

Baltimore Price Current.
CORRECTED WEEKLY.

Articles.	Per.	Prices.
BEAD, ship,	53	53
navy,	4	25
pitch,	5	50
BEEF, northern mess,	14	
carg, No. 1,	12	
No. 2,	10	
BACON,	11	12
BUTTER, for exportation,	18	
COFFEE, Batavia,	30	
W. India best gr.,	32	
com.,	29	30
COTTON, W. India island,	26	35
Louisiana,	25	
Georgian island,	22	
Sea-Island,	13	none
CORDAGE, American,	11	12
Russia,	10	12
Russia,	20	30
CHOCOLATE,	21	
CANDLES, mould,	18	plenty
dipt.,	13	
spermaceti,	50	
CHEESE, American,	11	14
English, best,	40	45
DUCK, Russian,	17	24
Holland,	24	27
Havens,	15	15
RUSSIA SHEETINGS,	12	
FISH, cold, dry,	16	dull
salmon,	22	
herrings,	5	
mackerel,	8	10
slad,	8	scarce
FLAXSEED, rough,	1	
cleaned,	12	
FLOUR, superfine,	7	7 25
fine,	6	6 75
middlings,	6	6 25
rye,	5	5 25
GUNPOWDER, Engl. 25,	10	
Do. Baltimore Manufac.,	9	
GRAIN, Indian corn, bush,	67	70
wheat, Virginia,	1 23	1 35
do. Maryland,	1 40	1 47
Rye,	67	70
Barley,		
Clover seed,	7 50	
Oats,	48	
HEMP, Russian,	285	290
Country,	7	7 5
HOPS, (fresh),	20	25
HOGS LARD,	15	18
IRON, pig,	35	40
Country bar,	115	120
Russia,	105	110
Sweden, best,	130	
Hoop,	373	
Sheet,	320	225
Nail rods,	147	150
Castings,	30	30
LEATHER, sole,	18	20
LUMBER, per 100 ft.		
oak, timb. & scant,	2	2 25
boards, all sizes,	2	2 25
pine scantling, do.	1 12	1 30
boards, 4-4,	2 50	
do. 5-4,	2 25	3
white do. com. 4-4,	2 25	3 50
do. clear 4-4,	2 40	3 50
shingles, cyp. 18 inch M.	2 50	3 50
Juniper, 24 do.	6 50	8 50
do. com. do.	4	5
staves, w. o. pipe,	65	70
do. hhd.	42	45
do. bbl.	25	
red oak, hhd.		
do. hhd.	30	32
MEAL, com. kin-dried, bbl.	4	
NANKINS, short,	82	83
NAVAL STORES, tar,	2 37	3 50
pitch,	3	3 50
turpentine,	2 50	
rosin,	3	
spirits turpentine, gal.	30	35
varnish, bright,	30	
black,	30	
PORK, northern mess, bbl.	25	
Prime,	19	
Cargo,	18 50	
Baltimore navy,	22	
Prime,	19	
southern, 2d.	17	18
PLASTER PARIS, Fr. ton	2 50	3
PORT, American,	1 25	4 75
ROBE, (new) per 100 lb.	4 50	5
SOAP, American, white, lb.	9	10
do. brown,	7	10
Castile,	17	
SALT, rough, Am.	18	
refined,	none	14
SASSAPARILLA, ton	12	14
SPIRITS, Brandy, F. 4th p. gal.	1 5	1 15
Cogniac, 4th p.	1 12	1 15
Barcelona, 1st p.	80	85
do. 4th p.	90	92
Gin, Hold, 1st p.	1 5	
do. American,	2 1	62
Rum, Jan. 4th p.	50	93
St. Croix, 3 & 4	none	
Antigua, 3 & 4	76	78
Windward, 3d	67	
Island, 4th	70	75
American,	48	50
Whiskey,	50	
SUGARS, Havana, brown, cut.	14 50	
do. white,	10 50	
clayed, white,	13 30	
do. brown,	13 30	13
muscov. 1st qual.	12 50	13 50
do. 2d	9 50	10
India, 1st qual.	12	12 50
Jaffa,	20	
Lump,	18	
SALT, St. Ubes, bush.	70	75
Lisbon,	65	70
Cadiz,	62	
Livepool, blown,	45	50
ground,	60	65
Tunks-Island,	none	none
Isle of May,	12 50	13
SHOT, of all sizes, cut.	12 50	13
Tobacco, Maryland, 100 lb.		
line yellow, 1st	7 50	8
Upper Patent, 1st	7	7 50
Lower Patent, 1st	5 50	6
Potomac, 1st,	5	
East shore, 1st	5	
Virginia, flat,	6	7
do. middling,	5 50	6
Rappahannock,	5	
Georgia,	14	none
TALLOW, American, lb.	42	44
WAX, bees,	2 30	3
WINES, Madeira, L.P. gal.	1 15	1 65
do. L.M.	1 12	1 50
do. N.Y.M.	1 12	1 50
Lisbon,	1 15	1 20
Sherry,	1 18	1 20
Genesee,	60	
Teneite,	80	1
Claret,	6	10
do. new,	33	40
Malaga,	95	
Port,	1 40	1 50

* Store prices.
† Board measurement.
‡ Cargo prices.
§ 3 bond qualities of Potomac, are 2 dollars less.
|| Potomac & Eastern-shore 1 dollar less.

AVERAGE PRICE OF STOCKS—this week.

8 percents,	100a102
6 do.	97
3 do.	58a60
Louisiana, do.	Dividend none at market
U.S. Bank Stock,	125a127
Maryland Bank Stock,	360
Baltimore do.	350
Union Bank of Maryland do.	60
Mechanics' Bank,	14
Alexandria Bank do.	200
Farmers Bank do.	40
Potomac do.	94
Baltimore Insurance Shares,	290a300
Maryland do.	500
Marine do.	360
Chesapeake do.	100
Union do.	140 a 150
Water Stock,	85

FOR THE FEDERAL GAZETTE.

BRITISH TREATY.

IT is understood that Mr. Erskine, the British minister, received from his court, on the 3d instant, at the city of Washington, a copy of a treaty, he was instructed had been concluded between the American ministers in London, and commissioners on the part of Great-Britain; and that in the afternoon of the same day (the 3d instant) he communicated the said copy to the president of the United States.

It is a fact, stated on the authority of the hon. S. White, a senator from the state of Delaware, that Dr. Mitchell, a senator from New-York, did mention to him and others, that the president did desire him (Dr. Mitchell) to inform the gentlemen of the senate, that the treaty would not render a call of the senate necessary during the recess of congress, as he (the president) had determined to send it back to England without submitting it to the senate—1st, because it contained no stipulation on the subject of the impressment of seamen from on board American vessels—2d, because there was annexed to, or accompanying it, a note, which went to declare, that if the government of the United States did ratify the treaty, it would be understood that they were to unite with England in resisting the decree of the emperor of France, relative to neutral commerce; or that notwithstanding the treaty, his majesty was to be at liberty to pursue such measures of retaliation on that subject as he should deem fit and proper.

The government paper, or National Intelligencer, of the 6th instant, gives the following information and surmises on the same subject: "We learn, that the treaty lately concluded at London, by the American and British commissioners, had not yet been received by our government. It is believed, however, on good grounds, that the instrument in its existing form presents some difficulties which will require further negotiations, &c. It is understood particularly, that it is defective with respect to the important subject of impressment from American ships, on the high seas, and that it is accompanied with a declaration on the part of the British government, that the signatures of its commissioners are not to bind it to ratify the treaty, or to restrain it from retaliating measures against the late French decree, unless it shall be previously assured, by the explanations or conduct of the United States, that they will pursue a satisfactory course against the infringement of their neutral rights by that decree."

It then appears, that the president had not on the 3d March instant, received the treaty concluded by our ministers with England, and that, on a view of a copy only, furnished by the British minister a few hours before the rising of congress, he had undertaken to declare, that it would not be submitted to the senate. May we be permitted to observe on the occasion, (and we express the sentiment with regret), that so hasty a determination, on the part of the president, in a concern so important, falls neither within the line of discretion, nor does it comport with the dignity of our nation. Respect for the senate, who had advised the negotiation, required, that they should be consulted on the conditions of the treaty. In every such case, the senate, not the secretaries of departments, are the president's constitutional advisers. A treaty once concluded, by properly accredited ministers, it is the right of the senate to have it laid before them. It is for them only to advise the ratification or rejection of such a treaty in whole or in part, with or without alterations.

Respect also for himself, should have induced the president to have abstained from any positive declaration, until he had received the treaty itself, with the dispatches from our ministers, and maturely weighed the provisions of the former, with the reasons assigned in the latter, for concluding and signing the same. That the president received neither the treaty nor dispatches, we are assured by the government paper of the same date, before quoted. We learn (observes the editor) that Mr. Purviance was the person appointed by our commissioners to be the bearer of the treaty, and their accompanying dispatches, and that he left London on the 8th of January—His arrival may consequently be hourly looked for.

Most sincerely do we wish, that the president had acted less precipitately, in a matter of great magnitude; particularly when we peruse a letter from Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney, our ministers, communicated to congress by the president, on the 19th Fe-

bruary last. These gentlemen say, "We have the pleasure to acquaint you, that we have this day agreed with the British commissioners, to conclude a treaty on all points which have formed the objects of our negotiations, and on terms which we trust our government will approve."

By this letter it appears, that our ministers had agreed with the British commissioners "on all the points which had formed the object of the negotiation."

This information being official cannot be questioned. It is certain therefore, that our ministers have agreed with the British commissioners on all the points, which had formed the object of their negotiation, and on terms which they believed would be approved of by our government!

Under shelter of this official communication, we incline to adopt the suggestions in the American and Commercial Daily Advertiser, of the 7th instant, on this very interesting subject, in preference to the information through Dr. Mitchell, or that in the National Intelligencer.

The suggestions are, 1st. "A copy of the treaty was presented by the British minister, on the evening of the 3d March, instant, to the president, accompanied by a copy of a note, delivered by the British commissioners to our envoys on their signing the treaty, importing, that the decree of the French placed things in a situation heretofore unexcused among civilized nations—that if executed agreeably to its apparent tenor, a spirited nation like America, would probably not submit to it; if they did, G. Britain might find herself compelled from imperious necessity, to retaliate against the French, which they thought honorable to promise to the United States."

"Are not these suggestions more rational (asks the American) than that Great-Britain should have insisted on an union to oppose France, or the rejection of the treaty, as the only alternative?" "From every circumstance that has transpired (continues the American) there is great reason to believe, that the treaty is tolerably satisfactory as far as it goes. It is probable from the difficulties which have been stated, to have arisen on the head of impressed seamen, in the course of the negotiation, that the subject may not have been embraced in the treaty; but the spirit and perseverance of our ministers on that score, is a full assurance that some negotiation in this respect, has been entered into, in some other way. The British commissioners have, perhaps, by a formal note, or something of the kind, placed the subject on a footing perfectly satisfactory to both envoys."

From the latter suggestions, which carry with them internal marks of authenticity, and which, conforming with the communication from our ministers just quoted, we are disposed to believe it follows, that the opinions or declarations of the president, as reported by Dr. Mitchell, on the subject of the treaty, must have been misunderstood by the doctor, or if faithfully reported by him, that the president has decided in an important case hastily, and without a knowledge of all the circumstances; without waiting the explanatory dispatches of our ministers.

From the United States Gazette. We have been favored with the following remarks upon the British treaty lately signed in London, and believe that the view which the writer takes of the subject is correct.

The treaty will not be laid before the senate, unless satisfactory explanations should be received by government respecting the point of impressment of seamen out of American ships, which is not mentioned in any of the articles of the copy of the treaty, received by Mr. Erskine, but, concerning which there may be some understanding between the respective commissioners.

Another objection has arisen from a note that was presented by the British to our commissioners, previously to the signing of the treaty, containing a declaration that the king of Great-Britain could not enter into the stipulations of the treaty, without an explanation from the U. States of their intentions with regard to the decree of Bonaparte of the 21st November, which it is stated, violates all the rights of neutrals to the direct injury of the British interest.

The note states that the king of G. Britain, being animated by a sincere desire to maintain a good understanding with this country, permits his commissioners to sign the treaty, but reserves to himself the right of refusing to ratify it, should the enemy not abandon, in the mean time, his unjust pretensions, on should the U. S. submit to the violent aggressions on its neutral rights.

It is very evident that at the time this note was delivered, no explanation of the meaning of Bonaparte's decree, had been received in London.

If the explanation already received be deemed a full and satisfactory security to our neutral rights, or if any modification should be made of this decree to put our commerce upon safe grounds, there will be an end to this difficulty at once.

The completion of the treaty when rest upon a single point, the relinquishing the right of impressing British seamen out of American ships; a right which no reasonable man ever supposed G. Britain would relinquish, a right which she has exercised towards every neutral nation, even her oldest and best allies; a right in fine, so intimately interwoven with her safety, that it cannot be abandoned, without absolutely endangering her political existence, and with hers, perhaps ours.

If it be true, as we have heard and believe, that by the new treaty we are permitted to bring French produce from French colonies hither, and from hence to carry it to any

port in Europe; if our trade to the British territories in the East Indies be allowed; & if it be stipulated that our ships shall not be searched within five miles of our shores, will it be wise to place in competition with all these important benefits, the right of impressing her own seamen, which England never has, never will, & never ought to relinquish.

STATE PAPERS
Relative to the late Negotiation between FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

[CONTINUED.]
No. XIV.

The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor, king of Italy, has laid before his government the note transmitted yesterday by Lord Lauderdale, plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty.

His majesty the emperor, king of Italy, cannot but be painfully affected at seeing that a negotiation which has been the object of so many conferences, which has given rise to the sending so many couriers to and fro, which was already finally conducted to its maturity, has been suddenly put back so as to present obstacles, not in the nature of the stipulations, but even as to the very basis on which this negotiation was opened.

The court of France has constantly refused to admit into the same negotiation the courts of England and Russia, and whatever be the desire of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to see a general peace speedily re-established, no consideration whatever can induce him to violate this principle of his policy. Moreover, the negotiations which France has set on foot at Petersburg must have convinced his majesty the emperor king of Italy, that the English cabinet was under a delusion concerning the nature of its relations with Russia.

After several months discussion, the cabinet of London gave way on this head, and his excellency lord Yarmouth arrived publicly at Calais, and afterwards at Paris in order to treat of peace. He had, immediately after his arrival in this capital, several conferences with his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, after having previously made known to him that he was duly authorized by his government.

Since that period, Russia has concluded her peace with France, the undersigned was appointed minister plenipotentiary to treat with the plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, and the first step was an exchange of his powers with those of his excellency lord Yarmouth, whom he had reason to believe, conformably to the full powers of his excellency, authorized to treat, conclude and sign a definitive treaty between France and the United Kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland.

Frequent conferences, most of them of several hours in length, took place between the two plenipotentiaries, who, with good faith on each side, applied themselves to remove the difficulties, and set aside every thing calculated to sour their minds and uselessly delay the progress of the negotiation.

Instead of each side submitting to the other notes more or less crafty, but which depart from more than they approach the end in view, instead of bringing forward these written controversies, no less prejudicial to humanity than open hostilities, and which prolong the misfortunes of nations; finally, instead of negotiating peace as war is carried on, the plenipotentiaries had frank conferences, in which his majesty the emperor and king granted every thing he could grant, without losing sight of the dignity of his crown, his love for his people and the interest of his allies.

His majesty will never be reduced to make other sacrifices. Does not the step which his excellency lord Lauderdale, the new plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, has taken appear to announce that a multitude of notes will not even suffice to enable the two governments to come to a right understanding with each other, and is not the risk evidently incurred by adopting such a step, the abuse of which has been so manifest in our day, of coming still less to a right understanding than has been hitherto done? If on the contrary it is intended only to make state papers for the purpose of afterwards laying them before the parliament of Great-Britain, his majesty the emperor and king has not the same want. It is peace he wishes for; this peace, equally honorable for France, G. Britain and her allies, which the assiduous and mutual labor of the respective plenipotentiaries had rendered acceptable to both governments.

Nevertheless in order to make his love of justice and the sincerity of his pacific sentiments appear before all, and in order truly to know those to whom must be attributed all hindrances towards the progress of the negotiation, his majesty the emperor and king has been graciously pleased to permit the undersigned to discuss in this place the vain question concerning the basis of this negotiation already in a state of advance, and on the point of being terminated.

In the letter written by his excellency Mr. Fox, on the 1st of April, by his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, went further. He proposed, in the name of his majesty the emperor and king, to establish for bases two fundamental principles, the first drawn from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th March, viz. "That the two states should have for object an honorable peace for themselves and their respective allies, at the same time that this peace should be of a nature to secure as much as in their power, the future repose of Europe." The second principle was "an acknowledgment

in favor of both powers of every right of intervention and guarantee both for continental and maritime affairs."

Such are the bases adopted by the British government and agreed on with it. It never could enter into the head of his majesty the emperor and king, to take the *uti possidetis* for a basis of the negotiation. Had such been his intention, he would have kept Moravia, a part of Hungary, Styria, Carniola, Croatia, all Austria, with its capital, Trieste and Fiume and the neighboring sea coast would be now in his power as well as Genoa and Venice. Hanover, Osnaburg and all the mouths of the great rivers in the north of Germany would be subject to his empire, and then certainly his majesty the emperor and king might without difficulty have left the Cape, Surinam, Tobago, St. Lucia, Pondicherry, &c. in the power of his Britannic majesty.

With regard to Sicily, under this supposition even, his majesty the emperor and king would not have left it to his enemies—but his majesty would only have thought that the conquest of this island ought to have preceded the opening of the negotiations, and when Prussia and Russia have either guaranteed or acknowledged the changes which have taken place in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies: is it presumed that England could have hindered the conquest of Sicily which is only separated from the continent by a channel less than two thousand fathoms across?

And even in supposing that the Cape and Surinam and other her Dutch possessions, could be definitively detached from the kingdom of Holland, is it not certain that its incorporation with the French empire, would have been the necessary consequence of the refusal of England to restore its colonies? What means could there be in fact for maintaining a nation which had only debts and which the total want of all commerce would deprive of every means of paying them? Whatever then may be alleged by their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty, it is impossible that they must be convinced that it is extremely different for Great-Britain to see the Texel, and the mouths of the Rhine & Meuse under French custom houses, or to see them under the Dutch ones. Thus then, without the restoration of her colonies, Holland would be forced to become a province of the French empire; for on accepting the crown of Holland, prince Louis formally declared his intention of renouncing it, unless the Dutch colonies were restored at the general peace.

Let Hanover become besides a province of France; let Trieste, Fiume and the territories appertaining thereto, become in like manner provinces of the kingdom of Italy, and let G. Britain keep in compensation the Cape, Surinam, Malta, Pondicherry, &c.—France will consent to it, and the *uti possidetis* will be applied throughout its extent for the present and future.

Let the new minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty find in the history of the world a negotiation terminated conformably to the *uti possidetis*, between two great people? Let him examine whether the *uti possidetis* does not rather belong to an armistice than to a peace? It is impossible not to say, but that by proposing the *uti possidetis* to France, more especially under present circumstances, a very strange idea must have been formed of the character of the emperor Napoleon, and he must have been thought reduced to a singular state of debasement and distress.

But in demanding the *uti possidetis*, his excellency lord Lauderdale the plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, without regard to the principle he advances, wishes nevertheless to change completely the destiny of a continental state, which furnished 25,000 men to England, together with a part of the means which she furnished in the 7 years war, and even in the war of the French revolution to the armies of the north. Thus then, the *uti possidetis* is wished for, in order to deprive France of all her commerce & establishments, and ruin her allies; but the principle of the *uti possidetis* is to be violated, in order to oblige France to renounce her engagements, break her treaties, and in fact dissolve her whole commercial system. Is this not proposing a peace a thousand times more disastrous than the longest war, and conditions capable of exciting the indignation of all Frenchmen? What then, has France vanquished every power for the pay of England, during the three coalitions, to see imposed on herself the conditions as unjust as they are dishonorable, notwithstanding the moderation and generosity she has displayed?

His excellency Mr. Fox himself proposed "that the peace should be honorable for the two courts and for their respective allies."

His majesty the emperor and king cannot look on the peace as honorable, if by one of its conditions he is to lose a single subject; and unimportant as the colony of Tobago may be, it is sufficient that it formed a part of the French empire when his majesty took the reins of government, for his majesty never to sign a treaty in which the alienation of that colony, or any other belonging to him, in the same manner should be compromised. No reasonable Englishman could flatter himself with the contrary, and in his position his majesty would loathe were he to consent to it, the esteem of every brave and generous man, even amongst his enemies.

The undersigned is charged to declare, that his majesty the emperor, looks on as a dishonor the very idea of a negotiation founded on the *uti possidetis*. It is so much the more contrary to his principles, as his majesty has restored his conquests, and that he would have reigned over a population the double of that which is submitted to him, if at the time of the peace, he had made, at the expiration of the different coalitions, he had taken solely for his principle the *uti possidetis*.

The undersigned is in like manner charged to declare that the only bases of the negotiation which his majesty the emperor consents to adopt are those proposed in part by his excellency Mr. Fox, and in part contained in the letter transmitted to him on