From the Salem Gazette, of January 24.

We this day published the Memorial, voted by about an *hundred* persons, on Monday last, to be presented to the government, as the doings of the town of Salem, which contains between one and two *thousand* voters.—The Boston Gazette very improperly mentions it, as "a Memorial of the *merchants* of Salem:" the fact is, that a very small number of the merchants were in the meeting, and generally speaking, that class of citizens appear to have paid no attention to the transaction.

To the President of the United States, and the Senate and house of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled, the Memorial of the inhabitants of the town of Salem, in the county of Essex, and state of Massachusetts, in town-meeting assembled—respectfully represents,

That on ordinary occasions they have deemed it unnecessary to apply for redress of grivances to the government of their country, confiding in the rectitude and wisdom of its councils; and though their confidence in this respect is undiminished, yet as questions of national moment are now agitated, and aggressions committed on our commerce in a manner unprecedented, they deem it the duty to approach the constituted authorities, and express their sentiments with fidelity and deliberation.

It has been a source of the purest satisfaction to your memorialists that while foreign nations have been engaged in wars, which, in their nature and consequences, have transcended the limits of human foresight, the United States have under the benign care of Providence, been preserved in the enjoyment of peace and liberty.—They have beheld with pleasure our commerce, at first feeble and confined, gradually expanding with awakened enterprize, until it has reached the farthest shores, and embraced the most inhospitable climes. This commerce, prosecuted with increasing vigor, and fostered by new aids, has continually brought to our ports the wealth of all nations, and by opening a liberal intercourse, added fresh zeal to foreign industry and domestic labor.

Your memorialists, considering war an evil, which could not be confined in its consequences to belligerents, even when prosecuted with good faith and amicable intentions towards neutrals and believing it the sound policy of the United States to avoid every entanglement in it, as injurious to internal improvement and external interests, have witnessed with unhesitating approbation the disposition to neutrality patronized by the general government at times when national wrongs have been pressed with peculiar aggravations and seemed to point to summary redress. Firmness and moderation have happily secured all the advantages of successful war, and the sober appeol of reason carried conviction to foreign nations. From considerations of a similar nature, your memorialists have submitted to the injuries of belligerents during the late European war, and awaited with confidence the decisions of tribunals instituted to adjust national rights, and afford a fair though tardy redress to grievances. To these tribunals, elevated in the presence of the world, as the learned and impartial courts of nations, they hoped that all parties might appeal for justice, and receive a righteous award. In some instances they were disappointed; in others they realized their expectations. And even when they could not admit the correctness of decisions principles were expounded and rules prescribed which might serve, as pole stars, for the future direction.

Your memorialists, however, have witnessed with *deep regret* and *deep anxiety* that to some of these tribunals they can no longer appeal for safety. New interpretations of old rules, and new glosses on ancient doctrines have been arrayed to control the circuit of neutral commerce, and restrain, if not annihilate, its most beneficial operations. Their surprise has been greater, because the nation, who has adopted them, is one from whom we had a right to expect the most conciliatory conduct, since with her ultimately centre the proceeds of our commerce, and from her we purchase the greatest portion of her staple manufactures.—The interests of Great-Britain and the United States seem in this respect mutual. We consume the products of her industry, and give her in return, besides large sums of money, raw materials, by which she may levy new contributions. Similarity of manners and habits of language and education, have added artificial inducements for intercourse, and gained for her among us a respect, not slightly to be viewed, or inconsiderably forfeited. On all occasions, the United States have exhibited towards her an amicable interest, and a just it may be added a generous policy. If, therefore, we had favors to ask or to receive, our claims have been peculiarly strong upon her because we have been emphatically the sinews of her opulence. But it is believed the United States never asked of any nation more than justice, and are willing to be bound by the established rules of commerce. Your memorialists, therefore, express *deep regret*, because a confidence has been shaken which may not easily be restored, and *deep anxiety*, because the principles alluded to, if conceded, must eventually prostrate our trade, or leave it at the arbitrary discretion of belligerents. Whether peace or war prevail, the baneful influence will every where be felt, and in the latter predicament, we shall as neutrals, share the mischiefs of it, without the chance of benefit.

With these impressions, your memorialists respectfully submit some observations on the nature and importance of the principles avowed by the British admiralty. On the present occasion they would avoid the discussion of contested points respecting the freedom of commerce, on which civilians have entertained different opinions. They would avoid the question, how far even a *direct trade, carried on by neutrals between the colony and mother country, with bona fide neutral property*, is protected by the law of nations, though it may justly be a ground of national investigation.—They are willing to avoid these extrinsic, though important subjects, and meet the principle of the English courts upon the laws and usage sanctioned by the practice of nations.

The principle recently established by Great-Britain, is as your memorialists understand it, that *it is not competent for a neutral to carry on in war any trade which he is not accustomed to do in peace; and that he shall not be permitted to effect that in a circuitous which is inhibited in a direct trade.* As corollaries from this principle, she insists that the colonial trade, exercised by neutrals, shall not extend beyond the *accustomed* peace establishment; and that whenever the neutral imports into his own country colonial produce, *with the intention* to tranship it to the mother country, if a direct intercourse be interdicted in peace, thy circuity of the route shall not protect the property from comfiscation. It seems admitted, that such circuitous route, with such intention, is not considered as evidence of *enemy's property*, confiscable within ordinary rules, but as a distinct, substantial, condemnatory principle independent both in efficacy and application. For it yields not the most clear proof of neutral property, or innocent though misdirected conduct. The *unaccustomed trade*, or the *importations with specific intentions*, are the tests by which every voyage is to be tried.

If these doctrines form a part of the law of nations, however mischievous they may be in operation, the United States must submit to them, until relaxed by particular convention. Though our commerce should be oppressed, and our enterprize crushed, yet are we bound to acquiesce, if the sanction of universal justice require it.

Your memorialists, however, beg leave, before they consider the law of nations in this particular, to advert to a few of the *consequences* resulting from this rule, and if they do not greatly mistake, from thence will arise a strong argumennt of its inadmissibility.

In the first place, great evils must in the nature of things result from the indefiniteness of what is the *accustomed trade*. Nations are continually changing their policy, their imports and exports, their manufactures, their staples and their commercial connexions. In peace as well as in war, peculiar circumstances induce them to open or close a traffic, and these circumstances arise as often from accidental caprice as political wisdom. Beside these, the silent peration of time, by destroying old sources of revenue, and developing new wants, and in a more important view, by erecting the grandeur of one state on the destruction of another, with secret fatality changes the channels of commerce, and forbids it to flow in an uniform course. It seems conceded on all sides, that the rule shall not apply to every case, and that those changes, which seem not the result of *a necessity imposed by an enemy*, are exempted from its operation. But how shall these limits be defined? Every nation varies its policy in this respect in time of war; and even Great-Britain relaxes her navigation act to meet the ordinary exigencies of it. On such occasions she admits neutrals to import into her dominions articles not the growth of her own country. She admits foreigners into her mercantile as well as military marine. She opens her colonies to importations strictly forbidden in peace, and allowed with jealous caution even under the pressure of war. To changes of this nature, *if they do not arise out of the predominance of the enemy's force, or out of any necessity resulting therefrom*, her own civilians avow the rule of accustomed trade shall not extend. According to them, *it is not every convenience or even every necessity arising out of the state of war, but that necessity which arises out of the impossibility of otherwise providing against the urgency of the distress inflicted by the hand of a superior enemy, that can be admitted to produce such an effect.* But in what manner shall this *impossibility* be determined? How shall we distinguish between the ordinary and the extraordinary necessities of war—between those evils inflicted by a superior force, and those resulting from general embarrassment? How shall we distinguish which is the predominant power, when one may be conqueror at one point, and conquered at another—one all-powerful by sea, another all-powerful by land? How shall we provide for or foresee the changes of the day, when time with unmeasured rapidity retrieves losses in the hour of defeat, and destroys power in the hour of victory? In the opinion of your memorialists, there is but one test of such predominance, and that within the old law of nations. It is, when the belligerent is able to blockade the ports of his enemy; and then his right to exclude neutrals is coextensive with this ability to blockade. If any other test be resorted to if the unlimited ingenuity of admiralty discretion be exercised in the application or denial of the rule, the rights of neutrals will change with the policy of an administration, and rise and fall with the pressure of hostilities and the security of depredation. Surely no principle of the law of nations can be bottomed on so fluctuating a basis. It would reverse the nature of all law, which is fixed and determined, and substitute a discretion little less injurious than despotism.

In another view, the rule appears to your memorialists not less untenable and unjust. It is stated as a part of it, that if colonial produce be imported by any person, with *an intention to tranship it on his own account to the mother country*, it is subject to confiscation; but if *imported for the purpose of general commerce*, and thrown into the market for general transhipment, it is within the exception. To distinguish between general and particular intentions, and to separate things so subtile in their own natures, and almost incapable of proof, for the purposes of national decision, seems a refinement reserved for the present age. In the nature of things it can hardly be possible to determine the intention of a merchant in importation. These may be formed and fixed at one moment, and abandoned from change of circumstance at another. The situations of foreign markets, the plenty or deficiency of supply at home, the nature of his funds, the success of his incipient voyage, and numerous other accidents, must continually change the destination of importations and divert them into various channels. In no case therefore can there arise an *indisputable* presumption that a merchant imports with a determination to export. Indeed, as his intention must *frequently* be ambulatory, the presumption lies as strongly the other way. And even if in a few instances, that intention could be ascertained, thousands of cases must arise, in which it would be impossible to form a criterion for judgment—All must be doubt, caprice or speculative construction.

These objections lie in the embarrassments attending the exercise of the rule respecting intentions. But a more serious one may be urged against it, grounded upon its efficacy, as it respects both the neutral and the belligerent. As it respects the *neutral*, if the rule is once known, transfers of property will be immediately made. There will be an impossibility of preventing frauds in there transfers, if they deserve the name, by any tests applicable to them, unless restrictions are imposed or evidence required, which no authorities could procure, and no independent nation ought to submit to. As it respects the belligerent, the same produce after sale would *according to his own principles*, be admissible to the ports of his enemy; and in that way the same assistance be supplied, and the same embarrassments be prevented. The importer will communicate a title to his vendee, which he does not himself possess and clothe his agent with an authority, which he cannot exercise at his own hands. The rule therefore would require the *mere formality of a sale*, but would effect none of the consequences, which it professes to value; and its foundation would be shaken by the extent of its exceptions.—Considered in this view your memorialists cannot but suppose that no such modification will ultimately prevail; but by degrees the restriction will be absolute *against all neutral carriage of colonial produce to the mother country under every variety of intention.* In any other way it might be nugatory, & with this unmeasured influence it must be ruinous.

The foundation of this modern doctrine is laid in this principle, *that the neutral has no right by an extension of this trade to afford supplies to the belligerent, because by such trade he assists the belligerent to ward off the blows of his enemy, and oppose for a longer period the dominion on his force.* But to this your memorialists deem it a conclusive answer that the proposition proves too much. That if true, it is a foundation for a far more broad and sweeping principle; that every commerce with the belligerent is inhibited to neutrals, *for every commerce assists him in resistance, and diminishes his necessities.* A doctrine thus comprehensive has never yet been avowed, & it is presumed never will be. Yet such must be the logical conclusion; and it shews irresistibly the absurdity of the assumed premises. The *accustomed*, as well as *unaccustomed* trade, is within the terms & must stand or fall together. Either the doctrine is unsound and assumed as a mere pretext for predatory seizure, or neutrals have no rights as such, and must endure the calamities inflicted by belligerents, in a contest in which they have no voice, and from which they can reap only injury.

Other considerations add force to the preceding remarks. It is well known, that in time of war, neutrals cannot carry on even their *accustomed trade* in its full extent.—They are prohibited from trading in contraband goods and to blockaked ports. Variations necessarily arise in the relations of the hostile powers, which the neutral ought to possess a right to turn to his profit, as an *indemnity for the obstructions of his old trade.* These obstructions are of a very serious nature. When exercised in the mildest form, they produce oppressive searches and delays, expensive litigation and often total failure of an otherwise lucrative voyage. Reason would therefore seem to declare, that for hazards of this nature, the benefits arising to neutrals from war are not more than a just equivalent. But if the obstructions be enforced, and no new channels be permitted, it seems hardly too much to say that they must lead to an extinction of all neutral commerce. If one belligerent adopt the rule, another has the same right; and regulations of colonial monopoly would then serve as false laws only to ensnare and betray neutral navigation. It is somewhat singular, that a belligerent should invite a trade with itself, which it declares fraudulent with its enemy; and should lift the arm of power to crush the neutral, whose conduct is criminal, only when it ceases to be partial.

Such are the remarks your memorialists respectfully submit upon the rule considered in itself; on this examination they confess it appears to them fundamentally incorrect. It subjects commerce to fluctuating decisions, overthrows the ordinaty rules of evidence, and place an immense power to be wielded at the uncontrollable discretion of magistrates appointed by a single party. It therefore wants all the discriminative features of a fundamental proposition of the law of nations—uniformity, precision, and general applicability. It would, in their opinion, if established create greater evils than it professes to redress, by perpetuating strife, destroying the emoluments of trade, embarrassing commercial intercourse and letting loose the passions to prey on the miseries, and plunder the property of the innocent. It would subject neutrals to hazards nearly as perilous as those of actual hostilities; and independent of its influence in stimulating to revenge and retaliation, it would transfer the benefits of peace to any victorious usurper of the ocean.

(To be continued.)

From the Boston Centinel.

COUNTERFEIT BILLS.

Mr. Russell,

The following COUNTERFEIT BANK BILLS are in circulation in the Northern states—and we think it our duty to describe them, as far as is in our power, to prevent their circulation.—Those who are not thoroughly acquainted with bills ought to be cautious what ones they take—as there never were more counterfeits in circulation, than at the present moment.

BILLS OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Union Bank, at Boston.—Five dollar bills:—They are executed entirely with a pen, and can easily be distinguished from the true ones—but few in circulation.

Massachusetts bank, at Boston—Ten dollar bills, a good imitation of the true ones;—paper lighter—few in circulation.

New-Bedford bank.—Nine-dollar bills—hard to distinguish from the genuine bills—excepting in the motto, "Peace to the world." In *world*, the *l* & *d* is in a shade in the counterfeits.—The true bills have only the *d*. Paper more spungy and whiter than the original.

Maine bank, Portland.—Five, Seven and Nine-dollar bills are counterfeited. Some of the nines are dated March 16, 1803, & are hard to distinguish from the true bills.—The seven are dated March 4, 1804, and are also well imitated.

Portland bank.—Seven dollar bills, easily known from the genuine.

Nantucket Pacific bank.—Ten dollar bills, and two dollar bills of Nantucket bank, altered to ten dollars.

Lincoln and Kennebeck bank, at Wiscasset.—Ten dollar bills. Imitation good. Paper lighter and more spungy than the genuine.

Plymouth bank.—Five dollar bills, of the first impression, issued from the bank: Imitation good, excepting the red and black ink, which are at once a detection of them—but few in circulation.

Gloucester bank.—Five and ten dollar bills; but so badly done that a single glance of the eye can detect them; but few in circulation.

There are also four and six dollar bills of Salem bank, in circulation. Imitation poor, besides bearing a fictitious signature of the president and cashier. The genuine bills bear the names of *Benjamin Pickman*, jun. as president, & *Jona. Hodges*, as cashier.

The incorporated banks in this state, are *twenty-two*; and we believe all the counterfeit bills in circulation are enumerated above.

BILLS OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE.

District Bank.—Two dollar bills: very badly executed.—They are dated Feb. 7, 1804.

Portsmouth.—Five and ten dollar bills of *New-Hampshire bank*, payable at the bank of the U. States in Philadelphia. They are a tolerable imitation,

Cheshire Bank, at Keene.—Ten dollar bills, dated Jan. 12, 1805—They are well executed, and known only by a critical examination with the true bills.

Some two dollar bills of this bank, are also altered to *ten*.

BILLS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT.

Norwich.—One dollar bills altered to 25. The 25, in German Text is shaded by a scrawl; in the *genuine*, they are not. One dollar bills are also altered to *ten*—and are well done.

New-London.—Twenty dollar bills, altered from a similar denomination, and extremely well done.

BILLS OF THE STATE OF RHODE-ISLAND.

Smithfield Bank.—Two, three, seven, five and ten dollar bills of this bank, have recently got into circulation. The *sevens* are extremely well imitated—so much so, that it requires a very close comparison with the true bills, to distinguish them. The other denominations are also well imitated.

Providence.—Five dollar bills of the *Exchange bank*—imitation very bad. There are also in circulation ten dollar bills of the banks in *Providence*, altered from a smaller denomination.

Newport Union bank.—Three dollar bills, dated, March 8, 1804—clumsily done.

Washington Bank, at Westerly.—One-dollar bills, altered to *twenty-five*. There are also a few five-dollar bills, counterfeited, of this bank in circulation.

BILLS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK.

Farmers Bank, at Troy.—Ten-dollar bills, the impression generally fainter than the true ones—paper lighter complexion, and more spungy.

Manhattan Bank, at New-York.—Five-dollar bills—paper and impression about the same as those of Troy Bank.

Merchant's Bank, at New-York.—Five and ten-dollar bills, poorly imitated, and easily known from the genuine bills.

Besides the above counterfeits, there are *five, ten, twenty* and *fifty-dollar bills* of the *United States Bank*, in circulation. Those acquainted with bills, can easily discover them from the genuine.

There have also, within a few days, got into circulation, spurious ten dollar bills of *Newbern Bank*, dated July 25 1805, signed James M'Kinley, president, and M. C. Stephens, cashier. They are a handsome-looking bill—but no such bank exists.—There are also no such banks as *Burlington, Richmond, Scituate*, or *Philadelphia Union Bank*—bills of which are in circulation.

From motives of public good we have been thus particular in describing all the counterfeit bills in circulation; & the seveal printers will doubtles render a service to the community, by inserting the above in their papers.

GILBERT & DEAN.

Boston, Jan. 27, 1806.

MESSAGE

From the President of the United States, communicating the report of the director of the mint, of the operations of that institution, during the last year.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.

I communicate, for the information of congress, the report of the director of the mint, of the operations of that institution during the last year.

TH: JEFFERSON.

January 15, 1806.

To the President of the United States.

Agreeably to former practice, I have the honor, at the commencement of the present year, to lay before you a statement of the issues from the mint of the United States, and the expences of the institution, during the past year: and conceiving, that it might not prove unacceptable, the treasurer has, at my request, drawn up, and exhibited, in one comprehensive view, (schedule, No. 4) a statement of all the gold, silver & copper coins, struck at the mint, from the commencement of its operation, till the present time.

From this statement it appears, that of gold coins issued from the mint, the whole amount is 2,613,972½ dollars; of silver coins 1,953,917¼ dollars; and of copper coins 179,453 dollars 47½ cents; making the total amount 4,747,343 dollars 72½ cents, and the total number of pieces 22,594,832.

During the last year, as will appear in particular detail from schedule No. 1, there have been struck at the mint, of gold coins 34,964 pieces, amounting in value to 170,367½ dollars, of silver coins 469,496 pieces—value 149,067¼ dollars; and of copper coins 1,755,580 pieces—value 13,483 dollars 48 cents; making the total number of pieces of the precious metals 504,460; and of copper coins 1,755,580, and the total value 332,918 dollars 48 cents. This amount is indeed somewhat less than that of the preceding year, ($371,827 94 cents) yet the number of pieces is much greater, being all of the smaller coins; and this latter circumstance will readily account for the small difference in value; since the labor and time necessary to prepare and strike an equal number of large and of small pieces of coin will be nearly equal.

Of the precious metals, the number of pieces coined in the last year, far exceeds that in any former year, since the establishment of the mint; indeed it is considerably more than *double* of what it has been, in any one of the four last years.

The striking of small coins is a measure which has been adopted to accommodate the banks and other depositors, and at their particular request; both with a view of furnishing a supply of small change, and to prevent the exportation of the specie of the U. States to foreign countries.

I am authorised, sir, to assure you, that the bank of the U. States (with perhaps the other banks in this city) will furnish the mint an ample supply of bullion, during the current year; and to avoid, as far as practicable, all inconvenient delay in the issue of coins, I am, with your approbation, about to employ a few additional workmen. The utmost economy, however, in the expences of the institution, will be carefully observed.

The Schedule No. 3, exhibits an abstract of the expenditures of the Mint during the last year. From this it will be observed, that the contingent expences in the last six months, have been pretty considerable.—This has arisen from sundry repairs, particularly of the stable, coal house, a pair of rollars, and one of the coining presses, which could no longer be dispensed with; but which will not again occur in many years.

Schedule No. 2, exhibits a general statement of the gain on the copper coinage for the last year, amounting to $. 2,187 68 cts. exclusive of $. 51 96 cts. spoiled planchetts, used in the alloy of the precious metals. This gain would have been still greater, had not the planchetts proved to be somewhat overweight—though the late director had given the most particular charges and instruction, on this head to the person of whom they were purchased.

I have, sir, the honor to be,
With the greatest esteem,
Your most obedient servant,
ROBERT PATTERSON,
Director.

Mint of the United States,
Philadelphia, 3d January, 1806.

BY THIS DAY's MAILS.

SALEM, January 28.

There has been no arrival at this port the 22 days past.

FROM HOLME'S HOLE.

Yesterday intelligence was received from Holme's Hole (Vineyard) by which we are sorry to learn that the late gale was highly disastrous to the shipping at that place.—The following is the most particular account we have been able to collect of the situation of the vessels there, viz.

The Beliasrius, Peele, from India for Salem, with dry goods, a-shore, her rudder gone and 4 feet water in her hold.