any to intimidate? Where is your public force? You have none; and seem resolved not to have or use any. My honorable colleague tells us that war will encrease our debt one hundred millions, and that our people are not fond of taxes. He says we are trying a *new* experiment to pay our debts in a given period, which war would derange. It would injure, moreover, our pacific character, and might *draw down* the jealousy of all nations who have colonies. He believes that three-fourths of our people are opposed to war, but yet he thinks that nine months hence we shall be in a better condition. What is the effect of this language? Is it not to convince the adverse party that he has nothing to fear from a refusal? As to this experiment for the payment of our debts, whether it has the merit of novelty I shall not enquire; but I am bold to assert that the merit, be it what it may, is due to one of my worthy friends who formerly administered our finances. The same plan also has been adopted by another great statesman, (Mr. Pitt) who has for many years past provided regularly a fund to liquidate in a given period each debt which his nation has incurred. But does England trust her safety to the protection of her sinking fund? No. She has fifty thousand seamen employed and a hundred thousand soldiers—These form the shield of her defence. A gentleman near me has told us that in case of war our mercantile capital is exposed in every part of the world. To this I answer, first, that the same objection will apply with equal weight upon any and every occasion. But further, I say the argument is directly and completely against him. How does it stand?

He admits that if negociation fails he will draw the sword. He goes further, and says he will throw away the scabbard. Now, sir, it is clear that if we operate at once, notice may be given to our merchants. Advices may be sent in season to every sea. And here let me say that it is a duty of the government to apprize both our insurers and shippers, of their dangerous situation. It is unwise as well as unjust, to lull them into a fatal security. But suppose the treaty shall fail, and remember that the success or failure depends on Bonaparte, he will weigh the present declarations and act accordingly. He will commence a war on your commerce long before you know that war exists. I say therefore the argument is directly against the gentleman who used it. And here let me say one word on the comparative merits of the resolutions on your table. Those moved by my honorable friend give the president command not only of the militia, but of the naval and military force. They place money at his disposal, and what is most important, they put it in his power to use these efficient means. The resolutions moved as an amendment authorize indeed a call for a greater number of militia, but when called they can do nothing but consume their rations. There is no power to bring them into action, and of course the expence is useless, even for the purpose of influence.

[*Speech to be continued.*]

Latest Foreign Intelligence,

By the British packet Auckland, and ship Atlantic, arrived at New-York—continued.

LONDON, February 5.

After a week's interruption, we have received Paris papers of the 28th ult. which were detained only by the severe weather; but they do not contain much intelligence.

They mention one circumstance not a little curious, and which will, probably, excite no little degree of conjecture among politicians, as to the consequences which may ultimately result from it. General Lannes (or Lasnes) the French ambassador who quitted the court of Lisbon some months ago in high dudgeon, has again been appointed French minister to that court!

A letter from Naples, dated December 22, published in the Moniteur, mentions the receipt there of letters from Algiers, dated December 5, stating that that regency has declared war against Denmark. It had given orders to the Danish consul to embark in three days, and even threatened to treat him with the utmost severity. Citizen Dubois Thainville, charge d'affaires of the republic, having received special orders from the first consul, to protect all friendly powers against the injustice and violence of pirates, made known to the dey that the first consul had with pain heard of this irregular conduct against a power which had given him no cause of complaint, and which on the contrary, had lately paid to him a very considerable subsidy. This mediation of France seemed to give great displeasure to the dey, who even threatened to send off the French agent with that of Denmark. Matters, however, seem to have been accommodated. The Danish agent has remained; and it is believed the regency will not declare war against Denmark.

Late last night we received Paris Journals of the 31st ult. inclusive. According to letters from Constantinople, a dreadful fire had broke out there on the evening of the 7th of December, and which raged with unremitting fury until next morning. The damage occasioned thereby was of course extremely great. The plague still continues to desolate that city; the progress of which is extended by the mildness of the weather.

On the 29th of December, the remains of pope Pius VI. were conveyed from Vatican to Civita Vecchia, where they were taken on board the Alcyon frigate, in order to be deposited at Valence, in France. This transportation of the holy viscera was conducted with no less devotion than magnificence; and arrived at Civita Vecchia at midnight. Next day the urn containing his sacred deposit was consigned to the commander of the French frigate. under a discharge of artillery, who only waited for a fair wind to convey him to Toulon, from thence the urn will be taken to Valence, and deposited in a rich mausoleum.

A very violent eruption of Mount Etna has been attended with considerable damage to the neighboring fields of Catania, and excited the most alarming apprehensions at Messina. Part of the volcanic matter produced by this eruption has fallen on the lordship of Bronte.

February 6.

Colonel Sebastiani is arrived in Paris, and in a long report to the first consul states the result, and enters into the details of his mission to Egypt, Syria, and the isles of the Levant, &c. It is highly important, but at the same time so very long, occupying nearly the whole of the Official Journal, that we are obliged to confine ourselves to an abridgement of it, which shall, however contain its principal features of interest and novelty:

On Sebastiani's arrival at Alexandria, he had an interview with general Stuart, to whom he communicated his orders, requiring the speedy evacuation, and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. The British chief said, he had no orders to quit Alexandria, where he thought he should spend the winter. General Stuart's aid-de-camp is a French emigrant, Chevalier de Sades, a very sensible man, but an enemy to France. Neither the Pacha of Alexandria nor his people are attached to the English. The fort of Abonkir is in the worst possible state. He saw several Cheiks: they are all persuaded of the first consul's good wishes relative to Egypt in general. He also saw Madame Murad Bey, whom he informed that the consul was inclined to interpose his authority to make their peace with the Porte. He then inspected the citadels, &c. The soldiers are dissatisfied. One of them threatened him with his piece. Shortly afterwards, one of the first people of the place, Mustaphia Oukil, insulted him. He complained to the Pacha, and insisted that the delinquent should beg his pardon publicly, and humbly supplicate his clemency: they wished to compromise, but he insisted. Mustapha approached. Colonel Sebastiani told him his first intentions were to have his head cut off, and that his life was spared only in consideration of the Pacha's solicitations; adding that, if he ever after insulted a French citizen, death should be his reward.—The Albanese were excited against him, and letters from Rosetta announced that the French were marching against Constantinople, and that he was there to cajole them. The letter was handed to him, and by his orders transmitted to the pacha. He had just received a letter from general Stuart, with the general orders, given on a former occasion by the first consul. They consisted in the very words of Bonaparte himself, who then openly devoted himself to the destruction of the dominion of the Turks. Such an order of the day shewn to Sebastiani by the pacha, at the moment he was boasting the sincere esteem and the profound veneration which his master entertained for the Sublime Porte, must have overwhelmed him with confusion, and he has now the baseness to accuse general Stuart of a wish to excite the Turks to assassination.

Throughout the country Sebastiani enters into long and private conferences with all the principal Cheiks, and he labors, in every instance, to cast odium and disgrace upon the English nation, and the English troops in Egypt. We must not forget to remark, that before he left Egypt, he was assured the Monks of Mount Sinai sang a te deum for the prosperity of the first consul, "for he is good and just."

His next visit was to Diezzar Pacha, at Acre, who also gladly acceeded to his commercial propositions; and from thence he went to Zanta, where his arrival produced an enthusiasm of joy. He hesitates not to assure the first consul that the Ionian Islands are ready at a moment's notice to declare themselves French. While, however, commerce is every where the first word in citizen Sebastiani's mouth, even a cursory perusal of the report would be sufficient to shew that there is another object much nearer to his heart. The word "liberty" appears to be worn out in French recommendations, and to be succeeded by "Commerce," but the meaning is still the same. While, therefore, citizen Sebastini traverses Egypt, Syria and the islands of the Levant, with proffers of commerce, takes especial good care to avoid any enquiry in the state of trade and manufactures, and examines the country with "a soldier's eye." The strength and situation of the various forts, even the most inconsiderable, are examined with the most minute precision. The disposition of the inhabitants in general towards the French, is every where founded, and the character, principles, and talents of every man of influence in the country, are every where cautiously enquired and accurately ascertained. Fortunately for his hopes, he every where finds the strongest attachment to the first consul. His visit to Egypt is remembered with gratitude. The astrologers are constantly employed in consulting his destinies, and a sight of his portrait every where excites an enthusiasm of joy.

The report concludes with an account of the wretched state of the Turkish army, and a favorable representation of the troops of the Mamelukes, whose repeated victories over the Turks, Sebastini confirms, and whose artillery is served by 80 French deserters.

February 7.

Part of Sebastiani's mission to Egypt was to require our troops to evacuate that country. General Brune also made a similar requisition to the Porte, that it should cause Egypt to be immediately evacuated, in conformity to the treaty of Amiens.

Whether it be in consequence of these requisitions, we know not; but we believe we are well informed when we state that orders have been sent to our troops to evacuate that country, and that at the moment we are writing, not an English soldier remains in Egypt.

If this be the fact, the public will naturally enquire for what purpose his majesty's ministers have put the nation to the expence of keeeping so many sail of the line in the Mediterranean, and so large a military force in Egypt?—Have they procured a guarantee that France shall not send troops thither? or, in the present state of Egypt, can they have *really* surrendered, or could they surrender Egypt to the Porte?—Do we not know that the Turks are totally unable to contend with the Beys? To surrender the country at such a moment, is in fact to surrender it not to the Porte, but to the Mamelukes, the avowed enemies of the Porte.

February 9.

This morning, we received Paris papers to the 6th instant.

We are strengthened in our belief of the report we communicated on Monday, of Russia having definitively agreed to guarantee Malta, by a paragraph inserted in almost all these papers. Our readers know, that prince Ruspoli refused to accept the grand mastership of the order till he received a second brief from the pope. The following is the paragraph we have alluded to:

"We learn from Rome that the second brief which his holiness sent to the prince Ruspoli, to engage him to accept the grand mastership of Malta, was dispatched to him by cardinal Caprara. The brief adds, that among other conditions proposed by Russia, are the suppression of the Maltese Langue, the absolute neutrality of the island in case of war between the European powers."

To those conditions, it is believed, Great-Britain and France have acceded, and that orders will be, or have been sent for the immediate evacuation of the island.

The Moniteur informs us, that upon hearing the news of the death of general Le Clerc, and the want which the army had of reinforcements, the minister of war, caused an application to be made among the different corps of volunteers. Nearly 60,000 veterans enrolled their names!!

The first consul has instructed the minister of war to express his satisfaction to these brave men; to inform them that fifteen thousand men having just failed, new reinforcements were not for the present necessary.

The French funds are 58 9-10. They had been the day before 59 4-10.

The Elbe is so strongly frozen over, near Hamburg, that carriages with eight horses can pass over it with safety.

CORK, February 9.

The London Journals to the 4th, and those of Paris, inclusive to the 31st instant, have been, with several foreign and provincial prints, received at our office. We cannot forbear attaching more importance to the contents of the French papers, than our English contemporaries seem inclined to allow. They contain advice of the return of colonel Sebastiani from Constantinople; and they, at the same time, detail his official report to the first consul, on the present state of the Ottoman empire; an article which, as it is of some length, we are obliged to postpone for the present. Our interest, however, in the political relations of the empire at large, will not permit us to pass over that passage in colonel Sebastiani's report, which relates to the British army in Egypt.

"This army, commanded by general Stewart, is 4,430 strong, and occupies entirely, and exclusively, Alexandria, and the forts which surround it. The Turks, who garrisoned some of these forts, have been driven out of them. The English have not made any works for the security of the forts; the palisadoes are almost entirely destroyed; and the rains have occasioned such damage, as to make those new fortifications altogether contemptible. They do not occupy any of the works which are beyond the lines of the Arabs; and all those outer redoubts which stood when the French army withdrew, are now destroyed. The pacha of Cairo supplies the English army with corn, rice, meat and fire wood, without any payment. The consumption is three times greater than it should be, and the greatest dilapidations are committed. The greatest misunderstanding prevails between general Stewart and the Pacha." Thus far we have given, verbatim, the language of Sebastiani; and we cannot help adding a passage from his account of the Turkish army, from which something may be inferred; to shew that his mission was for those purposes which we suggested in a former number of this paper. He observes that the Pacha, may be called a prisoner to the English—le pacha est pour ainsi dire, prisonnier des Anglais. Of the Turks, he says—"It is useless to add that this is not an army—they are men badly armed without discipline, without confidence in their chiefs, and enervated by excessive debauchery. The chiefs are like their soldiers—ignorant even of the first elements of military science; and impelled merely by the love of wealth they seek but to acquire it, and to contrive to retire in security. Six thousand French troops