Federal Gazette & Baltimore Daily Advertiser
1807/07-1807/12

msa_sc3722_2_6_2-0256

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Federal Gazette & Baltimore Daily Advertiser
1807/07-1807/12

msa_sc3722_2_6_2-0256

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WPPl!HPi"iJIU BURR's TRIAL. OPINION OF THE COVRt On the, motion to arrest the evidence, ddi- t)tred Aumist 3l. —Continued In'both the cas.es here stated, the persons actually set out together and were near enough to assist in the commission of the lact. That in the case of Pudsy the felony was as stated-by Hale, a different felony from that originally intended is unimportant in regard to the particular principle now under consideration, so far as respected distance, as respected capacity to asiit in case of re- sistance, it is the same as if the robbery had been that originally designed. The case in the original report shows that the felony c^cimittvd was in fact in pursuance of that originally designed. Foster 350, plainly supposes tit*; same particular design, not a general design composed of many particular distinct facts. He supposes them to be co- operating *tith respect to that particular de- sign. This may be illustrated by a Case which is perhaps common. Suppose a band of robbers confederated for the general pur- pose of robbing. They set out together or in parties, to rob a particular individual, and each performs the part assigned him. Some ride up to the individual and demand his purse, others watch out of sight to intercept those who might be coming to assist the man on whom the robbery is to be commit- ted. If muid-r or robbery actually take place, all are pi inci those particular overt acts of lelying war v>ith which he is charged. What would be the effect of a different doctrine ? Clearly that which has been ties. And the only of that point if the expression be allowed, which the court is now examining, is the constructive pre- sence of the prisoner at the fact charged. To return then to the application of the oases. Had the prisoner set out with the party from Beaver for Blannerhassett's island-, or peihaps had he set out for that place though not from Beaver, and had arrived in the island, he would have been present at the fact : had he not arrived in the island, but had taken a position near enough to co- operate with th se on the island to assist them in any act of hostility or to aid them if attacked, the question whether he was constructively present would be a question compounded of law and fart, which would be decided by the jury, with the aid of the court, so far as resptc:ed the law. In this ease, the accused would have been of the particular party assembled on ihe island, and ¦w uld have been associated v ith them in the particular act of levying war, said to Save been committed on the island. But if he was not with the party at any time before they reached the island; it he did not join t!~em there, or infnd t<> join them there ; it his personal co-operation in the general plan was to be afforded else- where at a great distance, in a different state ; if the overt acts of treason to be per- t rmed by him were in be distinct overt acts J then* he was n t of the particular par- ty assembled^! Blannerhassett's island, and was not constructively present, aiding and assisting in the particular act which was there committed. ¦'Tb* ww4«4tty on this point, to far as it Jta* been delivered, Is Hot equivocal. There stated. If a person levying war in Kentuc- ky, may be said to be constructively present and assembled *ith a party carrying on war in Virginia at a great distance from him ; then he is present at every overt act perform- ed any where ; he may be tried in any state on the continent, where any overt act has been committed ; he may be proved to be guilty of an overt act laid in the indictment in which he had no personal participation, by proving that he advised it, or that he committed other acts. This is, perhaps, too extravagant to be in terms maintained. Certainly it cannot be supoorted by the doctrines of the English law. The opinion of judge Patterson in Mitch- ell's case has been cited on this point. 2 Dal. 348. The indictment is not specially stated ; but from the case as reported it must have been either general for levying war in the county of Alleghany, and the overt act laid must have been the assemblage of men and levying of war in that county ; or it must have given a particular detail of the treasonable transactions in that county. The first suppositi n is the most probable ; but let the indictment be in the one form or the other, and the result is the same. The facts of the case are, that a large body of men. of whom Mitchell was one, assembled at Braddoek's field, in the county of Allegh- any, for the purpose of committing acts of violence at Pittsburgh. That there was al- so an assemblage at different times at Couch- es fort, at 'hich the prisoner aLo attended. The general and avowed object of that meet- ing was to concert measures for resisting the execution of a public law. At Couches fort the resolution was taken to attack the house of the inspector, and the body there assem- bled marched to that house and attacked it. It was proved by a competent number of witnesses, that he was at Couches fort armed, that he offered to reconoitre the house to be attacked, that he marched with the insurgents towards the house, that he was with them after the action attending the body of one of his comrades who was killed in it ; one witness swore positively that he was present at the burning of the house, and a second witness said " that it ran in his head that he had seen him there." That a doubt should exist in such a case as this is strong evidence of the necessity that the overt act should be unequivocally proved by two witnesses. But what was the opinion of the judge in this case ? Couches fort and Neville's house being in the same county, the assemblage having been at Couches fort, and the resolu- tion to attack the house having been there taken, the body having for the avowed pur- poses moved In execution of that resolution towards the house to be attacked, he inclined to think that the act of marching was ir» itself levying war. If it was, then, the overt act laid in the indictment was consummated by the assembly at Couches and the march- ing from thence, and Mitchell was proved to be guilty by more than two positive wit- nesses. But without deciding this to be the law, he proceeded to consider the meeting at Couches the-immediate marching to Ne- v'lle's house, and the attack and burning of the house, as one transaction. Mitchell was proved by more than two positive witnesses to have been in that transaction, to have ta- ken an active part in it, and the judge de- clared it to be unnecessary that all should have seen him at the same time and place. But suppose not a single witness had prov- ed Mitchell to have been at Couches, or on the march, or at Neville's. Suppose he had been at the time notoriously absent in a different state. Caw it be believed by any person who observes the caution with which Judge Patterson required the constitutional proof of two witnesses to the same overt act, that he would have said Mitchell was constructively present, and might on that straining of a legal fiction, be found guilty of treason ? Had he delivered such an opini- on, what would have been the language of this country respecting it ? Had he given this opinion, it -would have required all the correctness of his lite to strike his name from that bloody list in which the name of Jeffries is enrolled. But to estimate the opinion in Mitchell's case, let its circumstances be transferred to Burr's case. Suppose the body of men as- sembled in Blannerhassett's Island had pre- viously met at some other place in the same county, and that Burr had been proved to be with them by four witnesses : That the resolution to march to Blannerhassett's In- land for a treasonable purpose had been there taken ; that he had been seen on the march with them ; that one witness had seen him on the island, that another thought he had seen him there ; that he had been seen with the party direr ly after leaving the island ; that this indictment had charged the levy- ing of war in Wood county generally : the cases would then have been precisely pa- rallel, and the decisions would have been the same. In conformity with principle and with authority then, the prisoner at the bar was neither legally nor actually present at Blan- nerhassett's island ; and the court is strongly inclined to the opinion that without proving an actual or legal presence by two witnesses, the overt act laid in this indictment cannot be proved. But this- opinion is controverted on two grounds. The first is, that the indictment does not charge the prisoner to have been present. The second, that although he was absent^ yet, if he caused the assemblage, he may be indicted as being present, and convicted on evidence that he caused the treasonable act. The first position is to be decided by the indictment itself. The court understands the allegation differently from the attorney for the United States. The court understands it to be directly charged, that the prisoner did assemble with the multitude and did march with them. Nothing will more clear- ly test this construction than putting the case into a shape which it may possibly take. Suppose the law to be, that the in- dictment would be defective unless it alledg- ed the presence of the person indicted at the act of treason. If upon a special ver- dict facts should be found which amounted to a levying of war bv the accused, and his counsel should insist that he could not be condemned boc«i»;e the indictment was de fecfive in not charging that he was himself one of the assemblage which constituted the treason, or because it alledged the pro- curement defectively, would the attorney admit this construction of his indictment to be correct ? I am persuaded that he would not, and that he ought not to make such a concession. If, after a verdcit, the indict ment ought to be construed to alledcre that the prisoner was one of the assemblage 8' Blannerhassett's i-land, it ought to be so construed now. But this is unimportant,for if the indictment ailed ges that the prisoner procured the assemblage, that procurement becomes part of the overt act, and must be proved, as will be shown hereafter. The 2d position is founded on 1 Hale.-214, 238 and 1 East 127. While I declare that this doctrine contra- dicts every idea I had ever entertained on the subject of indictments, since it admits that one case may be stated and a veiy dif- ferent case may be proved I will acknow- ledge that it is countenanced by the autho- rities adduced in its snpjKirt. To counsel or advise a treasonable assemblage, and to be one of that assemula,_e, are certainly distinct acts, and therefore ou^ht not t-> be charged as the same act. The great ob- jection to this mode of proceeding is, that the proof essentially varies from the charge in the character and essence of the offence, and in the testimony by ¦ hich the accus- ed is to defend himself. These dicta of Lord Hale theiefore, taken in the extent in which they are understood by the counsel for the United Stales seem to be repugnant to the declarations we find every where, that an overt act must be laid, and must be proved. No case is cited by Hale in sup- port of them, and I am strongly inclined to the opinion that, had the public received his corrected, instead of his original manus- cript, they would, if not expunged, have been restrained in their application to cases of a particular description. Laid do * n gene- rally, and applied universally to all cases of treason, they are repugnant to the principles for ^hich Hale contends, for which all the elementary writers contend, and from which courts have in no case, either directly re- ported or referred to in the books, ever de- parted. These principles are, that the in- dictment must give notice of the offence, that the accused is only bound to answer the particclar charge which the indictment contains, and that the overt act laid is that particular charge. Under such circumstan- ces, it is only doing justice to Hale to ex- amine his dicta, and if they will admit of being understood in a limited sense, not re- pugnant to his own doctrines, nor to the geneial principles of law, to understand them in that sense. " If many conspire to counterfeit, or counsel or abet it, and one of them doth the fact upon that counselling or conspiracy it is treason in all, and they may be all in- dicted for counterfeiting generally within this statute, for in such case, in treason, all are principals." This is laid down as applicable singly to the treason of counterfeiting the coin, and is not applied by Hale to other treasons.— Had he designed to apply the principle uni- versally he would have stated it as a general proposition, he would have laid it down in , The crimes then are not the same, and treating on ther branches of the statute, as-j may not indifferently be tried undei well as in the chapter respecting the coin, he would have laid it down when treating on indictments generally. But ha has done neither. ' Every sentiment bearing in any manner on this point which is to be found in L rd Hale, while on the doctrine of le- vying war, or on the general doctrine of in- dictments, militates against the opinion that be considered the preposition as more ex- tensive than he has declared it to be. No court could be justified in extending the dic- tum of a judge beyond its terms, to cases in which he has expressly treated, to which he has not himself applied it, and on *hich he as well as others has delivered Opinions which that dictum would overrule- Thin would be the less justifiable if there should be a clear legal distinction indicated by the very terms in which the judge has expressed him- self between the particular caae to which alone he has applied the dictum, and other cases to which the court is required to ex- tend it. There isthisclearlegaldistinction. " They may, says judge Hale, be indicted for coun- terfeiting generally. But if many conspire to levy war, and some actually levy it, they may not be indicted for levying war general ly. Th« books concur in declaring that they cannot be so indicted. A special overt act of levying war must be laid. This dis- tinction between counterfeiting the coins, and that class of treasons among which le- vying war is placed, is taken in the statute of Edward 3d. That statute requires an overt act of levying war to be laid in the in- dictment, and does not require an overt act of counterfeiting the coin, to be laid. If in a particular case where e general indictment is sufficient, it be stated that the crime may be charged generally according to the legal effect of the act, it does not follow, that in other cases where a general indictment would be insufficient, where an overt act must be laid, that this overt act need not be laid according to the real fact. Hale then is to be reconciled with himself, and with the general principles of law, only by per- mitting the limits which he has himself given to his own dictum, to remain where he has placed them. In page 238, Hale is speaking generally of the receiver of a traitor, and is stating in what such receiver partakes of an accessary. 1st. "His indictment must be special of the receipt, and not generally that he did the thing, which may be otherwise in case of o e that is procurer, counsellor or consent ter." The words " may be otherwise" do not clearly convey the idea that it is universally otherwise. I 1 all cases of a receiver the indictment must be special on the receipt, and not general. The words it " nuy be Otherwise in case of a procurer, he" signify that it may be otherwise in all treasons, or that it may be otherwise in some treasons. li it may be otherwise in some treasons without contradicting the doctrines of Malt himself, as well as of other writers, but cannot be otherwise ill all treasons without such contradiction, the fair construction is, tlAit Hale used these words in their restrict- ed sense ; that he used them in reference to treasons, in which a general indictment would lie, not to treasons where a general indictment would not he, but an overt act of the treason must be charged The two passages of Hale thus construed, may per- haps be law, and may leave him consistent with himself. It appears to the court to be the fair way of construing them. These observations relative to the passages quoted from Hale, apply to that quoted from East, who obviously copies from Hale, and relies upon his authority. Upon this point Keeling 26, and 1st Hale 626, have also been relied upon. It is stated in both, that if a man be indicted as a principal and acquitted, lie cannot after- wards be indicted as accessary before the fact. Whence it is inferred, not without reason, that evidence of accessorial guilt may be received on such an indictment. Yet no case is found in which the question- has been made and decided. The objection has never been taken at a trial and overruled' nor do the books say it would be overruled. Were such a case produced, its application would be questionable Keeling says, an accessary before the fact is quodam modo, in some manner guilty of the fact. The law may not require that the manner should be stated, for hi felony it does not require that an overt act should be laid. The in- dictment therefore may be general. But an overt act of levying war must be laid.— These cases then prove in their utmost ex- tent no more than the cases previously cit- ed from Hale and East. This distinction between indictments which may state the fact generally, and those which must lay specially, bear some analogy to a general: j and a special action on the case. In a gene, ral action, the declaration may lay the as- sumpsit according to the legal effect of the transaction, but in a special action on the case, the declaraVon must state the material circumstances truly, and they must be prov- ed as stated. This distinction also derives j some aid, from a passage in Hale, 6*5, im- mediately preceding that which has h>en cited at the bar. He says, <* If A. be in- j dieted as principal and B. asaceessary before \ ox after, and both be acquitted, yet B. may | be indicted as principal, and the former ac quittai as accessary is no bar." same indictment. But why is it that an acquittal as principal may be pleaded in bar to au indictment as accessary, while an ac- quittal as accessary may not be pleaded in bar to an indictment as principal ? If it be answered that the accessorial crime may be given in evidence on an indictment as prin- cipal, but that the principal crime may not be given in evidence on an indictment as ac- cessary, the question recurs, on what legal ground does the distinction st and ? I can imagine only this. An accessaiy being qio'dam modo a principal, in indictments where the law does not require the manner to be stated, which need not be special, evi- dence of accessorial guilt, if the punish- ment be the same, may possibly be received —but every indictment as an accessary must be special. The very allegation that he is an accessary must be a special allegation, & must show how he becaiffle an accessary,— The charges of this special indictment therefore must be proved as laid, and no evi- dence which proves the ci ime in a form Sub- stantially different can be received If this be the legal reason for the distinction it sup- ports the exposition of these dicta which has been given. If it be not the legal rea- son, I can conceive no other. [To be continued."] BY THIS DAY's LS. BOSTONTSept. II. Arrived, ship George Augustus, Jack- son, 44 days from Liverpool, salt, iron & crates. Brig Commerce, Robins, of Plymouth, 62 days from Lisbon, salt and fruit. Spoke August 19th, lat. 43, long. 47, ship Julia, 19 days from No;folk, for Cork. Ship Nancy, Hale, of Newburyport, 82 days from Gronstadt (Russia.) hemp, iron, duck, &c. Brig Robert, ot Boston, .was at Copenhagen 3d July- 47 days from San- ta Croix, bound to Boston. Spoke, June 13Jth, 3 leagues W. of the island c( Hog- land, brig Industry, of New-York, fiom Nar.tz, for Petersburg ; ship Mary, Hol- land, from Amsterdam for Peteisburg—saw shipHesper, Cushing, but not near enough to speak him. July 16th, lat. 6o, long. 5, ship Eliza-Ann, Cox, 28 daysfr in Peters- burg for New-York. Aug. ,-th, lat. 44, long. 35, ship Fair American, Marshal, 15 days from New-York. Aug. 23d, on the Grand Bank, ship, Augustus of Boston, 15 days from Norfolk, for London. Aug. 31st, lat. 42, long. 6fi, brig Shepheidess, Purber, 5 days from Boston, for Liverpool. (Via quarantine) brig Rose, Rankid, cf Kennebunk, 28 days fiom St. Vincents, rum, &c. Schr. Vuican, Atkins, 25 days from Havana, sugar. Arrived, ship Lucy, of Portland, capt. Curtis, 47 dayi from Liverpool, salt, crates, &c. Spoke, Aug. 26, lat. 41', 49, long. 59, brig Telegraph, Edes, 50 days fiom Amsterdam, for Boston. 31st, lat. 41, 21, long 59, brig President Jefferson, Bar- nard, 50 days from Cadiz far New-York, with her topmast gone. Schr. Mary, Huxford, 8 days from Ha- lifax, salmon and mackerel. (Via quarantine) brig Rubicon, Thomas, 25 days trom Havana, sugars, &c. Arrived, (via quarantine) brig Return, Do vning. ot Kennebunk, 25 days from Tobago, rum. Left, brig Nancy, Hall, to sail in 5 or 6 days ; brig Bellona, Patten, of Kennebunk, to sail in 10 days. Spoke Aug. 19th, brig Aurora, of New-York, 3, days from Trinidad. Aug. 20th, brig- Merchant, Thompson, of Kennebunk, 4 days from Trinidad, for Kennebunk. Quarantine list. 7th, ship Columbia, Games, 18 days from Havana. Brig Hazard, Donnel, 25 days from Antigua. 8th, brig Susan, Howard, so days from Havana. 9th, schr. Fortune, Foster;- from Bay of Honduras. Cleared brigs Creole, Newell, Isle of France ; Evelina, Twycross, St. Croix ; $chn>. Industry, Collin, St. Johns, N. F. j Eleanor, Rider,Halifax; Commerce, Gard- ner, Jamaica ; Maria, Windsor ; Holland, Bay of Biscay ; Regulator Hobbs, New- fundland; Hoton Packet, Crane, Wind- sor. from NEW-YORK, September 14. Arrived, Ship Amiable, Rinker, 61 days London, in ballast—4 days ago, spoke brig Hannah, Irom St. Croix, for Boston.— Next day, spoke a schooner from Havana for Boston. On Saturday, off Barnegat, sch'r Margaret, Ferguson, 7 days from Ha- lifax for Philadelphia. Ship Fanny, Galloway, 56 days from Li- verpool, with dry g odo, paints, crates and coal. Aug. 29, in lat. 41, 31, long. 63, 30 experienced a heavy gale at E. handed all the light sails and struck all the top-gal- lant mast ; a heavy sea struck her forward, and carried away a part of her figure head —the gala increasing, at 8 A. M. was ly- ing too, with nine streaks of the ship un- der water, and the sea making a fair breach over her ; and in order to save the ship, car- go and lives, concluded to cut away the niii-— zenmast, and the maintopmast went with it; the gale still increasing, cut a<\ ay tJia fore- mast, winch eased her very much ; several of! her quarter boards were knocked away by the sea. At half past 9 A. M. the wea- : ther moderated, and all hands were e.mploy- I ed in clearing the i reck, and secu,ri»g the j things on deck. The gale lasted 12 hours, j (It is. remarkable that a similar accident Jfep- peue4 to this fin& ship,' 011 the same day, a : , •