FOREIGN NEWS,

From papers received at the office of the Federal Gazette, by the Abeona, captain Hobson, from Liverpool—CONTINUED.

Extract from a paper, entitled, "Remarks on the Plan of Operations proposed by Austria."

The plan which the cabinet of Vienna has transmitted to that of St. Petersburg, presents a new proof of the intimate confidence mutually subsisting between the two imperial courts; and if the war now undertaken to check and restrain the ambition of Bonaparte shall terminate happily, its success must be owing to the continuation of that confidence. Upon this principle we shall, without dissembling any difficulty, offer our remarks upon the plan, article by article, in order to obviate, as much as possible, the difficulties apprehended by the Austrian cabinet.

The plan begins with stating as a fact, "that the real forces of the French amount, upon the new organization, to 598,084 men, and with the addition of those which are at the disposal of the French government, to 651,961 men." The cabinet of St. Petersburg has reason to believe that the French army is far from being complete on its new organization, in consequence of the difficulty which the French government has to surmount, and notwithstanding the violent means which it is obliged to use, to muster the fresh conscripts, who strive, in all possible ways, to avoid the service.

Besides, though the English should be unable to effect any disembarkations on the French coast, sufficient for the prosecution of regular war within France, they may, nevertheless, occupy a considerable number of the French troops, by menacing a descent on all the accessible points; on the Lower Elbe, on the Weser, on the coasts of Holland, Flanders, France and Italy. The French, in short, must be naturally obliged to divide their strength, and distribute their forces for the defence of every assailable point of their possessions.

It follows, that the French can never be in a condition to oppose so many as 500,000 men to the operations of the powers of the coalition, and that a deduction of perhaps one-third of their forces may be confidently reckoned upon. The disproportion of 250,000 Austrians and 115,000 Russians to the French troops which can be bro't against them, will be therefore less considerable than it has been supposed.

From the unfavorable calculation of the relative forces of France and the allies, which is presented in the plan of the court of Vienna, the following conclusions have been drawn:—"1. That the local advantages which France enjoys by its geographical position, whether for defence or for agression, are such, that it is desirable to remain at peace till a more favorable conjuncture of affairs."

This reasoning would be solid and just, if it were probable that any more favorable conjuncture of affairs should hereafter arise; if the court of Viennacould, in the mean while prepare and augment its forces, and if, the state of things should, in other respects, remain unaltered.

But, while Europe temporizes, Bonaparte's government acquires every day new stability. His power increases by the subjugation and new organization of all Lombardy and Parma. The relative geographical advantages can undergo no change favorable to Austria; but in fact, the contrary. Besides, there can be nothing more dangerons than the policy of the French government, which has ever gained more by negociations than by its arms. If we enumerate the battles of the last war, the French lost as many as they gained. It is always in the intervals between one great period and another, in seasons of insincere, nominal peace, that they enlarge their dominions.

We are therefore firmly persuaded, that the court of Vienna, if it would consult its own true interests, should not hesitate to renew the war as speedily as possible, and ought to make every effort to prevent Bonaparte from consolidating his power. Assured of the assistance of Russia and of England, when shall it find a conjuncture more favorable?

The second thing assumed as a conclusion in the Austrian plan is, "that if war be inevitable, the allied courts ought to act with the most vigorous efforts of which they are capable." In this, the court of Vienna, has formed a just opinion. But it errs, in supposing for a moment, that it would be left alone in the midst of the contest. The good faith and honor of his majesty the emperor of Russia, are too well known to admit a shadow of mistrust upon this head. Neither would the English government be disposed to sacrifice such immense sums of money, if its determination were not finally fixed.

After this conclusion in the plan, are mentioned three things, the co-operation of which is requisite, in order to bring forward those great energies which are necessary to the success of the alliance, namely, the military arrangements, the financial arrangements, and the general policy.

1. "It is stated, that military efforts would be of no avail, if the Austrian armies should enter the field less than 300 000 strong."

We entertain too high an opinion of the resources of the court of Vienna, to doubt but the Austrian army may be put in a short time, upon such a respectable footing as to enter the field in sufficient force. Being in alliance with Russia, and certain of the good faith of that power, it will have only France to oppose, and will not be under any great necessity of maintaining a force to observe Prussia.

It is very true, that the French, as soon as they shall see war to be inevitable, will put themselves in motion; and that Austria will have to sustain their first attack till the Russians join them. But, as the Russian troops are ready to march, a body of them may be detached immediately, which shall advance by forced marches to assist in the protection of the hereditary dominions of the house of Austria, and to resist the first impetuosity of the torrent.

2. The finances are next mentioned in the plan. The difficulty in regard to them must be in a great measure removed by the subsidy from England. Besides, it is certainly to be expected, that in this, as in what regards the completion of the army, the court of Vienna will not fail to employ all its means & resources.

The contingent of Russia would be on the whole, 115 000 men. Deducting 25 000 for the kingdom of Naples, there would remain 90,000 to act in Germany, which might be conveniently formed into two armies, one of 50.000 men to assemble on the frontiers of Callicia, opposite to Lemberg; the other of 40,000, to assemble along the Boug, opposite Lublin.

The first of these armies might, upon the first appearance of hostilities, detach the column mentioned, which should march across Gallicia towards the Danube, to assist in opposing the first attempts of the French upon the hereditary dominions in Germany, when it should have arrived in the vicinity of Ratisbon; its subsequent movements would be determined by the condition of the Austrian army.

The rest of the Russian army should follow immediately, in order to reach its destination with the smallest possible loss of time.

The other army would march by Lublin and Cracow.

It were to be wished that we should know what routes the court of Vienna would particularly desire that these two armies should take. In all cases, their marches should be respectively so arranged, that they may not meet at Teschen.

As to their operations, the first might be employed on the left bank of the Danube, in communication with the Austrians upon the opposite bank, having its left upon Donauwerth.

The second army, upon arriving in Bohemia, would proceed into Franconia, or wherever the state of affairs should require its presence.

The court of St. Petersburg is about to send a confidential person to Paris, to make a last endeavor to persuade Bonaparte to listen to reasonable conditions. Should these be accepted, it may prevent the war. But, in the mean time, nothing is to be neglected; for it is certain, that we shall succeed only in proportiou as we put ourselves in a respectable position. And we ought to be ready to begin the moment the negociation terminates.

The reasonings suggested upon the probable progress of the military operations, appear to proceed upon very salutary and judicious views. It is agreed, that any operations against the frontiers of France, along the Rhine, whether below or above Mentz, would be attended with great difficulty. It is rather on the Italian line that the first success is to be expected. It is consequently toward that quarter that the principal efforts ought to be directed. All this part of the plan must be allowed to be perfectly well arranged.

Copy of a dispatch from the count de Rasoumoffski, dated at Vienna, the 29th April—11th May, 1805.

Since the creation of the council of war, I have this day to mention its first meeting, which, directed to other details than those of the administration, at length presents an object worthy of attention. The conferences took place in the presence of his majesty the emperor, on Monday and Tuesday last. The committee was composed of the two archdukes Charles and John, the president and vice-president of the council, and the quarter master general Mack. The question submitted to their deliberation turned on the prodigious increase of the French forces in Italy; on the imminnet danger which thence resulted to the frontiers of the Hereditary states; on the rapidity with which, from the first hostile determination of Bonaparte, they would be attacked; and on the absolute impossibility of resistance. This situation was deliberately considered, and it was unanimously decided, even with the consent of the archduke Charles that it was necessary to reinforce the troops in that quarter. This point being settled, the necessary details will be arranged in consequence; and I lose no time in forwarding to you the most important of their resolutions.

Extract from a Memoir on the Situation of Affairs communicated by count Stahremberg.

Never were hopes, founded on the most salutary views and plans, destroyed by a more fatal blow, than the disastrous reverse which our army in Germany has experienced by con course of unfortunate circumstances, the consequence of a single fault.

The simultaneous co-operation of the two imperial courts of England and Russia should have offered, at the commencement of the war, a chain of armed forces from the north to the south, and should have obliged France by mutual diversions to separate hers. It was our first misfortune, that none of the hopes we had placed in diversions on the north of the Continent, which might have obliged the emperor of France to divide the troops that he had withdrawn from his coasts were realised: and not only all the troops were able to be employed against our army in Germany, but even the Gallo-Batavian army, and that of Bernadotte, could quit Hanover and Holland also, without impediment, to joiu in the attack.—It is to this circumstance that the French troops which were opposed te ours, owe the superiority of their numbers; for, deducting these two armies, the troops arrived from the interior in the course of the month of October, have but little exceeded the number of Austrian troops placed on the Iller, where, in the strong position which they occupied, they would have been able to awaite the junction of the first army of his majesty the emperor of Russia.—There was even a moment when they had the hope of preventing the junction of the French troops from the north with those arrived from the interior of France, by falling on a party of the latter; when, as a second misfortune, the violation of the Prussian neutrallty suddently changed the face of affairs, and reduced our German army to the alternative, either to fall back immediately on the Inn, or see itself surrounded and destroyed.

The retreat on the Inn should have prevented every disagreeable consequence. Joined to the body of the army under the general in chief, De Kutusow, these troops would have been sufficient to resist the limited French forces; the subsequent arrival of the second Russian army, and finally the developement of other measures of the coalition, might have procured to the allied troops that superiority of force which had been absolutely depended on in the mutual engagements.

Through the inconceivable fault of a general chosen for a reputation gained by former successes, the army of Germany remained on the Iller; and in the course of a few days, without having been beaten, after some slight actions in which it had rather the advantage than the disadvantage, the greater part of the army was taken, and the remainder dispersed. All the following misfortunes were the inevitable consequences of this disaster.

The united French forces in Germany alone exceeding, without the allied troops, 110,000 men, advanced against the Austro-Russian troops posted on the Inn, which ammounted to little more than half of that number. To expose these troops to a regular combat against a force double their number, would have been to risk the ruin of them, before the arrival of the second army of his majesty the emperor of Russia; it would have been to commit the same fault that had just lost our army of Germany. On the contrary to preserve the first Russian army entire, until the arrival of the second, became the principal object of the dispositions, which were concerted by his majesty in person with the general in chief Kutusow.

To complete our disappointment, the arrival of the second Russian army was delayed more than a month, by the first armaments which the court of Berlin threatened to oppose to those of the court of Petersburg. The troops, therefore, under generals de Meerfeldt and Kutusow, unable to maintain a position on the Inn, or in any other part of Austria, where obliged to fall back upon Moravia. The inevitable consequence of this movement was the progressive advance of the enemy in Upper and Lower Austria. Having reached the last bridge on the Danube above Vienna, near Krems, the Russian army had no other alternative than to pass it, in order to avoid being cut off from the left bank, and from their route into Moravia. From that moment, the fate of the capital of Austria was decided, considering the impossibility of defending it, within the walls, unless the time necessary for the arrival of the reinforcements could be gained by means of an armistice for a very short period. Many reasons concurred to render his majesty desirous of saving his capital by such an armistice; he therefore determined to send lieutenant general Count de Guilay to the emperor Napoleon, to porpose it. The negociation was without effect.

Vienna was occupied by the French; and his majesty thought by the sacrifice of his capital, at least to have ensured to the first Russian army the facility of forming a junction with the second. To this effect, he gave the most positive orders, that the great bridge in front of Vienna should be destroyed, whereby, four or five days march would have been gained to the general in chief Kutusow.—Prince Murat, however, deceived the person to whom this charge was entrusted, by the unworthy falsehood that peace was just concluded between Austria and France, and he thus prevented the demolition of that bridge. This cruel incident exposed the first Russian army to the most imminent danger of being surrounded and destroyed, before it could join the army of general Buxhoevden, as well as a corps of 10,000 Austrians that had retreated from Vienna.

Had this misfortune happened, the continuation of the war would have been evidently impossible. The destruction of the first army of his majesty the emperor of Russia would have infallibly led to that of the second, and of every subsequent reinforcement, successively and separately attacked by the great forces which Napoleon had assembled in Austria; while the army, commanded by the archduke Charles in Italy, must also have been ruined by these forces united to those of Massena. In a word, the danger was so critical, that had there been no other means of preventing it, his majesty would have been obliged to sign a precipitate peace, unfavorable indeed to himself, but inevitable, from motives which would have been but too justifiable in the eyes of his allies. The impossibility of prolonging the war; the necessity of saving the existence of the monarchy; the general interests of Europe, and even of England, required him to insure the existence of the Austrian monarchy, rather than to continue a war from which nothing could be expected but an issue still more unfortunate. In short, the sacred duties by which his majesty was bound to his noble and faithful friend, the emperor Alexander; duties which he shared with every well disposed sovereign, and which imposed upon him the obligation of preferring every sacrifice to the destruction, (as certain as it was useless) of the brave and well appointed armies which Russia was pouring forth to his assistance.

In this extremity, his majesty did not hesitate to enter into new explanations with the emperor Napoleon, and to propose to open negociations with him for peace, as soon as measures to this effect might be concerted with the emperor Alexander, whom his majesty expected immediately to see in person.

But happily these dangers and necessities are no more. Generals Kutusow and Buxhoevden have surmounted the difficulties which threatened to prevent the seasonable junction of the forces under their command. The mission of the Austrian envoys has been accompanied with the resumption of active hostilities. On the 27th of November, the day after they quitted the camp, the combined armies concentrated in the environs of Olmutz, consisting of the first and second Russian armies, with a body of 20,000 Austrians, comprehending also for their rear guard the Imperial life guards, 10,000 strong, and making in all an effective strength of 80,000 fighting men, advanced towards the enemy. On the 28th they had reached Wischaw, and had taken in that city and its environs, more than 600 prisoners. On the 29th and 30th, they continued their march to Austerlitz, on the way to Nikolsburg.

NINTH CONGRESS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Friday, March 21.

A report was received from the Postmaster-general, stating the obstructions in the route from Athens to New-Orleans, and the expence of a horse road, which was referred to the committee of the whole, to whom was referred the general appropriation bill.

Mr. Clinton presented a memorial from the citizens of the city of New-York, urging the expediency and the necessity of a more efficient protection of that port against external danger, and praying that New-York may be assigned as the harbor for those ships of war not in actual service.

Referred to a committee of the whole on the state of the union.

Mr. Early offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That the standing and select committees be directed to report on all the business heretofore referred to them and now depending, before the last Wednesday of the present month.

Mr. J. C. Smith opposed this motion, and suggested the propriety of acting on the resolution relative to an adjournment.

Mr. Early withdrew his motion, and said that he would pursue this course.

Mr. Thomas, from the committee on post offices and post roads, reported a bill relative to the establishment of new roads, &c. which was referred to a committe of the whole on Monday next.

Mr. Early withdrew the resolution offered by him a few days since relative to an adjournment, and substituted in lieu thereof a resolution directing the president of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives to adjourn the two houses on the first Monday of April.

Mr. Smilie moved a postponement of the consideration of this resolution until Monday week, to allow in the interim, time for the adoption of the national business before the house.

Mr. Early disclaimed any intention to defeat the measure alluded to by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

After some further debate the motion of postponement prevailed.

Mr. Crowninshield from the committee of commerce and manufactures, reported a bill for building light houses in Massachusetts, &c. which was referred to a committee of the whole on Monday.

The same committee made a report on the memorial of the inhabitants of Nantucket, unfavorable to the prayer of the petitioners.

Saturday, March 22.

A message was received from the senate, stating that they had passed the bill authorising the imposition of a tonnage duty by the city council of Charleston; that they had likewise passed, with amendments, the bill fixing the compensation of the officers of the two houses; and that they have disagreed to the bill relative to the Danish brigantine Henrick.

Mr. Early was, at his requeset, excused from serving on the committee of enquiry into the conduct of Gideon Granger.

The speaker laid before the house a letter from the secretary of the treasuary, transmitting a list of all the bills drawn by the minister of the United States at Paris under the convention of the 30th of April, 1803.

The house went into a committee of the whole—Mr. Varnum in the chair—on the bill directing the secretary of the treasuary to cause to be surveyed the coast of North Carolina between cape Hatteras and cape Fear.

Mr. Crowninshield advocated the principle of the bill, and observed that he hoped the measure, contemplated by it would be the commencement of a system for surveying the whole coast, by which he had no doubt many lives and much property would be saved.

The bill appropriates 5,000 dollars for the survey.

No opposition having been made, the committee rose, and the house ordered the bill to a third reading on Monday.

The house went into committee of the whole on a resolution for altering the standing rules of the house, in which the house concurred.

The house having agreed to consider the bill from the senate for laying out a road from Cumberland, in the state of Maryland, to the state of Ohio, Mr. Leib moved to postpone the bill indefinitely.

Mr. Clark supported this motion. He thought there was not sufficient time to act on the bill during this session. He declared his wish to be to lay out three roads, one from some point in Pennsylvania, one from some point in Maryland, and one from some point in Virginia, expending, in the first instance, an adequate sum on the middle road, and afterwards appropriating a like sum to each of the other roads.

Mr. Jackson gave a concise history of the fund from which the making of roads to Ohio is to be effected; and stated his opinion that, inasmuch as the compact with Ohio, provided for the laying out "turnpike or other roads," it would be a violation of it to lay out a *single* road—Mr. J. regretted that the subject had been so long delayed, and observed that when it was previously before the house, he had meant to offer a resolution, calling on the secretary of the treasury for the amount of the lands sold since June 30, 1802, in which purpose he had been frustrated by an adjournment.—Fearing that the subject would not this session be deliberately examined, from its competition with other important objects, and believing that the bill contained an exceptionable principle, he should concur in the motion of postponement.

Mr. Bedinger opposed the postponement, and advocated the bill. He observed that he was well acquainted with the route contemplated in the bill, and he considered it the shortest and best for the general interest of the union.

Mr. R. Nelson likewise opposed the postponement, and advocated the bill, whose object was, he thought, as important as that of any business before the house. He viewed the idea of the compact being violated by, in the first instance, laying out one road instead of three, as strange and unfounded; inasmuch as the laying out one road did not supersede the right of afterwards laying out another. Mr. N. further advocated the bill as fixing a route most convenient to the three states of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.

Mr. Jackson said he was not adverse himself to acting on this business this session, if he could be convinced that the house would pay to it a full and dispassionate attention. He was, however, persuaded this would not be the case. Mr. Jackson spoke also at some length against the route contemplated by the bill, and the inadequacy of the fund to forming so vast and difficult a turnpike.

Mr. Lyon opposed the postponement, and advocated the bill, under the impression that the route proposed would be of great benefit to the western people.

Mr. Conrad supported the postponement, on the idea that the proper course of proceeding was for the states first to lay out roads, and for congress then to aid them by appropriating this fund. He thought it was desirable that there should be three roads, one from each of the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.

Mr. Leib was against the bill, because he considered the measure contemplated by it premature. What authority have congress to lay out this road, before they have obtained the consent of the states? Considering the expence of laying out this route, he looked upon the bill as merely making an appropriation for the benefit of commissioners and chain carriers.

Mr. Morrow, of Ohio, believing this road would be conducive to the interests of the western people, that it was the best and most direct route, and that the fund would be adequate to the object, was adverse to the postponement, and in favor of the bill.

Mr. Findley believed the best way was to appoint disinterested commissioners, and after receiving their report, to designate the route. He said he had travelled this road, and believed that a better one could be designated. He should therefore vote for the postponement, and then in favor of appointing commissioners, should that measure be prooosed.

Mr. Smilie was opposed to a postponement.

Mr. Lewis took nearly the same ground with Mr. Findley.

When the question on an indefinite postponement was taken by yeas and nays and lost.—Yeas 51—Nays 59.

Mr. Jackson moved a postponement to Monday, with the view of obtaining information from the secretary of the treasury of the quantity of land sold since the 30th of June, 1802.

Mr. Morrow, of Ohio, hoped the postponement would not prevail. He stated that the information desired was before the house, he considered it sufficient to act on, & remarked that there would exist a fund of near 40,000 dollars on the 1st of next October.

On postponing the bill till Monday, the house divided—Ayes 51—Noes 56.

Mr. Claiborne moved a recommitment of the bill to a select committee, considering the information before the house as not satisfactory.

Mr. Clark supported the motion, on which the house divided—Ayes 50—Noes 58.

The house then took up the amendments agreed to in committee of the whole.

Mr. Jackson spoke at considerable length against the route designated in the bill, and concluded by offering a proposition amendatory of an amendment of the senate—allowing a discretion to lay out the road at any point between Steubenville and Grave river of the Ohio—so as to allow a like discretion with that contemplated on the Potomac between the points of Cumberland and Western port.

The house concurred in the amendment of the committee of the whole, and non-concurred in that of Mr. Jackson.

Mr. Clark offered a motion which went to modify the bill, so as to direct the laying out three roads instead of one.

The speaker declared this motion out of order, as it affected an amendment already agreed to.

Whereupon a question to reconsider the emendment, in order to try the sense of the house on Mr. Cleark's motion, was taken, and lost—Ayes 44—Noes 47.

Mr. Jackson moved to recommit the bill, which motion having been negatived, the bill was ordered to a third reading on Monday.

Mr. Jackson then submitted a resolution, requiring from the secretary of the treasury information of the quantity of lands sold in Ohio, in each year from the 30th day of June, 1802, with the amount for which they were sold.

Motion disagreed to—Ayes 42—Noes 45.

Monday, March 24

A confidential message was received from the president of the United States, which was read with closed doors.

A bill directing the secretary of the treasury to cause to be surveyed the coast of N. Carolina, between Cape Hatteras & Cape Fear, was read a third time and passed—ayes 74.

A bill for laying out and making a road from Cumberland in Maryland, to the state of Ohio, was read the third time.

Mr. Holmes moved to postpone the bill indefinitely, and observed that if this motion prevailed, he should offer a motion for the appointment of commissioners by the president to explore a route.

Messrs. Sloan, Bard, Clark, Olin, Findley and Jackson supported; and Messrs. Mac Creery, Bedinger, Lyon, and R. Nelson opposed this motion, which was disagreed to—yeas 52, nays 64.

The question was then put on the passage of the bill, which was carried in the affirmative—yeas 66, nays 50.

Mr. John C. Smith from the conferees on the disagreeing votes of the two houses on the bill for the relief of Peter Landais reported a recommendation to the house to recede from their disagreement to the amendment of the senate, in which recommendation the house immediately concurred, and the bill has consequently passed the two houses.

The house took up the amendments of the senate to the bill establishing rules for the government of the armies of the U. States, to some of which they agreed, and disagreed to others.

The house agreed to some of the amendments proposed by the senate to the bill fixing the compensations of the officers of the two houses, and disagreed to others.

Mr. Dawson reported a resolution in favor of the prayer of the memorial of Robert Peters and others, in which the house concurred and appointed a committee to bring in a bill.

Mr. R. Nelson reported a bill making a further appropriation towards completing the south wing of the capitol, which was re-