FOR THE FEDERAL GAZETTE.

Meſſrs. Fundt & Brown,

IF you ſhould ſee any thing contained in this narration worthy of publiſhing in your paper, you have my conſent ſo to do—and more than that, I think it a duty incumbent on me to-lay (in ſome way) before the public a tranſaction ſo notoriouſly villainous. We have men in America ſaid to be in favor, or, in other words, well-wiſhers to the French. How true the aſſertion is, I know not. I am of opinion that any American experiencing what I have from them, will then exclaim (like myſelf) that he is no Frenchman, but an American

I ſailed from Norfolk, in Virginia, on the 3d November, 1802, in the ſchooner Maria, of which I was owner, of about ninety tons burthen, laden altogether with hogſhead ſtaves, heading, and ſhingles, bound to the iſland of Tobago, in the Weſt Indies. On December the 6th, following, about 11 o'clock, I arrived at Tobago. I immediately depoſited my papers in the cuſtom-houſe, and appeared to be well received by all the officers of the iſland. At that time there lay a French national frigate, commanded by capt. Deneporte, in Caſtarra bay, which ſent her boat and ſeized my ſchooner, and took us out on the ſame evening, not ſatisfying us ſo far as to inform me what they ſeized me for. They forced one of my ſeamen on ſhore, and got the ſchooner under way, leaving on ſhore the captain, ſupercargo, and one ſeaman, and ſtood to ſea, informing me that they would take me to Martinico, before the captain-general of that iſland. The wind being light, the could not get from under the lee of the iſland readily, and the ſeaman they had forced on ſhore informing the captain and ſupercargo what the captain of the frigate had done, they immediately proceeded to the governor and acquainted him with what had taken place. The governor ſeemed highly amazed at the conduct of the captain, and informed them that he would write on immediately to the captain-general of Martinico to ſend us back. The captain and ſupercargo proceeded to the cuſtom-houſe and took the ſchooner's papers and hired a boat and four negroes and boarded the frigate about five degrees from land, and informed the captain of the frigate that the governor of the iſland had given them permiſſion to unlade.—The captain of the frigate ſaid the governor might kiſs his a—e; that he ſhould do with us as he pleaſed. He then ſent his long-boat along ſide, with about 30 ruffians, amongſt whom were two officers, who immediately plundered the ſchooner of the regiſter and other papers, ſealing up every avenue to the hold, and took with them one other ſeaman belonging to the ſchooner, leaving on board 7 ſanſculottes, among whom were two officers, and three men ſick with the fever. Not one of them knew any thing of working the ſchooner; but they knew how to plunder, and immediately began to riſle the ſchooner of our proviſions and burn the ſtaves and ſhingles, and commit every outrage that a ſet of villains could think of. They beat the ſchooner about at ſea, ſtill falling to leeward, until they compleatly wrecked her, and let her drive at the mercy of the wind and ſea. On the 13th, one of the ſick ſoldiers died, and on the 14th, another, leaving one ſick on deck. They now found that plunder began to be ſcarce, and requeſted we would take the ſchooner and try if we could gain ſome port, ſaying that they would give up her and cargo altogether, both at ſea and on ſhore, and gave us an inſtrument of writing, in French, which they ſaid was an abandonment in toto. I took charge of the ſchooner, and refitting her as well as I could, ſhaped my courſe for St. Croix, and arrived there on the 17th of the ſame month. The viſiting doctor came on board and found one ſick Frenchman, and underſtanding that we had buried two on our paſſage, gave orders that we muſt not launch our boat nor ſuffer any boat alongſide till further orders. He went and informed the general of our ſituation, who immediately gave orders to the captain of the port to tow us out to ſea—we wrote to the American conſul, informing him that we were out of proviſions and water, and that our ſchooner was not ſea-worthy. The conſul furniſhed us with two caſks of water, three barrels of bread dreadfully worm-eaten, and one barrel of beef, ſo rotten that one muſt be in a ſtate of ſtarvation before they could eat it; and ſent a letter, informing us that we muſt go to ſea at all events—we wrote to the conſul that if we were forced to ſea we ſhould abandon the ſchooner altogether and take to our boats; the general ſaw our letter and ſaid we might lie where we were till further orders. The French ſanſculottes, true Frenchmen-like, then reclaimed the ſchooner, and wrote to the general to compel us Americans to aſſiſt them to carry the ſchooner to St. Domingo—thus we lay 8 and 10 days together, without ſpeaking to any ſoul that was not on board. When we could get an opportunity of writing to the conſul for liquors, &c. Dr. I. S. Adams would countermand the orders, and ſend a line with the liquors, ſaying, that it was for the Frenchmen on board—thus we lay 22 days, almoſt ſtarving, at which time we received orders through the doctor, that we Americans might come on ſhore, and only ſtay ſix hours to arrange our buſineſs with the conſul—the ſanſculottes were permitted to go on ſhore when they pleaſed, and ſtay as long as they pleaſed. Thus ſituated, I had no alternative but to hire a Daniſh ſchooner to carry myſelf and one of the French officers to Martinico for which I agreed to pay 16 joes. On our arrival, the French frigate La Bedam (which was the name of the frigate, commanded by captain Deneporte) rode guard ſhip at St. Pierre. I was immediately ordered on board the frigate, to appear before the captain—after going through my examination before the ſame villain, the ſame robber, who had ſeized me, my papers were forced on me, and the captain told me I ſhould go back to St. Croix and take the ſchooner as ſhe was, and poſitively refuſed to let me go on ſhore. I however got permiſſion from the lieutenant next day to go on ſhore for a few hours, when I proceeded to Fort Royal and petitioned the captain-general for damages, ſtating in my petition what I had ſuffered; but the great ſanſculotte captain could do nothing for me but refer me to the admiral on board of the admiral's ſhip, which then lay at anchor in Fort Royal bay. I ſhewed my petition, together with a ticket from the captain general, to the admiral, but he could do nothing for me; neither would he do any thing but refer me back to the ſame villain who had ſeized me.

This is in part the treatment I have met with from thoſe robbers and plunderers—the French. WILLIAM LEWIS.

N. B. If you ſhould think proper to publiſh the above, or any part, I will at ſome convenient time inform you (by letter) how they proceeded after I made application to the captain of the frigate, and how the buſineſs ended. My ſufferings have been laid before the ſecretary of ſtate, and would have been communicated earlier to the public, had not my avocations as a farmer, at an inconvenient diſtance from the preſs, prevented. W. L.

From the UNITED STATES GAZETTE.

The editors of the moſt diſtinguiſhed London newſpapers have repeatedly mentioned, with great regret, that none of their reporters were preſent in the houſe of commons, when Mr. Pitt delivered his celebrated ſpeech in the debate on the war, in May laſt. A friend, lately arrived from England, has kindly favored us with a pamphlet, which purports to be the ſubſtance of that ſpeech. It ſeems to have been taken by an able hand, and to be the only report which has been made of the ſpeech. Our readers will trace in it the operations of a great mind, and find a very complete vindication of the conduct of Great-Britain for entering into the war.

Mr PITT began by obſerving upon ſome paſſages of Mr. Erſkine's ſpeech, the tendency of which he profeſſed not entirely to underſtand, but from which he was led to hope that the learned gentleman, and thoſe with whom he uſually acted, were not likely materially to object to the ſubſtance of the propoſed addreſs. He flattered himſelf that this was likely to be the caſe, becauſe, whatever difference of ſentiment might ariſe, and much was certainly to be expected, on many points included in the great maſs of information contained in the papers upon the table, yet upon the great and important queſtion at iſſue between this country and France, and upon the juſtice and neceſſity of the grounds on which we were compelled to enter into the war, he thought it almoſt impoſſible that the houſe ſhould not be unanimous. He ſtated, that in thoſe tranſactions which had moſt immediately produced our preſent ſituation, the learned gentleman himſelf appeared, notwithſtanding ſome doubts which he had thrown out in particular points, to admit, upon the whole, that there was ſuch clear evidence of views of aggreſſion and hoſtility on the part of France, as juſtified this country in retaining Malta for its own ſecurity. This he maintained to be the firſt great point on which the queſtion turned; and he contended that the whole of Sebaſtiani's report, and the circumſtances of his miſſion to Egypt, the expreſs and deliberate avowal by Bonaparte himſelf, of his views and intentions, in a formal conference with lord Whitworth, and the information of the ſame intentions thro' the official channel of the miniſter for foreign affairs, afforded the cleareſt and moſt indiſputable evidence, that the firſt conſul had formed the determination, even while Malta was yet in our own hands, of reſuming his hoſtile projects againſt Egypt; that the purſuit of ſuch a project was an undeniable act of hoſtility againſt this country, and aimed at ſome of its moſt important intereſts; that it was, beſides, a direct violation, both of the letter and ſpirit of the treaty of Amiens itſelf; under pretence of which treaty alone, our evacuation of that iſland was demanded, though under circumſtances which, in other reſpects, according to the letter of that treaty, did not authoriſe ſuch a demand; that the diſcloſure of this hoſtile project clearly juſtified this country in requiring freſh ſecurity againſt it, and, if ſuch ſecurity was refuſed, in having recourſe to arms for that purpoſe, at the moment which appeared to be moſt for our advantage.

He then more particularly commented on each of theſe ſeveral circumſtances with reſpect to the report of Sebaſtiani. He ſtated that that was evidently an official paper addreſſed to the government, by a perſon regularly commiſſioned and employed by the conſul himſelf; that its contents could never have been publiſhed in France but by his conſent, and that they were publiſhed in fact in the official paper, under the direct authority of the government; that the whole tenor of that paper, and the account thus given by Sebaſtiani himſelf of his conduct in Egypt, made it impoſſible to doubt, that he was ſent there to prepare for the execution of a freſh attempt to put that country under the dominion of France; but that it was not neceſſary to dwell on the particular contents of the report—the mere circumſtances of a military man having been ſent at that time with ſuch a commiſſion to Egypt, was a ſufficient evidence of the object of his miſſion. The time, he remarked, was very material, becauſe it at once deſtroyed the chief pretext under which the French government had attempted in the courſe of the official correſpondence, to juſtify or extenuate the publication, or to deny the concluſion to be drawn from it. This pretext was, that the honor of the chief conſul had been wounded by a narrative of the expedition to Egypt, publiſhed by a reſpectable officer in the Britiſh army (ſir Robert Wilſon) and that the publication of Sabaſtizni's report became neceſſary for his vindication. The facts ſtated in that narrative, he obſerved, were not even contradicted by the report, but even if they had been, in what degree would that circumſtance account for originally ſending Sebaſtiani to Egypt, with ſuch a commiſſion as had been already ſtated? It appeared that that officer had actually embarked from Toulon on the 16th of September, and after proceeding to Tripoli, had arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of October; whereas it is notorious that, at that time, ſir Robert Wilſon's narrative had not actually been publiſhed, and probably not ſent to the preſs. With reſpect to the avowal of his deſign by the firſt conſul himſelf, he referred to lord Whitworth's account in his diſpatch of the 21ſt of February. He obſerved, that ſo far from the converſation appearing as ſome perſons had imagined, only looſe and deſultory, it was one which took place by the expreſs appointment of the firſt conſul—that it was therefore evidently prepared and deliberate, and that was actually opened by the firſt conſul himſelf, as being the mode which he had adopted for the purpoſe "of conveying to his majeſty, in the moſt clear and authentic manner, his ſentiments on points which muſt be brought to an iſſue" In the courſe of this converſation, the firſt conſul did not attempt to diſguiſe his ultimate views upon Egypt; and though he profeſſed to diſclaim any intention of ſeizing it at preſent, he aſſigned, as the reaſon for his forbearance "that ſooner or later it would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkiſh empire, or by ſome arrangement with the Porte." That in a ſubſequent converſation with M. Talleyrand, it was expreſsly admitted that the acquiſition of Egypt had been, and ſtill was, a favorite object with the firſt conſul; but at the ſame time endeavored to convince his majeſty's ambaſſador, that it was not ſo great an object as to allow him to go to war for its attainment; and yet, upon being preſſed to explain what ſecurity it was intended to give, to remove apprehenſion on this point, for which he had before ſtated there was a project in contemplation, he referred only to a paſſage in the firſt conſul's meſſage to the legiſlative body, ſaying that "there is a French ambaſſanor at Conſtantinople, who is charged to give every aſſurance of the diſpoſition of France to ſtrengthen inſtead of to weaken the Turkiſh government."

To all the evidence founded on theſe ſeveral documents, he had heard but one argument oppoſed—the improbability of the French government thus diſcloſing its views, if it really entertained them. On this point it might be ſufficient to obſerve, that it might indeed be difficult to account for ſuch a diſcloſure, even on the ſuppoſition of ſuch a project being really intended; but that it was not only difficult, but impoſſible to account for it at all, on the ſuppoſition of its not being intended. He aſked whether, on the latter ſuppoſition, any motive could be aſſigned, either for the miſſion having been ſent, or the report having been made and publiſhed, or for the avowels contained in the converſations of the firſt conſul and M. Talleyrand? He thought, however, that the difficulty of accounting for the diſcloſure, was removed by referring to the new and peculiar policy which had marked the conduct of France on many extraordinary occaſions, from the very beginning of the revolution, that where any meaſure was in contemplation more flagrant and atrocious than other, and more likely to ſhock the general feelings of Europe, and perhaps to excite vigorous and united reſiſtance, inſtead of carefully concealing it till the moment of execution, it had, on the contrary, been ſtudiouſly announced before hand; that the object of this policy had been gradually to familiarize men's minds to that which at firſt they could ſcarcely even believe, and that their ſchemes which, in the firſt inſtance, were received with horror, and would have been oppoſed with indignation, came afterwards to be contemplated with neglect and indifference; and that which at firſt no man thought it poſſible ſeriouſly to attempt, was by degrees conſidered as natural and probable, and, in the end, as that which it was hopeleſs and impoſſible to reſiſt. He therefore put it to the houſe, whether, after having obſerved this practice, it was poſſible for us to be ſo credulous and childiſh as to act on the belief that Bonaparte would abandon the projects he had formed, only becauſe he had himſelf told us he would perſiſt in them; and whether we thought that if, for whatever reaſon, he had been led prematurely to diſcloſe this project, even while Malta, the great ſecurity againſt its execution, was ſtill in our poſſeſſion, he would renounce the attempt when that ſecurity had been ſurrendered by us, and put, in fact, into his poſſeſſion? If then the deſign againſt Egypt was apparent, he deſired the houſe to conſider whether, upon every principle of juſtice and ſelf-defence, admitted by all the ſyſtems of the law of nations, and adopted by the practice of all countries, we have not the clear right to take, from this moment, ſuch meaſures of prevention and ſecurity as are ſufficient to guard againſt the danger to which we ſhould be in conſequence expoſed—whether it was not admitted, on almoſt all hands, that our poſſeſſion of Malta was eſſential, or at leaſt in the higheſt degree material, for the defence of Egypt—whether the importance of Egypt to this country was not in itſelf ſufficiently evident, from its connexion with the ſafety of our Indian poſſeſſions—and whether it might not at this day be conſidered as a point of our national policy, already decided and atteſted by the glorious efforts which had been made, and the heroic blood which had been ſhed in the laſt war for recovering it from France, and which had, in a manner, conſecrated it in the hearts and affections of Engliſhmen?

He therefore wiſhed the houſe to conſider what was to be our future conduct, if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to ſurrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in ſix or in twelve months afterwards—Were we prepared for the ridiculous, but diſaſtrous alternative to which we ſhould be reduced, of either ſubmitting without a ſtruggle to national calamity and diſgrace, becauſe, foreſeeing our danger, we had voluntarily and wantonly ſacrificed the beſt means of averting it; or, when it was perhaps too late to enter upon a difficult and almoſt hopeleſs conteſt, having by our own act given up the arms by which we would be enabled to conduct it to a ſucceſsful iſſue?

If the queſtion were cloſed here, Mr. Pitt obſerved, that for the reaſons he had given, he was prepared to maintain, that on theſe grounds alone the war was both juſt and neceſſary, and ſuch as ought to call forth the utmoſt exertions of parliament and the nation in its ſupport. But ſo far was this from being the caſe, that there was not any one of the leading tranſactions ſubſequent to the treaty of Amiens, to which his majeſty's declaration referred, which was not in his opinion, as far as juſtice was concerned, a clear and evident cauſe of war, and ſuch as would have been acted upon, if there were ſufficient means of co-operation on the continent, in almoſt every period of the hiſtory of this country. He here referred to the annexation of Piedmont, as the firſt act by which the French government had proceeded, ſubſequent to the treaty, to purſue the ſame ſyſtem of aggrandizement which had appeared in all their previous conduct, and which it was vainly hoped they had relinquiſhed. He referred alſo to the tranſaction reſpecting the German indemnities, where the French government, with an arrogance, he believed, unprecedented in the hiſtory of Europe, had preſumed to dictate to all Germany the detailed mode of arranging thoſe indemnities, on which the diet of the empire was expreſsly convened to deliberate, purſuant to the treaty of Luneville, and had publicly announced their ſcheme as ſettled and decided, before it was even communicated to thoſe to whom it ought, in the firſt inſtance, to have been propoſed.

He next paſſed to the violence offered to Switzerland, on which he thought it the leſs neceſſary to dwell, becauſe he believed the conduct of France towards that unfortunate and devoted country had excited one univerſal ſentiment of deteſtation. He wiſhed here to declare (as this had been a ſubject ſo often adverted to on former occaſions, when he had been unavoidably abſent) that he conſidered the interference of his majeſty's miniſters on this ſubject, as not only evidently warranted by the circumſtances, but ſuch as was their duty to employ to the extent to which he underſtood it to have been carried, in order to give time for learning whether a confederacy could be formed in Europe, really ſufficient for ſaving the country from the yoke of France; but when upon trial, all hopes of ſuch a confederacy vaniſhed, he thought them equally right in not puſhing the conteſt, on the part of this country, to extremities.

He then adverted to the continuance of the French armies in Holland, which appeared, from the papers on the table, to have been directly inconſiſtent with the principles on which the treaty of Amiens, had been negociated, and with the engagements which were known to ſubſiſt between France and Holland. After dwelling on theſe points, he ſtated, however, that he thought it leſs material to diſcuſs whether they were each in itſelf ſufficient cauſe of war on the part of this country, becauſe he admitted that whatever might be the juſtice of the cauſe, our conduct upon them at the time was neceſſarily regulated, not by that conſideration only, but by the queſtion of policy, which was unavoidably dependent upon the ſtate of the continent; but that whatever it might be right to decide upon them at the time they occurred, it was impoſſible to contend that they were not now material, as ſymptoms of that deliberative ſyſtem of ambition and encroachment which had been thus uniformly purſued towards others, and which was now directed to a quarter where it immediately affected our ſeparate intereſts, and was in direct violation of the treaty with this country itſelf. He here drew a ſtrong picture of the continued and rapid ſucceſſion of the acts of violence and oppreſſion, which, during this period, had deſolated ſo many of the countries of Europe; and after comparing the irreſiſtible force and overwhelming progreſs of French ambition to thoſe dreadful convulſions of nature by which provinces and kingdoms were conſumed and buried in ruins, he aſked whether we could contemplate thoſe ſcenes of havoc and deſtruction, without reflecting how ſoon that torrent of liquid fire might direct its ravages againſt ourſelves?

Having here cloſed his review of what had paſſed on the continent, he next obſerved that the period of which he had been ſpeaking was marked not only by the hoſtile acts which he had detailed, with reſpect to other powers of Europe, but by others immediately affecting the ſeparate rights and intereſts of this country. He referred, he ſaid, principally to two points which appeared in the correſpondence.—The firſt point was the demand which had been made by the French government reſpecting reſtraints on the liberty of the preſs, and the expulſion of the French emigrants now remaining in this country. On this it was unneceſſary to enlarge, becauſe the inſolence of the propoſition was ſufficiently felt, and becauſe it had been at the time reſiſted by his majeſty's miniſters, on grounds which were ſtated with great force and ablity in one of the papers on the table, and which he was perſuaded every member of the houſe had read with the higheſt approbation. The ſecond point related to the commercial agents—the indignity and outrage which attended their miſſion, was one of which it was difficult to ſpeak with compoſure.—The French government had made a formal propoſition to ſend perſons of this deſcription, who had never been found neceſſary even when a commercial treaty ſubſiſted, at a time when not only there was no ſuch treaty, but when, as appears from the papers on the table, the commercial intercourſe of his majeſty's ſubjects with France was ſuffering every degree of violence and oppreſſion. This propoſition had naturally and wiſely been refuſed. The French government then proceeded clandeſtinely to ſend theſe agents in the train of their ambaſſador; and not content with this breach of the law of nations, they afterwards addreſſed to them inſtructions, under the official character in which they had received admittance, and the object of theſe inſtruſſions was, to direct them to take meaſures in time of peace, for aſcertaining the ſoundings of ports, and for obtaining military information of diſtricts, acts for which they would have been hanged as ſpies in time of war. Under ſuch circumſtances, he could not but lament to find that his majeſty's miniſters had contented themſelves with merely applying to the French government to withdraw thoſe perſons, and had not at once adviſed his majeſty, by his own authority, to order them to depart the kingdom within twenty-four hours, reſerving it to himſelf afterwards to require from France the reparation due for ſo groſs an inſult.

He did not think it neceſſary to dwell ſeparately on another head of complaint, the violence committed againſt the veſſels and property of his majeſty's ſubjects in the French ports, and the withholding, to this hour, all ſatisfaction for thoſe injuries. Theſe proceedings, he ſaid, would have been ſufficient ground of complaint in ordinary times, but they could ſcarcely give additional force to the outrageous tranſactions which he had juſt enumerated, and which appeared to him as if they had been deſignedly caculated to include, under two diſtinct heads, the groſſeſt inſults that could be offered to the independence of any country. The firſt pretenſion of which he had ſpoken, that of reſtraining the liberty of the preſs, was nothing ſhort of claiming the right to dictate to us in a point of municipal law, and to require that we ſhould ſacrifice to the caprice of the firſt conſul, a known and important privilege of our conſtitution, and model at his pleaſure, the judicial proceedings and internal regulations of the country. The ſecond pretenſion, that reſpecting his commercial agents, manifeſted, as had been already ſtated, an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refuſal, authorized emiſſaries into our arſenals and ports, in order to prepare in time of peace, the moſt effectual means for our annoyance and deſtruction in time of war. This was nothing leſs than to inſiſt on our ſurrendering, before-hand, the right and the means of national defence; and if the former claim had ſtruck at the liberty, this ſtruck as directly at the actual ſafety of the country. It was true, he believed and hoped that the commercial agents had at length been withdrawn, upon the repreſentation of his majeſty's miniſters, but, as he had already ſtated and lamented, it did not appear that any diſavowal had been obtained of the principle on which they had been ſent. The claim reſpecting the reſtraint upon the preſs, and the expulſion of the emigrants, had alſo been ſuſpended for a time, in conſequence of the unanſwerable repreſentations in the diſpatch before referred to; but the firſt part of this claim had ſince been expreſsly revived in the courſe of the late negociation. At all events, he contended that the circumſtance of the firſt conſul having even ſuſpended it as he did, only afforded a ſtriking leſſon of the benefit to be derived from a firm and ſeaſonable reſiſtance; but that the fact of ſuch pretenſions having at any time been urged (whether they were perſiſted in or withdrawn,) muſt be remembered as the ſtrongeſt proof of the nature of the views which he really entertained, & which he would unqueſtionably accompliſh whenever he found it in his power. He maintained, therefore, that all theſe indignities and inſults, as well as the encroachments and violences of which he had been ſpeaking, on the continent, muſt enter deeply into our conſideration, in judging of the character and ultimate views and policy of our enemy. They moſt deciſively confirm us in the reſolution to employ without heſitation, the moſt vigorous and determined reſiſtance, when, in addition to theſe proofs of his general diſpoſition, both towards this country and towards Europe, we found him now engaged in that project of direct and ſeparate hoſtility againſt ourſelves, which had already been argued.

On all theſe grounds, he felt convinced