Baltimore Price Current.

CORRECTED WEEKLY.

Articles.	Per.	Prices.	
BREAD, ship,	cwt.	$3	
navy,	—	4 25	
pilot,	—	5 50	
BEEF, northern mess,	bbl.	14	
cargo, No. 1,	—	12	
——, No. 2,	—	10	
BACON,	lb.	11	12
BUTTER, for exportation,	—	18	
COFFEE, Batavia,	—	30	
W. India best gr.	—	31	32
do. com.	—	29	30
COTTON, W. India island,	—	26	35
Louisiana,	—	26	27
Georgia, upland,	—	24	25
Sea-Island,	—		none
CHOCOLATE,	—	20	30
CANDLES, mould	—	21	
dipt,	—	18	
spermaceti,	—	50	53
CHEESE, American,	—	11	14
English, best,	—	40	45
DUCK, Russia,	blt.	17	24
Holland,	—	24	27
Ravens,	—	14 50	15
Russia Sheeting,	piece	22	
FISH, cod, dry,	qut.	4 50	dull
salmon,	bbl.		none
herrings,	—	5	
mackerel,	—	8 10	
shad,	—	8	scarce
FLAXSEED, rough,	bush.	1	1 12
cleansed,	csk.	12	
*FLOUR, superfine,	bbl.	6 75	
fine,	—	6 25	
middlings,	—	5 50	
rye,	—	4 50	
GRAIN, Indian corn,	bush.	70	scarce
wheat, Virginia,	—	1 25	
do. Maryland,	—	1 25	1 33
Rye,	—	65	
Barley,	—	80	1
Clover seed,	—	7 50	
Oats,	—	45	
HOPS, (fresh)	lb.	20	25
HOG'S LARD,	—	15	18
LEATHER, sole,	—	18	20
§LUMBER,	per 100 ft.		
oak, timb. & scant	—	2	2 25
boards, all sizes,	—	2	2 25
pine scantling, do	—	1 12	1 30
boards, 4-4	—	2 50	
do. 5-4	—	2	3
white do. com. 4-4	—	2 25	
do. clear. 4-4	—	2 50	3 50
shingles, cyp. 18 inch	M.	2 50	3 50
juniper, 24 do.	—	6 50	8 50
do. com. do.	—	4	5
staves, w. o. pipe	—	55	60
do. hhd.	—	36	
do. bbl.	—	22	25
red oak, bbl.	—	12	14
do. hhd.	—	16	20
hhd. heading,	—	30	32
MEAL, corn, kiln-dried,	bbl.	4	
PORK, northern mess,	—	25	
Prime	—	19	
Cargo	—	18 50	dull
Baltimore navy	—	22	
——— Prime,	—	19	
southern, 2d,	—		none.
———, 3d,	—		do.
PLAISTER PARIS, Fr.	ton	8	
PORTER, London,	doz.	2 50	3
American,	—	1 25	
RICE, (new) per 100	lb.	4 50	none
SOAP, American, white,	lb.	10	12
do. brown,	—	9	10
Castile,	—	15	17
SALTPETRE, rough, Am.	—	18	
refined,	—	none	
SASSAFRAS,	ton	12	14
SPIRITS, Brandy, F. 4th p.	gal.	1 5	
Cogniac, 4th p.	—	1 12	1 15
Barcelona, 1st p.	—	80	85
do. 4th p.	—	90	92
Gin, Hol'd, 1st p.	—	1	1 5
do. 2d p.	—		
do. American,	—		62
Rum, Jam. 4th p.	—	90	93
St. Croix, 3 & 4	—		none
Antigua, 3 & 4	—	76	78
Windward Island 2d	—	62	plenty.
Windward Island 3d	—	67	
Windward Island 4th	—	70	75
American,	—	50	52
Whiskey,	—	46	plenty
SUGARS, Havana, white,	cwt.	14 50	15
do. brown,	—	10 50	11
clayed, white,	—	13 50	
do. brown,	—	12 50	13
muscov. 1st qual.	—	12 50	13 50
do. 2d	—	9 50	10
India, 1st qual.	—	12	12 50
loaf,	lb.	20	
lump,	—	18	
SALT, St. Ubes,	bush.	70	75
Lisbon,	—	65	70
Cadiz,	—	62	
Liverpool, blown,	—	50	55
ground,	—	55	plenty
Turks-Island,	—		none
Isle of May,	—		none
SHOT, of all sizes,	cwt.	12 50	13
TOBACCO, Maryland, 100	lb.		
fine yellow, ‡ 1st	—		
Upper Patuxent, 1st	—	7 50	8 50
Lower Patuxent, 1st	—	7	7 50
Potomac, 1st,	—	5 50	6
East shore, 1st	—	5	5 50
Virginia, fat,	—	6	7
do. middling,	—	5 50	6
Rappahannock,	—	5	
Georgia,	—	6 50	7
TALLOW, American,	lb.	14	
WAX, bees,	—	42	44
WINES, Madeira, L. P.	gal.	2 50	3
do. L. M.	—	1 15	1 65
do. N. Y. M	—	1 12	1 50
Lisbon,	—	1 12	1 20
Sherry,	—	1 20	1 25
Corsica,	—	60	
Teneriffe,	—	80	1
Claret,	doz.	6	10
do. new,	csk.	33	34
Malaga,	gal.	95	
Port,	—	1 40	1 50

* *Store prices.*
§ *Board measurement.*
† *Cargo prices.*
‡ *Second qualities of Patuxent, are 2 dollars less; Potomac & Eastern-shore 1 dollar less.*

AVERAGE PRICE OF STOCKS—*this week.*

8 per cents,	Dividend off	102
6 do.		97 a 98
3 do.		55a58
Louisiana, do.		*none at market*
U. S. Bank Stock,		129a130
Maryland Bank Stock,		360
Baltimore do.		350
Union Bank of Maryland do.		59
Mechanics' Bank,		14a14 1-4
Alexandria Bank do.		200
Farmers Bank do.		*par*
Columbia do.		*par*
Potomac do.		90
Baltimore Insurance Shares,		229a300
Maryland do.		600
Marine do.		330
Chesapeake do.		100
Union do.		130 a 140
Water Stock,		115 a 120

[It will be recollected, that a resolution was passed by the house of delegates of Virginia, in approbation of the conduct of Mr. Jefferson. This resolution was, after much debating, rejected by the senate of that state. Mr. Daniels opposed the resolution, in a long and animated speech, from which we extract the following passages.]

MR. CHAIRMAN—I concur most heartily with all the gentlemen who have spoken, in the expression of regret that this subject has in any manner been brought into debate here. What, sir, is the real object of this resolution sent up from the house of delegates? What good is it calculated to effect? What occasion is it that demands us to withdraw our attention from those subjects of legislation which properly belong to us, and bestow it *in resolves* upon the affairs of the United States? Has the government of the United States seized upon the rights of the people, or violated that remnant of state sovereignty which is reserved by the constitution? Is there any dreadful calamity impending which threatens the destruction of the administration and the ruin of our sacred institutions? Gentlemen, avow none of these things—and yet they tell you, that none but great, important, and perilous occasions can justify this *resolving* inteference on the part of the general assembly. What, then is the *great occasion* which justifies this resolution? Why truly, sir, in the last congress there were some republicans, few indeed as to numbers, but great for their talents and the services which they had rendered to their country, who had independence enough to oppose one or two measures which, *we are told*, were recommended by the president, but which their judgment could not approve. This is the great, the perilons affair, on account of which we are called upon to denounce those men.—The true question is—*Will yon censure the minority?* What will be the effect of this course of proceeding? Are you ready to establish by this precedent, that upon every occasion when any republican representative, impelled by a sense of his duty, shall oppose the wish of the executive, or any measure of the government, the general assembly of Virginia will interpose with its denunciations? If this be done on one occasion, it must on another, or the president and the administration will be left under indirect censure—Do you expect, sir when once this course of proceeding is sanctioned, there will not be found in all succeeding time, men, courting executive favour, or with better motives, to offer similar resolutions—& thereby put you under that same sort of necessity the authority of which you now allow? Or is it expected that this denunciation, this *proscription of the minority* of the last congress will silence all opposition in future, and that no representative will hereafter dare to oppose the executive will? What, sir, if this *will* require improper things to be done, or if it become vicious—shall it be opposed? But all republican opposition to any measure, is hereby to be proscribed.—What well informed republican, who *dare think* and be honest, do you expect will under these circumstances, remain in your representation? If he has capacity, he will think; if he thinks, his judgment may lead him on some subjects, to conclusions differing from the administration; if he be honest, he will follow the dictates of his judgment. But if he dare *do this*, the legislature of Virginia denounces him as a traitor? This will be his situation; on one hand are placed hopes and prospects of executive favour and patronage, if he advocate measures pleasing to it; but the honest dictates of his judgment tell him those measures are not good; on the other hand, *rest in terror* the denunciations of the state, if he dare oppose! What must he do? Give up his independence and become corrupt, or abandon his post. This course, so objectionable to my mind, will throw your government back into the hands of the federalists.

Are the means of seducing a representative from the respect he owes to the source of his authority, the people, too weak in the government of the United States, whose executive has the most extensive patronage, that we must throw in our denunciations to destroy his independence or drive him from his post? In what does the greatest security of representative government consist? Is it not in the independence of the representative, as opposed to executive influence, and in a *pure responsibility* to the people whom he immediately represents? Why shall we intervene between the people and their representatives? Wherefore this anxiety to take from the people the right of having the *account made to them*, by their public servants? Will you take from the people the responsibility of their representatives and transfer it to Richmond, to the general assembly? Are you afraid to trust the people? If the people be dissatisfied with their representatives, they will leave them at home and elect others. But you deem them unworthy of taking the *account*. and officially throw your weight into the scale of executive influence—an influence hitherto deprecated by us. Has it by any means beome weakned? Do not gentlemen say we have an executive, the wisest the firmest, the most virtuous that the world ever saw; and an administration so enlightened as to be the wonder of nations and the boast of Americans? To my mind it appears but a poor compliment to such a government to allow that our aid becomes necessary to protect it against the consequences of a difference of opinion, which has happened between it and a few representatives of the people; a difference of opinion too, that relates only to *one or two measures of expediency* and which does not bring into question the right to exercise any power or authority delegated by the constitution.

Gentlemen may call the opposers of this resolution by what political names they please, and denounce them as enemies of the administration—but it will not change my course.—I am not willing to praise the government for measures which I apprehend to be objectionable. Yet I may be mistaken. But I act upon the conviction of my mind, as they now are; and I will not through fear of being called a federalist, suffer gentlemen to force into my mouth whatever language they please, in the form of a resolution. I expect this day to be found in a minority—but I appeal with confidence to the people. When they are ready to proscribe every representative who dare stand between their rights and the approach of executive power: When they are ready to abandon every man who shall have firmness and virtue enough to oppose the honest convictions of his judgment to the wishes of any administration—then I shall become an unworthy representative. But, sir, I trust a long time is yet to come, in which there will always be found faithful, enlightened and independent representatives to oppose those measures which their judgment cannot approve; *no matter by whom recommended.* What is the object of representation? Is it not that the representative shall oppose those measures which they do not approve, as well as support those which they think good? If every project proposed or wished by the executive is at any event to be adopted, then is the representation of the people in your government a mere sham—an useless expence.—Leave the government at once subject to executive will.

Do not gentlemen perceive that the doctrine, for which they now contend, favors that course which has been used by every government that has by peacable means arrived at tyranny? Few indeed have affected that end by open and direct assault upon the liberties of the people. Did you ever know a free government changed into despotism as long as the representatives of the people continued virtuous and enlightened, and had independence to oppose themselves as a barrier between those who govern, and the governed?—You will not say that the people shall not utter their sentiments, but you declare in effect, that their representatives should not; unless it be to approve the measures of government. What is the scheme you would now present to the view of the first administration, that shall be sufficiently corrupt and ambitious to use it? This—"Offend the people directly—enlist them by numberless unimportant forms on your side—if one or more of their representatives be found superior to the lucre of executive favor, and dare raise their voice against executive will, *cause them to be suspected;* give out the worst interpretations to all their most indifferent actions, procure them to be denounced by the state legislature: thus shall good and virtuous men be intimidated, proscribed—their stead shall be supplied by men obedient to oor will—through *these* shall our measures succeed *without opposition*, and we arrive at all power.

Sir, I will not in compliment to the integrity of any administration do that which I think wrong upon principle, although I should be assured that no evil would immediately result from it. Are gentlemen desirous to protect the acts of the administration from all inquiry, and to silence all scrutiny? I should suppose that an administration conducted with great wisdom and much virtue, would rather court investigation, that their acts being seen and known, should be the better approved. I never expect to have any representative whose every act shall accord with my judgment; nor do I expect to see any president of the U. States whose administration shall in every respect meet with my applause; and yet I expect to be as well satisfied, in relation to either, as most men. I look to the general course; if that be good, it is sufficient. Where I find *much* to approve, the *little* that does not command my applause shall not receive my censure.—I mete the same measure to my representative and the president.

But I will not adopt this resolution; because I see no good which it can produce; because I doubt whether the particular measures alluded to were the best; because it is an unjustifiable attack upon the independence of the representatives of the people—and because under the influence of a vicious and ambitious administration it might be used as a precedent to bring into operation the most wicked schemes.—Do not gentlemen, perceive that this ardent desirs of *hunting down* the minority is the effect of executive influence, of a confidence that does not sufficiently guard against consequences? Are we not told that the administration can scarcely stand up under the weight and talents of this opposing minority; and that it is high time for every friend to republicanism to rally around the executive? But who can believe the truth of this summons? That an administration wise, firm and virtuous, strong in the affections of the people, and rich in the patronoge of a numberless train of offices, can be shakened by the talents of any one, two or three men? Men acting too in the plain, open, responsible character of representatives! Our compliments must be false—the administration must cease to be wise, firm and virtuous, or these fears must be dismist.—

There is one reason unconnected with the merits of the question, why I lament that this subject has been unnecessarily obtruded upon us; which is, that it is calculated to excite an unpleasant sensibility between those who have heretofore acted upon the same principle. The introduction of this subject seems to have thrown a cold and and suspicious aspect upon that intercourse of civility which was heretofore open, candid and affectionate. I wish to abate the causes of this unnecessary irritation; I inquire wherefore is this thing done? The answer is fully made when gentlemen avow, (not indeed in this house, but the other) that they are "*opposed not only to the measures of the minority, but to the men.*" This then is a design, *not so much to approve the administration, as to censure and bring into disrepute particular characters of the minority.* That particular measures should not be approved is reasonable, and accords with the truth that "honest men may differ."

Can you then fail to see that this is an electioneering scheme emanating from executive influence, calculated to discredit those who dared to oppose (what we are told were) the wishes of the administration, & designed if possible, to remove all opposition? *Are you ready to disgrace the senate and join in this electioneering cabal?* Or do you suppose, that this resolution, if adopted, will have no effect upon the elections? Surely, sir, if your *resolve* is of so great authority as to decide between the administration or majority and minority in congress, it ought to be supposed worthy of respect among the citizens of your own state. Yes, sir, adopt this resolution, and next spring you will find it in the hands of all the new candidates—they will connect the authority of your name with the weight of executive influence, they will tell the people that those minority-men and their friends are suspected by their country, that they are opposed to the administration and enemies of the president.

REMARKS *from the* PARIS ARGUS, *October 12.*

Whilst the French army is already answering in so worthy a manner the manifestoes of Prussia, observers cannot yet withdraw their attention from the errors of that cabinet. The spirit of the last note delivered by M. Knobelsdorff, appears indeed as contrary to sound policy as it is indecent in its form, and repugnant to the honor of a sovereign.

At the moment when the king of Prussia was professing so sincere a friendship for France, he was closely connected with her enemies; he was erecting himself into the agent of a new coalition, and secretly selling himself to that power who pays so *generously* for treasons; nor did he throw off the mask till the moment his means of attack appeared quite ready. Indeed the English cabinet itself deprived him of the honor of giving the signal of it; for the negociation had not assumed an offensive turn, neither was the last note of general Knobelsdorff delivered, until the departure of lord Lauderdale had been determined upon. By another connection not less striking, the king of Prussia so imperatively required an answer, by the 8th of October, to the insolent note of his envoy, only to make the commencement of hostilities on the continent coincide with the odious and useless attack made by the English navy on the coast of France.

Upon attentively examining this last note of general Knobelsdorff, it will be found of a quite foreign texture. The cabinet of Berlin never spoke so openly, so unguardedly, and is indeed incapable of writing in that style. Such language would hardly become a power whose standards had ever been followed by victory, and who had a million of men ready to avenge her offended honor. It less becomes the king of Prussia than any other, he who has never dared to attempt any thing either for or against France, whose power he so late pretends to diminish. His envoy continually returns to the friendship which he has *constantly* professed. A great deal might be said upon this friendship solely founded upon his personal interest, and which all parties had by turns reason to complain of, or to mistrust. It is very certain that until the last moment, France wished to stifle the mistrust she had of the secret dispositions of the cabinet of Berlin. But is it possible to conceal at present the shame which France endeavored to spare those who had only the mask of friendship? Did not the emperor of Austria, the czar of Russia, and the king of England, rely last year upon the co-operation of Prussia? Was not the matter carried so far as even to estimate the troops which she should furnish to the league that those powers had formed. The very hope which the king of Prussia had made them conceive if it be true that he made them conceive only hopes, was a treason against one or other party, and announced much less friendship for France than a desire of joining the strongest, to share the spoils of the vanquished. Thus, since Great Frederick, Prussia has aggrandized herself only by selling her very inaction.

The jealousy which she bore to Austria, might have made her persist in it. But it was not through affection for France. The very style of this note proves that the cabinet of Berlin, which thinks it has inherited the power of Austria, wishes at present to turn against France the jealous sentiments and hatred which it so long bore that power. They sufficiently appear in this single phrase of the last note, "he (the king of Prussia) who more than once was perhaps able to ruin her (France) and who knows but too well at present the progress of her power." There is more regret in this than friendship. France owes no obligation to such avowals. They betray an enemy who waits only for an occasion to hurt.

But in fact, upon examining this power which the cabinet of Berlin so bitterly complained of, it is but the fruit of a legitimate defence and resistance. France was menaced with ruin in four coalitions; was she to have always left her enemies the power of renewing their plots? If victory secures no advantage, then the vanquished may always dispute it with the vanquisher. It is an eternal struggle, in which nations must fall massacred one upon another.

Has not England reaped a hundred times more advantage from her maritime superiority, than France has done from her continental preponderance? The former has returned nothing of her conquests; the latter has left independent all the nations she has vanquished. Even Austria herself, has recovered the greater part of her invaded dominions; Russia has made enormous increases, and Prussia has obtained by ten years inaction, more advantage than she could have acquired by ten years of a successful war.

The conditions which the king of Prussia sets upon peace, are those of a conqueror. Louis XIV, at the height of his power and glory, would not have dared to hold such language. We shall not stop to take notice of the 3d article relative to Wesel, and the taking possession of the three abbeys. These objects might have been amicably settled; they are of too little importance compared to the real dangers of the war, & cannot be the motives of it. We shall then confine ourselves to weighing the two others. The king of Prussia demands, first of all the return of the French troops from Germany. They were not upon his territory but upon that of the confederate states: he has no right to intermeddle in their affairs.—The troops which were on the side of Braunau, were waiting for the evacuation of the mouths of the Cataro. No doubt, the intention of the king of Prussia was to defer that evacuation and open to the Russians the east of Germany in the same manner they have opened to themselves the Turkish provinces, where civil war is carrying on so successfully, to the profit of Russia.

It appears that the confederacy of the Rhine has hurt the pride of the cabinet of Berlin. It took a pleasure for a long time past in looking upon itself as the arbiter of the German empire; it domineered at the diet; it affected to contradict the views of Austria, and it had really despoiled her of all useful influence. But in fine this confederacy is the consequence of the victories of France, and the guarantee of peace between her and Germany. Prussia had an intention to form a counter-confederacy in the North. But has she therein the same reasons, the same right and the same aim?

This confederacy would in the first place present a fundamental vice, inasmuch as the princes who were to form it have not emitted their free will; and Prussia has acquired no right, either by victory or by her protection, to command them. She has saved neither Saxony nor Hesse. The king of Sweden himself considers her as his equal, and notwithstanding the imprudent hatred he has shown against France, he withdraws from the field of battle, wherein is going to be decided whether Russia is to domineer over all the powers of the north. This right seems to belong less to that power than any other, whose crooked policy has by turns disobliged or betrayed them all. What would be the aim of the northern confederacy? Neither Denmark nor Sweden, nor Saxony was menaced. Would it be to fight the confederacy of the Rhine, the system of which is merely defensive, which has no other view but the common safety? Then it is the interest of all Europe to prevent it. The splendor of the commerce of the Hanse towns is the envy of the cabinet of Berlin; but this splendor is owing to their independence, and France wishes to preserve it to them, for the common benefit. Even England herself is interested in its continuance.

Let us attentively peruse the second part of the Prussian *ultimatum*. This confederacy must compromise, without any exceptions, all the states not named in the fundamental act of the confederacy of the Rhine. Then nothing prevents Prussia from putting under her protection, besides the two former electorates of Hesse and Saxony, Sweden, Denmark and the Hanse towns, Austria and even Russia herself; nothing prevents her from pretending to an empire over sixty millions of men. The most extravagant pretensions would not shock more than those she announces at this day. In this state of things, the emperor of the French owed to the honor of his name, to the good of his people, and to the tranquillity of Europe to oppose any confederacy which should not suppose the absolute independence of the confederates and to destroy all hopes of a leagues; wherein the secret interests of England would continually threaten the continent with a general conflagration.

From the Boston Gazette.

THE WANDERER OF SWITZERLAND.

"A Wanderer of Switzerland and his family, consisting of his wife, his daughter, and his young children, emigrating from their country, in consequence of its subjugation by the French, in 1798, arrive at the cottage of a Shepherd beyond the frontiers, where they are hospitably entertained." They are thus accosted by the Shepherd:

SHEPHERD.

"Wanderer! whither dost thou roam?
Weary Wanderer, old and grey;
Wherefore hast thou left thy home,
In the sunset of thy day?

WANDERER.

"In the sunset of my day,
Stranger! I have lost my home:
Weary, wandering, old and grey,
Therefore—therefore do I roam.
Here, mine arms a wife enfold,
Fainting in their weak embrace:
There, my daughter's charms, behold,
There her infants—O their Sire,
Worthy of the race of TELL!
In the battle's fiercest fire,
In his country's battle—fell!"

SHEPHERD.

"Switzerland then gave thee birth."

WANDERER.

"Aye—'twas Switzerland of yore!
But—degraded spot of earth!
Thou art Switzerland no more.
O'er thy mountains sunk in blood,
Are the waves of ruin hurl'd:
Like the waters of the flood,
Rolling round a buried world."
"By an hundred waters pil'd,
When the Glaciers, dark with death,
Hang o'er precipices wild,
Hang—suspended by a breath:
If a pulse but throb alarm,
Dash'd down dreadful in a trice—
For a pulse will break the charm—
Headlong rolls the rock of ice:
Struck with horror, stiff and pale,
When the chaos breaks on high,
All that view it from the vale,
All that hear it coming, die—
In a day and hour accurst,
O'er the wretched land of TELL,
Thus the Gallic ruin burst—
Thus the Gallic Glacier fell."