From the Sun, of the 10th of March, received at this office.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF PEERS.

Wednesday, March 9.

The order of the day for taking his majesty's message into consideration, being read,

Lord Hobart rose, to move an address to his majesty on the occasion. He observed, that he could not entertain the smallest doubt with respect to the motion which he should shortly have the honor to submit to the house. He felt himself justified in anticipating the most perfect unanimity in the present instance. A communication is made from the sovereign, that the most extensive military preparations were making on the coasts of France and Holland, and also, that important discussions were pending between his majesty and the French government, the result of which was very uncertain. In such a situation, he could hardly believe himself justified in supposing that a difference of opinion could prevail as to the line of conduct proper or necessary to be adopted. In a partial consideration of the subject, he by no means wished to disguise from their lordships—indeed it was a point of which they must in general be well aware, namely, that there existed reasons for thinking that the state of certain of the French possessions abroad was such as might warrant or call for the preparations that were making by France, independent of any hostile designs which possibly might be harbored by her government; but they must also at the same time see, and feel for the situation of their own country; and that, while discussions of the utmost importance are depending, they could not be justified in not taking those precautions which the security and honor of the country required.—With respect to any detailed exposition of those discussions, he could hardly think, that at the present time any thing of the kind could with any shadow of propriety be expected from him. He conceived it sufficient to say in the present instance, that he saw no necessity for the discussion not terminating satisfactorily; at the same time it must be perfectly obvious to the house, that it was the duty of ministers to be prepared for the alternative. It was certainly the earnest wish of ministers not to see the tranquility which subsisted between the two countries interrupted: but they at the same time hoped that nothing would be wanting on the part of the country to enable them to maintain that tranquility in a way consistently with the honor, the security, and the true interests of the British nation, the spirit, the energy, and the resources of which, he doubted not, would be successfully exerted on such an occasion as the present. Under these impressions he would no longer detain their lordships, but move an address to his majesty on the occasion of his most gracious message. The noble secretary of state then moved the address, which was couched in the usual form, echoing his majesty's message, and fraught with assurances of the cordial support of the house.

On the message being read from the Woolsack, and the question being put,

Earl Spencer rose, chiefly, if not entirely, for the purpose of signifying his full approbation of the proposition just now made by the noble secretary of state. He anticipated, with the noble lord, the most perfect unanimity on the occasion, and felt with him cordially as to the right line and system of conduct which was proper to be pursued on such a crisis as the present. He also felt that in the relative situation of Great-Britain and France, there existed circumstances that, under whatever degree of uncertainty, called for the measures at length resolved upon by his majesty's ministers. The present crisis in which this country was involved, he held to be of that importance and magnitude, as to render him confident that there was not a man in that house, or scarcely an individual in the country who would not join in offering to spill the last drop of their blood, or to spend their last shilling in support of its honor and its most essential interest: for his own part, after the uniform and decided opinions he had so frequently given, as to the relative situation of the two countries, it could be little expected that a firm and vigorous system of conduct should not meet his full assent and approbation. He could not, however, at the same time avoid observing, that he should feel more satisfaction, if the noble secretary of state had, not only for the satisfaction of the house, but for that of the public and the country, explained a little fuller the situation of the moment, and adverted to those circumstances which have produced such a sudden and marked alteration in the tenor and complection of his majesty's councils and measures. He would repeat, that his own opinions on these points had been long formed. He was perfectly satisfied, that a system of conduct like that now resolved upon by ministers, was that most likely to conduce to the preservation of peace, a wish in which all true friends of their country must unite. A system of firmness and vigor was much more likely to ensure the continuance of peace, than that line of conduct heretofore adopted by ministers. Indeed, in his opinion, the only chance that now remained for the preservation of that blessing, was the effect of the measures now proposed: of concession, and attempts at soothing our late adversary, we had too much. Were the line of conduct adopted earlier, in all human probability no necessity for it would exist at the present moment. However, as matters stood, he hailed the first appearance of spirit and vigor in the national councils with joy and gladness, as the only means left for our salvation. He had at present nothing farther to offer; but upon an occasion of such great importance and magnitude, he could not give a silent vote, consistently with his feelings of duty, or the dictates of his conscience.

Lord Grenville said, he had but a few words to offer on the present occasion. He cordially agreed with what fell from his noble friend who spoke last; but, like him, the part he had always taken with respect to similar discussions, prevented him from giving a silent vote. He thought with his noble friend, that the adoption of the system now about to be acted upon, was the only one that could preserve the blessings of peace to the country. He was likewise of opinion that a system of firmness and dignity, if earlier acted upon, would have ensured the continuance of peace, and certainly have obviated the necessity of such an incipient system at present.—It was, he was firmly convinced, only because such a system was not earlier adopted, that the continuance of peace was now questionable. However, its adoption even now, would afford to the country the best chance for the maintenance of that blessing—but at the same time, he had to observe, that the conduct of ministers in the present crisis should be such as to enable the country to feel and know its real situation, by which means, if the injustice of our adversary rendered it necessary to call forth the full powers and resources of the country, they could be used with the greatest vigor and effect. The reasonings of that day were warranted by the experience of the last eighteen months—they had seen the consequences resulting from a system of concession and meanness, in which all their attempts at conciliation only elevated the arrogance and the pretensions of the French government. If there was any chance remaining for the preservation of peace, it would proceed from the measures now resorted to; at the same time it was with regret he had to consider, that in consequence of the former conduct of ministers, if we were now driven to the alternative of war, we should have to meet a state of war under great and many disadvantages. Cessions the most important and valuable had been made with a view to operations either of an offensive or defensive nature; these considerations should not withhold his concurrence from the present motion. On the contrary, he rejoiced at this first appearance of sound political wisdom, and vigorous determination on the part of ministers. He hoped such a system would be acted upon with due energy and perseverance. Upon the whole, the motion had his hearty concurrence; and he was confident there could be no difference of opinion in that house on such an occasion. They were in the present instance simply called upon to concur in measures for strengthening the hands of the king with necessary powers, at a crisis wherein discussions of acknowledged importance and magnitude were pending—the result of which was known to be uncertain—they were called upon no farther. His lordship concluded with expressing his hearty assent to the motion.

The Earl of Moira, in expressing generally his concurrence in the motion, observed, that his support was rather qualified by the seeming backwardness in the noble secretary of state, to give that degree of explanation, which he thought necessary, and at the same time unexceptionable; there were of course certain reservations, and these proceeded chiefly upon the following grounds:—First, they were by no means satisfied that the causes which induced ministers to come as they now did, did not exist even long before; the conduct of the French government in many respects was well known. They were also unsatisfied whether the crisis said to be now arrived might not have been prevented or obviated, if earlier taken up, and the attention of parliament called thereto. At the close of the last session, no serious apprehensions from our late enemies were declaredly entertained by ministers, though, notwithstanding those declarations, they thought it necessary to propose an increase of our establishment. At that time every thing was doing or done in France, as fully as at the present moment when such serious apprehensions seemed to be entertained. They should be given to understand at least what it was that had thrown such a new colour on the pretensions of the enemy; what change there was in the situation of France, or in the tone held by its ruler. Some intimation of these should at least be given, in order to enable them to judge of the extent of the proceedings now going on. Perhaps to a certain degree these explanations might be declined, on the ground that speaking too fully out might give umbrage to the ruler of France. Umbrage to that new Hannibal, who has sworn on the alters of insatiable ambition, an eternal enmity to this country! He would ask, has this man never shewn any disposition to induce unfavorable sentiments and conduct, on the part of others, against this country? After expatiating some time on the manifest disposition of the first consul of France against this country, he contended, that we should place ourselves on the defensive, but in a dignified attitude; that we should be prepared for the worst; that we should betray no marks whatever of despondence or dismay, but come forward manfully, and shew ourselves not afraid of the result of the alternative of war. A genuine and useful spirit should be shewn by our government, and not an empty parade of valor; for if the first consul had really advanced so far in his system, as avowedly to render such precautionary measures necessary on the part of our government, he had lost all hope of its stopping there; their conduct in such case should be such, as in effect to appeal to the sense of the French nation against the ambition and injustice of its ruler, to let them fairly see and decide, whether, in consequence of the headstrong passions of one man, they would be willing again to plunge into all the calamities of war. The effect of such a line of conduct, if any thing of that kind could, would be to restrain the ambition of the first consul, and to induce him seriously to pause before he should proceed to extremities. A decided tone and vigorous system of policy on our parts, would more than any other be likely to prevent hostilities between the two countries. Such, in fact, as would have the effect, comparing little things to great, of preventing a quarrel between any two manly Englishmen.—"On such terms I should wish to remain at peace; but set your foot on such place, and I shall consider it as the signal for instant war!" Such a mode would best conduce to the preservation of peace, even with a country governed by the most despotic ruler. With respect to any important objects in a train of negociation, he confessed it might be improper now to inquire; but he hoped that information respecting those would, as soon as practicable, be laid before the house, as the people should, as soon as possible, be apprized of their real situation. Considering the subject in another point of view, and urging the policy of vigorous preparation, his lordship observed, that we should not calculate upon the attempts of Bonaparte, according to the principles or motives of conduct which actuate any other man. We should make up our minds, as to the probability at least, of attempts upon this country; but for these we should be prepared—we should look the danger full in the face, and more, we should let our adversaries know that we are so determined. Their boast, that England cannot contend single-handed against France, should not go unnoticed: whatever purposes they might have against us was perhaps when we were encumbered with what they would call assistance. But how stood the fact? It was, that when we were single handed with France we were always successful, and of this he thought his noble friends near him (lords Nelson and Hutchinson) afforded a good practical illustration. But above all, our adversaries should be made to understand, that if contending with them, in this country, we most confidently looked for signal and decisive success. In such a possible contingency, the safety of the capital should be especially looked to. We should not talk of the impracticability of invasion: we should consider the extent of coast possessed by us, as well as the character of the adversary we had to contend with.—Therefore, what was possible was practicable, and what was practicable we should consider as likely to be attempted. We should consider that in such a contest, we should be playing our last stake. Such a contest should not be managed under a common-place system, or official practice of war—if so, we were lost indeed! but the strength, the resources, the energies of the people and the country, should be called forth and fairly brought into action. The first object of the enemy in a descent, would doubtless be the capital; its security should be first looked to. A great and powerful army should be stationed between it and the coast; this, he would wish to be understood; and so circumstanced, he was of opinion, the officer commanding the British force ought to lose his head, if he did not [so we understood his lordship] come to an action with the enemy before they reached the capital. In such a crisis, the destruction of one army ought to be risqued against that of the other. After dwelling upon these points, and urging the necessity of securing the capital, especially from attack, which among other ill effects, the temporary elevation it might give to the few disaffected spirits, should be guarded against, he again urged the superior policy of vigorous preparations, and a determination to be prepared for the worst, and above all, to assume that tone and attitude which should convince the enemy that no invader that should set his foot in this country, should be suffered to return to tell of his fate.

The earl of Westmoreland made a few observations upon the general subject. He contended that Great-Britain was of herself amply capable of asserting her honor, maintaining her dominions, and preserving her independence. In such a contest she needed no ally. Let republics court the alliance, or unite themselves to the Great Nation; the kingdom of Great-Britain under the auspices of its sovereign, aided by the spirit and resources of its people, would stand alone, and in a dignified attitude. It was then unnecessary, as well as obviously improper, to enter into the discussion of certain points adverted to by the noble earl, though in another point of view, the forbearance of that noble lord to enquire was highly entitled to approbation. He trusted that due confidence would be placed in ministers on the present occasion, as it was but fair to deem of them, that they would not rashly throw away those blessings of peace which they so greatly exerted themselves to attain and secure. He could assure his noble friends, that his majesty's ministers were as anxious for the preservation of those blessings as any men possibly could be.

Lord Auckland followed on the same side. He expressed his conviction that the steps lately adopted, were not unadvisedly taken, and that no wish whatever was entertained by ministers to plunge the country again into the calamities of war. He adverted to the colossal strength of France, and to the great extent of her continental possessions or influence, and scouted the principle advanced on the part of France, that Great-Britain had no right to interfere in the concerns of the continent.—There were several instances, as illustrated by his lordship in argument, where the interference would be not only justifiable, but laudable. After commenting some time on the prosperous situation and circumstances of this country, and her ability, in every point of view, successfully to cope with France, his lordship adverted particularly to the financial concerns of England, which, he observed, it was of late so much the practice to depreciate in France: it was to evince to the world, and to that country in particular, the unprecedented prosperous financial situation of this country, that he moved for the various accounts which were then before the house. To establish the positions adverted to, the noble lord entered into a variety of financial calculations, from which he deduced, that the country now possessed, after the discharge of debt, an income of not less than seventeen millions a year. This income, in consequence of various operations, was increasing from day to day; that a rapid progress was making in the liquidation of debt. Added to these considerations was the immense territorial possessions of Great-Britain, particularly in the East-Indies, and which naturally increased the magnitude of her strength and resources. These were leading and important facts, which, his lordship observed, could not be too generally known, and with a reference to that publicity, he originally proposed the discussions he alluded to.

After a few words in explanation between lords Moira and Auckland, the question was put, the address was voted *nem. diss.* and the lords, with white staves, ordered to wait upon his majesty respecting the same. Their lordships then adjourned till to-morrow,

Latest Foreign Intelligence,

Via New-York, continued.

LONDON, March 11.

The chancellor of the exchequer yesterday delivered the following message from his majesty to the house of commons:

GEORGE R.

"In consequence of the preparations carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, while important discussions are subsisting between his majesty and the French government, his majesty thinks it due to the care and concern which he feels for his faithful people, to omit no means in his power which may contribute to their security.

"In pursuance, therefore, of the acts of parliament enabling his majesty to call out and assemble the militia of the United Kingdom, his majesty has thought it right to make this communication to the house of commons, to the end that his majesty may cause the said militia, or such part thereof as his majesty shall think necessary, to be forthwith drawn out and embodied, and to march as occasion shall require.

"G. R."

The secretary at war rose and moved—"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, thanking him for his gracious communication, and for his parental care in adopting measures for the security of the kingdoms.

The address was agreed to *nemine contradicente*, and was ordered to be presented to his majesty by such members of that house as were of his majesty's privy council.

March 17.

The last Dutch mail that arrived brought us an article, dated from Madrid, communicating an account of an expedition having been fitted out from Bengal against the Portuguese settlement at Macao, which expedition was put an end to by the arrival of the intelligence of peace having been concluded. A private letter we have received explains the cause of this expedition, and furnishes us with another commentary upon the *race of commercial rivalry*, which the French mean to run with us. Our East-India and China trade are the great objects of the envy of France. To check and interrupt them is of course her most ardent wish. The Portuguese possess a settlement called Macao, situated at the entrance of the river Canton. In the hands of so feeble a power as Portugal, the possession of that island cannot be injurious to us, but it would be highly so if it were in the hands of an active and powerful rival. We are informed, that one of the private articles of the treaty between France and Portugal ceded this settlement to the French. This information was sent to our government at Bengal, and it was resolved to fit out an expedition to prevent the Portuguese from making such a cession. Whether our remonstrances and preparations prevented them from delivering up the place, or whether the French had no force sufficient to cope with ours, we know not. The following is the letter we have received. It is from an officer on board the Rainier, and is dated

"*Java Seas, 22d January*, 1802.

"By the Wellesley, which sailed from Bengal, the 8th ult. I informed you of my having volunteered to go on a secret expedition then fitting out, the destination of which was at that time, a profound secret; but it is so no longer; and I need hardly observe, that it is to occupy the island of Macao, situated at the entrance of the river Canton, *which the Portuguese, by the late treaty of peace, are said to have made over to the French*; who would, if established there, annoy our China trade exceedingly. Our force is composed of one company of Bengal artillery, one of the 78th regiment of Higlanders, and 500 seapoys, embarked in the Asia, Dover Castle and Rainier East-Indiamen, and escorted by the Arrogant, captain Osborne, and Orpheus, captain Elphinstone. Sir Home Popham accompanied us to Paulo Penang, when admiral Rainier took the command. At Penang, the admiral took all his provisions out, except enough to carry him to Madras, from whence we pushed on to Malacca, and waited a fortnight, till the two men of war joined us. We are to stop a few days at Amboyna, after which we launch away to the eastward of all the islands, even the Phillipines and Pelews, into the Pacific Ocean, before crossing the N. E. trade for Canton, which will take us at least six weeks more."

Admiral Ranier received advice of peace having been concluded before he arrived in Canton River.

March 18.

The great ground of complaint against the ministers in the present state of affairs is, that they have given no information of any kind, either as to the points in discussion between them and the French cabinet, or the nature and extent of the armaments preparing in the ports of France and Holland. The latter species of information they are less excuseable for withholding, as it could consist only of a statement of facts, which could not at all affect the negociations pending, while it must afford the most satisfactory reason for counter yreparations on our part, and the best measure for the extent and limitation of those counter preparations. The present statement of the French military establishment given by the secretary at war, as a ground for the increase of the peace establishment, shews how easy it is to ascertain, not only the collective force of a country so near and so easy of access, but also its details and distribution. Every one recollects the effect of that statement in the house of commons, where it was felt as the most urgent cause for an increased establishment on our side; and it was only lamented that any preparation which prudence would permit us to make, must fall so infinitely short of the half million of men which the honorable secretary shewed to be at the command of the first consul; and which that consul boasts that he has in readiness to defend the republic from England, and to avenge any attempt made from this side of the channel.

This statement is now recollected, and opposed to the bare demand of a vote made by the chancellor of the exchequer. Every one is surprised that the number of ships in the different ports of France and Holland, together with their size and forwardness for equipment, their declared destination, and the number of land forces in readiness to be embarked on board them, as well as the strength of the bodies of troops stationed in the vicinity of the ports, so as to be an available force in case of hostility—Every one is surprised that ministers have not ascertained all these as prudence should have directed them to do, even in a period of the most profound and unsuspected peace, and as they might with ease have done by means of three or four frigates, commanded by active and intelligent officers.

If the chancellor of the exchequer had prefaced his vote of 10,000 seamen with such a statement of the naval preparation of France in all her ports from Toulon to the mouth of the Scheldt, he would have laid a ground of the most urgent and irresistible kind for preparation on our part, and he would have astonished and confounded the enemy by such a display of the vigilance with which their designs were observed, and the energy with which they would be counteracted if they should prove unfair. Now all that we know is, that there are armaments in the ports of France and Holland, and that the professed object of these armaments is colonial service. But what precise force, either naval or military, there is in any port, or what the professed destination of that force, we are entirely ignorant. We have therefore only the single word of ministers, by no means a parliamentary or constitutional ground of proceeding, to inform us that it is necessary and proper for us to arm, and that the precise additional force which we should raise is 10,000 seamen.

Yet though no parliamentary explanation has been given by ministers, a paper connected with them has communicated some particulars from which we are able to infer what are the real points in dispute That paper says,—"*If* it should appear because Egypt was not evacuated at a moment when there was too much reason to suppose that France had views to forming an establishment there----that therefore threats were held out of driving our army from Alexandria---*if* similar threats have been made to starve or invade Malta, although no means have yet been discovered to place that island in the independent state in which it was proposed to be placed by our treaty with France---*if* menacing language upon other points has been held to our ambassador at Paris --*if* armaments have been prepared and, ships commissioned in the ports of France, without complete satisfaction as to the purposes of such measures---*if*, upon other anxious and interesting points, explanations have been refused, who is there in the nation, valuing our existence as an independent people, who does not think that it is time to bring things to a point?"

No one can be at a loss to guess why the ministerial paper does not communicate the above information in a more positive manner. We have no doubt that the points above stated are the real grounds of the dispute with France.

The same paper prepares us to expect changes in the administration, and paves the way for the introduction into the cabinet of men, not belonging to the old opposition, but to the old administration.

March 19.

A cabinet council sat several hours yesterday, and a messenger, we understand, was dispatched to lord Whitworth as soon as the council broke up.

We communicated yesterday the sub-