GENERAL REPUBLICAN STAR OR ADVERTISER.

[Vol. 13.....16] EASTON, TUESDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 29, 1814 [No. 13.....785.]

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED,
EVERY TUESDAY MORNING, BY
Thomas Perrin Smith,
(PRINTER OF THE LAWS OF THE UNION.)

THE TERMS

Are *Two Dollars and Fifty Cents* per annum, payable half yearly, in advance: No paper can be discontinued until the same is paid for.

Advertisements are inserted three weeks for *One Dollar*, and continued weekly for *Twenty Five Cents* per square.

SPEECH OF MR. BAYLY,
OF VIRGINIA,
ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
WAYS AND MEANS ON THE REVENUE.

MR. BAYLY said, there was a difficulty in voting for the proposition before the Committee until they had decided the principle by which the tax should be raised, whether entirely upon the capacity of the still, as the law now is, or upon the product of the still, or upon both, as the Committee of Ways and Means had recommended. I consider (said Mr. B.) as I always have, this article as a necessary and proper subject of taxation; but as to the best manner of laying and collecting the tax to make it productive to the Treasury and agreeable to the people, I differ from the hon. Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means. It is not probable that any system of taxation could be formed that would please all parts of the U. States, and in discussing a tax which will be paid by some States or parts of States, more than other States, we ought to remember that there are other articles in this report proposed to be taxed which will balance and equalize the burthen, so that taking the whole system there will be no cause of complaint by any other State of paying more into the Treasury than their proportion. It is admitted by all that the tax will be paid almost entirely by the consumer, and that whenever a high duty was laid upon any article the price would thereby be raised in the market. It would seem that as the army and navy of the United States consume much of domestic spirits, they would in fact raise the price in the market, and thereby enable the distiller to advance the tax which would eventually be paid by the U. States. But this tax may be so heavy as to put down some of the distilleries (especially the small ones) and the revenue from this article thereby fail; and Congress ought to be cautious that they do not tax the article so as to destroy the contemplated revenue which they expect to derive from it. But (said Mr. B.) I cannot agree to this double mode of taxing the capacity of the still and the product. I am opposed to the present tax upon the capacity of the still. It is unequal and inconvenient.——The Secretary of the Treasury states the tax now established by law, equal to a duty of five cents a gallon on the spirits distilled. With some distilleries this may be the case; and distilleries on a large scale and in great perfection perhaps it will not amount to more than two and an half cents on the gallon distilled. In small distilleries such as are used by farmers it will amount to not less than ten cents, and often fifteen. It was inconvenient because the farmer was compelled to be at much trouble in obtaining the license which he could not obtain for a shorter time than two weeks, although he might not have a use for his still half that time. The only reason the honorable Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means gave for continuing the present tax was, that it would be a guide by which the Collector might detect fraud when committed by the distiller.—But the Collector must know the industry and skill of the distillers (which would be difficult) or his knowledge of the size of the still would be useless.—The Collector might often raise groundless suspicions of fraud in the Revenue, which would inflame and irritate the public mind against the tax without obtaining one cent in the Treasury, which it is the duty of Congress to avoid. Mr. Bayly believed that fraud would be very seldom practised, and would not materially affect the Revenue. The duties on all imported spirits are and have been very high; yet, the American merchant held as an exalted character for the honesty as the merchant of any country—and, surely, the farmer might with equal safety be trusted. Mr. B. wished the direct and excise taxes would be left as the last subject of taxation reported by the Committee of Ways and Means; that after ascertaining what might be raised from other objects, we might return to them and make up the deficiency from them. The taxes upon cotton manufactories, furniture, leather, hats, shoes, watches, &c. are very objectionable; they will disturb the public mind, now more than sufficiently excited, and thereby weaken the government more than the taxes which they will produce will strengthen the Treasury. The excise and direct taxes upon equal & fair principles would always be favorite taxes with him, and the best internal taxes under a popular government; they were certain, easy of collection, and the people knowing what they had to pay for the support of their government, would examine into all extravagant expenditures. But when the money is drawn from the people by indirect means, they give themselves little or no trouble to enquire how it is expended.—If the Treasury had been supported partly by a direct tax, it is not probable that the people would have suffered their commerce to be destroyed by our non intercourse restrictions & embargoes, and thereby lose the Revenue from our foreign trade, which must have been supplied in part by taxes on land——their Treasury would never have been emptied by schemes and experiments, nor would this war have existed. Mr. Bayly observed that no man was more averse to this war than he was, and it was well known that he was opposed to the administration; but opposed as he was to the war & administration, such was the danger in which the country was placed, and the character of conquest which this war had assumed on the part of the enemy, that he would not withhold the resources of the country from the administration, but would give every aid in his power to bring it to a glorious conclusion; and he was willing that the administration should possess all the honors gained by such a peace. He did not agree with most of his friends with whom he acted, that the campaign now drawing to a close was inglorious to our arms. It is true, that at the commencement of the war, the navy far out-shone the army; and the reason is obvious: our small and gallant navy was manned by sailors who had been long accustomed to danger, and as soon as they were on board the ship they were ready for action; not so with the army, time was required to form the recruit into a useful soldier. Our armies are now formed and are equal in discipline and courage to our enemy, as this campaign has proved. He would, therefore, impose taxes upon such articles as would be paid by the community without complaint, and draw a safe and productive Revenue into the Treasury: and he was persuaded they would be cheerfully paid when the people were satisfied that they were necessary to their safety. But the honorable gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. M'Kee) and his honorable colleague (Mr. Eppes) are opposed to a great encrease of the excise and direct tax, because they bear harder upon Kentucky and Virginia than some other States now advocating these taxes. Before this war the eastern states paid more than a proportion of taxes to the general government by the aid of their extensive commerce, which is now gone ——their ships and fisheries are destroyed, and it may be recollected that this war is the cause which Kentucky and Virginia had a great agency in producing. If then by raising the money to carry on the war, it should be found that these States paid a fraction more than other States, they ought to pay it with cheerfulness.

Mr. B. observed he could not agree with many of his friends in desiring the President to take into his administration federal men. He believed it would be difficult to prevail upon federal gentlemen of high and commanding talents, to take any of the departments of the government, and he should think it a misfortune to the federal cause if such an arrangement should take place. For the affairs of the country could not prosper with a divided administration, and it is impossible for a government constituted as that of the U. States that any administration could conduct prosperously the affairs of the country at the present dangerous & perplexing crisis without the confidence and support of the people. I must therefore give to the administration now in power all the resources of the country, and I will not in my legislative capacity withhold all support from them & thereby endanger the existence of the Constitution. But, sir, at elections I shall, as I always have, use every fair and honorable exertion to displace them, and when a complete change is made in the public sentiment, then and not till then do I wish to see a federal administration.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

Aberdeen, Sept. 3.

The affairs of Norway are said to be finally settled, and Prince Christian has formally stipulated for the subjugation of the Norwegians, after having, as it would appear, placed their army in a situation where it was surrounded by that of Sweden. The letters and public documents of this Prince have for some time been of a very undecided description. He affected to be the warlike leader of a people resolved to sacrifice all for independence, and at the same time he informed his enemy, that he would faithfully represent to the people the *dangers* to which they were about to expose themselves in the war. In the present era of duplicity and underhand intrigue, it will not be very wonderful, if it appear that Prince Christian had merely gone over to *manage* the Norwegians; to take the lead among them with many patriotic declarations, in order to prevent some more determined man from assuming the character of their chief, and finally to bring about their subjugation to the crown of Sweden. The spirit of the people was certainly good, their good discipline and valor unquestioned, and the passes of the country such, that a comparatively small army could effectually stop invaders. But with all these advantages, we find the fortresses on the frontiers given up without resistance, and after some unmeaning movements in the field, on the part of the Norwegian army, an armistice agreed on which virtually resigns the independence of Norway.

With regard to Poland, no person can be sanguine enough to expect, that it will be restored to independence during the present order of things. The partitioning of Poland will form an important part of the discussions to take place at the approaching Congress. A report has been circulated, that the Emperor Alexander had some intentions of erecting it into an independent kingdom, under a Russian Prince, and were this to be accomplished, Poland would be but a vassal state of Russia; but the court of Vienna, it is said, will oppose this arrangement, and insist upon the dismemberment of the territory. It is thus that the allies give liberty to Europe; and when we reflect, that in Spain despotism in church and state is restored in all its horrors, while continued inroads upon liberty are made in France, and the most ridiculous attempts are made to restore priest craft & the exploded notions of the divine right of kings, we cannot help saying that, within our recollection, *the liberties of Europe never appeared in a less thriving way.*

And whatever we may think of the blessings we have conferred upon Europe by the late revolution, it is yet certain, that a majority of the continental states do not all thank us for our good offices. The French express no gratitude or good will for breaking their bonds—the Spaniards undo every thing we had done while endeavoring their deliverance—the Dutch, with much apathy, decline our commerce, and threaten to discontinue the Orange Boven, since their Prince imposed a tax of [illegible] half pence a pound on butcher's meat—the Austrians are apprehensive of renewed attacks [illegible]—and of all the nations of Europe, perhaps Russia and Prussia only, would thank Britain for her exertions, and Sweden while the Crown Prince retains his influence; all the three having to expect the treatment of treacherous allies, had France proved successful in the war.

For what reasons we so pertinaciously urged the war against France will ever be a very pertinent question, while the fatal effects arising from that war are felt. *Indemnity for the past and security for the future* we have not obtained.—We have added about six hundred millions to our national debt, and of course, thirty millions to our permanent taxes—and have just as little security, as at any period of the reign of Bonaparte.

FROM THE NATIONAL ADVOCATE.

EUROPEAN POLITICS

Have lately presented a scene so whimsical and shifting, and the public attention in this country has been so exclusively devoted to our own affairs, that we have not thought it often necessary to draw the minds of our readers to a consideration of the transactions of the old world. But the approach of that period, when the results of the Congress at Vienna will be known here, render those transactions more interesting to the people of the U. States.

It will be recollected that we have always expressed an opinion that no peace would be durable, that did not give France her natural boundaries, and, of course, include Belgium in her territory. If this be true, how much less probability is there, of the continuance of a peace, which not only severs Belgium from France, but annexes it to Great Britain! For such will be the result, whether the country be actually British, or nominally annexed to Holland. The ancient subserviency of the Orange family to the British court is now strengthened and confirmed. British bayonets have extinguished the liberties of Holland, and restored the Prince of Orange, not as Stadtholder of the Republic, but as Sovereign of the Netherlands. A large British army is stationed in Belgium, the head-quarters of which are at Brussels, and which (in case of war) is to be commanded by WELLINGTON, now minister at Paris. At the time when the preliminary treaty of peace was signed, Marshal NEY told Louis XVIII that though it might be prudent to abandon Belgium for the moment, yet France would never consent to lose it, and it could be re-taken within six months. In fact, who is so credulous as to believe that such statesmen as Talleyrand, Segur, Carnot, Malonet, and Barbe Marbois, who now have the ascendency in the French cabinet, will ever, contentedly, see France degraded to the rank of a second-rate power, whilst Britain is aggrandised with the richest colonies in the world—Russia with Poland, and Austria with Italy?—Who is so credulous as to believe that such military men as Soult, Berthier, Ney, Massena, Davoust, Augereau, and Suchet, will suffer all their conquests to be wrested from them by armies which they have uniformly vanquished in equal combat? It is this discontented state of the political and military mind of France, which causes a fermentation throughout Europe. All the powers are arming to support their respective pretensions.

But a question arises, whether France, after recruiting her armies with the soldiers returned from other countries, where they have been prisoners of war, will be strong enough to resist Great Britain and the powers pensioned by her?—or, if not, whether she will find among them any friends to support her cause?

It is well known that we have been among those who have indulged the least in our hopes of any good from Russia.—It is not that the personal character of her sovereign is not as virtuous as a despot's can be. But *he* is not the government; and that government is imbued with a hereditary lust of dominion, which it has ever gratified at the expense of principle and consistency. Austria now stands in nearly the same relation to Russia that Russia did to France in 1811—and, therefore, an alliance with the cabinet of Vienna seems to be the most natural connexion which the cabinet of Paris can form. But this natural order of things may be reversed by intrigue and corruption. It is, therefore, difficult to decide how the parties to a new war in Europe, should it take place, will be arranged.

It is more easy to determine that such a war would make a diversion highly important to the success of the contest in which the U. States are engaged with G. Britain. If it be the intention of our enemy to carry the war to the south—to begin the campaign in Louisiana at the same moment it is ended in Canada, such a diversion can have no influence upon that campaign. It will, however, be felt in the operations of the next year; and, possibly, to so great a degree as to us.

The nation ought not, however, to be influenced by this consideration to relax in the smallest degree the preparations necessary for a vigorous prosecution of the contest. In the words of the unanimous resolution of the two houses of the Legislature of this State, we would say, "that however ardently we may desire the restoration of peace to our country, we can never consent to purchase it with the sacrifice of national honor and dignity." Though the enemy's demands are now limited to the cession of 165,000,000 of acres of land, and 128,000 people—yet, in the event of the failure of the present winter & of the next summer campaign, they may be extended to the cession of Louisiana, and we know not what other States and people. To do him justice, he has been very plain in his overtures, and has declared that he will not abide by those he now makes, unless the fortune of the war should render it expedient.—In other words, he will rise in his demands in proportion to his success—and we presume, by the same rule, will *fall* in proportion to his defeat. Let the American people bear this in mind, and act accordingly.

FROM THE BOSTON PATRIOT.

MARTIN CHITTENDEN.

THE public seem to be impressed with sentiments favorable to the character of Governor Chittenden. We must confess that when we saw the Governor's proclamation, we rejoiced to find that even at this stage of the war he had laid aside his former principles and feelings. But we are again obliged to say that in this we have been greatly mistaken. A writer in the Burlington Northern Intelligencer, has come out with a statement of facts respecting Gov. Chittenden's late conduct, which shews him in a more odious point of view than ever his former conduct placed him. It appears that on the first of Sept. Gen. Macomb sent an express to Gov. Chittenden, informing him of the approach of the enemy. On the 3d of Sept. he was at Burlington, and returned home the same day, *determined not to do any thing in any event whatever.* On the 4th the Gov. received another express from General Macomb, stating that the enemy would march for Plattsburg that day. On Monday Gen. Newell wrote to Governor Chittenden that his brigade would cheerfully obey any order from him to repair to Plattsburg, or any other place, to oppose the enemy. The Gov. on the same day, in reply to General Newell's letter, wrote *that he did not consider himself authorised, either by the constitution or laws under which he acted, to order out the Militia of the State.* On Tuesday the 6th of Sept. a tremendous cannonading at Plattsburg was heard during the greatest part of the day at Burlington and at Jerico, the Gov's. place of residence. This aroused the fire of our brave and patriotic citizens of all parties, and on the afternoon and evening of the same day, without any call from his excellency, for his voice was not heard—without any advice from him, for he did not shew himself—they began to cross the Lake and to VOLUNTEER their services in defending their brethren and their country. Information had on this day been received, that the enemy had entered Plattsburg, and that General Macomb was in the utmost distress for reinforcements.

The people were aroused to a sense of their situation and their duty; *but Gov. Chittenden (forgive him, Heaven,) remained quietly at Jericho!* On Sunday, the 11th Sept. that ever memorable day, before the fate of Plattsburg and Lake Champlain was known at Burlington, the Gov. unequivocally declared, that *so far from ordering out the militia,* HE HAD ADVISED THEM AGAINST GOING! It is as well known that at the time the proclamation is dated (Sept. 19th) the British army, instead of "indicating future aggressions, were pursuing their retreat as fast as was practicable, without the least appearance of returning to Plattsburg." Four days previous to Gov. Chittenden's proclamation a brigade of New York militia were discharged by General Macomb.

The volunteers from Vermont had all been discharged. These facts will certainly shew whether the enemy indicated a disposition to return to the attack, or whether General Macomb at this time wanted any aid from his Excellency. Now, when the danger is all over, he had just discovered that he has a right to order the militia "to meet invasion *at every point*, and to chastise and expel the invader!"——How Governor Chittenden can reconcile these things to his country and to his God, remains to be seen.

FROM THE AURORA.

This is a brief history of the whole matter.

AMERICA was discovered a few centuries ago, one part was taken by one European nation, another part by another.

England took a large share for herself, and might have kept it for a long time, if she had not got out of her senses.

She wanted us to be a sort of white slaves, but we resolved to be a nation.

Many doubt what would have been the issue of their struggle, had not France, Spain and Holland helped us.

By our own energy and the aid of those powers, England was compelled to acknowledge us a free nation.

But this did not quiet the claims of England; on the contrary, she secretly resolved to revenge herself, whenever and however she could.

Accordingly she paid the savages to murder our people in 1794-5, her own officers were found by Gen. Wayne disguised amongst the Indians, who were butchering our frontier inhabitants.

She also began to plunder our ships & steal our seamen.

She also laid heavy duties to be paid by us and cripple our trade, altho' she did not make others pay them.

In short, she sent her ships to block up our harbours, actually attacked and took one of our frigates in our own waters, killed many of our seamen, and committed every other outrage short of open war, which jealousy and long rankling resentment at our successful struggle for freedom could prompt her to inflict.

In order to hold a nation's rank, and to oblige England to treat us as we deserved, and not as vassals, we resorted to arms, and if the war in Europe had continued, we would have been, by this time, able to command respect.

Peace in Europe, however, soon, permitted England to fight us singly and alone.

Our government, now that war has ceased in Europe, offered to make peace without any stipulation on former points of dispute—it agreed to make peace on the same footing or terms as those existing before the war.

But England said "*no*"—you are now alone, you no longer have France, Spain, and Holland your allies; you must now fight me single-handed; I have ten soldiers and fifty ships to your one; I will punish you for your conduct in 1776; your ships of war have shewn me what you may be, if I suffer you to grow up to manhood——I will not make peace with you, except upon certain conditions.

1st. You must not fish on the banks of Newfoundland, unless you pay me such sum as I choose to ask.

2d. You must give me the exclusive command of all the Lakes.

3d. You must give me so much of Massachusetts as will make my north eastern frontier and settlements compact and suitable for more extensive smuggling.

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