For the FEDERAL GAZETTE.

He that stealeth a man and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death. Exodus, chap. xxi. ver. 16.

The kidnapping and carrying off free negroes has been carried on so long, and with so much success in this and some of the neighboring states, that it is now reduced in some measure to a system, and is become a lucrative branch of trade amongst a class of villains harbored here, and known by the name of *Georgia men.*

It is greatly to be feared, this most barbarous and inhuman commerce is connived at, if not absolutely encouraged, by some amongst us whose offices give them an opportunity of comforting and assisting the unprincipled actors in this detestable practice, which outrages every principle of moral and civil justice, tramples under foot the sacred laws of God and our country, and scatters wretchedness and misery wherever its baleful operations pervade.

The writer of this has often felt his mind deeply affected under the consideration of the manifold cruelties and vexations which are daily committed on the persons of the *blacks* amongst us, fully believing, that there is a just omnicient Providence, whose mercies are over all his works, and who having "created of one blood all the nations of them that dwell on the earth," will one day demand an awful retribution for the great injustice that has been done these people—for he has emphatically declared, "Justice is mine and I will repay."

To recapitulate the numberless instances *in this city alone*, of the free negroes who have been, without any infraction of law, forcibly dragged before magistrates, under the pretence of their being runaways, would be to write a volume. I have known several who had been legally manumitted by persons of my own acquaintance, and who after residing here a considerable time, (in some instances many years,) and known to be free, but who, having lost their passes were apprehended, and without any offence being alledged against them, committed to prison, where they lay until some person would come forward, pay their fees, and have them discharged, otherwise they would be sold out to pay the expences of their commitment, &c. I know one instance of a negro who was emancipated, and furnished by his master with a legal pass; he was soon after coming here, met by a certain constable, who, I believe, draws a considerable revenue from these practices, and taken before a magistrate, who, notwithstanding he had a pass, did commit him, under the pretence that it was forged. This negro had also a bundle of cloaths, which between the different hands he passed through, was stolen from him, and he never recovered them.

These are instances which are entirely within my own knowledge, as I have at different times been at considerable expence in procuring the discharge of the individuals, knowing them to have been free.

It will naturally be asked by persons not acquainted with these matters, what can be the motives of a constable in apprehending a peaceable free negro, or of a magistrate in committing him? The plain answer is this, that the former obtains 25/ and the latter about 2/6 for their trouble; which must be paid by the negro or his friends, let him be free or not, before he can be discharged.

When a negro is sold out of jail for his fees, he has no choice of masters, and if bought by a *Georgia man*, or any of their agents, though only sold for a term of years, he is clandestinely carried out of the state, and enslaved for life!

I have already extended this essay much beyond my first intention; should you give it a place I shall at another time resume the subject, believing it to be of the utmost importance to our country, and if I can so far call the attention of the public to it as to excite an enquiry into it, I flatter myself the evils complained of may be greatly diminished, if not altogether destroyed, and the infamous actors in it driven from amongst us. Q.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,
May 24.

WAR WITH FRANCE.

[CONTINUED.]

Mr. Whitbread said, the right honorable gentleman had called for unanimity in the discussion of this subject, and he (Mr. Whitbread) also called for unanimity. The right hon. gentleman had said that there was nothing he would not sacrifice for the sake of unanimity, except honor and conscience. He put it to the right hon. gentleman under the gallery, (Mr. Pitt) and to the right honorable gentleman who had just spoken, or to the honorable gentleman who sat upon the same bench with that right honorable gentleman, whether they could with a safe conscience vote a direct approbation of the conduct of his majesty's ministers, to which the present address would pledge them? He called upon them to say, whether his majesty's ministers had uniformly manifested a desire for the maintenance of peace? Whether those ministers had conducted themselves well, or whether they had not committed the honor of the country? The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Grenville) had distinctly admitted that ministers had committed the honor of the country, and if the right honorable gentleman could not approve of them, he could not approve of that paragraph of the address, which went to the approval of their conduct. Let those, therefore, who called for unanimity, vote for the amendment of his honorable friend (Mr. Grey,) which went the full length of pledging their lives and fortunes in the support of his majesty in the contest in which we were engaged, without pledging themselves to the approval of the conduct of his majesty's ministers. He trusted the house would indulge him when he previously confessed that it was impossible for him to take that narrow view of the question which was proposed by the right honorable gentleman. He thought it absolutely necessary to comment upon those steps which ministers had taken during the negociation, since it was impossible to discuss the steps ultimately taken by those ministers, without enquiring into the previous negociation. In doing this, whatever might have been his feelings with respect to any party with which he was connected, he acted perfectly free from all party bias. He had hailed the accession of the right hon. gentleman, (Mr. Addington,) and his colleagues to power, as the only chance of saving the country. He acknowledged the brilliancy of the speech made by a right honorable gentleman, (Mr. Pitt,) on the preceding evening, and he so much the more regretted the part that right honorable gentleman had taken, for as it had been said that one person in France had absorbed the whole power of that mighty empire, so it might be observed, that if ever the fate of empires hung upon the lips of one individual, it was on the lips of the right honorable gentleman (Mr. Pitt) on the preceding evening. He regretted the part which the right honorable gentleman had taken, and should have been happy if it had been otherwise, for no one would have been more happy than himself at the return to power of any one who was disposed to restore peace, which he thought might still be restored. He thought the negociation had been conducted ill, and that when it was broken off, it still might have been brought to a happy issue. But if the noble lord (Hawkesbury) thought the experiment of the treaty of Amiens was useful in destroying that spirit of enthusiasm in France, from whence so much mischief had resulted, do not let those who spoke upon this subject, increase inflammation upon a question which they ought to discuss dispassionately, and not suffer themselves to be run away with by the old inveterate spirit of hatred against France. They should not fear to deliver their opinions, be they what they may, and without apprehension of any unfavorable construction being put upon them. Let them recollect who were the ministers who called for war. He was not surprised that the right honorable gentleman, (Mr. Grenville,) and those who sat with him, should contend, that there were sufficient grounds for war, but did not enter into the consideration of any distinct cause for war, contending as they did, that at any time since the signature of the treaty of Amiens, there was sufficient ground for war. But what did we now go to war for? Was it, or was it not on account of the single paper of the ultimatum of this country which now lay upon their table? And if France had accepted that ultimatum, should we, or should we not be now at peace? If so, let them dismiss from their consideration all circumstances of aggravation from the dispassionate discussion of the subject before them. No man felt more than he did, the aggravated insults offered to this country by France; but why not make representations upon each insult received, and if no satisfaction was obtained, why not appeal to parliament? He granted that every individual insult was a cause for war; but why then not demand satisfaction, and if not granted, appeal to parliament? What were the circumstances which related to the treaty of Amiens? On the 23d of November last, his majesty's speech was made to parliament. He confessed that the speech of the right honorable gentleman (the chancellor of the exchequer) then made upon the question respecting the address was far from being satisfactory to him. He took the liberty at that period to ask for explanation, and if he did not much misinterpret what was then stated by that right honorable gentleman it was, that there was no danger of any breach in the treaty of Amiens. From this circumstance a grave and weighty responsibility rested upon ministers. The subject of Switzerland had been dwelt upon already with so much eloquence that he would only say that he viewed the events that had taken place in that country with as much horror as any man. But how did the question stand with respect to that country? At the time that Bonaparte invaded its liberties, a Swiss deputy applied to the powers of Europe, through the medium of their ambassadors at Paris, for assistance; they were only successful in their application to this country. A note was presented from lord Hawkesbury, remonstrating with the French government respecting that subject. A letter of instructions, dated the same day (the 22d of November) with that note, was sent to Mr. Moore, giving him an irrevocable power to involve this country in a war with France; not but that there was just cause for war, but knowing at the same time that the Swiss were supported by no other power than by this country, under which circumstances it must be agreed that such a war would have been impolitic. Thus, after the refusal of the other powers of Europe was known, and ministers having on the 23d of November risked a war with France on the subject of Switzerland, and not then knowing the issue of the negociation, did then in point of fact, inform the house & the country, that there existed no danger of any breach of the treaty of Amiens. How was this to be interpreted? Ministers sent out immediate orders in consequence of this dispute, not to evacuate the Cape of Good Hope and other places, which was a direct breach of the treaty of Amiens. Soon afterwards they sent out orders to evacuate those places. This would serve to shew how ministers interpreted their own act respecting Switzerland. It was most extraordinary at the same time, when they sent out orders not to evacuate the Cape and other places, that no orders were sent out not to evacuate Malta, which was more particularly the subject of dispute between the two countries, on the importance of which so much stress was laid, and which it now appeared formed the whole subject of the present contest. On the 8th of Dec. when a flourishing statement of the finances of the country was made by the right honorable gentleman (the chancellor of the exchequer) that right honorable gentleman then said that there was no danger of any breach of the treaty of Amiens, at least if not so in terms, that was the tenor of the expression used by that right honorable gentleman upon that occasion. At the time of his majesty's message respecting his royal highness the prince of Wales, the same thing was repeated, that there was no danger of war. Very soon afterwards came his majesty's message, announcing a probable rupture with France: the grounds of that message had never yet been explained: distinct information had been asked for as to the grounds of that message, but his majesty's ministers had never yet given it, nor had they at all explained that message, which appeared so very inexpedient. It had been asked by the right hon. gentleman, (Mr. Grenville) what she would give up by going to war. He would ask what were the sensations produced in the country by that message, which announced the probability of war. Let that right honorable gentleman consider the sorrow which was produced throughout the country by the tidings of that message, and let him imagine the real grief which it occasioned. As to the opinion of the country, his opinion was, that it was polled from one end to the other, with those exceptions which must always be the case, there was not one man to be found who would not say, that if we had received insults from France, that those insults ought not to go unredressed; but let the opinion be taken in the same way, as to the conduct of his majesty's ministers & whether they have done all in their power to avoid war, and he believed the answer of a large majority would be, that they had not; that was also his feeling upon that subject. He tho't that his majesty's ministers had passed over in the declaration, many points with respect to which the tone of France was more insulting, or at least as much so as in those they had noticed. He should abstain from pursuing that line of conduct which had been adopted by those on the other side who had spoken of those insults as topics of inflammation rather than as a grave subject of consideration, which they ought to be. With respect to the representations of France respecting libels alledged to be published against the government of that republic in this country, such remonstrances should have been treated with contempt—the answer should have been, we have no satisfaction to give you, take your remedy.—With respect to commercial commissioners, did ministers do their duty? Were those men sent out of the country? What was the consequence of not doing their duty? that still remained a problem, whether they had received satisfaction from France on that point or not, and this mixed up with other things, was brought forward as matter of aggravation against France.—Lord Hawkesbury, as it appeared in the papers, had been called upon to send out of the country certain individuals, because they were obnoxious to France. No Briton could contend that men who had received the protection of this country, ought to be sent out of it; but it appeared that the noble lord had made a promise upon the subject;—but how should the representations upon that subject have been met? By a direct refusal; and if France chose to avenge herself, let her do it. The subject of the aggrandizement of France had been already ably discussed. Those who voted against the peace of Amiens, stated this as a reason why they opposed that treaty. But how was it with respect to his majesty's ministers? The independence of Holland was secured, but the fact was that French troops were in the Batavian republic at that time, and continued there. Were any representations made respecting those troops? Several motions were afterwards made by those troops, for the purpose, as it was supposed, of quitting the Batavian republic, but they stopped on the frontiers of Holland, under the pretext of being destined to serve in the expedition to Louisiana; but was there any formal remonstrance upon this subject? He should have thought it proper that ministers should have sent a formal representation, in order that they might have a formal answer: then they might have come to parliament with their doubts; and there would have now been no dispute about the object of war. The independence of Switzerland was secured by the treaty of Luneville, yet eight or nine months after the signature of that treaty, the French troops were not withdrawn from that country: that might have been considered as an omen of the bad faith of France. A considerable time elapsed between the signature of the treaty of Luneville and that of the treaty of Amiens, and still the French troops were not withdrawn; those who made the treaty of Amiens must have considered at that time that Switzerland would be kept by France. All these circumstances were stated, and the argument by which they were answered, was, that it was to be supposed that the treaty would be executed. A system of aggrandizement was likewise pursued in Italy, and at the time of signing the treaty, Piedmont was in fact annexed to France, by being made a military *arrondissement* of that country, which was in fact very little different to being really annexed to France. The isle of Elba was likewise taken under the protection of France, and what that protection was, was sufficiently known. All these circumstances were known at the time the definitive treaty was signed. It was not therefore for those who signed that treaty, or those who supposed it to contend, that those reasons which existed at the time of signing the treaty were now reason for going to war. It had been asked by the noble lord (Hawkesbury) on the preceding evening, was no country to come forward to take up the cause of an injured sovereign, or an injured people?

He (Mr. Whitbread) agreed, that if a case was made out of injury, their cause ought to be taken up. But it was needless to talk of giving what could not be given. That noble lord had alluded to the German indemnities, the whole of which was a complete system of robbery: but did the noble lord and his colleagues, who knew such a system was resolved upon at the treaty of Luneville, did they set their faces against it? Now, however, we were to go to war to redress the wrongs of the continent. If the ultimatum on the table was not the object of the war, in God's name let them know the object of it; let them not raise a false spirit in the country; let them know whether the object might be attained or not without going to war. With respect to Malta, which seemed to be the sole object in dispute with a view to Egypt, the noble lord (Hawkesbury) had discanted upon the perfidy of the French government, in throwing difficulties in the way of the guarantees; but he forgot that all the while the French government were throwing difficulties in the way of those guarantees, Malta remained in the possession of England, and that it must have done so whilst those difficulties remained.

The noble lord and his colleagues had however resolved to fulful the treaty of Amiens when on the 9th day of February a dispatch was sent to lord Whitworth, announcing that the evacuation of Malta would have taken place if a certain circumstances had not happened. This circumstance was Sebastiani's mission. The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Pitt) had said that the hostile disposition of the first consul was to be inferred more from the mission than the report. Ministers had stated that they knew of the mission, and that they knew Sebastiani had seen general Stuart, as in their dispatch to the French government they had stated that Egypt had not been evacuated, in consequence of a mistake. If the report was an act of aggression, he thought that ministers were highly culpable in not remonstrating at the time. Did that report disclose more of the hostile disposition of the first consul than was before known? Egypt was always a favorite object with the French government, and Malta also, with a view to the former. What was done to prevent Malta from falling into the hands of the first consul? It was proposed to garrison it with Neapolitan troops, when the feeling of every military man upon that occasion was, that it was in fact placing it in the hands of France, as the first consul might have it when he pleased. As to the importance of Malta with a view to Egypt, it had been stated upon a former occasion by a gallant officer, that it was of no importance in that point of view, and he believed that statement to be nearly, if not wholly correct. The chief consul was well known to be a man subject to sudden gusts of temper, and therefore his expressions in conversation with lord Whitworth, were not to be taken in their literal sense. It was not unlikely that the empire of the Ottoman Porte might fall by means of some arrangement of partition, to which the first consul might be supposed in that conversation to allude and therefore his words were not to be taken in that sense which was applied to them; but at any rate it only refuted that all that we knew before upon that subject was confirmed.

It appeared that Talleyrand had signified the willingness of the French government to give every security respecting Egypt; he did not think that his majesty's ministers went far enough in enquiring what that security was. The emperor of Russia had offered to guarantee Malta, leaving out the Maltese langue. This morning an important document had arrived, contained in the French official paper, which was a note from the Russian minister to Talleyrand, stating in the most conciliatory terms the desire of his Imperial majesty that the treaty of Amiens should be maintained, and his wish to interpose his good offices between the two countries, and at the same time stating, that the English government knew that the emperor could not assent to the Maltese langue, on account of a previous arrangement to the contrary. From this it appeared that his Imperial majesty was willing to interfere between the two countries. With respect to the previous arrangement there mentioned, it appeared very strange, but perhaps ministers might be able to explain it satisfactorily. This, however, he was sure they would not explain satisfactorily, why they had not noticed that project of the court of Petersburg at that time, when there had been no Sebastiani, and no message to the legislative body. The publication of the report of Sebastiani, notwithstanding what had been said by the right honorable gentleman (Mr. Pitt) might be considered as an answer to sir Robert Wilson's work, respecting the transactions of our army in Egypt.

Mr. Pitt here interrupted Mr. Whitbread by way of explanation. He had stated, he said, that it might be alledged as an excuse for the publication of the report, that it was intended as an answer to the pamphlet of sir Robert Wilson, but that this could be no excuse for the mission, as Sebastiani must have been sent on the mission before that pamphlet appeared.

Mr. Whitbread continued: If the message to the legislative body had been considered he said, as an insult, his majesty's ministers might have demanded and obtained satisfaction immediately, as they had done in the case of M. Reinhard. With respect to the refusal of Russia to guarantee Malta, it was contradicted by the note which had been laid on the table that evening by the noble lord. He thought that his majesty's ministers might still avail themselves of the interference of Russia, and that peace might still be preserved—Upon these grounds he should support the amendment.

[*Debate to be continued.*]

Extract from a history of the British EXPEDITION *to* EGYPT.

The following is a part of colonel Wilson's account which is considered as deviating from fact, and which gave very great offence to the first consul. It is alluded to in the papers of negociation.

"General Hutchinson was very angry with the Turks for still continuing the practice of mangling and cutting off the heads of the prisoners; and the captain Pacha, at his remonstance, issued again very severe orders against it; but the Turks justified themselves for the massacre of the French by the massacre at Jaffa.—As this act and the poisoning of the sick have never been credited, because of such enormities being so incredibly atrocious, a digression to authenticcate them may not be deemed intrusively tedious; and had not the influence of power interfered, the act of accusation would have been preferred in a more solemn manner, and the damning proofs produced by penitent agents of these murders; but neither menaces, recompense, nor promises can stifle the cries of outraged humanity, and the day for retribution of justice is only delayed.

"Bonaparte having carried the town of Jaffa by assault, many of the garrison were put to the sword; but the greater part flying into mosques, and imploring mercy from their pursuers, were granted their lives; and let it be well remembered, that an exasperated army in the moment of revenge, when the laws of war justified the rage, yet heard the voice of pity, received its impression, and proudly refused to be any longer the executioners of an unresisting enemy. Soldiers of the Italian army, this is a laurel wreath worthy of your fame, a trophy of which the subsequent treason of an individual shall not deprive you!

"Three days afterwards, Bonaparte, who had expressed much resentment at the compassion manifested by his troops, and determined to relieve himself from the maintenance and care of three thousand eight hundred prisoners,* ordered them to be marched to a rising ground near Jaffa; where a division of French infantry formed against them. When the Turks had entered into their fatal alignment, and the mournful preparations were completed, the signal gun fired. Vollies of musquetry and grape instantly played against them; and Bonaparte, who had been regarding the scene through a telescope, when he saw the smoke ascending, could not restrain his joy, but broke out into exclamations of approval; indeed he had just reason to dread the refusal of his troops thus to dishonor themselves. Kleber remonstrated in the most strenuous manner, and the officer of the etat major who commanded (for the general to whom the division belonged was absent) even refused to execute the order without a written instruction: but Bonaparte was too cautious, and sent Berthier to enforce obedience.

"When the Turks had all fallen, the French troops' humanity endeavored to put a period to the sufferings of the wounded, but some time elapsed before the bayonet could finish what the fire had not destroyed, and probably many languished days in agony. Several French officers, by whom partly these details are furnished, declared, that it was a scene, the retrospect of which tormented their recollection, and that they could not reflect on it without horror, accustomed as they had been to sights of cruelty.

"These were the prisoners whom Assalimi, in his very able work on the plague, alludes to, when he says that for the three days the Turks shewed no symptoms of that disease, and it was their putrifying remains which produced the pestilential malady, which he describes as afterwards making such ravages in the French army.

"Their bones still lie in heaps, and are shewn to every traveller who arrives; nor can they be confounded with those who perished in the assault, since this field of butchery lies a mile from the town.

"Such a fact should not, however, be alledged without some proof, or leading circumstance stronger than assertion being produced to support it; but there would be a want of generosity in naming individuals, and with infamy for obeying a command when their submission became an act of necessity, the whole army did not mutiny against the execution; therefore to establish farther the authenticity of the relation, this only can be mentioned that it was Bonn's division which fired, and thus every one is afforded the opportunity of satisfying themselves respecting the truth, by enquiring of officers serving in the different brigades composing this division.

"The next circumstance, is of a nature which requires indeed the most particular details to establish, since the idea can scarce be entertained that the commander of an army should order his own countrymen (or if not immediately such, those amongst whom he had been naturalized) to be deprived of existence, when in a state which required the kindest consideration. But the annals of France record the frightful