[illegible] gainst the executi[illegible] ments of the State, [illegible] the declaration of nullification [illegible] judgment of the State Court would [illegible] pronounced and executed, before the possibility of a reversal; and executed, too, without responsibility incurred by any one.

Beaten before the courts, the General Government would be compelled to abandon its unconstitutional pretensions, or resort to force—a resort, the difficulty (I was about to say, the impossibility) of which, would very soon fully manifest itself, should folly or madness ever make the attempt.

In considering this aspect of the controversy, I pass over the fact, that the General Government has no right to resort to force against a State—to coerce a sovereign member of the Union—which, I trust, I have established beyond all possible doubt. Let it, however, be determined to use force, and the difficulty would be insurmountable, unless, indeed, it be also determined to set aside the constitution, and to subvert the system to its foundations.

Against whom would it be applied? Congress has, it is true, the right to call forth the militia "to execute the laws, and suppress insurrections;" but there would be no law resisted, unless, indeed, it be called resistance for the juries to refuse to find, and the courts to render judgment, in conformity to the wishes of the General Government; no insurrection to suppress; no armed force to reduce; not a sword unsheathed; not a bayonet raised; none, absolutely none, on whom force could be used; except it be on the unarmed citizens, engaged peacefully and quietly in their daily occupation.

No one would be guilty of treason ("levying war against the United States, adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort,") or any other crime, made penal by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

To suppose that force could be called in, implies, indeed, a great mistake, both as to the nature of our Government and that of the controversy. It would be a legal and unconstitutional contest, a conflict of moral, and not physical force—a trial of constitutional, not military power, to be decided before the judicial tribunals of the country, and not on the field of battle. In such contest there would be no object for force, but those peaceful tribunals—nothing on which it could be employed, but in putting down courts and juries, and preventing the execution of judicial process. Leave these untouched, and all the militia that could be called forth, backed by a regular force of ten times the number of our small but gallant and patriotic army, could have not the slightest effect on the result of the controversy; but, subvert these by an armed body, and you subvert the very foundation of this, our free, constitutional, and legal system of government, and rear, in its place, a military despotism.

Feeling the force of these difficulties, it is proposed, with the view, I suppose, of disembarrassing the operation as much as possible of the troublesome interference of courts and juries, to change the scene of coercion from land to water; as if the government could have one particle more right to coerce a State by water, than by land; but unless I am greatly deceived, the difficulty on that element will not be much less than the other. The jury trial, at least, the local jury, (the trial by the vicinage,) may indeed, be evaded there; but in its place other and not much less formidable obstacles must be encountered.

There can be but two modes of coercion resorted to by water; blockade, and abolition of the ports of entry of the State, accompanied by penal enactments, authorising seizures for entering the waters of the State. If the former be attempted, there will be other parties besides the General Government and the State. Blockade is a belligerent right. It presupposes a state of war, and unless there be war, (war in due form as prescribed by the Constitution,) the order for blockade would not be respected by other nations, or their subjects. Their vessels would proceed directly for the blockaded port, with certain prospects of gain, if seized under the order of blockade, through the claim of indemnity against the General Government; and, if not, by a profitable market without the exaction of duties.

The other mode, the abolition of the ports of entry of the State, would also have its difficulties.—The Constitution provides that "no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce, or revenue, to the ports of one State, over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another;" provisions too clear to be eluded even by the force of construction. There will be another difficulty.—If seizures be made in port or within the distance assigned by the laws of the nations, as the limits of a State, the trial must be in the State, with all the embarrassments of its courts and juries; while beyond the ports and the distance to which I have referred, it would be difficult to point out any principle by which a foreign vessel at least, could be seized, except as an incident to the right of blockade, and, of course, with all the difficulties belonging to that mode of coercion.

But there yet remains another, and, I doubt not, insuperable barrier, to be found in the judicial tribunals of the Union, against all the schemes of introducing force, whether by land or water. Though I cannot concur in the opinion of those who regard the Supreme Court as the mediator, appointed by the Constitution, between the States and the General Government; and though I cannot doubt there is a natural bias on its part towards the powers of the latter, yet I must greatly lower my opinion of that high and important tribunal, for intelligence, justice, and attachment to the Constitution and particularly of that pure and upright magistrate, who has so long, and with such distinguished honor to himself and the Union, presided over its deliberations with all the weight that belongs to an intellect of the first order, united with the most spotless integrity, to believe, for a moment, that an attempt, so plainly and manifestly unconstitutional as a resort to force would be in such a contest, would be sustained by the sanction of its authority. In whatever form force may be used, it must present questions for legal adjudication. If, in the shape of blockade, the vessels seized under it must be condemned, and thus would be presented the question of prize or no prize; and with it the legality of the blockade. If, in that of a repeal of the acts, establishing ports of entries in the State, the legality of the seizure must be determined, and that would bring up the question of the constitutionality of giving a preference to the ports of one State over those of another; [illegible]

at[illegible] conte[illegible] ment m[illegible] and every [illegible] er by land o[illegible] arbiter in their pr[illegible] stitutionality of the att[illegible] and palpable, that it woul[illegible] sustain it.

There is indeed one view, and one on[illegible] the contest, in which force could be employed; but that view, as between the parties, would supercede the Constitution itself; that nullification is secession, and would, consequently, place the State, as to the others, in the relation of a foreign State. Such clearly would be the effect of secession; but it is equally clear, that it would place the State beyond the pale of her federal relations, and thereby, all control, on the part of the other States over her. She would stand to them simply in the relation of a foreign State, divested of all federal connection, and having none other between them but those belonging to the laws of nations.—Standing thus towards one another, force might indeed be employed against a State, but it must be a belligerent force, preceded by a declaration of war, and carried on with all its formalities. Such would be the certain effect of secession; and if nullification be secession—if it be but a different name for the same thing—such, too, must be its effect, which presents the highly important question, are they in fact the same, on the decision of which depends the question whether it be a *peaceable* and *constitutional* remedy, that may be exercised without *terminating* the *federal* relations of the State, or *not?*

I am aware that there is a considerable and respectable portion of our State, with a very large portion of the Union, constituting, in fact, a great majority, who are of the opinion, that they are the same thing, differing only in name; and who, under that impression, denounce it as the most dangerous of all doctrines, and yet, so far from being the same, they are, unless indeed I am greatly deceived, not only perfectly distinguishable, but totally dissimilar in their nature, their object, and effect; and that, so far from deserving the denunciation, so properly belonging to the act with which it is confounded, it is, in truth, the highest and most precious of all the rights of the States, and essential to preserve that very Union, for the supposed effect of destroying which, it is so bitterly anathematised.

I shall now proceed to make good my assertion of their total dissimilarity.

First, they are wholly dissimilar in their nature. One has reference to the parties themselves, and the other to their agents. Secession is a withdrawal from the Union; a separation from partners, and, as far as depends on the number withdrawing, a dissolution of the partnership. It presupposes an association, an union of several States or individuals, for a common object. Wherever these exist secession may, and where they do not, it cannot. Nullification, on the contrary, presupposes the relation of principal and agent; the one granting a power to be executed, the other appointed by him, with authority to execute it; and is simply a declaration on the part of the principal, made in due form, that an act of the agent, transcending his power, is null and void. It is a right belonging exclusively to the relation between principal and agent, to be found wherever it exists, and in all its forms, between several, or an association of principals and their joint agents, as well as between a single principal and his agent.

The difference in their object is no less striking than in their nature.

The object of secession is to free the withdrawing member from the obligation to the association or union; and is applicable to cases, where the intention of the association, or union has failed, either by an abuse of power on the part of its members or other causes. Its direct and immediate object, as it concerns the withdrawing member, is the dissolution of the association or union. On the contrary, the object of nullification is to confine the agent within the limits of its powers by arresting his acts transcending them; not with the view of destroying the delegated or trust power, but to preserve it by compelling the agent to fulfil the object for which the agency or trust was created; and is applicable only to cases where the trust or delegated powers are transcended on the part of the agent. Without the power of secession, an association or union, formed for the common good of all the members, might prove ruinous to some, by the abuse of power on the part of the others; and without nullification, the agent, might under the colour of construction, assume a power never intended to be delegated, or to pervert those delegated, to objects never intended to be comprehended in the trust, to the ruin of some of the principals. Each has, thus, its appropriate object; but objects in their nature are very dissimilar, so much so, that in case of an association or union, where the powers are delegated to be executed by an agent, the abuse of power, on the part of the agent, to the injury of one or more of members, would not justify secession on their part. The rightful remedy in that case would be nullification. There would be neither right no pretext, to secede; no right, because secession is applicable only to the acts of the members of the association or union, and not to the act of the agent; nor pretext, because there is another and equally efficient remedy, short of the dissolution of the association or union, which can only be justified by necessity. Nullification may, indeed, be succeeded by secession. In the case stated should the other members undertake to grant the power nullified, and should the nature of the power be such as to defeat the object of the association or union, at least, as far as the member nullifying is concerned, it would then become an abuse of power on the part of the principals; and thus present a case where secession would apply; but in no other, could it be justified, except it be for a failure of the association or union to effect the object for which it was created, independent of any abuse of power.

It now remains to show, that their effect is as dissimilar as their nature or object.

Nullification leaves the members of th[illegible] sociation or union, in the conditi[illegible] them, subject to all its burde[illegible] to all its advantages, comm[illegible] ber nullifying, as well [illegible] being, not to dest[illegible] been stated. I[illegible] agent, as far [illegible] leaving, in [illegible] of the [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] powers delegated, and those [illegible] course, to decide whether th[illegible] has or has not been violated. [illegible] difference, then, between those who [illegible] cession, and deny nullification, and tho[illegible] admit both, is, that one acknowledges th[illegible] declaration of a State pronouncing tha[illegible] Constitution has been violated, and is, th[illegible] fore, null and void, would be obligatory on [illegible] citizens, and would arrest all the acts of [illegible] Government, within the limits of the Sta[illegible] while they deny, a similar declaration, made by the same authority, and in the same manner, that an act of the Government has transcended its powers, and that it is, therefore, null and void, would have any obligation; while the other acknowledges the obligation in both cases. The one admits that the declaration of a State assenting to the Constitution bound her citizens, and that her declaration can unbind them; but denies that a similar declaration, as to the extent she has in fact bound them, has any obligatory force on them; while the other gives equal force to the declaration in the several cases.

The one denies the obligation where the object is to *preserve the Union, in the only way it can be*, by confining the government formed to execute the trust powers, strictly within their limits, and to the objects for which they were delegated, though they give *full* force where the object is *to destroy the Union itself*; while the other, in giving equal weight to both, *prefers the one because it preserves*, and *rejects the other because it destroys*; and yet the former is *the Union;* and the latter the *disunion party!* And all this strange distinction originates, as far as I can judge, in attributing to nullification what belongs exclusively to secession.—The difficulty, as to the former, it seems, is that a State cannot be in and out of the Union at the same time. This is, indeed, true, if applied to secession—*the throwing off the authority of the Union itself.* To nullify the Constitution, if I may be pardoned the solecism, would indeed be tantamount to disunion; and as applied to such an act, it would be true, that a State could not be in and out of the Union at the same time; but the act would be secession.

But to apply it to nullification, properly understood, the object of which, instead of resisting or diminishing the powers of the Union, is to preserve them as they are, neither increased nor diminished, and, thereby, the Union itself (for the Union may be as effectually destroyed by increasing, as by diminishing its powers—by consolidation, as by disunion itself,) would be, I would say, had I not great respect for many who do thus apply it, egregious trifling with a grave and deeply important constitutional subject.

I might here finish the task which your request imposed; having, I trust demonstrated, beyond the power of refutation, that a State has the right to defend her reserved powers against the encroachment of the General Government; and, I may add, that the right is in its nature peaceable, consistent with the federal relations of the State, and perfectly efficient, whether contested before courts, or attempted to be resisted by force. But there is an aspect to the subject, not yet touched, without adverting to which it is impossible to understand the full effects of Nullification, or the real character of our political institutions; I allude to the power which the States, as a confederated body, have acquired directly over each other; and on which I will now proceed to make some remarks, though I fear at the hazard of fatiguing you.

Previous to the adoption of the present Constitution, no power could be exercised over any State, by any other, or all of the States, without its own consent; and we, accordingly, find that the old confederation and the present Constitution, were both submitted for ratification to each of the States, and that each ratified for itself, and was bound only in consequence of its own particular ratification, as has been already stated. The present Constitution has made, in this particular, a most important modification in their condition. I allude to the provision which gives validity to amendments of the Constitution, when ratified by three fourths of the States—a provision which has not attracted as much attention as its importance deserves. Without it, no change could have been made in the Constitution, unless with the unanimous consent of all the States, in like manner as it was adopted. This provision, then contains a highly important concession, by each to all of the States, of a portion of the original and inherent right of self government, possessed, previously, by each separately, in favor of their general confederated powers, giving thereby increased energy to the States in their united capacity, and weakening them in the same degree in their separate. Its object was to facilitate and strengthen the action of the amending, or (to speak a little more appropriately as it regards the point under consideration) the repairing power. It was foreseen, that experience would probably disclose errors in the Constitution itself, that time would make great changes in the condition of the country, which would require corresponding changes in the Constitution, that the irregular and conflicting movements of the bodies, composing so [illegible] plex a system, might cause derangem[illegible] quiring correction, and that to rem[illegible] nanimous consent of all [illegible] these various con[illegible] the whole [illegible] parts, [illegible] powers of the Govern[illegible] thereby advance their power and [illegible] rallying on the reserved powers as the on[illegible] means of protecting themselves against the [illegible] croachments and oppression of the other. [illegible] such a contest, without the most effectual [illegible] check, the stronger will absorb the weaker [illegible] interests; while, on the other hand, without an adequate provision of some description or other, the efforts of the weaker to guard against the encroachments and oppression of the stronger, might permanently derange the system.

On the side of the reserved powers, no check more effectual can be found or desired than nullification, or the right of arresting, within the limits of a State, the exercise by the General Government of any powers but the delegated; a right which, if the States be true to themselves, and faithful to the Constitution, will ever prove, on the side of the reserved powers, an effectual protection to both.

Nor is the check on the side of the delegated, less perfect. Though less strong, it is ample to guard against encroachments; and is as strong as the nature of the system would bear, as will appear in the sequel. It is to be found in the amending power. Without the modification which it contains of the rights of self-government on the part of the States, as already explained, the consent each State would have been requisite to any additional grant of power, or other amendment of the Constitution. While, then, nullification would enable a State to arrest the exercise of a power not delegated, the right of self-government, if unmodified, would enable her to prevent the grant of a power not delegated; and, thus, her conception of what power ought to be granted, would be as conclusive against the co-States, as her construction of the powers granted, is against the General Government. In that case, the danger would be on the side of the States or reserved powers.—The amending power, in effect, corrects this danger. In virtue of these provisions which it contains, the resistance of a State to a power, cannot finally prevail, unless she be sustained by one fourth of the co-States; and in the same degree that her resistance is weakened, the power of the General Government, on the side of the delegated powers, is strengthened. It is true that the right of a State to arrest an unconstitutional act, is, of itself, complete against the Government; but it is equally so, that the controversy may, in effect, be determined against her, by a grant of the contested powers, by three fourths of the States. It is thus by this simple, and apparently incidental contrivance, the right of a State to nullify an unconstitutional act, so essential to the protection of the reserved rights, but which, unchecked, might too much debilitate the Government, is counterpoised, not by weakening the energy of a State in her direct resistance to the encroachment of the Government, or by giving to the latter a direct control over the States as proposed in the convention, but in a manner infinitely more safe, and, if I may be permitted so to express myself, scientific, by strengthening the amending or repairing power, the power of correcting all abuses or derangements by whatever cause, or from whatever quarter.

To sum all in a few words. The General Government has the right, in the first instance, of construing its own powers, which if final and conclusive, as is supposed by many, would have placed the reserved powers at the mercy of the delegated, and thus destroy the equilibrium of the system. Against that, a State has the right of nullification. This right on the part of the State, if not counterpoised, might tend too strongly to weaken the General Government and derange the system. To correct this, the amending or repairing power is strengthened. The former cannot be made too strong, if the latter be proportionably so. The increase of the latter is, in effect, the decrease of the former. Give to a majority of the States a right of amendment, and the asverting power on the part of the State, would, in fact, be annulled.—The amending power and the powers of the Government would, in that case, be, [illegible] reality, in the same hands. The same [illegible] rity that controlled the one, would [illegible] her; and the power arrested, as not [illegible] ould be immediately restored in [illegible] grant. This modification [illegible] ment, on the [illegible] pivot of [illegible]

[illegible] the reverse to be true. He says, [illegible] due and owing from the Bank, [illegible] of 83 millions of dollars, arising [illegible]

[illegible] on account of stock [illegible] stockholders, $35,000,000

Notes in *transitu*,	$4,363,410	
" in circulation	17,968,733	
		$22,332,143
Deposits—public	6,957,621	
" private	7,622,805	
		$14,580,590
Due on public debt		4,747,696
Loss account,		2,332,968
Discount, exchange and interest,		1,548,569
Fund to cover losses,		2,194,905
Cost of Banking houses,		611,292
Unclaimed dividends		94,937
		$83,493,013
Add—Dividend due January next, on 35 millions of stock at 3½ per cent.		1,225,000
Total amount of debt due from the Bank,		$84,718,013

Thus it appears that the whole amount of debt that is due and owing from the Bank of the United States, is eighty-four millions seven hundred and eighteen thousand dollars; and to pay and discharge which, they have—

Notes under discount,	$45,784,854	
Bills, foreign and domestic,	16,387,890	
Real estate, 1,822,721		
Banking houses, 1,174,380		6,510,053
Notes of state Banks, 3,512,952		
Specie,	8,026,055	
Cash in Europe,	2,885,016	
Debts from Offices, Navy Agents, &c.	3,899,145	
		$83,493,013

But of this amount of funds, applicable to the payment of debts due from the Bank, a material question necessarily arises—1st, of the bills under discount, scattered as they are from New Orleans through Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and almost every State of the Union, what amount ought fully to be set down under the head of insolvent and bad debts. The same question arises as to the value of the real estate, a great portion of which was received at exorbitant prices, and when the value of property was greatly beyond what it is at present. To place the whole at a loss of 12 per cent. is as low, are much lower, than truth would sanction. By this estimate, then, upon the bills under discount, and on the real estate say 62 millions of dollars, the entire loss to be sustained will be about seven millions four hundred and fifty thousand dollars. By this calculation, and it certainly is a moderate one, the Bank, is unable, to this extent, to meet the demands which rest against it.

Now every man at all acquainted with Bank operations, know that the solvency of any institution, even under the wisest and best management, depends upon the ability of its debtors to pay up their loans. If the makers and endorsers of those foreign and domestic bills, and notes under regular discount, amounting to $62,000,000; and some of which as is well known, having to run two, three and four years, should fail, of course loss is sustained. Now, instead of assuming, as we do, this probable loss at 12 per cent., we venture the belief that no guarantee of these debts could be obtained at less than 25 per cent. which would place the probable and expected loss to the Bank at more than 14 millions of dollars.

Such is the fair estimate as to the condition of a Bank that had been prudently and soberly managed. But can such a course be charged upon the Bank of the United States? All recollect its early career, under the administration of its first President, Mr. Jones. Absolute insolvency was then apprehended, and that result was, indeed, so threatening as to be averted only by its being placed in different hands, and when to save it, the dividends had to be withheld for several years. Since that time, its management has not been improved. Persons upon mere nominal discounts—themselves bankrupts, some procured large sums, and why and wherefore, and for what purpose, let the political operations recently witnessed in our country declare, for they do declare most loudly, and the nation at large has witnessed them. How much has been lost in this way none can know, for upon their face they are all "fair business transactions" no doubt—that is, there is a drawer of a note, with one or two endorsers probably; but what the whole are good for, on settlement, the Bank books, and those who look into them, cannot tell. Now looking to these charges, and to the probable losses we have before stated, what man in his senses, can presume the United States Bank, to be in a healthful state and condition. None can infer it—no one can believe it; and yet, because the President and Secretary of the Treasury, whose duty it is to guard the great interest of the country, have suggested such a thing, as probable, the whole Bank kennel are yelping, growling and barking.

We do not charge the Bank as insolvent. For the good of the country we hope otherwise. But our allegiance is not of a character to make us bow to its supremacy, or under present circumstances, to uphold it as correct; and especially, will we not presume upon its purity of management and purpose, when we see so much to warn us of the weakness and folly of such a presumption? It is a MAMMOTH, capable to swallow up the liberties of this country, unless cautiously guarded; and knowing this, we are disposed to presume nothing in favor of the honor, honesty, and integrity of purpose of its managers that we cannot clearly perceive, and fully understand! Then let us have light upon the subject.—Let us know those borrowers, in and out of Congress, upon whose ability to pay rests the solvency of this institution.

The President and Secretary, probably, did not mean to say that the Bank was insolvent, in the comprehensive meaning of the term, as it is usually understood and applied in cases of individuals, but merely that it owed more than was due to it—that if pressed, it could not meet its engagement. We say so, likewise; and the statements above submitted confirms that opinion.

DEMOCRATIC OHIO.—The extra of the Columbus Sentinel, gives the result of the election of Senator of the United States. Thomas Morris, the Senator elect, is one of the most decided friends of the present administration. He is opposed to the Bank of the United States, and maintained, a few days previously to his election, in a strong speech, the policy of chartering State Banks, founded on unquestionable securities—responsible directly to the State authorities, and conferring the benefits of the privilege on the whole people.—Globe.

The Germantown Telegraph of Thursday, announces the death of Mr. Robert McMurtrie, of that borough, and says:—"The deceased was assisting a neighbor to butcher some hogs, and became [illegible] at the sight of the blood, and fell to the ground. [illegible] to the house, where medical aid [illegible] him, but in fifteen minutes

[illegible] If the right be denied to the State to defend her reserved power, for fear she might resume the delegated, that denial would, in effect, yield to the General Government the power, under the colour of construction, to assume, at pleasure, all the reserved powers. It is, in fact, a question between the danger of the States resuming the delegated powers on one side, and the General Government assuming the reserved on the other.—Passing over the far greater probability of the latter than the former, which I endeavored to illustrate in the address of last summer, I shall confine my remarks to the striking difference between them, viewed in connexion with the genius and theory of our Government.

The right of a State, originally, to complete self-government, is a fundamental principle in our system, in virtue of which, the grant of power required the consent of all the States, while to withhold power, the dissent of a single State was sufficient. It is true that this original and absolute power of self-government has been modified by the Constitution, as already stated, so that three-fourths of the States may now grant power, and, consequently, it requires more than one-fourth to withhold. The boundary between the reserved and the delegated powers, marks the limits of the Union. The States are united to the extent of the latter, and separated beyond that limit. It is then clear, that it was not intended that the States should be more united than the will of one-fourth of them, or rather one more than a fourth, would permit. It is worthy of remark, that it was proposed in the convention to increase the confederated powers, as it may be called, by vesting two-thirds of the States with the right of amendment; so as to require more than a third, instead of a fourth—to withhold power. The proposition was rejected; & three-fourths unanimously adopted. It is, then, more hostile to the nature and genius of our system, to assume powers not delegated, than to resume those that are; and less hostile, that a State, sustained by one-fourth of her Co-States, should prevent the exercise of power really intended to be granted, than that the General Government should assume the exercise of powers not intended to be delegated. In the latter case, the usurpation of power would be against the fundamental principle of our system, the original rights of the States to self-government; while in the former, if it be usurpation at all, it would be, if so bold an expression may be used, an usurpation in the spirit of the Constitution itself—the spirit ordaining that the utmost extent of our Union should be limited by the will of any number of States, exceeding a fourth, and that most wisely. In a country having so great a diversity of geographical and political interest, with so vast a territory, to be filled in a short time with almost countless millions,—a country, of which the parts will equal empires; an union more intimate than that ordained in the Constitution, and so intimate, of course, that it might be permanently hostile to the feelings of more than a fourth of the States, instead of strengthening, would have exposed the system to certain destruction. There is a deep and profound philosophy, which he who best knows our nature will the most highly appreciate, that would make the intensity of the Union, if I may so express myself, inversely to the extent of the territory and the population of a country, and the diversity of its interests, geographical and political, and which would hold in deeper dread the assumption of reserved rights by the agent appointed to execute the delegated, than the resumption of the delegated, by the authority which granted the powers and ordained the agent to administer them. There appears, indeed, to be a great and prevailing principle, that tends to place the delegated power in opposition to the delegating; the created to the creating power—reaching far beyond man and his works, up to the universal source of all power. The earliest pages of sacred history record the rebellion of the archangels against the high authority of Heaven itself, and ancient mythology the war of the Titans against Jupiter, which according to its narrative, menaced the universe with destruction. This all-pervading principle is at work in our system—the created warring against the creating power; and unless the Government be bolted and chained down with links of adamant by the hand of the States which created it, the creature will usurp the place of the creator, and universal political idoltary overspread the land.

To be concluded.

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the Globe.

[illegible] being made in and out [illegible] tors and by mem[illegible] belief, that the [illegible] easury have [illegible] to suggest [illegible] Bank; [illegible]

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