General Republican Star and Advertiser.

VOL. XXXII. EASTON, (MD.) TUESDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 14, 1830. NO. 16...1535.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED EVERY TUESDAY MORNING
BY
THO'S. PERRIN SMITH.

TERMS

Two Dollars and Fifty Cents per Annum payable half yearly in advance.—No paper can be discontinued until the same is paid for.

Advertisements are inserted three weeks for *One Dollar*, and continued weekly for *Twenty-Five Cents* per square.

SHERIFF'S SALE.

BY virtue of a writ of firi facias, issued out of Talbot county Court, and to me directed, by the clerk thereof against George W. Nabb, at the suit of Alexander C. Bullitt, will be sold on THURSDAY, the 23d of December next, between the hours of 12 and 4 o'clock, of said day, at the residence of the said George W. Nabb in the town of Easton, all that lot or parcel of land situate lying and being in the town of Easton in Talbot county, the same being part of the tract of land called Long Acre and which was heretofore conveyed to the said George W. Nabb, by a deed of indenture from a certain Henry Nicols, bearing date the 27th of April eighteen hundred and twenty five; also all and singular a certain lot and parcel of ground situate in the town of Easton aforesaid near the home stables of John Goldsborough, Esq. and anjoining an old School House and which was conveyed to the said George W. Nabb, by a deed of indenture from Henry Troth and Samuel T. Troth of the city of Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania bearing date the 25th day of January eighteen hundred and twenty-eight, also by a deed of indenture from Ann Troth, Ann B. Troth, William K. Austin and Mary his wife, of Talbot county, bearing date the 18th February 1828, seized, taken and will be sold to pay and satisfy the aforesaid fieri facias and the damages, cost and charges due and to become due thereon.

Attendance by

JOSHUA M. FAULKNER, Shff.

nov 3 4w

TRUSTEE'S SALE.

BY virtue of a decree of Talbot county Court, sitting as a Court of Chancery, in the Case of Alexander C. Bullitt and Elizabeth Harrison, Executrix of Hall Harrison, decd. complainants, and George W. Nabb, defendant. The Subscriber will expose to Public Sale to the highest bidder, on the premises, on THURSDAY, the 23d of December inst., between the hours of eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and four o'clock in the afternoon of that day. All that Dwelling House and Lot, together with the appertenances, where George W. Nabb, Esq. lately resided, situated at the south end of Harrison street in the town of Easton.

The above lot comprises within its limits, three lots, which are distinguished on the plat of the town of Easton as lots No. 24, 25 and 26, and is handsomely enclosed by a substantial paleing.



The Dwelling House is very commodious, having three rooms on the first floor, and four chambers, together with a good Kitchen, Pantry and House-Keeper's room, all newly done up, painted, &c and now in a state of complete repair. There is a Pump of good water immediately at the Kitchen door. Also, an Ice-house, Smoke-house, Stable, Carriage-house, &c. &c. all new, and lately erected on the premises.

By the terms of the Decree a Credit of nine months will be given on the purchase money the purchaser giving bond with approved Security to the Trustee as such, for the payment of the same with interest thereon from the day of Sale, till paid, and on the payment of the purchase money and the ratification of the Sale by the Court, and not before, the Trustee is authorised to convey the premises to the purchaser free clear and discharged from all claim of the defendant and complainants or either of them.

WM HAYWARD, Jr. Trustee.

dec 7 3w

Contracts for Timber.

PROPOSALS will be received, until MONDAY the 20th December, at the office of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Co., in this city, for the supply of LUMBER, of the following descriptions and dimensions, to be delivered to the said Company, during the next Spring, in the city of Baltimore.

PRIME ASH SCANTLING, to be divested of the Heart Piece, viz:

35,000 Feet 4 by 7 inches, and in lengths of 15 and 16 feet.
30,000 Feet 4 by 5 inches, and in lengths of 14 and 15 feet,
23,000 Feet 3 by 6 inches, and in lengths of 10 to 12 feet.
35,000 Feet 3 by 5 inches, and in lengths of 12 and 13 feet.

Seasoned Ash will be preferred.

PRIME WHITE OAK PLANK, well seasoned viz:

20,000 Feet of Plank, 2 inches thick.

PRIME SOUTHERN YELLOW PINE, viz:

75,000 Feet of Plank, 1 inch thick.

Persons disposed to contract for the above Lumber, or any part of it, will please address their Proposals to

P. E. THOMAS, Pres't.
Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company.
November 23, 1830.—30 3w

SHINGLES FOR SALE.

THE SUBSCRIBER HAS JUST PURCHASED A LOAD OF

80,000 Cypress Shingles,

In BUNCHES of Superior Quality,

Which he will sell cheap, for Cash only.

☞Persons sending orders will be good enough to accompany them with the money, otherwise the Shingles will not be delivered.

WM. H. GROOME.

nov 2 eow8w

NOTICE.

ALL persons having claims against the Estate of N. Hammond, Esq. late of Talbot county, dec'd. will be pleased to exhibit them to the subscriber; and those indebted to the said deceased, are requested to make immediate payment.

N HAMMOND, Ex'or.

St. Aubin, Nov. 30—3w

IS DANIEL MARTIN,

ELIGIBLE AS THE NEXT GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND?

The 31st article of our Bill of Rights declares, that 'A long continuance in the first Executive Department of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation therefore, in those departments is one of the best securities of permanent freedom.'

The corresponding article of the constitution, (the 31st.) accordingly provides that 'The Governor shall not continue in that office longer than three years successively, nor be eligible as Governor, until the expiration of four years after he shall have been out of that office.'

The perfect harmony under which we have heretofore lived, from the formation of the constitution up to this day, under the idea that, according to these articles, any man who had not served as governor for three years successively was eligible to that office;—the repeated recurrence of occasions when, if objections could have been, they ought to have been made to this construction, and the utter silence on all those occasions;—the perfect accordance of this construction of the article in the constitution, with the reason for it proposed in the article of the Bill of Rights, as well as its manifest accordance with the common sense and with good English—all are calculated to astonish us that a question should now be made about it. Plain and settled and concluded, as the case seemed to us to be, it is nevertheless true that a question has been made, and argued in the public papers too, whether under this 31st article, Daniel Martin is eligible for re-election.

The plea is made by detaching the latter clause of the single sentence which the article contains, from its preceding clause—'Until four years after he shall have been out of that office,' it is insisted applies to any one who has been governor and is 'out of that office.' To a remonstrance at the unreasonableness of the idea that the framers of the constitution should have so bungled the article intended expressly to secure rotation, as to disqualify one man that had only served one year, had already been subjected to rotation and was 'out of the office,' and leave him eligible who had already served two years and was still 'in the office,' to this and all other remonstrances addressed to reason and common sense the objectors make one short emphatic answer: 'it is the letter of the Constitution' They admit reason to be all on our side—they can't do otherwise—but the *text* they say is imperative—and they are bound by it.

After reading the text over and over again, it really seems to us to be so plain, and its meaning so obvious and indisputable, that we wonder how the idea ever occurred to any man to suggest a difficulty. But, so true it is, that no case can be made so plain that human ingenuity will not devise some pretext to take exceptions, especially where persons are found wishing to find a loop hole.

The Declaration of Independence is admitted to be a chaste and splendid specimen of english composition—yet subjected to the severe criticism of such a linguist as Daine, it was made to appear even ludicrous. So may almost any sentence, especially if subjected to the tribe with whom special pleading* is a vocation.

The objectors in this case, in order to arrive at the conclusion that Mr. Martin is not eligible, commit precisely the same violence which the Atheist did upon the text, when he pledged himself to prove by the Scriptures themselves, that there was no God.—He found it in the volume of the book in exactly so many words, 'there is no God,' but the preceding part of the same sentence read, 'The Fool saith in his heart.'—All you have to do in either case is to suppress the previous member of the sentence and their proposition is incontrovertible. In the constitution there is a prohibition of eligibility for four years, but of whom? why plainly of the person mentioned in the first clause; the Governor who had served the time therein limited, 'three years successively.' Read the sentence, entire. You have it said in one instance in accordance with Infinite Wisdom, 'That the fool saith in his heart there is no God.' So in the other in the Constitution you have in accordance with common sense that the Governor after having served three successive years shall be ineligible until four years after he shall have been out of that office. The objectors attempt to make two distinct propositions of a text, that has in fact but one proposition in it. When there is in the *letter* neither period, colon or semicolon, they read it as if a full paragraph occurred—what is joined together to make good sense and wholesome restriction, they would sever apart, disjoin and make preposterous nonsense of.

And these gentlemen claim to be regulated by literal meaning!

Suppose for amusement and by way of illustration, we take what they please to style the *literal*, but which is in fact the *quibbling* side of the question, and carry out the train of some of the technical objections this short article of the constitution is susceptible of, and see into what a plight a departure from common sense might lead us. We are entitled to just as many little cavils as they are, if we can find them; common sense being considered out of the question. Let us see:

It reads, 'The Governor shall not continue in that office longer than three years successively.' Now, rigidly confine to the strict letter, 'The Governor,' with which this sentence commences, may be construed to mean the governor at the time, and no other. It does not say a governor,' or 'no governor shall, &c.' as it ought have done, and doubtless would have done if it was intended, to apply to all that might become governors—but it is the definite article 'The Governor.' Now, it is evident that there can be but one governor of the state at one time.—To modify a favourite sentence of the Koran, no body is Governor but the Governor.† No one is prohibited by the strict letter of the article but he that is governor. If this is ridiculous it is no fault of ours We have used exactly the kind of argument maintained by these stricklers for *the letter*; supposing them to have been correct in their prosody too, which, by the by, we have shown they are not. If the letter of the 31st article binds them in its last clause, it certainly frees them and their bond too, in the strict reading of the first clause. Daniel Martin is no governor now. It is only 'the Governor' that is ineligible. They are at liberty, according to their own logic, to vote for him. Reader, have patience—our object is to show what nonsense there is in technical quibbles.

But suppose now for mere charity sake, we let the objectors out of the literal difficulties into which their own method of arguing, had seduced them. Suppose we admit in this case that the framers of the Constitution expected us to use our reason and discretion in interpreting their language and that when they said, 'The Governor' in this place we admit they meant as all men of common sense will always interpret it, that 'no Governor shall continue in that office longer than three years successively.'

Another difficulty that might be made more perplexing than the last to such as suckle with technical nicety for the strict letter, by any one skilled in twisting language to his own purpose, is the apparent Irishism of implying that he is Governor who is out of that office. Can a man be Governor that is not Governor?—If our objectors attempt to urge that the Constitution meant he that has been Governor, but is now out of office, as well as he that is now Governor, and ought at the end of three years at furthest to go out of office, we reply that they abandon their only ground—*the strict letter*—'It is not in the bond;—I cannot find it so in the bond.'

Again—'Nor be eligible until four years after he shall have been out of that office.' The quibble next hinges upon when a Governor is 'out of that office.' On this point columns have been published. Why clearly says one writer, 'when he is no longer in that office.' That seems plain enough, but it leaves us just where it found us. When is he no longer in that office? Why replies another, 'when he is out of that office.' 'You will admit that Daniel Martin is out of that office.'—Yes, but he has not 'continued in that office for three years successively,' which is required to interdict his eligibility. Ah! but the interdict, say the objector, applies to every Governor the moment he he is 'out of that office,' without regard to how long he may have been in. Suppose for argument sake we grant this, though we believe not a word of it,—but suppose you are right—then it must have applied immediately to every Governor, for no Governor is elected for longer than one year, and when that time expires he is 'out of office,' and the Governors and the legislatures, two years out of every three, must have violated the Constitution. When will the present Governor be 'out of office?' We say he is 'out of office,' twelve months after he was elected when the Constitution requires another election to be made—on that day Mr. Carroll will be just as much 'out of office' as Mr. Martin is now and therefore according to your construction he cannot be eligible for four years to come.

It is the fate of error to accumulate difficulties in every step of its wayward career To avoid the embarrassment of the last predicament, their writers have resorted to a position yet more desperate and preposterous. They insist that the Governor is not out of office at the end of the year for which he was elected!

The only danger which our opponents affect to apprehend as possible from the old fashioned construction of the 31st article, is far fetched enough to be sure. It is this:—That two men high enough in the confidence of successive legislatures to be elected as Governors just when *they* please, might bargain with each other to take it alternately, and thus by avoiding being in that office 'three years successively,' they might keep the reins between them as long as they liked. To arrive at this result, it is true that the legislature must be presumed to be either corrupt or blind, so long as they did not perceive or correct so palpable an evasion of the spirit, if not of the letter of the Constitution And not only the legislature, but the whole people must be presumed to be blind too; to continue to elect such delegates, for if either the legislature or the people discover the trick, it must fail. I *guess* it would be obvious enough for some one to find it out.

But if we recollect that if the two high contracting conspirators which are imagined in this case, should discover how much easier it would be to effect their object of keeping power constantly, and that too without having annually to corrupt the legislatures or to cheat the people, by only just enlisting a third individual in the scheme and agreeing to take the 'three years successively' instead of rotating annually, and they have their object without running the risk of violating or evading a single article of the Constitution. It is true that it would be requisite for them to continue to be agreeable enough to the legislature to insure that they will be elected, but this was required in the case the objectors have supposed also.

And yet to get rid of the remote possibility of danger from such contrivances as first stated above—a possibility which can only occur in a case of coalition between two Governors and a continual recurrence of a corrupt majority in the legislature, together with an utter blindness of all the people;—to get rid of this bare possibility, these strict constructionists resort forsooth, to a position by which the tenure of the executive office may never terminate at all. He that is Governor has only to contrive some means to avoid an election of Governor occurring.

'Hamilton,' a writer who appeared originally in the Frederick-town papers, and whose vast learned lore breaks out through some score of antique legal latin phrases, has devoted a long essay to the question. He strenuously insists that the Governor of Maryland never is 'out of that office.'—Here another *literal* difficulty glares on us; it is only the Governor, that is 'out of that Office,' that is ineligible. We are tempted to ask, how then the 31st article can ever be operative according to its letter? But let that pass. The nerves of 'Hamilton' seem to startle instinctively with horror at the idea of the anarchy that must succeed the *interregnum*, which would occur in case of our being for a day without a Governor. Happy ignorance! Maryland has been twenty times in this very predicament, and never once imagined the awful danger of the case! This idea of the objectors is a legitimate descendant, begotten by the 'British authorities' resorted to from the royal axiom, that 'The King never dies;' and is nearest kind to the old doctrine, that 'the King can do no wrong.' How long are we to remain in bondage to such nonsense? Who expected these doctrines to be preached at this day in Maryland? It is predicated upon the presumption which is in fact the rock of legitimacy, that it is the King or (Governor) who is sole sovereign in the land and that without he be there, anarchy is restored. We had really imagined that our fathers had redeemed us from such servile chains, and left us a political system founded upon the principle that the People alone were Sovereign, and governed through the medium of laws. We thought that it had been found out that the Governor was but one of the people's agents, charged with having certain of the laws duly executed, and that we might in certain cases be without one for a few days, 'without Chaos coming again'—just as we do without a Chancelor, Judge, or any other officer charged with executing the laws—some of whom do certainly occasionally die, though 'none resign.'*

It is manifest that the Governor must either remain *in office*, according to these gentlemen's opinions, not only after the day on which the Constitution requires a successor to be elected, but as long as ever it may be until a successor qualifies. Unless they allow this, they must allow that he is at some intermediate time 'out of office,' when the dreadful interregnum as well as the interdiction of the 31st article must occur.

'Tis true, the Constitution does not directly specify a period of time for which the Governor shall be elected, nor make any direct provisions for his going 'out of that office.' But as it specifies a day 'in each and every year' on which an election of a Governor shall take place, we all conceived it impliedly limited the period of office to that day, and that on that day the previous Governor was 'out of office.' We actually imagined that there was a limit secured, beyond which 'the first Executive Department of power or trust' should not be retained in the same hands, at least without a re-election. But these scrupulous objectors tell us that we were entirely mistaken. We have no certainty they say that Governor Carroll's first term of service will expire on the first Monday of January next. He is Governor of Maryland without limit of time or further qualifications forever; if by any accident or contrivance the election or qualification of a successor can be avoided. So say those gentlemen who come out on purpose to defend the principle of rotation in office?

Now if these gentlemen will just lend us the the use of their supposed case of danger—that of two Governors conspiring—we will apply it to their own constitution as explained by themselves, and see how handily an aspiring Governor might keep the reins. Just bargain with the intended individual that the legislature should succeed him, not to qualify; or, in consequence of an equalization of parties, contrive a quarrel about organizing, as the legislature of Delaware did a year ago, or, avoid making a quorum in either house, as has been the case in this state; or any other of the ten thousand expedients by which parties contrive to effect darling objects, and he that is in power remains in power safe enough, in spite of our teeth.

In the case of danger which they make out and pretend to apprehend, it is necessary in the first place to suppose two persons, enjoying the greatest confidence of the legislature for honesty and integrity, to conspire to cheat the state—in the next place we must admit that the legislature remain year after year corrupt enough to connive at the bargain; and in the 3rd place we must suppose the people to be so blind as not to discover the cheat, or change their delegates for better ones. Unless all these circumstances concur there is no possibility of the case occurring. Yet for fear it may occur they resort to a construction of the constitution, by which any governor who is in and who rather than part with his honours and his powers, by buying over one particular individual, may continue to hold on to both, and may in a thousand other ways, which this construction opens the door for, contrive to perpetuate his reign during life. This we suppose to be enough, and therefore won't stop to ascertain whether he can entail a legitimate successor upon us also

Do these consequences which inevitably flow from allowing that the Governor is never 'out of that office,' or in other words that there is no prescribed limit to the period which a Governor may serve—for even having served 'three years successively,' does not prevent his continuing to serve in this case—it only prevents his being eligible for re-election;—do these consequences sufficiently expose the folly of admitting such construction? If they do, let us return to our own old way of reading a whole sentence together and placing a common sense meaning on what is said in it. We shall then have the Constitution just as our fathers intended we should have it—just as every legislature, for fifty-four years since its adoption, have considered it to mean, as is proved by their votes, time after time.

There is no instance heretofore, in which the eligibility of a candidate, under such circumstances, has even for one moment been objected to. In repeated instances the election has not taken place till after the day on which the Constitution required it should take place†—yet never was an objection suggested, that the last Governor was not eligible, because he was 'out of that office' in the meantime.

When Gov. Bowie was beat by the federal majority, elected in the year 1813, the Republican members of the ensuing legislature never dreamed of objecting that he was not eligible in 1814. He was nominated and voted for. When Governor Goldsborough was beaten by the Republican majority of 1820, the Federal party to a man voted for his re-election the year following. The votes were 43 for Spriggs and 46 for Goldsborough. Amongst the number who stand committed upon this very question, not in manner of a mere legal opinion, but bound by the solemn obligations of the oath which the Constitution requires each member to take before he deposits his ballot upon the occasion, I find the names of men who may be quoted as authorities, if any names in Maryland can Amongst those on the Republican side, were John Thompson Mason, Thomas B. Dorsey, (now Judge,) Thomas Emory,* Mr. Spencer, Samuel Stevens, (since Governor) Mr. Maulsby, of Harford, Thomas Culbreth, of Caroline, James L. Donaldson, of Baltimore, Frisby Tilghman, Edward Lloyd, (since Governor and now Senator,) John Steven, (now Judge.) Moses Tabbs, Nathaniel Williams, Levi Hollingsworth, Thomas Hollingsworth, James Fenwick, George Hebb, William McCreery, John Williams, &c. Amongst those of the Federal party, similarly committed we find, Robert Goodloe Harper, Virgil Maxey, William Carmichael, Richard Carroll, H Holliday, Robert B. Magruder, Roger B Taney, (Attorney General,) George W. Jackson, Levin Gale, Peter Emerson, Joseph Cresop. These were Federal Senators. Others might be named belonging at the time to the House. But is it not enough?—With such authorities; with uninterrupted usages with the plain letter of the connected sentence as always heretofore understood; and interpreted, according as it confessedly does too with the reason of the case, and having the glaring follies of the other construction staring us in the face; it seems to us that we are bound and concluded, if ever any subject can be considered as concluded.

One word seems to be due to Mr. Martin, individually, in considering this subject. It has been observed that no one objects to his re-eligibility but those who wish to find some pretext for thinking him so. With some exceptions this may be the case. It is probable the objection originated with some individual who was unfriendly to Mr. Martin. Certain it is that those who are most active in urging the plea, are opposed to him, and most of them are known to have been opposed to his first election. No public man is without rivals and enemies. Neither can any man give universal satisfaction in administering public affairs. The best, in performing duty, are obliged to thwart the sinister designs of some, and the too sanguine hopes of many. There may have been those too well deserving, men if you please, yet who were mortified at Mr. Martin being preferred to themselves or their own particular favorite on his first election. We have heard it intimated that this was unfortunately the case.

No exception is publicly made to Gov. Martin's administration No man ever left the Executive chair retaining a firmer hold upon the attachment of his political friends than he did.—Every eye was instinctively turned towards him as a matter of course, with the expectation of his resuming the functions from the exercise of which he had been ejected by the momentary triumph of the oppsing party. Nothing was left those disaffected, to his re-election, but to seek some special plea of ineligibility. They have diligently sought, and at length found, in the Constitution, precisely the proof the Atheist did in the Scriptures.

Pleading—derived from pleasing, because to plead well, please above all things, and not by a contrariety of phrases, because it does not please. Lord Coke.

Special Pleading—a species of exquisite logic. Sir Wm. Jones.

†We can't conclude the sentence by taking the technical objector for our prophet—or lawgiver either.

*Mr. Emory has recently expressed his opinion that Mr. Martin is eligible—according with his votes at that time.

*'Burke,' a writer whose remarks appeared in the Hagers Town Torch Light, and afterwards in the Allegany 'Civilian,' cunningly assumes that those who consider Mr. Martin eligible ,admit that by the letter of the 31st article, he would be ineligible. We admit no such thing—The letter is as plainly with us as we show the spirit of the Constitution to be.—He admits that the 'writer in the Baltimore Chronicle, reasons very ingeniously about the spirit of the Constitution, but he cannot reason the seal off the Bond.'

We answer, has Burke reasoned who shall have served three years successively out of the 31st article?

'Till thou canst rail those words away,
Thou but offends thy lungs to speak so loud,
Repair thy wit, sage counsellor, or it will fall,
To curseless ruin. We stand here for Law.'

†In the session of 1810, Gov. Lloyd was re-elected two weeks after the period that the Constitution required a Governor to be chosen.

From Brown's Sketches.

The horse was not found on the American continent by the early discoveries of that immense quarter of the earth. 'The countless numbers of wild horses which are now to be seen in South America have all sprung from emancipated individuals left there by the Spaniards.—They have spread in all directions where food is plentiful! and if we may judge from the rapid increase, the climate and soil seem particularly adapted to the habits of the horse. This animal, however, has been formed with a constitution of great pliability, for he will thrive in all climates.'

In the United States the horses are principally of British origin. 'Considerable attention has of late been bestowed upon rearing good horses, and with much success; although none have appeared to equal the horses of Great Britain. The majority of the best trottors now in the United States are descended from the imported English race horse Messenger.'

The Canadian horse is a hardy curiosity. 'The winter travelling in Canada is sometimes very expeditious. It is surprising with what speed a good canadian horse will go when drawing a cabriolet over the ice, instances have occurred of them travelling ninety miles, in one of these vehicles in twelve hours; but when this occurs, the roads must be very smooth and hard. The shoes of their horses are never roughened, as in this country, by turning up the ends of them, but by inserting two or more steel screws, which can be removed or renewed with pleasure. The horses of Canada are very hardy animals; their best pace is a trot; they are accustomed to much bad usage and hard work and are the most willing creatures in the world, for they never refuse the draught. They are brought from the country into Quebec, in the coldest weather, and left standing in the open air, without any covering, for hours together, while their owners are transacting their business or drinking, and they seem not to be any the worse for it. In the winter the Canadian horse, like all other quadrupeds of that country, acquires an increased quantity of fur to protect him from the cold, and the curry comb is never used.

When the horses have been heated by fast driving, in a cold day, they appear to have a sort of icicle at every hair, and icicles two or three inches in length are often suspended from their noses. Travelling on Lake Champlain is at all times dangerous, and it is very common for sledge, horses, and men, to fall through the ice, where the water is some hundred feet deep, and there is no warning of danger till the horses drop in, pulling the sledge after them; luckily the weak places are of no great extent; the traveller extricates himself from the sledge as soon as possible, and he finds the ice strong enough to support him, though it will not bear the weight of the horses. The pulling of them out is done in a manner perfectly unique; the horses are strangled to save their lives. When the horses fall through—for there are always two in these sledges—their struggles only tend to injure and sink them; but, as they have always round their neck a rope with a running noose, the moment the ice breaks, the driver and passengers get out and catching hold of the rope, pull it with all their force, which in a very few minutes strangles the horses; and no sooner does this happen than they rise in the water, float on one side, and are drawn out on strong ice, where the noose of the rope being loosened, respiration returns, and in a short time the horses are on their feet, and as much alive as ever. This operation has been known to be performed two or three times a-day on the same horses. The Canadians tell you, that