

LONDON, November 9.

M. D'OUBRIL.

Observations on the conduct of D'Oubril, on the treaty which he signed on the 20th of July, and the refusal of the emperor of Russia to ratify it.

It was expected that Bonaparte would become furious as soon as the refusal of the emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty concluded by M. D'Oubril was known.

The organs of his passions, those slaves of Journalists, ought to have prepared their calumnies and their insults at the moment that the signature to this treaty had been obtained from the weakness or the perfidy of this subaltern negotiator; for Bonaparte must have been sure that M. D'Oubril was exceeding his powers, and betraying the confidence of his august master. He must have foreseen, and in fact, he has since experienced, that the treaty could not be ratified. It was at this moment that those wretched persons condemned to defile their pen by undertaking his defence, and their persons, by receiving his protection, ought to have drawn up those abusive and absurd calumnies with which he chuses to amuse his grooms of the chamber, and fatigue his slaves.

But it is now requisite for us to establish the facts, and to dare him and his accomplices to deny a single assertion, or to attack one of our reasons; for if he should venture to contradict our facts, we shall reply by supporting them with such evidence; if he discuss our arguments, we will punish him by unveiling the absurdity of his sophisms, and displaying the turpitude of his calumnies.

Let us, in the first place, meet an objection which naturally presents itself to the mind. The incredible conduct of M. D'Oubril—the crime of having exceeded the instructions of his master, the singular situation in which he had placed himself, of being obliged to confess himself either a traitor or a coward, and of being accused perhaps of both—these collected circumstances cause it to be asked, with a pardonable degree of astonishment, "how the Russian government could recommend such a man to the confidence of the emperor?"

We presume that we shall have answered all objections, dissipated all doubts, and annihilated the impostures of Bonaparte, if we prove—

1st. That the choice of M. D'Oubril was, in the actual circumstances, such an one as appeared, and which with reason appeared the best that could be made.

2d. That M. D'Oubril had never any other powers than those granted for ages to every negotiator.

3d. That those formal powers were still subject to his instructions.

4th. That he has neither followed his instructions, nor obeyed his powers.

5th. That he declared to M. Talleyrand and lord Yarmouth, and that he wrote at the same time to England and St. Petersburg, that he had no power to sign what Bonaparte required of him.

6th. That Bonaparte had, notwithstanding those declarations, a great interest in compelling the signature of M. D'Oubril.

7th. That he did obtain this signature from the cowardice of the negotiator, knowing at the same time, the absolute inefficiency of it for its apparent object, a treaty.

8th. That he absolutely made the very use of it for which it was demanded.

9th. That if he has failed in the results that he promised himself from it, it was not his fault, but the happy effect of the firmness of England.

These are the facts that we are to establish. Let Bonaparte answer us, and he shall be satisfied with the degree of evidence that we promise to bring to this discussion.

It was in contemplation at the time of sending M. D'Oubril to Paris, to charge a sub-minister with this mission, that he might hear, report, and conclude nothing; that the tenor of the instructions, which limited his powers, might be more strict and severe, and that to such a dubious negotiation a character more imposing than it deserved might not be given. It would, indeed have been dangerous for it to acquire an importance in the public opinion from the rank of the person charged with it, as it might have weakened on the continent that energy and vigilance which are so necessary. It was essential, however, that the person, charged with this negotiation, should be well acquainted with the actual state of political affairs; that he should have a clue to all the negotiations, and understand the interests of all the allies. M. D'Oubril then, having been principally employed in the chancery of the prince Czartorinski, must necessarily unite all this knowledge, since it formed the very elements of his employment. Talents were necessary, and it was known he possessed them. Principles were necessary, and he was thought to be influenced by the best. It was proper that the negotiator should have the confidence of the allies, and not be odious to the French. M. D'Oubril united in his person those qualities which were necessary for the negotiator. What was expected from him, he appeared to promise by his past conduct, and that is the only means by which men have to form their judgment of the future. The prince Czartorinski, then, in presenting M. D'Oubril to the confidence of his master, did what was his duty, and the confidence with which he honored him, was founded on and influenced by circumstances. Nevertheless it remained for the prince minister, after having made this choice, to guard against the weakness or disloyalty of the negotiator, as if he had suspected him, and to conciliate these wise and political

precautions, (whatever confidence a negotiator may deserve) with the will of the emperor, which ought to be the supreme law.

On the one hand, the emperor of Russia must desire peace, because he is just, and the father of his people; peace being the only object of a wise government; because kings only reign for the purpose of establishing and maintaining peace; and because it is the stability of peace alone which they look for in the necessity and continuation of war.

But the emperor is too well known to Europe and the world, for any honest man even in France, to believe that he would give the name of peace to a treaty incompatible with his dignity; for his dignity is the safety of the state, and the undeniable pledge of the confidence of nations.

But there can be no association of his dignity with any treaty of peace that does not fulfil the engagements which he had contracted with his allies; which does not establish in Europe such a political situation as would secure the balance of power, so necessary to its existence; because the existence of Europe is connected with the security of his dominions. Besides, if every war has for its object the security of the state that is forced to undertake it, the sovereign can only terminate it when he has acquired that security for which he went to war. Such were the intentions of the emperor.

The minister conformed himself to them, by giving to M. D'Oubril powers, such as for many ages have been given to every negotiator; but, at the same time, regulating the use that he was to make of those powers, by instructions that were to fix the extent of them, and to circumscribe them within the necessary limits. The instructions of M. D'Oubril were, to listen to propositions, to prepare for those the emperor of Russia might chuse to make, and to await the orders of his court.

In addition to these, his first instructions and powers were still further restrained, after M. D'Oubril had arrived in Paris.

During the residence of M. D'Oubril at Vienna, the prince of Czartorinski, aware of the projects of Bonaparte against Germany, had the prudence to send to Vienna new orders to restrain still more strictly the powers he had received, and to regulate the use of them.

In these new instructions, he was enjoined to confine himself in the negotiation to the preparing a treaty on the basis which had been approved by the emperor, his master; but was expressly forbidden to conclude any thing without fresh orders. These new instructions placed M. D'Oubril in that subordinate rank which the emperor wished him to possess through the whole of the negotiation. Whatever, therefore, might have been his first instructions, those given at Vienna were the foundation of his powers and the rule for his conduct. These were the circumstances under which he arrived at Paris.

One might stop here, now that this infamous treaty is known, and say, here is what M. D'Oubril ought to have done: this is what he has done, let the whole world judge of him.

One might ask, what prince has ever ratified such a treaty? And if it depends on the treason or cowardice of a minister to destroy the dignity of his master and the security of his dominions, and to make him violate his engagements? Has it ever been said that a negotiator can dispose of the throne of his king? For he who can dispose of the honor of kings, may also dispose of their states, and even of their existence.

But, although what we have said will doubtless be sufficient fully to expose the absurd declarations of Bonaparte, as transcribed by his journalists, we have, however, not yet completed the circle which we have here traced for ourselves.

We assert, that Bonaparte, in snatching from the weakness of M. D'Oubril his degrading signature, knew the invalidity of the measure which disgraced him; and that he had a different object in extorting from him the signing of a treaty which he knew would not be ratified.

He knew that it could not be ratified, because he knew that M. D'Oubril was sensible he must, at the sight of what he was commanded to do in Paris, see that he was acting contrary to his instructions. He declared it to the French negotiators; he declared it to lord Yarmouth; he wrote this account to England and he asserted it at St. Petersburg. He has declared that, "in thus acting contrary to his instructions, he had been surrounded, circumvented, wearied and provoked: that many threats were uttered; that a harsh insulting tone was used towards him; that the negotiators were assembled at two o'clock in the morning; that the conference had lasted for sixteen hours; that he was alone against a number, who relieved one another; that he had become as feverish; that his head was bewildered, and that it was under these circumstances he signed."—Certainly it might be asked how it was possible that a minister of Alexander should be intimidated by any power whatever? One naturally asks, what menace could frighten a subject of Alexander the first. M. D'Oubril should answer these questions.

He alone has provoked the possibility of a fact incredible in itself. He has realized what no Russian before him conceived possible. It is his business to explain the causes of this phenomenon. It is sufficient for us, that the first is confirmed by his own statement at Paris, to lord Yarmouth, in his letters to England, and his avowals at St. Petersburg.

Can it then be believed that Bonaparte relied on the ratification of such a treaty, extorted from the weakness of the negotiator by such strange means.

Let people read this treaty, and it will be immediately seen whether Bonaparte could expect it ratified? But it will be said then, what motive could have made him feel so interested to obtain it?

His motive was to terrify England by the

desertion of such an ally: to inspire England with suspicions of Russia; to increase his acts of violence against Germany, and to extinguish all resistance, upon the appearance of the emperor of Russia having absolutely abandoned Germany, Italy, and all his allies; to snatch from England a shameful treaty; to multiply without ceasing her hostilities on the continent, and to accuse Russia of re-kindling the war. This was his project; this was the reason he wished first to persuade Paris, and then Europe, that he was sure of the treaty being ratified. He himself ratified it six hours after he had extorted the signature from M. D'Oubril. He caused it to be published three hours after he ratified it. He went further—he wished to appear to proceed immediately to its execution, as if he had received the ratification of the emperor of Russia. For this motive alone, he published the order to the French marine to treat the Russian ships as friends; an order which was illusory, and of no value in the present state of the French navy. Upon the other hand, counted so little on the ratification of the treaty, that in publishing this order, to convince the public that it could not be refused, he suspended the exchange of prisoners, because that such a step had some real value.

England is the power which made him feel that his plan had failed. He could neither terrify her, nor impose on her—and in her refusal to accept a dishonorable peace we please ourselves with the thought that she has rendered to the emperor Alexander the homage due to his virtues—and that she never doubted his fidelity.

We know that all Russia will be astonished at the confession of M. D'Oubril, that he has been menaced, and that he yielded to menace. The possibility of such a phenomenon will not be believed—but one must believe real facts, although their existence might have appeared incredible.

There are, however, other facts which M. D'Oubril has not disclosed. He has not told us, that Bonaparte, according to his usual practice, held out temptations to him as well as threats, and had pointed out to him the situation of the Russian ambassador at Paris, as a reward for his docility and a consequence of the treaty; that he had made him hope that France herself would ask this situation for him from Russia, as the best means of consolidating peace, and of obtaining from it all that could be desired.

To this temptation, which our information states, was employed, we must add the following reflections:

M. D'Oubril, on quitting the prince Czartorinski, could not be ignorant, and was not ignorant, that the prince was determined to obtain from the justice of the emperor leave to resign his situation; he knew all the motives of that prince retiring from office. These motives were that the political system followed by the prince up to that time, did not appear to have obtained that approbation which he wished, and that it was proposed to adopt measures of less energy than such as he conceived to be absolutely necessary. This M. D'Oubril well knew. He thought then that a new ministry would adopt different views, and that he might hazard a step which would be favorably received by them, as it would be possible to throw whatever odium attended such a treaty on that minister who had been his benefactor, and who had honored him with his confidence.

These are the motives which we are allowed to believe were as powerful as the menaces of Bonaparte. In this case, what a miserable calculation has M. D'Oubril made.

Ministers may be changed in Russia, but the emperor is not changed; and the choice that he made of a successor to prince Czartorinski did not announce to M. D'Oubril, that any motive could secure the approbation of M. de Budberg to a treaty which would pollute the honor of his master and of his country.

Does he not know the force of public opinion in Russia? A stranger may be allowed to be ignorant of this circumstance; but can a Russian deceive himself in this point? A Russian knows that there does exist such a thing as public opinion in Russia; he knows that the emperor who has every thing to expect and nothing to fear from it, has endeavored to create, direct and support it; and that in circumstances of such importance, the emperor (however great his power) knows how to listen to it and to avail himself of it.

Let us conclude then, at present, that prince Czartorinski, in presenting M. D'Oubril to the confidence of the emperor made a proper choice, that he gave him the customary powers, and that he limited the extent of them by successive orders at St. Petersburg and Vienna.

That M. D'Oubril, after his arrival at Paris, declared, that what was demanded from him was beyond the limits of his power; that he declared so to lord Yarmouth; that he wrote the same to London and confessed it in St. Petersburg; that Bonaparte, well assured that a treaty signed by M. D'Oubril would be null, yet wishing to extort that signature; and that M. D'Oubril himself confesses that it was extorted by menaces, and by overwhelming him with labor and fatigue.

That the use which Bonaparte wished to make of this treaty, which he knew could not be ratified, was to obtain a peace that should be dishonorable to England, and to enslave Germany. Let us then agree, that thanks to heaven, the shame of this infamous treaty remains exclusively his own, without having derived from it any of the advantages which he expected.

MUNDEN, (HAN.) Oct. 20.

Yesterday arrived here the brave Prussian lieutenant, Hellwitz, of the regiment of Plotz, with his hussars, which near Eisenach he attacked the French escort of 300 men, who had in possession the late Prussian garrison of Erfurt, (7000 men) which they were marching towards the French army—the escort was either cut down, or made prisoners, and the garrison liberated—they are now marching in here.

The Prussians have evacuated Hanover—Hameln is garrisoned, and commanded by gen. Von Schiller.

The disfigured corps of Prince Louis, of

Prussia, covered with wounds, has been deposited at the castle Saalfeld, till it can be removed to Berlin.

Another Prussian army of 50,000 men has assembled between Brunswick and Magdeburgh, and another battle was expected.

The Swedish troops have advanced towards the Elbe.

On the 17th, a convention was signed at Naueuburg, by France and Saxony—the troops of the latter were to abandon the Prussians.

All strangers have been compelled to leave Magdeburgh—the French army was not far from it on the 22d, and sent in a trumpeter.—The Prussian army have passed over the Oder.

The French have ordered the merchants at Leipzig to deliver up all British property in four days.

On the 18th October it was stuck up at Berlin. The king has lost a battle; the first duty of a citizen is quietness, and the governor desires every body to conform thereto. The king and his brethren live!

The villages on the high road from Bamberg to the frontiers of Thurgovia, are mostly ruined and abandoned by their inhabitants. Several houses had 50 and 100 men quartered upon them at a time—the inhabitants gave what they had, and when all was finished, they bade adieu to their paternal roofs.—Beef costs at Cronach one guilder per pound.

From the London Times, of the 17th of October last, we have taken the following account of the battle of Maida, in Calabria. An engagement in which the disparity of force, was so great as to shew the superiority of British troops to be not less than that of British seamen. [People's Friend.]

BATTLE OF MAIDA. Extract of a letter from an officer of rank. MESSINA, August 1.

"You will probably before you receive this, have heard the official account of our brilliant victory over Regnier's army in the plains of St. Euphemia, on the 5th ult. It may not, however, be unacceptable to you to learn a few particulars of the action, which I had a most favorable opportunity of seeing from the commencement to the end.

"We landed on the 1st. We were most grossly misinformed respecting the nature of the country and of Regnier's force, which we were assured did not exceed two thousand men, and that the country was so mountainous, that hardly any thing but a goat or a mule could pass; we were also assured that all Calabria would rise to join us in mass the instant our disembarkation was known. The very reverse of all this turned out to be the fact: we found a fine open Champaign country, where you might have drawn up fifty thousand men in order of battle: not a Calabrian joined us till they saw us victorious; and instead of two thousand men, whom we expected to attack when we marched towards Maida, we saw about eight thousand of the enemy drawn up in a most advantageous position.

"Regnier, from his situation, could distinctly count every man of our force as we advanced; and seeing us so much inferior in numbers, he ordered his army to move forward into the plain to attack us, in full confidence that our defeat and rout would be more complete, than if he had waited to receive our attack; and certainly, had we been worsted on the open plain on which we engaged, very few of us could have escaped from their cavalry.

"On finding the enemy advancing to attack us, and their force so much greater than what was expected, there was for a few moments a halt, and some indecision and consultation on our part, what was most advisable to be done: to have retreated would have been shame and defeat, and even to wait their attack would have been extremely dangerous, where we had expected to be the assailants.

"Our light brigade, and the 78th and 81st regiments, which were in advance, were, therefore, ordered to attack the enemy, and by then the action was commenced. The light brigade was opposed to the celebrated line regiment of French infantry Lecler, which bore a high character in their service as gen. Moore's does in ours. After firing two rounds, they ceased firing, ported their arms, and advanced upon us to the charge, whilst our gallant fellows immediately did the same to meet them. It was the most awful and anxious moment I ever experienced, as I beheld these two corps approach each other, with firm and rapid pace to the work of destruction; and we could plainly see a smile of confident presumption in the faces of the enemy, as if they were certain of overturning us at the first charge. The French, however, on seeing the undaunted resolution with which our men moved forward, began to slacken their pace, and to waver in their ranks when we had got within about 60 yards of them; and as we still pushed on, they soon halted, as if afraid to advance further & ashamed to fly. When within a few paces of them, our men came to the charge, and dashed at them full speed with their bayonets: and in one instant afterwards the enemy were routed, and every man who could run took to his heels, tho' we had the bayonet so close to their breasts before they broke, that more than one half of them were killed or mortally wounded, nearly on the ground where they were drawn up.

"Never, perhaps, were the firmness and courage of the two nations with the bayonet, more fairly put to the test, than on this occasion; and after this proof, let no British regiment ever hesitate to meet a French one at that weapon, for you may rest assured, that they will not stand the actual charge from us, whatever they may threaten. I was in a situation to see the conduct distinctly of every man of both regiments as they advanced upon each other, and I solemnly assure you, that no part of the British line for one moment hesitated or hung back, and that the whole of this French boasted regiment, when we came within a few yards of them, either halted, wavered or fled; and in no one point of their whole line could they properly have been said to stand or oppose our charge.

"Whilst this was going on, the 78th and 81st attacked that part of the French line opposed to them, with the most determined bravery; and, after giving and receiving two volleys, they also advanced upon the

French to charge them; but the latter immediately gave way, from the effects of our fire, before our men got within two hundred yards of them. They made several attempts to rally afterwards, but were so closely pressed that they were soon totally defeated. These three corps bore the chief brunt of the battle, which hardly lasted an hour before the French army fled in all directions, and was so completely routed, that I sincerely believe, if we had had 500 cavalry, not 50 men of them could have escaped.

"The French cavalry had the finest ground in the world to act upon, had they been inclined to charge in good earnest; but, on part of the 27th regiment wheeling back to receive them when they attempted to outflank us, their courage failed them and they sunk from the trial.

"It is impossible to do ample justice to the cool intrepidity which the whole of our troops showed on this occasion; and the 78th regiment in particular, which is entirely composed of young Highlanders, (hardly a man of them above twenty years of age) advanced to the attack with an enthusiasm that astonished and delighted every British officer, as much as it appalled the enemy.

"We had but few guns on either side; the French had four, and we six. Their guns were very ill managed and pointed, ours, admirably well.

"Our loss in killed and wounded is twelve officers, and 300 men. We buried upwards of 900 men of the enemy in the field, and about 1600 more wounded or taken prisoners.

"From the returns of the French regiments, which we obtained from general Compere, it appears that the enemy had 7553 rank and file in the action, exclusive of officers, whilst our whole army, including officers, did not exceed 4950, so that the enemy outnumbered us by nearly 3000 men.

"We are doubly pleased to think, that the brigadier REGNIER should have commanded the army we so completely defeated, with such inferior numbers; and, in his account of the battle of Maida, we fancy he will hardly venture a second time to assert, that the English displayed neither courage, intrepidity, nor talents, in the field, as he vaunted in his history of the Egyptian campaign.

"After the action, the Calabrians, seeing the French no longer invincible, every where took arms, and all the French outposts in the country have been cut off, and in general they have been literally cut to pieces by the justly-angered natives. Regnier's army has since the battle, been reduced to less than 3000 men, and they are so dispirited and panic-struck, that they fly now even before the Calabrians; and I am convinced, that it will require at least forty thousand men to subdue that country again."

"This Regiment is wholly composed of Irishmen, being the renowned Inniskilling regiment.

From the Charleston Courier, December 23.

Although the French, by the immense superiority of their numbers, obtained the victory of the 14th October, yet we may reasonably conclude that it cost them more than any other victory which they have obtained; or, it is to be presumed, from the wonderful activity and perseverance of Bonaparte, that he would not have suffered his army to have remained idle after that battle, but would have followed up his victory by pursuing the retreating Prussians, and destroying them in their flight. But we find that this was not the case; they were permitted to retreat to Magdeburgh, and Bonaparte marched quietly to Berlin, which had been previously emptied of its public treasure. Such an event was anticipated, as it is unfortified, it was not intended to defend it. From all the information which we have been able to collect, both from private letters and the Hamburg papers which we have examined, we see the Prussians undismayed by their disaster, unconquered in their spirit, and unappalled with fear. They every where, evince the most determined intention to persevere in the contest in which they have engaged, and, by waiting for the arrival of the Russians, and by recruiting from their own people, while Bonaparte's myrmidons are seeking Berlin, they will, we hope, be able to check the career of this enemy of the civilized world. All accounts agree that the Prussians fought with unparalleled bravery, and particularly the cavalry, which it is said, performed prodigies in the field. Persons who have visited the field of battle, since the action, affirm, that it was not only literally covered with the dead, but that, in many places, the bodies were actually piled up together, as if designedly done. Such was the vigor of the Prussian operations, that before the French received the reinforcement of marshal Ney, they had taken 125 pieces of cannon, and the issue of the battle appeared evidently to be against the French; but the arrival of 11,000 men, who were transported in carriages, that they might not be fatigued, changed the fate of the day, and they obtained by their numbers, what they could not extort by their courage.

The Prussian troops have proved that they are still deserving of that high renown which they obtained under Frederick II. It is said that the French cavalry were entirely cut up by the Prussian, who fought with the most desperate resolution and determined bravery.

When the French entered Leipzig, they levied contributions upon the inhabitants, and all the merchandize supposed to be British was confiscated. The general opinion in Germany was, that the battle was by no means decisive; that the fate of Prussia did not hang on so slender a thread; that a great and powerful people, affection-