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DEBATE IN THE SENATE, ON MR. VAN BUREN'S NOMINATION.

REMARKS OF MR. WEBSTER.

Mr. President: As it is highly probable that our proceedings on this nomination will be published, I deem it proper to state shortly the considerations which influenced my opinion, and will guide my vote.

I regard this as a very important and delicate question. It is full of responsibility; and I feel the whole force of all that responsibility. While I have been in the Senate, I have opposed no nomination of the President except for cause; and I have at all times thought that such should be plain, and sufficient; that it should be real and substantial, not unfounded or fancied.

I have never desired, and do not now desire, to encroach, in the slightest degree, on the Constitutional power of the Chief Magistrate of the Nation. I have heretofore gone far, very far, in assenting to nominations which have been submitted to us. I voted for the appointment of all the gentlemen who composed the first Cabinet; I have opposed no nomination of a foreign Minister; and I have not opposed the nominations recently before us, for the reorganization of the Administration. I have always been especially anxious, that in all matters relating to our intercourse with other nations, the utmost harmony, the greatest unity of purpose, should exist between the President and the Senate. I know how much of usefulness such harmony and union are calculated to produce.

I am now fully aware, Sir, that it is a serious, a very serious matter, to vote against the confirmation of a Minister to a Foreign Court who has already gone abroad, and has been received, and accredited by the Government to which he is sent. I am aware, that the rejection of this nomination, and the necessary recall of the Minister, will be regarded by the foreign States, at the first blush, as not in the highest degree favorable to the character of our Government. I know, moreover, to what injurious reflections one may subject himself, especially in times of party excitement, by giving a negative vote, on such a nomination. But, after all, I am placed here to discharge a duty. I am not to go through a formality; I am to perform a substantial and express moral duty. I am to advise the President from my best judgment of appointment. This is my duty, I have to deliberation and I shall perform it conscientiously and fearlessly. I am bound to give quantum necessary, that is, I do not advise committee would be House of Legislation. I do not think assume the ope[illegible] and my reasons basis of their ca[illegible] written. To avoid, however, [illegible] 1827, the public rev[illegible] Court of annual amo[illegible] Mr. Adams, to [illegible] Minister. I think these a[illegible] narrows it, [illegible] in a high degree, to the [illegible] sider it as [illegible] the honor of the country [illegible] his (Mr. Adams) a manifest disposition in the chief House of [illegible] to establish a distinction between, took off Country and his Party, to place [illegible] as far above the country, to make interest, at a foreign Court, for that party, rather than for the country; to persuade the English Ministry and the English Monarch, that they had an interest in maintaining in the United States the ascendancy of the Party to which the writer belonged. Thinking thus of the purpose and object of these instructions, I cannot be of opinion that their author is a proper Representative of the U. States at that Court. Therefore it is, that I propose to vote against his nomination. It is the first time, I believe in Modern diplomacy, it is certainly the first time of our history, in which a minister to a foreign court has sought to make favor for one party at home, against another; or has stooped, from being the Representative of the whole country, to be the Representative of a Party. And as this is the first instance in our history of any such transaction, so I intend to do all in my power to make it the last. For one, I set my mark of disapprobation upon it; I contribute my voice and my vote, to make it a negative example, to be shunned and avoided by all future Ministers of the U. States. If, in a deliberate and formal letter of instructions, admonitions and directions are given to a minister, and repeated, once and again, to urge these mere party considerations on the foreign government, to what extent, is it probable, the writer himself will be disposed to urge them, in his one thousand opportunities of informal intercourse with the agents of that Government.

I propose, sir, to refer to some particular parts of these instructions; but before I do that, allow me to state, very generally, the posture of that subject, to which those particulars relate. The subject was to the state of our trade with the British West India Colonies. I do not deem it necessary now to go minutely into all the history of that trade. The occasion does not call for it. All know, that by the Convention of 1815, a reciprocity of intercourse was established between us and Great Britain. The ships of both countries were allowed to pass, to and from each other respectively, with the same cargoes, and subject to the same duties. But this arrangement did not extend to the British West Indies.—There our intercourse was cut off. Various discriminating and retaliatory acts were passed, by England and by the United States. Eventually, in the summer of 1825, the English Parliament passed an act, offering reciprocity, so far as the mere carrying trade was concerned to all nations, who might chuse within one year, to accept that offer.

Mr. Adams' Administration did not accept that offer, first, because it was never officially communicated to it; secondly, because only a few months before, a negotiation on the very same subject had been suspended, with an understanding that it might be resumed; and thirdly, because it was very desirable to arrange the whole matter, if possible, by Treaty, in order to secure, if we could, *the admission of our products into the British Islands for consumption*, as well as the admission of our vessels. This object had been earnestly pursued ever since the peace of 1815. It was insisted on, as every body knows, through the whole of Mr. Monroe's Administration. He would not treat at all, without treating of this object. He thought the existing state of things better than any arrangement, which, while it admitted our vessels into the West India Ports, still left our *productions* subject to such duties there, that they could not be carried.

Now, sir, Mr. Adams' Administration was not the first to take this ground. It only occupied the same position which its predecessor had taken. It saw no important objects to be gained by changing the state of things, unless that change was to admit our products into the British West Indies, directly from our ports, burdened with excessive duties.—The direct trade, by English enactments, and American retaliations had become closed.—No British ship came here from the British West Indies. No American ship went from us to those places. A circuitous trade took place, through the Islands of third Powers; and that circuitous trade was, in many respects, not advantageous to us.

In this state of things, sir, Mr McLane, was sent to England; and he received his instructions from the Secretary of State. In these instructions, and in relation to this subject of the Colonial Trade, [illegible] sentiments of which I complain [illegible] they? Let us examine and see.

Mr. Van Buren tells Mr. McLane "*The opportunities which you have derived from a participation in our public councils, as well as other sources of information, will enable you to speak with confidence (as far as you may deem it proper and useful so to do.) of the respective parts taken by those to whom the Administration of this Government is now committed, in relation to the course heretofore pursued upon the subject of the Colonial Trade.*"

Now, this is neither more nor less than saying "you will be able to tell the British Minister, whenever you think proper, that you, and I, and the leading persons in this Administration, have opposed the course heretofore pursued by the Government and the country, on the subject of the Colonial Trade. Be sure to let him know, that, on that subject *we* have held with *England*, and *not* with *our own Government*." Now I ask you, sir, if this be dignified diplomacy? Is this statesmanship? Is it patriotism, or is it mere Party? Is it a proof of a high regard to the honor and renown of the whole country, or is it evidence of a disposition to make a merit of belonging to one of its political divisions?

The Secretary proceeds: "*Their views* (that is, the views of the present Administration) *upon that point have been submitted to the People of the United States; and the counsels by which your conduct is now directed, are the result of the judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late administration was amenable for its acts.*"

Now, sir, in the first place, there is very little reason to suppose that the *first* part of this paragraph is true, in point of fact. I mean that part which intimates that the change of administration was brought about by public disapprobation of Mr. Adams' conduct, respecting the subject of the colonial trade.—Possibly, as much was then said, on a subject which so few understood, some degree of impression may have been produced by it.—But be assured, sir, another cause will be found, by future historians, for this change; and that cause will be the popularity of a successful soldier, united with a feeling, made to be considerably extensive, that the preferences of the People in his behalf had not been justly regarded, on a previous occasion. There is, sir, very little ground to say that the "only tribunal to which the late administration was amenable" has pronounced any judgment against it for its conduct on the whole subject of the colonial trade.

But, however this may, be the other assertion in the paragraph is manifestly quite wide of the facts. Mr. Adams' administration did not bring forward this claim. I have stated, already, that it had been a subject, both of negotiation and legislation, through the whole eight years of Mr. Monroe's administration. This the Secretary knew, or was bound to know. Why then does he speak of it as set up by the late administration, and afterwards abandoned by them, and not now revived? But the most humiliating part of the whole follows:—

"*To set up acts of the late administration, as the cause of forfeiture of privileges, which would otherwise be extended to the People of the United States, would under existing circumstances, be unjust in itself, and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility.*"

So, then, Mr. President, we are reduced, are we, to the poor condition, that we see a minister of this great Republic instructed to argue, or to intercede, with the British minister, lest he should find us *to have forfeited our privileges; and lest these privileges should no longer be extended to us!* And we have *forfeited these privileges*, by our misbehaviour, in chusing rulers, *who thought better of our own claim, than of the British!* Why, sir, this is patiently submitting to the domineering tone of the British Minister, I believe Mr. Huskisson —[Mr. Clay said, "no, Mr. Canning,"]—Mr. Canning, then, sir, who told us that all our trade with the West Indies was a *boon*, granted to us by the indulgence of England. The British Minister calls it a *boon*, and our Minister admits it as a *privilege*, and hopes that his Royal Majesty will be too gracious to decide that we have forfeited this privilege, by our misbehaviour in the choice of our rulers! Sir, for one, I reject all idea of holding any right of trade, or any other rights, as a *privilege* or a *boon*, from the British Government, or any other Government.

At the conclusion of the paragraph, the Secretary says, "*You cannot press this view of the subject too earnestly upon the consideration of the British Ministry. It has bearings and relations that reach beyond the immediate question under discussion.*"

And adverting, again, to the same subject towards the close of the dispatch, he says, "*I will add nothing as to the impropriety of suffering any feelings that find their origin in the past pretensions of this Government, to have an adverse influence upon the present conduct of Great Britain.*"

I ask again, Mr. President, if this be Statesmanship?, if this be dignity?, if this be elevated regard for country? Can any man read this whole despatch, with candor, and not admit, that it is plainly and manifestly the writer's—[Here is a defect in the report of Mr. Webster's remarks, which we do not find supplied by the last Washington papers.]

Lest I should do the Secretary injustice, I will read all that I find, in this letter, upon this obnoxious point. These are the paragraphs:

"Such is the present state of our commercial "relations with the British colonies, and such "the steps by which we have arrived at it. In "reviewing the events which have preceded, "and more or less contributed to, a result so "much to be regretted, there will be found "three grounds upon which we are most assailable, 1st, in our too long and too tenaciously resisting the right of Great Britain to "impose protecting duties in her colonies;" 2nd, &c.

"The opportunities which you have derived "from a participation in our public councils, "as well as other sources of information, will "enable you to speak with confidence (as far "as you may deem it proper and useful so to "do) of the respective parts taken by those to "whom the administration of this Government is now committed, in relation to the "course heretofore pursued on the subject of "the colonial trade. Their views upon that "point have been submitted to the people of "the United States; and the counsels by which "your conduct is now directed are the result "of the judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late administration "was amenable for its acts. It would be sufficient that the claims set up by them, and "which caused the interruption of the trade in "question, have been explicitly abandoned by "those who first asserted them, and are not "revived by their successors. If Great Britain deems it adverse to her interests to allow us to participate in the trade with her "colonies, and finds nothing in the extension "of it to others to induce her to apply the same "rule to us, she will, we hope, be sensible of "the propriety of placing her refusal on those "grounds. To set up the acts of the late Administration as the cause of forfeiture of privileges which would otherwise be extended "to the People of the United States, would, "under existing circumstances, be unjust in "itself, and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility. The tone of feeling which "a course so unwise and untenable is calculated to produce, would doubtless be greatly "aggravated by the consciousness that Great "Britain has, by order in council, opened her "colonial ports to Russia and France, notwithstanding a similar omission on their part "to accept the terms offered by the act of July, "1825. You cannot press this view of the "subject too earnestly upon the consideration "of the British Ministry. It has bearings and "relations that reach beyond the immediate "question under discussion."

"I will add nothing as to the impropriety of "suffering any feelings that find their origin "in the past pretensions of this Government "to have an adverse influence upon the present "conduct of Great Britain."

Sir, I submit to you, and to the candor of all just men, if I am not right in saying, that the pervading topic, through the whole, is, not American Rights, not American interests, not American defence but denunciation of past *pretensions* of our own country, reflections on the past Administration, and exultation, and a loud claim of merit, for the Administration now in power. Sir, I would forgive mistakes, I would pardon the want of information; I would pardon almost any thing, where I saw true patriotism and sound American feeling: but I cannot forgive the sacrifice of this feeling to mere Party. I cannot concur in sending abroad a public agent who has not conceptions so large and liberal, as to feel, that in the presence of foreign Courts, amidst the monarchs of Europe, he is to stand up for his country, and his whole country; that no jot nor tittle of her honor is to come to harm in his hands; that he is not to suffer others to reproach either his Government or his Country, and far less is he himself to reproach either; that he is to have no objects in his eye but American objects, and no heart in his bosom but an American heart; and that he is to forget self, to forget party, to forget every sinister and narrow feeling, in his proud and lofty attachment to the Republic, whose commission he bears.

Mr. President, I have discharged an exceedingly unpleasant duty, the most unpleasant of my public life. But I have looked upon it *as a duty*, and it was not to be shunned. And, sir, however unimportant may be the opinion of so humble an individual as myself, I now only wish that I might be heard by every Independent Freeman in the United States, by the British Minister, and the British King, and by every Minister and every crowned head in Europe, while standing here in my place, I pronounce my rebuke, as solemnly and as decisively as I can, upon this first instance, in which an American Minister has been sent abroad, as the Representative of his Party, and not as the Representative of his Country.

REMARKS OF MR. MARCY.

Mr. MARCY said, that he had intimated heretofore, more than once, that it was not his intention to offer to the Senate, any observations upon the main question now before them. What regarded the public conduct of the present Minister to London, was better understood by other members, and what was to be said in explanation or vindication of it would be better said and better received from most of them, by reason of their great experience in public affairs, and their particular knowledge of the transactions which have been brought under review in this discussion. He had determined that it would be his duty to trouble the Senate with remarks, only, in case topics should be introduced into the debate, with which he might well be supposed, from his local situation, to be particularly acquainted.

The occasion which rendered it proper, that he should say something, had arisen in consequence of what had fallen from the honorable Senator from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay.) His attack was not confined to the nominee; it reached the State, which he, (Mr. M.) represented in this body. One of the grounds of opposition to the Minister to London, taken by the Senator from Kentucky, was the pernicious system of party politics adopted by the present administration, by which the honors and offices were put up to be scrambled for by partizans, &c.—A system which the Minister to London, as the Senator from Kentucky alleged, had brought here from the State in which he formerly lived, and had for so long a time acted a conspicuous part in its political transactions. I know, Sir, said Mr. M, that it is the habit of some gentlemen to speak with censure or reproach of the politics of New York. Like other States, we have contests, and, as a necessary consequence, triumphs and defeats. The State is large, with great and diversified interests; in some parts of it, commerce is the object of general pursuit; in others, manufactures and agriculture are the chief concerns of its citizens. We have men of enterprise and talents, who aspire to public distinction. It is natural to expect from these circumstances and others that might be alluded to, that her politics should excite more interest at home, and attract more attention abroad than those of many other States in the confederacy.

It may be, Sir, that the politicians of the United States are not so fastidious as some gentlemen are, as to disclosing the principles on which they act. They boldly preach what they practice. When they are contending for victory, they avow their intention of enjoying the fruits of it. If they are defeated, they expect to retire from office—if they are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belongs the spoils of the enemy.

But if there be any thing wrong in the policy which the Senator from Kentucky has so strongly reprobated, he should know that this policy was not confined to the Minister to London and his friends in New York, but is practised by his [Mr. Clay's] own political friends in that State: he should know that if one man, more than any other now living, the existence of that policy is to be ascribed, it is to *one* of the Senator's own political friends. The practice of making extensive changes in the offices, on the change of parties in that State, was begun, I believe, before the nominee was upon the political stage; certainly while he was quite a young man, and before he had acquired great consideration in political affairs. I must be permitted, Sir, to say, that of all the party men with whom I have acted, or been particularly acquainted, (and the number of such is not small,) I know of no one who has acted with, or advised to, more moderation than the person whose nomination we are now considering.

When the Senator from Kentucky condemns the present administration for making removals from office, an I then ascribes the act to the pernicious system of politics imported from New York, I fear he does not sufficiently consider the peculiar circumstances under which the present administration came into power. General Jackson did not come in under the same circumstances that Mr. Adams did, or Mr. Monroe, or Mr. Madison. His accession was like that of Mr. Jefferson. He came in, Sir, upon a political revolution. The contest was without a parallel. Much political bitterness was engendered. Criminations and recriminations were made. Slanders of a most extraordinary character flooded the land.—When the present Chief Magistrate took upon himself the administration of the Government, he found almost all the offices, from the highest to the lowest, filled by political enemies. That his Cabinet was composed of his friends, no one will complain. The reasons for thus composing it will apply with considerable force to many of the officers under the heads of the several Departments.

If some dismissals of the subordinate offices in those departments were made, it will not be asserted that all opposed to the administration were discharged. I have heard it confidently asserted, by those who I supposed spoke with knowledge on the subject, that many, perhaps a majority of those retained, and almost all were retained—belong now to the opposition—they are the political supporters of the Honorable Senator from Kentucky.

There are good reasons—very good reasons, for believing, that it is the general rule of conduct, to take care of his friends when he is in power. It requires not the foresight of a prophet, to predict, that if he shall come into power, he will take care of his friends, & if he does, I can assure him, I shall not complain; nor shall I be in the least surprised if he imitates the example which he now so emphatically denounces.

Now I am up, I will offer a few words relative to the much censured instructions to our former Minister to England. I must say, I have discovered in them nothing to merit or provoke the harsh strictures bestowed on them. They do not, in my opinion, furnish a fit occasion for the Senator from Kentucky, to impute to Mr Van Buren, as he has done, with passionate emphasis and frequent reiteration, a charge of falsehood or culpable ignorance. The language which he desired might be taken down, is "That Mr. Van Buren stated what was false, or he was culpably ignorant for not knowing that it was false." The instructions alledge, that those who first asserted certain claims to interfere with the regulations of Great Britain, as to the Colonial Trade, had abandoned them, &c. The Senator from Kentucky chooses to consider this a declaration, that the late Administration first asserted the claims, and then abandoned them. If we admit his construction to be the true one, to what does it amount? He does not deny—indeed it is expressly admitted—that the late Administration asserted the claims, and then waived them. What then is the mighty difference between the assertion in the instructions, and the fact as admitted here? We are told that the late Aministration were not the first to assert them—that they were set up under the Aministration of Mr. Monroe. If this pretended falsehood is of such a flagitious character as has been given to it, it is natural to expect that it would change very essentially the meaning of the sentence. If there be the least error in the instructions, it is in the use of the word first, strike out that word and let us see whether the meaning of the sentence is materially changed. Whether the late Administration were the first to assert the claims; and then gave them up; or asserted them after they had been previously asserted by Mr. Monroe's Administration, and then gave them up; is very nearly the same thing. If there was any thing wrong or reprehensible in asserting claims or pretensions, and then giving them up, the censure incurred by the late Administration for so doing, is not much mitigated by the circumstance that a preceding Administration had asserted similar claims or pretensions. It appears to me that if a cause of censure had not been very much wanted, such an one as this would not have been hunted up and put forth so prominently.

The manner in which our late Minister to London was instructed to conduct the negotiation, may, for ought I know, be unusual; but it does not appear to me to be censurable. The whole affair presents itself to me as a very plain matter. The British Government, by their act of Parliament of 1825, offer to the United States a participation in the trade with her American Colonies on certain conditions, the particulars of which it is not at all necessary now to consider. That administration, for some reason or other—probably in the hope of getting better—refuse the terms offered, and claimed more advantageous ones as a matter of right; but afterwards, finding, I presume, that better terms could not be obtained, and their claims of right could not be sustained, concluded to take those that were first offered and had been refused. When they proposed to take these terms, the British Government told them they were too late, and positively refused to grant what it had before offered. The colonial trade was lost to the country. The late administration attempted to recover it—they made more than one attempt to open a negotiation with the British Government, for the purpose of obtaining that trade on the very terms on which it had been offered to, and refused by, them. This was the situation of affairs when that administration went out of power. The commercial interests of the country required that their successors, who thought the terms offered by the British Government should have been accepted, should make an effort to regain that important trade. As negotiation had been repeatedly and peremptorily refused to the Governmenment of the United States, it was necessary to offer some excuse for attempting it again. That excuse was found in the public and notorious fact, that the administration of the affairs of the United States had passed from the hands of those who refused the offered terms, into the hands of those who thought the offered terms ought to have been accepted, and who censured their predecessors for not accepting them. Mr. McLane was instructed to use this fact to remove any obstacle to opening the negotiation for the recovery of the lost West India Trade, in case any obstacle should be interposed on account of the manner in which the late administration had managed this affair. I confess that I cannot see any thing wrong in these much censured instructions. I see no invoking of favors on party considerations—no abandonment of honor or dignity. Gentlemen may call it novel diplomacy; but I call it plain dealing, and the result has shown it was a successful negotiation.

From the Washington Globe.

If there can be found any parallel for the extraordinary violence of the proceedings by which the Chief Magistrate's nomination of Mr. Van Buren has been rejected, it will be in the extraordinary folly and inconsistency of the pretences by which it is attempted to be excused. We shall in due time expose the utter shallowness of these pretences—for they are evidently only pretences—by facts and reasoning the most conclusive. We shall not fail, also, to expose the effrontery with which Mr. Webster, in the face of his almost treasonable opposition to the embargo, for the sake of "trade,"—of his un American separation of his party, not merely from his government, but from his country, during the war,—in the face of his subsequent agency in the Hartford Convention, and in those disgraceful measures which were deliberately formed to strengthen the hope of the enemy and paralyze the arm of his country, now boasts of "American feeling," and nothing but American feeling, in reproach of the Chief Magistrate, to whose pre-eminent services in the hour of peril, the country owes its safety; and of Mr. Van Buren, who was at the same time patriotically engaged in defeating the treasonable machinations of Mr. Webster and his friends.

In the mean time however, we cannot too soon call the attention of our readers to the [illegible] Mr. Webster has thought proper [illegible] the want of American spirit in the "instructions," as an excuse for his vote against Mr. Van Buren's nomination.

Mr. Webster says, he rejects all idea of holding any right of trade, or any other rights, as a privilege, or a boon, from the British government, and thence desires it to be inferred, that, as the instruction solicited it on those grounds he would reject it. Now, we will hereafter show that the instructions did not so treat it, and that the trade was not so solicited. But we beg to enquire, in the mean time, how the Senate, and Mr. Webster, stand in relation to this subject? We aver that both the Senate and Mr. Webster so far from rejecting the trade, before the negotiation was concluded, and with the fullest knowledge of the subject, and after an examination of the instructions, and all the correspondence, did expressly consent, not merely to take trade but did positively authorize the President to accept it upon the very terms, and in the same manner, and under the very same instructions, which he now persumes to insinuate compromitted the national honor.

On the 26th May, 1830, the President sent a Message to Congress, stating that he was expecting the definite answer of the British Government to a proposition which had been submitted to it by ours, upon the subject of the Colonial Trade, and inviting Congress to pass a law authorizing him to carry such arrangement into effect during their recess, or adopt retaliatory measures against Great Britain. On that occasion, as it now appears by the public Message of the President, of the 6th of December following, a copy of the "instructions under which Mr. McLane had acted, together with the communications "which had at that time passed between him and the British Government," was confidentially submitted to both Houses of Congress. And it also appears, that this correspondence embraced all that was in any wise material.

Here, then, at that early day, these instructions, now the subject of so much declamation, were fully disclosed; the mode in which they had been executed, fairly laid open, and the Senate and Congress necessarily consulted whether they would approve what had been done, and accept the trade in the manner in which it had been asked, and upon the terms proposed.

If there had been any thing in the instructions, or in the correspondence, in the slightest degree derogatory to the national pride and dignity, then was the time to point it out: if the negotiation had compromitted our honor, then was the time to avert it: if the terms on which the trade had been solicited, and was likely to be obtained, were disgraceful, then was the time to reject it, for that reason—then the Senate, and Mr. Webster, might have given full scope to their American feelings, indignantly to cast back the offer and by disdaining to accept "a boon" upon such terms, read an appropriate and timely lesson to the Minister who had acted so reprehensibly.—But did they do so? Did they even stand still and withhold their sanction, and decline any participation in the matter? No—they passed an act of Congress authorizing the President to accept the "trade," and to open the ports pursuant to the terms offered by the instructions, and in the manner in which they had been executed.

Is it not plain, then, that both Mr. Webster and the Senate have expressly sanctioned the whole "instructions," propositions, correspondence, arrangement and all; and that they are as much responsible for every part of the transaction as the President, or Secretary of State, or the Minister who executed them?

The Senate, having thus acted with the "instructions" before them, while the negotiation was pending, and when, if they disapproved, they might have arrested it and which if they believed the half of what Mr. W now says, they were bound to do, are as much responsible for the instructions, and as effectually assented to the whole, as if their advice had been taken and given before the Minister departed upon his mission.

This, however, is not all; the arrangement was concluded more than five months after the passage of this law; was returned to the United States, and in October following was carried into effect by the President according to his duty under the law. In December following, in his annual message to Congress, the President communicated the result of the whole subject to both Houses, and all the papers, including the instructions, were published by direction of both Houses. The instructions had not been before known to the British Government; and the Senate and Mr. Webster, send it forth to the American people without the slighest objection to any part of the subject.

The exaggerated and factious misinterpretation of the instructions now relied upon, was first suggested by some scribbler in a newspaper, lived its day in a few kindred presses, and is finally selected from such vehicles by certain pure Senators, to excuse a violent and unparalleled attack upon the President, and upon an eminent public servant, resident in a foreign land.

If these instructions be really what these Senators say they are, they too should be made to feel, for they too have given them their sanction; and the honor of the nation will not be restored until every one of them shall be removed by their respective State Legislatures.

But it is idle to attach any seriousness to this pretence—it is an unworthy and stale excuse, dragged forth from the oblivion to which public indignation was fast consigning it, to justify an act for which no other excuse could possibly be invented. On this ground, therefore, these Senators may have nothing to apprehend from their local legislatures; but for the manner, the time, and the purpose, for which it is brought into use, we know little of the American People, if there be not a heavier judgement in store for them at the tribunal of public opinion.

We have not done however, with Mr. Webster, on either of those grounds. His Hartford Convention Americanism, and his official and deliberate sanction of the instructions of the negotiation, are matters fruitful of observation, and we intend to pursue them.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

The following editorial paragraph of the London Morning Chronicle, of the 30th December, respecting the President's Message, is of a pleasant tenor.—Ed.

"European statesmen will not [illegible] document full of information [illegible] from the profuse vulgar [illegible] cient in the information which [illegible] ther, his wife, [illegible] who, judging from [illegible] ought to be of intense interest [illegible] mericans. We hear nothing in it [illegible] ner in which he means to dispose of [illegible] gency, and of his expectations that the nation will enable him to make suitable provision for them. Not a word does he say of his own establishments, his palaces which are in progress, and the repairs which are required to make the old edifices worthy of the head of a great a nation. This comes of trusting the affairs of thirteen millions of men to one who does not probably know the name of his grandfather, though, of course, he had a grandfather as well as other folks."

From the London Courier.

The President's Message is altogether a gratifying document, from the pacific and moderate tone adopted towards this country; but what will excite peculiar gratification to the friends of American independence, is the allusion to the prosperous condition of the finances; it being announced that the whole debt of the country may be extinguished within four years of the administration of the present President. There can be little doubt, we think, of a perfectly satisfactory termination to the question of boundaries. The two governments are, by interest as well as good feeling, influenced in their view of that question, and it is not likely that they will allow any little difference of opinion to prevail against the important conviction that, for the sake of independence and freedom, it is essential to have a cordial understanding between constitutional countries. It is very, important that Great Britain, France and America, should be cordially disposed towards each other, in order to counteract the effort of a Holy Alliance league, which now exists in the force of its predecessor, although it is not found convenient to acknowledge a determination to enforce its doctrines and extend its power.

From the London Times.

The Message of the American President is a discourse on which, although the full credit belongs to the government of the U. States, the wisdom, integrity, and conciliatory spirit may be turned to account by other nations, in their policy, both foreign and domestic. From the rapid but comprehensive sketch which General Jackson takes of the relation between his Republic and Foreign Powers, it is gratifying to observe what expressions of respect and cordiality he employs in speaking of the latter.

From the Morning Chronicle.

The Message of the American President must appear a strange document, to European statesmen. He actually says that he has nothing to conceal from the people. What would statesmen in Europe be without concealment and trick?

From the Liverpool Chronicle.

It contains a full and candid exposition of the affairs, both foreign and domestic, of the United States; and the facts which are disclosed afford the most convincing evidence of the great and rapid progress which that country is making in every branch of national and commercial prosperity. The advance of the United States' population, agriculture, commerce, and all the arts of civilization, is, we believe, quite unparalelled in the History of the World. The paragraphs which refer to the relations of this country with America will be read with interest. The tone of the Message is extremely conciliatory and pacific; it holds out no decided promise of any repeal.

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