FROM THE AURORA.

FIRST LIGHT INFANTRY.

Special Meeting—Dec. 23d, 1805.

Whereas, by a recent communication made by the president of the United States to congress, it has been officially stated, that our territory has been violated, and some of our fellow citizens have been seized and taken by an armed force acting under the authority of the Spanish government, and it further appears by said communication, that persons acting under the same authority have purchased military stores and provisions, and that even his officers, both civil and military, have publicly declared that the negociations at Madrid had failed to effect the peaceable adjustment of our differences, and that war, with all its train of concomitant evils, must be the inevitable consequences; and that the said preparations were intended to facilitate an unjust attack upon a portion of our territory to the destruction of our peaceable citizens and their property, the prostration of our rights, as well as to the entire degradation of our honor and dignity as a free and an independent nation.

And whereas it is the duty at all times (but more particularly in the hour of danger) of the good citizens of these states, of whatever party to support to the utmost of their power, the honor and independence of their country; but more especially, it is the duty of those citizens who, as volunteers having accumstomed themselves to the use of armes, & thereby virtually pledged themselves, as far as in them lies, to repel the wanton aggressions of a hostile foe at the point of the bayonet. And it further appears highly probable that the services of the volunteer corps of the United States may be required before a sufficient number of regular troops can be raised & brought into operation; it therefore, becoms their solemn duty to be prepared against any sudden emergency that may arise, and resolutely determine to meet the foe and remain free or die—therefore,

Resolved unanimously, officers of this corps, respectfully represent to the president of the United States, that it is the wish of this corps that the same may have the distinguished honor of being first called into the defence of their country's cause, and that in such an event, that they be placed upon the same footing with the regular troops of the United States.

Philadelphia, December 21, 1805.

SIR—We have the honor to inclose a copy of a resolution of the company under our command, with a respectful request that you will be pleased to lay the same before the president of the United States, and in case there should exist any necessity for calling out the volunteer companies, of which in our opinion there exists a great probability; although for want of correct information we are sensible we cannot at present be competent of being one of the first that may be called into actual service, upon condition of being placed upon the same footing with the regularly enlisted troops of the United States, and we hold ourselves pledged to be in perfect readiness to march at an hour's notice to any part of the continent where our services can be most usefully employed.

We have the honor to be,

With sentiments of the highest respect,

Your obedient servants,

FRANCIS SHALLUS, Captain,
JOHN STRATTEN, Lieutenant,
JOHN HUFTY, Ensign.

The hon. Henry Dearborn, esq.
secretary at war, Washington.

From the Norfolk Ledger.

The following extract of a letter was put into our hands by a mercantile friend of this place. The writer is a captain of an American vessel, well known to the editor of this paper, for his candor and veracity, and one who would not complain without cause, or exaggerate British depredations:

The letter is dated Antigua, Dec. 28.


"It was fortunate that I had not sold, and purchased a return cargo at Martinique, as much loss to you, and anxiety to me, have been avoided. It would have been impossible for me to have eluded the vigilance of the British cruizers in these seas. A system has been adopted here, the most iniquitous in itself, and ruinous to our trade that can be imagined. Every American vessel coming from a French island, with cargo, is certain to be carried in, because the courts in every case, make us pay all expences. I have informed myself fully on the subject, and know that the privateers out of this island are ordered to bring every vessel from a French port, with cargo, in for trial, stating that matters are settled between the court and them that the expences shall be paid in all cases by the Americans.

"The abuses to which we are subjected are intolerable; a jnnto consisting of the judge, the lawyers, the owners of privateers, and those who become our friends when we are brought in, have laid their heads together to fleece us; we are sure to be put to great expence, the amount of which the gentlemen share between them. They appear to us to be opposed to each other, but they, I know, divide the spoil. I got my information from one of the party, and what I see every day confirms the information I have received. It is a fact that several Aerican vessels have been sent in here, whose papers were never looked at by those who sent them in. They were ordered to send them in, without regard to papers or documents, for the reasons before stated."

PLAN

OF THE LATE BRILLIANT NAVAL ENGAGEMENT,

OFF CAPE TRAFALGAR.



For a draft of the preceding plan of the battle off Trafalgar, and the subsequent expository remarks, we are indebted to a gentleman at a distance. They were written and communicated to a friend in this city, prior to the arrival of the Gilraltar account of the action. That account proves the accuracy of this plan and of the exposition as relates to the manner in which the combined line was formed, and to the attack made upon it.

It is to be observed, that the above sketch or plan exhibits the position of the ships on both sides after the general engagement had commenced. This, it is believed, furnishes a more impressive view of the action, than the mere delineation of the ships in the position of moving forward to the engagement. The reader will recollect that the British ships moved in two lines towards the centre of the combined line, where the latter was first broken.

It should also be observed, that in sketching and engraving the plan, it was found necessary to substitute marks or characters for ships (although the latter might have been more pleasing to the eye) to enable the reader the more easily to discriminate between the British and those of the

A sketch of the battle off Cape Trafalgar, between lord Nelson, with twenty-seven sail of the line, and the combined fleets of France and Spain, under admirals Villeneuve and Gravina, of thirty-three sail of the line—fought on the 21st of October, 1805, with the wind westerly and moderate.

The van ships of the combined fleet are place with their heads to the northward and westward, being in number on that tack, in first curved line, eleven. The rear division consist of twelve ships from the center of the first curved line, with their heads to the southward and westward. Six British ships cut this line to the northward of the centre; and from the centre southward twelve ships cut it. Five of the combined fleet are placed in the van of the second line, with their heads to the northward and westward from the centre; and five in the rear, with their heads, from about the centre, to the southward and westward. Four British ships lay abreast of five from the centre of the second line, with their heads to the northward; and five against five abreast, with their heads to the southward.*

This arrangement on both sides leaves the five ships in the van of the first curved line unoccupied, as admiral Collingwood mentions in his official letter to the admiralty; & of course 28 of the combined fleet fought the battle against 27 of the English ships. One of the 5 unoccupied ships (the sternmost) was taken, after many in the fleet had struck their colors, and after admiral Gravina with ten ships had given way, and in conjunction with his frigates stood towards Cadiz.

* If admiral Collingwood's official letter is examined, it will be found that the combined line on the 21st of October, was a compleat Crescent—for says the admiral, the van and rear of their ships were abaft my beam in going down, before any firing commenced.

An English view shows a double line, forming a small curve, and not a crescent.—Besides it does not exhibit the ships placed alternately in the second line as the British admiral himself has mentioned, but on the contrary, a compleat double line having sixteen ships in the first, and seventeen in the second.

In the common line of battle, a-head ships are all drawn up on the same tack; but in a crescent they are formed from the centre on both tacks, in order to keep their position. To do which, with exactness, each ship must be nearly close hauled by the wind.

To form a crescent otherwise under sail, would be impossible to keep any exact position, as a part of the fleet would be by the wind, a part from the wind, and a part before the wind. These observations must be ouvious, but are added to give a more comprehensive idea of this battle.

The five headmost ships in their van, says admiral Collingwood, tacked, & standing to the southward to windward of the British line, were engaged and the sternmost taken. This proves the van of the combined line was formed to the northward, as in the annexed sketch, and not to the southward, as some had supposed, perhaps from a typographical error in printing the admiral's letter. †

This interesting battle, (for interesting it is to every naval officer of every country) has led me to some observations for the amusement of such gentlemen as chuse to speculate on all the particulars of the event. As a neutral, however, I have no disposition to offend either party concerned in the affair, but merely to state some circumstances that have occurred to me, and in fact could not be passed unnoticed by me after reading the official details of admiral Collingwood, the only document of consequence or to be depended on, yet received, though others perhaps when given to the world will more fully elucidate the whole business and add much to the science of naval war;—Meantime a part of this sketch is imaginary.

The combined fleet formed in two lines (as appears by the official letter quoted) [illegible] The weathermost curved line consisted of every alternate ship, placed about a cable's length to windward of her second a head and astern.

Admiral Villeneuve, commander in chief, was in the centre, and admiral Gravina 2d in command, in the rear; but the French and Spanish ships were *mixed* without any apparent regard to order of national squadron. There is a little ambiguity in this expression, for in the first part of the noble admiral's letter, he says, the Spaniards under the direction of admiral Gravina, were with their heads to the northward—meaning the *southward*, I presume, as admiral Gravina was in the rear. From this it would appear that the Frenchmen and Spaniards were in two distant divisions, and the inference is that the French division was on the other tack to the northward.—Every allowance, however, ought to be made for letters written in such a situation, where the commanding officer is much fatigued and his mind anxious for his fleet and prizes all crippled and all on a lee shore with a hard gale of wind.

Lord Nelson made the signal and led the weather column of the British fleet down to the attack, and admiral Collingwood 2d in command, the lee-column. Nelson was about the tenth ship, from the van in the action, and Collingwood about the twelfth from the rear, leaving the van of the combined fleet unoccupied—the succeeding ships breaking through astern of their leaders and engaging their opponents at the muzzles of their guns. The combat continued three hours, and nineteen of the combined fleet struck.

As to the five ships in the van of the combined fleet, which remained unoccupied until the close of the battle, I do not know whether they were French Spanish or both;‡ but from causes unknown to us, it appears that they were entirely useless in the battle. Perhaps the proper signals were not made to them; or, if made and repeated, not seen; but, if made and seen they were not obeyed. Admiral Collingwood thinks the combined fleet, formed as he describes, is new—not so in theory, but there are very few instances of this plan being put in practice.

† The French division being on one tack, and the Spanish on the other, they formed a sort of double van as well as double crescent; and in this particular structure of line, there are advantages of defence; but to prevent any misconception on the van and rear of the fleet, those on the same tack and ahead of admiral Villeneuve from the centre, forms the van division, and those astern of him under admiral Gravina, the rear division, whether formed with their heads on the one tack or the other. In perusing this sketch, the reader should have admiral Collingwood's official letter of the 22d of October before him.

The object, however, of the commandre of the combined, fleet in forming a double crescent, was not only to endeavor to secure his line from being broken by the English bearig up to attack him in two columns, but to rake them from all points, in carrying their disign into execution.

The double crescent, or two curved lines, the leewardmost of more than double the strength of the weathermost, and both closely and correctly formed, was a plan of defence extremely judicious; and the commander of the combined fleet must have intended the five ships of his van as a *corps de reserve*, to afford succor in the action to that part of his fleet which might be the hardest pressed. Hence the five unoccupied ships in the van ought to have tacked & doubled on the British ships, as soon as the engagement had commenced, or had become general. They then, according to circumstances, could have commanded every advantage which a situation to windward, with so formidable a surplus force, presents to our view, in a battle at sea.

Had the force of the parties engaged been reversed, thirty-three English ships formed in the same manner against twenty-seven of the combined fleet, every ship of the latter however, [illegible] sea-generalship, for the English are not superior in the science of naval tacties, but they are more dextrous in handling the ships and cannon, more obedient in battle to signals and orders—in addition to this, 5 ships would not have remained unoccupied on such an occasion.

Admiral Collingwood gives no position of the frigates attending the battle on either side, nor the manner in which the three-deckers or other particular ships were posted, excepting the chief commanders on both sides. It will be taken for granted, however, that the situation of the heaviest ships was in and near the centre; but as this is not fully ascertained, all the ships of the combined fleet are designated by one mark, and those of the English by another.

The English, it is presumed, for the most powerful reasons, laid their ships abreast their enemy in the second curved line, while they broke and confused them in their strongest line to leeward. The wind being westerly, and the second combined line in the concave being only about a cable's length to the windward of the first curved line. Had the British cut that line also, there would have been a jumble of ships; and two or three perhaps on the same side would have gotten foul of each other by dropping down on the first line. Thus would the prospect of success on the part of the British, who calculated on it with certainty, have been rendered extremely doubtful:—hence I take it for granted, and that from the strongest reasoning, that while they broke though in various parts of the main line of the combined fleet and gave them battle, they engaged the second line abreast.

A NEW-YORKER.

December 18, 1805.

‡ The editor thinks it proper to state, that this exposition was written before the intelligence of admiral Strachan's victory had reached this country. In a letter written since the arrival of that intelligence, the author remarks—"Britain has gained another victory at sea, under Strachan. You will have seen that the four ships of the line taken in this late affair, were part of the combined fleet that escaped, and must have been the van of Villeneuve's squadron, for the rear ship of the five of the van was taken at the end of the action, when they tacked to the southward, as appears by Collingwood's letter—the other four escaped. You will also see that these ships were perfectly unhurt in the action of the 21st, so that, if they had done their duty on that day, the battle would have been still more bloody."

Wanted to Rent,

A good and convenient DWELLING HOUSE, as near as can be had to the intersection of Market & Charles streets; rent to be from 400 to 450 dollars per annum.—Enquire of the printers hereo

January 1. 2aw3t

BY THIS DAY's MAILS.

BOSTON, January 17.

Vessels arrived at the Vineyard:—Bellisarius, from the Cape of Good Hope for Salem; Susanna, Minot, from Berbice for Portland; Mary, Morrison, from Guad. for Newburyport; Dido, of Marblehead, from Leghorn for New-York; Active, of Salem, from Bourbon; Dolphin, from Martinique for Boston; Juno, Jacobs, of Salem, from Philadelphia; *Betsy of do. from Baltimore.*

Capt. Robert Peele, master of the Bellisarius, informs that the English had 15 sail of the line, besides frigates, in the India Seas, who were upon the look out for the French squadron. The Isle of France was closely blockaded by an English squadron.

NEW-YORK, January 21.

Arrived, the brig Thetis, Bowen, in 28 days from New-Orleans, and 21 from the Belize. Left ship Joseph, Gibbs, from Trinidad for New-York, having put in there in distress, about 2 weeks before, and was discharging her cargo; ship United States, Reid, just arrived from N. York; brig Friendship, Donn, at the Belise, from New-York; brig Warren, of Rhode Island, at do; schooner Lætitia, of Philadelphia, at New-Orleans; brig Prudence, Bunker, of New-York, from Leghorn; brig Nancy, of and from Boston, discharging; brig Eliza, Toby, of and from Philadelphia, discharging; schooner Wright, Spence, of Philadelphia; brig Federal Volunteer, Freeman, of Boston, uncertain. In the river, a brig from Boston; ship Ophelia, Pekins, of and from New-York, bound up. At the Belise, schr. Venus, King, from New-York, for Laguira; ship Aurora, Sutherland, of and from New-York, for Bordeaux, was ashore at the S. W. pass. At anchor outside the Belise, brig Warren, Coggershall, of Warren, R. I. bound up. The thetis is aground on Oyster Island, but received no damage.

The schoonr Clotilda, Jefferson, in 8 days from Norfolk, 18 leagues from Norfolk, spoke the schooner Rising Sun, Bradford, 20 days from Fatmouth, Massachusets, for Norfolk, being in a state of starvation, snpplied them with provisions.

Cleared, brig Young Edward, Morris, Havana; Paul Sherman, Peare, St. Croix; Martha, Bragdon Leghorn; Jupiter, Thompson, Lisbon; schrs. Only Daughter, Jackson, Nixenton; Triumph, Fallen, Richmond.

The ship Ann and Hope, belonging to Brown and Ives, of Providence, from Batavia and the Isle of France, with sugar, coffee, and pepper, went ashore during the late snow storm on Block-Island, vessel and cargo entirely lost, and three of the people drowned.

The brig Mary, Parsons, of New-York, [illegible] for adjudication, has been liberated, both vessel and cargo.

January 22.

Arrived, the Huntress, Stanton, of Stonington, in 55 days from Bordeaux. Left ships Hugh Johnson, Sword, of Boston; Ohio, Hall, of New-York, for New-Orleans, uncertain; Catharine, Butler, for do. do. Thomas, Jones, of Philadelphia, for N. Orleans; Fabius, Norris, of Philadelphia, for freight; Frances-Ann, Davis, for New-York; Independence, Hunter, for do. Phillipsburg, Leffingwell, of New-York for New-Orleans; Arcturus, Main; and Mary-Ann, Burk, both for New-York.—Brigs Fox, Drummond, of Boston; Eliza, Noyes, of do. Caroline, Young, of do. for freight; Caroline, Drew, of New-Orleans; Jennie, Bliss, for Philadelphia; Eliza-Dolby, Howard, of do. New-York, Rogers, for New-York; brig Kitty, Booth, of New-York for freight; and Minerva, do. do.—Schooners Hannah, Doan, of Boston, in the river, bound to Lisbon; Heart of Oak, Virgin, of do. for do. and Mercury, Cook, for Salem. Spoke, Jan. 2, in lat. 24 long. 62, schr. Rebecca, Doak, 11 days from Alexandria for Barbados. 5th, in lat. 26, long. 63, ship Thomas, from Surinam for Portsmouth—next day, brig Eliza, of Plymouth, 27 days from Lisbon for Boston. 12th, in lat. 34, 40, long. 72, brig Neptune, Brown, from the island of Jersey for Charleston, and supplied her with water—her sails split.

The British ship Pandora, Lang, in 70 days from Sligo; with 60 passengers.

FEDERAL GAZETTE.

FRIDAY, *JANUARY* 24.

We are sorry that the length of the important diplomatic correspondence in this day's Gazette, should have excluded from our columns an article signed "*Friends of the Militia.*" Citizen Yrujo cannot leave off his old pranks. Formerly he could make a direct appeal like his co-adjutors, *Genet, Adet & Bauchet*, from the government itself to the people, and through the columns of the Aurora, figure away to the high gratification of *certain gentlemen*, whose situation now, is vastly different from what it then was. At present, he must make his appeal not through the Aurora and its echoes, but through the corps diplomatique.

As the tactical principles on which the late memorable naval battle was fought off cape Trafalgar, were then for the first time reduced to practice, we have copied the descriptive sketch of which appears in this day's Gazette, from a N. York paper. The observations which accompany it, it will be perceived, are, though given as original by *A New-Yorker*, but little more than a paraphrase of what has been already copied by us from the Norfolk Ledger. Many read-