THE NEGOCIATION.

Papers presented by his majesty's command, to both houses of parliament, 18th May, 1803.

[CONTINUED]

(No. 21.)

Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Liston, to lord Hawkesbury, dated Hague, 13th Oct 1802.

A few hours after I had sent off my last dispatch to your lordship, on Saturday, the 9th of this month, the French ambassador, M. de Semonville, waited upon the president of the government of state, and informed him that he had just received by a courier from Paris, orders to inform the government of this country—

"Que le premier consul avoit appris, avec autant de surprise que d'indignation, que des personnes avides de revolutions vouloient de nouveau troubler le repos dans la Batavie, en abusant meme pour cet effet de noms respectables; et que le premier consul, comme alliée de la republique, invitoit le gouvernement a prendre toutes les mesures necessaires pour maintenir l'ordre des choses etabli par la constitution."*

These were nearly the words read to me by the secretary of state, from a note in his own hand writing, dictated to him by M. de Semonville, with a view to its publication. (And a translation accordingly inserted in the Dutch official paper of the Hague, on the 11th); but they fall very short of the language employed by the French minister for foreign affairs in his dispatches to the ambassador, and in the communication made by him to the Dutch chargé d'affaires at Paris, (who also sent a messenger to the Hague upon this occasion.) In these M. de Talleyrand entered into a considerable detail on the subject of the plots supposed to be formed in this country against the administration, mentioned the names of the chiefs, and ended by making an offer, on the part of the first consul, to come to the assistance of the government (should circumstances render it necessary) with all his forces.

(No. 22.)

Hague, October 29, 1802.

My Lord,

The recent attack made by Bonaparte upon the liberties and independence of the Swiss cantons, has naturally made a strong impression on the inhabitants of this country; and the public anxiety has been much augmented by certain symptoms in the conduct of the consular government, which seem to indicate an intention not to withdraw the French troops, which have been kept in the Batavian republic for some time past, under the title of *auxiliaries*, said and maintained at the expence of the Dutch nation.

These troops (amounting to between ten and eleven thousand men) were to remain here till the conclusion of the definitive treaty with Great-Britain. It was afterwards formally promised on the part of France, that they should evacuate the territories of the republic at the latest, on the expiration of the last French year (the 23d of September). They accordingly began their march to the southward a few days before that period; and the government and the people rejoiced at the prospect of being finally relieved from a load which has become extremely irksome to them. But, on pretence that a great proportion of the corps were to be embarked at Flushing for Louisiana, and that there was a want of shipping for their accommodation, they took up the quarters on the frontiers of the country, (at Bois-le-Duc, Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom) where they still remain; and demands have continued to be made for their pay and maintenance.

Hopes were, however, entertained from day to day, that their departure would take place; when to the astonishment of the Batavian government, official notice was last week transmitted from France to the department of war at the Hague, (which has been charged with the support of these corps) that the first consul has been pleased to appoint a new commander in chief, (gen. Montrichard) and a new staff for the auxiliary troops in this country: and the notice was given that government might provide for the pay of the officers in question.

The administration appear resolved to oppose all the resistance in their power to this unexpected and oppressive extortion. An express has been sent off to the Dutch ambassador at Paris, charging him to claim, in the most urgent terms, the accomplishment of the treaties subsisting between the two republics, and the fulfilment of the repeated and recent promises made by the French government upon this subject. And in case of the failure of this application, they talk of addressing themselves to the principal powers of Europe who had any share or influence in the conclusion of the peace, to intreat their intervention and good offices, with a view to the maintenance of the independence of the republic.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT LISTON.

Rt. Hon. lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

(No. 23.)

Letter from lord Hawkesbury to lord Whitworth, imputing the declaration of general Stuart to colonel Sebastiani, of his inability to evacuate Egypt, to his having been misled in supposing that it was requisite he should receive a warrant for the purpose; and stating that orders should be immediately sent to general Stuart to remove the king's troops with as little delay as possible.

Nos. 24, 25, and 26, are extracts of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Vienna, relative to Malta. They are unimportant.

No. 27. Extract of a dispatch from the honorable A. Paget to lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, August 22, 1802; stating the emperor's act of guarantee and accession to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

Nos. 28, 29 and 30, are unimportant.

(No. 31.)

Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Jackson to lord Hawkesbury dated Berlin, November 25, 1802,

Stating, that count Haugwitz had hinted that the king of Prussia took a very slight interest in the fate of Malta; and that he was countenanced in withholding his guarantee by the example of Spain. He, however, added, that the report in question had been made to the king, and that he only waited his majesty's commands to confer with Mr. Jackson farther upon the subject.

Nos. 32 and 33 are unimportant.

(No. 34.)

Contains the conditions upon which his Imperial majesty of all the Russians is willing to accede to the stipulations of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

1. The acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the order of St. John, of Jerusalem, over the island of Malta and its dependencies; the acknowledgment of the grand master, and of the civil government of the order, according to its ancient institutions, with the admission into it of native Maltese.

* *That the first consul has learnt, with no less surprise than indignation, that certain persons eager for revolutions, wished again to disturb the tranquillity of Batavia, by improperly using, for this very purpose, some respectable names; and that the first consul, as the ally of that republic, had invited the government to take all necessary measures for maintaining the order of things established by the constitution.*

2. The rights of the king of the two Sicilies, as sovereign of the island, shall remain upon the same footing as they were previous to the war, which is now terminated by the treaty of Amiens.

3. The independence and neutrality of the island of Malta, its ports and dependencies, shall be secured and guaranteed by the respective contracting powers, who shall mutually engage to acknowledge and maintain that neutrality in all cases of war; whether between each other, or between any of them and any other power, not excepting his Sicilian majesty, whose rights of sovereignty shall not extend so as to enable him to cause a departure from the neutrality of the island, as guaranteed by the present act.

4. Until the order shall be in a situation to provide, by its own resources, for the maintenance of its independence and neutrality, as secured by the preceding article, as well as for the defence of their principal residence, the different forts shall be occupied by his Sicilian majesty's troops, who shall send a sufficient force for the defence of the island and its dependencies, the number of which shall be agreed upon by his said majesty and the two contracting powers, who shall take upon themselves conjointly, the expence of maintaining the whole of the said troops, so long as the defence of the island shall continue to be entrusted to them, during which period the said troops shall be under the authority of the grand master and his government.

5. The present additional act shall be considered as forming an integral part of the treaty of Amiens, the same as if it had been inserted therein, word for word, and shall be executed in like manner.

6. Their majesties, the emperor of all the Russias, the emperor of the Romans, the king of Spain, the king of the Two Sicilies, and the king of Prussia, shall be invited to accede to this act as guarantees.

(Signed)

Comte Alexander de Woronzow.

(No. 35.)

Paris, January 27, 1803.

My Lord,

I have to report to your lordship the purport of a conversation I had on Tuesday last by appointment with M. Talleyrand. He had invited me some days ago for this purpose. The communication he had to make to me related to two points, both equally important, as he said, to the maintenance of good harmony between the two countries; with this difference, however, that the one originated withself, and was dictated by his anxiety to do away every thing that might feed the mutual irritation of the two countries; and the other by the express order of the first consul. That which came from himself related to the English newspapers, against which he pronounced a most bitter philippic, assuring me that the first consul was extremely hurt to find that his endeavors to conciliate had hitherto produced no other effect than to increase the abuse with which the papers in England continually loaded him. He expatiated much upon this topic, and endeavored to establish a fact, which I assured him a reference to any one newspaper in Paris would instantly refute, that during four months not a word of provocation had appeared in any French Journal, that could justify a retort from those published in England. For the rest he advanced nothing but what has been said on more than one occasion to Mr. Merry, and reported by him to your lordship. I was however given to understand, that the first consul was in fact highly incensed, and the more so, he was pleased to say, as it came from a country of whose good opinion he was very ambitious.

In my reply, I could but go over the old ground, and endeavor to make M. Talleyrand understand—first, that whatever was said in the English papers might be considered but as a national retaliation for what was published in the French papers—secondly, that what was officially published here was by no means so in England—and thirdly, that although the government possessed a control over the press in France, the English government neither had nor could have, unless they purchased it at the same price, any whatever in England. Upon this he endeavored to prove to me, that there were papers in England attached to different parties, and went over their names and supposed connections with great precision; and that consequently his majesty's ministers might so far control those at least which depend upon them, as to prevent their inserting that abuse which must be considered as having their sanction. I endeavored to explain to him what the influence was, which he supposed ministers to possess in England; that it amounted to nothing more than a preference which your lordship for instance might give to one paper rather than another, by sending to it any articles of news which it might be wished to make public; but that your lordships' influence went no further; and that if the editor of such paper conceived it more for his interest to continue to write after his own fancy and uncontroled, than to be publisher of such occasional articles, in that case all influence was at an end. I told him that if he had remarked any abusive article in any paper of such a description, it was natural and fair to conclude that it did not depend upon government to prevent it. He persisted in his opinion, that his majesty's ministers might keep certain papers in order, as I did in assuring him, that until the first consul could so far master his feelings as to be as indifferent to the scurrility of the English prints, as the English government was to that which daily appeared in the French, this state of irritation was irremidable. I told him, however, that I would report the substance of this communication to your lordship, although I could assure him that your lordship could add nothing to the explanation which had been given, and in such detail, by Mr. Merry from your lordship.

M. Talleyrand, with great solemnity, required of me to inform him, and this by the express order of the first consul, what were his majesty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta. He again on this occasion made great professions of his sincere desire to set aside every thing which could interrupt the good understanding between the two governments; adding, that it was absolutely necessary that the French government should know what it was meant to do, when the clause in the treaty of Amiens, which stipulates the cession of Malta, should be fully accomplished. He said that another grand master would now very soon be elected; that all the powers of Europe invited so to do, with the exception of Russia, whose difficulties it was easy to remove, and without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, were ready to come forward; and that consequently the term would very soon arrive when Great-Britain could have no pretext for keeping longer possession. I informed him that I would report his conversation to your lordship, and would have the honor of communicating to him your lordship's answer as soon as I could receive it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

Right hon. lord Hawkesbury.

(No. 36.)

Extract of a letter from lord Hawkesbury to lord Whitworth, dated Downing-street, Feb. 9, 1803.

The most remarkable passages in this dispatch are the following:—"The late treaty of peace was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specially agreed to in an official note by the French government, viz. that his majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the continent. This is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded with reference to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe, since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the annexations which have been made to France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of the French government, his majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect the true intent and spirit of the 10th article, the execution of which, according to its terms, had been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his majesty's power to control. A communication to your lordship would accordingly have been prepared conformably to his disposition, if the attentions of his majesty's government had not been attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of colonel Sebastiani to the first consul. It is impossible for his majesty to view this report in any other light, than as an official publication; for without referring particularly to explanations which have been repeatedly given upon the subject of publications in the Moniteur, the article in question, as it purports to be the report to the first consul of an accredited agent, as it appears to have been signed by colonel Sebastiani himself, and as it is published in the official paper with an official title affixed to it, must be considered as authorised by the French government. It discloses, however, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his majesty and the French government: and his majesty would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the honor of his crown and to the interests of his dominions, if he should see with indifference such a system developed and avowed. His majesty cannot, therefore, regard the conduct of the French government on various occasions since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the insinuations and charges contained in the report of col. Sebastiani, and the views which that report discloses, without feeling it necessary for him distinctly to declare that it will be impossible for him to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanation on the subject of the communication."

HAWKESBURY.

No. 37. Extract of a dispatch from lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Feb. 17, 1803. This dispatch is not very interesting, as the subject of it is more fully explained in the subsequent number.

(No. 38.)

Paris, February 21, 1803.

My Lord,

My last dispatch, in which I gave your lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, was scarcely gone, when I received a note from him informing me that the first consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at the Thuilleries at nine o'clock. He received me in his cabinet, with tolerable cordiality, and, after talking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the other side of the table, and began. He told me that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should, in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to me, in order to their being communicated to his majesty, and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself than through any medium whatever. He said that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him, that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was now avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue.

He now enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria as we were bound to do by treaty. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and of the two he had rather see us in possession of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public prints: but this he said he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it meant to excite this country against him and his government.—He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this, he told me, that two men had within these few days been apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the bishop of Arras, by Georges, and by Dutheil, as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world.

He acknowledged, that the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind, (I make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions) which blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him.

He now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Alboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the 4000 British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with pretence for invading it. This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it as a colony, because he did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might, perhaps be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire or else by some arrangement with the Porte.

As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of offence he had, & that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were, that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea? He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him; but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprize.

He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France with an army of 480,000 men, for to this amount it is, he said, to be immediately completed, all ready for the most desperate enterprizes; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he could equal in less than ten years. Two such countries by a proper understanding might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said, that if he had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate: participation in indemnities as well as in influence on the continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction, and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British government, and therefore it was now come to the point, whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse in the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and persons of that description) must be withdrawn. If war, it was only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfill the treaty. He now made the tour of Europe to prove to me, that in its present state there was no power with which we could coalesce for the purpose of making war against France; consequently it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain, renew the war when circumstances were more favorable.—He said it was not doing him justice to suppose that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression; neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war unless on good grounds. He said, that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers, but he hoped that England, Russia and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land, than by plunder.

In the little I said to him, for he gave me in the course of two hours but very few opportunities of saying a word, I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your lordship's instructions. I urged them in the same manner as I had done to M. Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as I could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the views of France towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance and jealousy. He maintained that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace, was on the one hand the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt, with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with the approbation of all Europe, and more particularly of the Turks, who had repeatedly invited him to join with them for the purpose of forcing us to evacuate their territory.

I do not pretend to follow the arguments of the first consul in detail; this would be impossible, from the vast variety of matter which he took occasion to introduce. His purpose was evidently to convince me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at the same time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he possessed of annoying us at home and abroad.

With regard to the mistrust and jealousy which he said constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, I observed that after a war of such long duration, so full of rancor, and carried on in a manner of which history has no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of agitation should prevail; but this, like the swell after a storm, would gradually subside, if not kept up by the policy of either party; that I would not pretend to pronounce which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he complained, and which was still kept up, though with this difference, that in England it was independent of government, and in France its very act & deed. To this I added that it must be admitted, that we had such motives of mistrust against France, as could not be alledged against us, and I was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the treaty, when he interrupted me by saying, I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland; "ce sont des bagatelles;"† and it must have been foreseen whilst the negociation was pending; "Vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler a cette heure."‡ I then alledged as a cause of mistrust and jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice, or any kind of redress for any of his majesty's subjects. He asked me in what respect; and I told him that since the signing of the treaty not one British claimant had been satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period; and that since I had been here, and I could say as much of my predecessors, not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innumerable representations which we had been under the necessity of making in favor of British subjects and property detained in the ports of France and elsewhere, without even the shadow of justice: Such an order of things, I said, was not made to inspire confidence; but, on the contrary, must create mistrust. This, he said, must be attributed to the natural difficulties attending such suits, when both parties thought themselves right; but he denied that such delays could proceed from any disinclination to do what was just and right. With regard to the pensions which were granted to French or Swiss individuals, I observed that they were given as a reward for past services during the war, and most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as had been insinuated of a nature repugnant to the feelings of every individual in England; and to the universally acknowledged loyalty and honor of the British government. That as for any participation of indemnities, or other accessions which his majesty might have obtained, I could take upon myself to assure him that his majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve than to acquire; and that with regard to the most propitious moment for renewing hostilities, his majesty, whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure as the greatest calamity; but that if his majesty was so desirous of peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining allies; and the less so, as those means which it might be necessary to afford such allies, for perhaps inadequate services, would all be concentrated in England, and give a proportionate increase of energy to our own exertions. At this part of the conversation he rose from his chair, and told me that he should give orders to general Andreossi to enter on the discussion of this business with your lordship; but he wished that I should at the same time be made acquainted with his motives and convinced of his sincerity, rather from himself than from his ministers. He then, after a conversation of two hours, during the greatest part of which he talked incessantly, conversed for a few moments on different subjects, in apparent good humor, and retired.

Such was nearly, as I can recollect, the purport of this conference.

It must however be observed, that he did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute colonel Sebastiani's mission *to commercial motives only*, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view, by the infraction by us of the treaty of Amiens.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

P. S. This conversation took place on Friday last, and this morning I saw M. de Talleyrand. He had been with the first consul after I left him, and he assured me that he had been very well satisfied with the frankness with which I made my observations on what fell from him. I told him, that without entering into any farther detail, what I had said to the first consul amounted to an assurance, of what I trusted there could be no doubt, of the readiness of his majesty's ministers to remove all subjects of discussion, where that could be done without violating the laws of the country, and to fulfil strictly the engagements which they had contracted, inasmuch as that could be reconciled with the safety of the state. As this applied to Malta and Egypt, he gave me to understand that a project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so effectually secured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain himself further.

† *These are mere trifles.*

‡ *You have no right to speak of that at this time.*

[*To be continued.*]

SALEM, June 30.

Arrived, brig Rajah, captain Joseph W. Williams, 39 days from Oporto.—Sailed in company with captain M'Kinsey, of Boston, for Guernsey. Left at Oporto, May 12, barque Columbia, Day, from Boston, just arrived; brigs Mary, West, Baltimore, to sail in 8 days; Hope, Sellers, do. 8 days; Catharine, Lawrence, Alexandria, 12 days. Sch's Father and Son, Bryan, Norfolk, just arrived; Fish-hawk, Cook, of Salem, for Lisbon, just arrived; Harriot and Ann, Cox, Norfolk; Commerce, Baldwin, of and for Alexandria, sailed the day before the Rajah. In lat. 40, 20, long. 49, 50, spoke ship Columbia, from Boston, bound to Hamburg, blowing fresh could not learn the captain's name. Lat. 40, 41, long. 51, spoke brig Harlequin, from New-York, bound to Hull, Charles Hammond, master. 12 days out. Lat. 42, 30, long. 56, 20, spoke ship Pitt, of Greenock, 15 days from New-York, bound to London. Eighteen leagues to the westward of the Isle of Sable, spoke schooner Bird, 6 days from Marblehead, bound to the Banks. Passed two others from do. Lat. 43, 30, long. 64, spoke brig John Adams, William Barrett, master, 47 days from Liverpool, bound to Portsmouth.

Same day, ship Trent, Kinsman, 42 days from Gibraltar. Left there, brig Hopewell, captain Very, of Salem; brig Fox, Lock, of Boston; a ship from Philadelphia, Williams, bound up the Straits. In lat. 42, 22, long. 59, 30, spoke brig Fame, Avery, from Bordeaux, bound to Boston, 30 days out. Same day, schr. Hetty, Marshall, of Salem, from Gibraltar, 40 days out. Lat. 42, 46, long. 66, spoke schooner Polly, Atwood, of Plymouth, bound to Grand Bank. Lat. 42, 36, long. 66, 30, a schooner from Cape-Ann, 3 days out, bound to Grand Bank, Andrew Simmons, master. Markets very dull at Gibraltar.

District of Salem and Beverly, July 1.

Entered, brig Liberty, Fillebrown, Oporto, schooner John, Harris, Havanna.

Cleared, brig Nancy, Woodberry, West-Indies; schooner Hannah, Skerry, Norfolk.

BOSTON, June 28.

Arrived, schooner Favorites, Twicross, 25 days from St. Croix.

Same day, brig Nautilus, capt. French, 25 days from St. Croix.

Same day, schooner Betsy, capt. Williams, 60 days from Alicant.

The sloop Stork, Foster, was at Gibraltar, taking in freight for Cadiz. June 12, in lat. 41, 9, long. 53, W. spoke the brig Concord, Mason, of Kennebunk, from Norfolk, bound to London.

June 29.

Arrived, the ship Katharine, captain Worth, 135 days from Canton. Parted with, March 16, in the Straits, of Sunda, the Columbia, Fitch, of Nantucket, for Boston. Spoke, June 14, lat. 12, 21, long. 58, brig Hazard, Wood, from Dublin, 33 days from Cape de Verds, but having sprung a leak was bound to Charleston, or the first port he could make. June 21, lat. 32, 30, long. 14, 25, ship Gipsey, 42 days from London, for New-York. June 24, lat. 37, long. 64, ship Argo, Howland, from Charleston, for Hull. Same day, brig Julian, Lovett, 5 days from New-York, for Isle of France. June 27, lat. 40, long. 67, brig Catharine, 5 days from New York, for Bilboa.

Same day, via quarantine, the brig Favorite, captain Sales, 28 days from Havanna.

June 30.

Arrived, brig Fame, Avery, Bordeaux, 45 days. Spoke, June 16, in lat. 41, 30, long. 60, ship Franklin, of Salem, from Gibraltar, 26 days.

Same day, a brig from Wilmington, D. Brig Pacific, Nash, from Guadaloupe, is below.

PHILADELPHIA, July 6.

Arrived, ship Missouri, Read, Lisbon, 50 days; Fame, Jones, Cadiz, 49; Warren, Hammond, New-York, 4; brig Union, Brown, do. 4; William, Preston, Gibraltar, 56; schooners Hope, Lincoln, Boston, 14; Nancy, Bates, Richmond, 14; sloops Astrea, Pryor, do. Eliza, Norton, New Bedford, 8.

Cleared, ship Richmond, Volans, Lisbon; brig Lovely Lass, M'Alister, Batavia; schooner Nancy, Bouletier, Cape-Francois; sloop Pythagoras, Ely, New-York.

Arrived at the Lazaretto,

Brig Sally and Jenny, Port-Republican
Lark, Heim, Jamaica
Schr. Eleanor, Ling, New-Orleans
Sukey & Peggy, Wallace, Martinique
Sloop Sea Flower, New-York
Prosperity, Pintard, do.

Captain Gaitsbury, of the brig Fame,