

may or may not be enforced. To be a little more explicit, he must go back to his school boy days, for an analogous distinction—that between perfect and imperfect obligations. Those who have perfect obligations must be enforced, and an imperfect obligation may or may not be performed at pleasure. The only question to be determined is, whether the Constitution of the United States be the one or the other of these. I insist, said Mr. H. upon its obligatory character, and its power of enforcing its own authority; that it is a perfect compact, a social compact, as gentlemen call it. My syllogism then, is this: that a perfect obligation may be enforced in the manner prescribed in the compact; that the United States' Constitution is a perfect obligation; and that it may therefore be enforced in the manner prescribed in the compact. If I do not prove all this, Sir, then my doctrine must fall to the ground.

Now, Sir, here is a case. The United States passed certain revenue laws, which the State of S. Carolina annuls. If the United States have the power to pass the revenue laws, the nullifying laws are nullified. The minor, in this proposition, depends upon the facts and principles of which the Constitution arose. He would attempt to show, first, that the United States, at the time of adopting the Constitution, had power to grant to a general Government the right of ultimate decision. Second, that the States intended to do it. Third, that they did it. And, fourth, that they have always since acted up to this intention. He would pledge himself to make these propositions, if he could. What is sovereignty? There is but one absolute sovereignty—the Sovereign of the Universe. No State is sovereign, except in respect to other States. Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without dependence on a foreign power, is sovereign. Can the Government enforce obligations upon the People of this Union? When sovereignty is vested, it is vested with the right to govern the people over whom it acts. If the people disposed of a part of their sovereignty to a certain body of men, they made a grant at will, which they can resume whenever they please. The grant to a certain body of men of exclusive legislative, judicial, and executive power, is a grant at will, according to our Declaration of Independence. The power that gives the sovereignty can take it back; but where several States concur to grant a sovereignty for the common benefit, two or three of the parties cannot withdraw it without the assent of the whole. He did not care whether the States or the People made the grant.

The enquiry whether the States or the People made the grant is entirely beside the question. Suppose Great Britain made the Constitution for us. The question would be, what is it? Does it vest in the United States, sovereign powers, whether expressly, or by implication? That the powers given by the Constitution are sovereign, there is no doubt. The power to make peace and war, to coin money, &c. are attributes of sovereignty. Two or more States may grant to a common government all their legislative, judicial, and executive powers. This would be a grant of their whole sovereignty. Consequently, they might grant certain defined powers, and this would be a grant of a portion of their sovereignty. Those principles by no means admit the inference that the people of a State may reserve federal sovereignty. Two or more States then, as they have the power, may vest in a common government the right to define its own limits. He would admit that where the majority of the people could decide, the government would become consolidated. But that consolidation, in this case, would result in despotism, he would not admit. The Federal power, so far from tending to consolidation, held the popular power in check.

This was a most happy frame of Government.—The popular power held the federal power in check, and the federal power checked the popular power. He need not go beyond these walls for an illustration of this position. Can the majority of the people of the United States, without the concurrence of the States, carry a measure? Certainly not. Look at the facts of the case. He would illustrate it by a few examples. Fourteen States in this Union, in population a little above one fourth of the whole population of the United States can defeat any measure of the House of Representatives.—Thirteen States, in population somewhat below a fourth of the whole population of the United States, or even twelve States, with a population but a little above one-third of the whole, may also defeat any federal law. How then, can the popular branch carry any measure they please, and produce a consolidation of power? But this was not all. Thirteen States could always check the whole popular power in the appointment of Judges, for the Judges were created by the federative power. The States too, were represented in the electoral colleges. No Government under Heaven was so capable as this of protecting the rights of the minority. If each State had an equal vote, the Government would be merely federative; and if the House of Representatives had all the legislative power, the Government would be consolidated; but it was neither federative nor consolidated. The federative in the Senate, and the popular power in the House, checked each other, and there was a third compound power in the Executive, which checked both. Never was power in any government so well balanced. Yet we are told that we must go beyond this power, to ascertain whether State rights have been violated here or not.

Having shown that the States could form just such a Government as we have,

the next question was—Did they design to form it? If they did not, then they deceived the People, or the People deceived themselves. What was the old Confederation called? "A league of perpetual union," not a Government. The Constitution was called the Constitution of the United States; that is, a substitution of Government. Each State, under the old Confederation, retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence; and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. Under the Constitution, the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People. The old Confederation had legislative but not executive and judicial power. He appealed to gentlemen to say whether the Constitution was formed for any other purpose but to create a sovereign power. It bestowed on the General Government all the attributes of sovereignty, and it begins "We the People of the United States, in order to form a perfect Union," &c.

Mr. Holmes then compared the constitution of the United States with that of the State of South Carolina, to show that, in title, and in the clauses conferring judicial, executive, and legislative power, they bore a strong resemblance, and had the same object in view—the creation of a sovereignty. In each case, the framers seemed to think they were doing the same sort of business—making a compulsory power for the purpose of enforcing obedience to the constitution.—Was it to be believed that the State constitutions were to be enforced, and the federal constitution to be observed or not, at pleasure? The constitution of South Carolina, and that of the United States is the Government of the United States.—There is nothing in the constitution of the United States which authorizes the supposition that laws made by the United States can be resisted by any other power. The presumption is, that the same power which has legislative authority has also the authority of adjudication; and that the same Government that makes the laws can alone repeal them; and further that even the same branch of the government which makes can unmake a law, unless otherwise provided for. In the case of war and peace: a peace may be made by the President and two-thirds of the Senate, though, to declare the war, the whole concurrent legislative authority is necessary. Ordinarily, the power that makes is the only power that can repeal a law. Would it not be an anomaly in legislation, if one power could make a law, and a portion of that power repeal it. South Carolina is but one of the family—but seeks to control the whole.—Like the old Lady in Dr. Franklin's story, she does not know how it happens that, in all the family quarrels, she is always right, and the rest are always wrong. We have a Legislature, an Executive, and a Supreme Court—all exercising supreme authority. If we had need of more positive proof that these powers are supreme, we have it in the fact that all State officers are sworn to support it, and the State Judges are bound thereby in conversation of State laws and constitutions. Every Judge in South Carolina must swear this, notwithstanding the ordinance. The design of the framers of the constitution was to make a common sovereignty, as we find by looking back to their correspondence.—Under the confederation, the States were "separate"; and there was no power to compel a refractory State to obey the laws of the Union. Their whole object was to get this compulsory power. Every thing was right, except the means of protecting the common interests.

The design of the great founder of our Government was apparent from a letter to a friend in Great Britain, in which he says, "they [the people] see the necessity of a general controlling power, and are addressing their respective assemblies to grant it to Congress." Again, he says, "I do not see that we can long exist as a nation, without lodging some where a power which will precede the whole Union, in as energetic a manner as the authority of the State Government extends over the several States." We see that he believed this controlling power to be essential to the preservation of our independence.

Having considered, continued Mr. H. whether this power could be and was intended to be granted, it remained with him to inquire next, whether, in fact, it was granted. This was a constitution of government, and, therefore, it was sovereign as far as to all powers delegated to it. This was the general understanding of the people; and the idea of nullification, and reserved rights, was almost every where ridiculed by them. In a Tennessee newspaper he had seen a story which he would relate. A law of that State respecting marriages required the publication of the banns, some time previous to the marriage. The time appeared too very long to one individual, and he determined to oppose the law and set himself down on the reserved rights. The law did not prohibit marriage, which would be flatly unconstitutional. He accordingly nullified and disobeyed the law. If we refer to the powers granted to the Federal Government we shall be satisfied that they have all the essential attributes of sovereignty: they were the powers of taxation, war, treaties, coin, commerce, domain, allegiance, [viz: treason], and naturalization.

What attribute of sovereignty was more essential than the right, in some manner, to determine definitively and effectually, its own limits? The Senator from Kentucky, (Mr. Bibb) said, as he understood him,—he was sorry that he was not present to say whether correctly or not—that the Supreme Court

could judge only in judicial cases, and not in political cases. But were not controversies between States political cases?

The judicial power extends to all cases in law arising, &c. and that the cases are described—one case mentioned, is that controversy between a sovereign State, it is said, must not be drawn to the feet of the Federal Government; but in a case, involving political power, the Supreme Court must adjudicate upon it. What case controverted between States was not a political case, except those merely of *revenue and tariff*—Questions arising relative to foreign ambassadors are also political cases.

The power might be humbling to the pride of the States, but it was essential to the general Government and it was intended to be given by the framers. The large and proud States might seek with more confidence than the smaller and weaker States, to destroy this power. How would Rhode Island and Delaware fare if the General Government could not protect their rights in controversies with more powerful neighbors. He should think that no small State would ever consent to this doctrine.

No, sir, it is the rock of their political salvation. He would warn them to cling to it. Whenever the Federal Government is deprived of the power of deciding controversies between the U. States and the State, the great States would eat up the little ones—gentlemen might depend upon it. All the quarrels between the General Government and the U. States had originated with the large States. The State of Virginia 1798 passed her famous resolutions going a great length—a little too far—travelling in the road to nullification. What did Massachusetts say on that occasion? (Here Mr. H. read the resolutions passed by the State of Massachusetts relating to the proceeding of Virginia.)

Pennsylvania had a dispute with the General Government on the subject of the Olstead case. Well, Pennsylvania is a great State—she kicked up her heels, and there was an application made to the military power. Gen. Bright, "With his ten thousand men, "Marched up the hill, and then marched down again."

The Marshal very peaceably executed his precepts. Then that State applied to the other States, saying that there must be some other tribunal to decide cases of this description, instead of the Federal Court. Virginia replied that the U. S. Supreme Court was constituted tribunal, and that no letter could be found. How did Massachusetts act during the time that the embargo law was in force? She was for declaring the law unconstitutional, and really did so. Pennsylvania joined in that opinion. The large States were always troublesome to manage. They would wax faint and kick.

It was believed by the framers of the Constitution that there would be some danger of the larger States imposing upon the smaller, and therefore made it a *novum* in that the Senate each State should be represented equally. What would New Jersey do in a controversy with New York? Though she might have with her talents such as we had seen exhibited here in this debate, she would be obliged to yield. If there was no Supreme tribunal, the rich and powerful States would oppress the smaller, who would stand on chance with them. The large ones would eat up the small ones. How would it be with respect to Delaware and Pennsylvania? If there was a common tribunal? Little Delaware would fight hard, but in vain. How would it be with Rhode Island and Massachusetts? The small State would be obliged to yield to the large one.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bibb) had said that no process could be devised to compel a sovereign State to yield to the judgment given in favor of another sovereign State. He thought that he was in a way to devise a process to make Massachusetts come into a process and answer to Rhode Island. (Here Mr. H. named the various processes that would be necessary to effect that object.) Yes, he could put the little State of Rhode Island in such a position that, if Massachusetts were to attempt to disturb her, she might double up her first, and say "touch me if you dare!" In giving this great power, he admitted there was much danger, but not so much as may appear at first sight.

That power must be vested somewhere, and where else can it be vested? If we give any power at all, we must give as much as is given in this bill. It was a high-handed power he admitted, but not more high-handed than the power assumed by a State to nullify the laws of the Federal Government. Legislative power was not in so much danger of being abused as was power vested in the hands of the Executive. This bill gave to the President as much power as he had before, but it gave him no more. He was never too much disposed to give power to a President, and to this President he would not give it so soon as he would to any other. The remedy against the abuse of the power was here; and the construction of the Government itself. The House of Representatives is only elected for two years, when they must be accountable to their constituents. Senators are elected for six years, when they must answer to their States, and the share they have taken in the Federal Administration. In both branches there is an equal responsibility to the body politic. The President himself is also responsible to the people, acting through their representatives; and in consequence of these securities the danger of the abuse of power was very much diminished. After all, if a State conceived itself to be injured by any abuse of power, it had the right of appeal to the good sense of the community, and could apply for any amendment of the Constitution. Then, after that, came the last remedy—revolution. If the whole people were so depraved, so corrupt, and so bent on oppression, that there was no hope of any redress, then the only remedy was revolution. But the gentleman from Kentucky had put an extreme case, a case which was not even to be supposed—one which the framers of the Constitution never had contemplated—but still if such a case ever occurred, then the remedy must be—revolution. It had been said there was danger to be apprehended from the investment of this power in the hands of the Executive. But it appeared to him that when the gentlemen who made this observation were sticking against giving the President these powers, after what they had done in former instances, they were straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.

If the people made the Constitution, or if they adopted it, the secession of a State was, in his opinion, impossible, because the laws of the United States, made under that Constitution, are binding on every citizen of every State. All owe allegiance to the United States. How was it possible for an individual to go off, to secede. He might go, and expatriate himself, but he could not go off, and yet remain in the Union; he could not remain within the jurisdiction of the U. States, and yet be out of the operation of the Federal power. He might go away from the shores of the U. States, but

he could not otherwise secede. And the States stood in the same condition. Both States and individuals stood on the same ground. If he was not right in his conviction that the ultimate determination of power was in the United States, he would ask—where is it? It is somewhere. Where? If there be no power anywhere, why then it existed no where, and the question could not be decided. The gentleman from Kentucky insisted that the power did not exist, although it was right before his eyes. It was a common thing for a man to assume his conclusions first, and to look for evidence afterwards. But it must have been hard work for the gentleman to deny the existence of a power which was staring him in the face. There are sectarians of all kinds, who by down their conclusions first, and then look about for their premises to sustain them.—There was a preacher of that kind in his section of the country, who would always begin with his conclusions and work up to his premises. On one occasion he took for his text a sentence of Thomas, and endeavored to expound it on his old principle, more and more perplexed as he proceeded, and concluding in the midst of mist and confusion, leaving his congregation about as ignorant of his meaning as he himself was. One of his auditors, after the conclusion of his sermon took occasion to speak to him, and to suggest that he seemed to have juggled a little in his discourse, and was not quite so lucid as usual. Why, said he, I thought I had made a very excellent argument, a very good argument, indeed, from my text; but between you and me, I would rather Thomas had never said it. So it was, rather Thomas had never said it. So it was, rather Thomas had never said it. So it was, rather Thomas had never said it.

Suppose the Federal Government were to permit South Carolina to carry her point, and to have things just as she desired. The principle being extended thus far, where would the government stop? South Carolina would suppose had made her regulations to admit goods into her ports, without the payment of duty. In reference to commercial advantages, she would at once destroy the equality between the States. South Carolina would exclusively enjoy the benefit of this regulation, to the injury of all the others. On this principle any State may nullify the laws of the Union. Suppose that Rhode Island had adopted a provision that no law of the U. States which did not adopt the principle of the protective system should be considered as constitutional, on the ground that the principle of protection is recognized by the Constitution. She has the right to do so. South Carolina to adopt nullification. And suppose that South Carolina should declare that no law should be constitutional which adopted the principle of protection. These conflicting opinions of the States would place the Federal Government in a position where its action is sure to be wrong. If a law should be passed to protect goods, South Carolina would oppose it. If any such law should be repealed the repeal would be opposed by Rhode Island. Each would set itself on her reserved rights, and would set the laws of the General Government at defiance. So, if the State of Mississippi should take it into her head to seat herself on her reserved rights in reference to the freedom of the navigation of the Mississippi, she might defy the U. States with the same propriety. Suppose that Indiana was to adopt the principle that no law, no provision of the Constitution of the U. States could sanction slavery, and should proceed accordingly to oppose the laws on this subject. He (Mr. H.) would ask gentlemen to apply this doctrine that a state can decide for itself, and nullify a law of Congress and the Constitution, and leave them to say in what a situation they would find themselves. It was not his intention to disturb that delicate question, nor to provoke any discussion from gentlemen whose situation rendered them so sensitive on the subject.

If, indeed, we were not to hold together, he would ask in what condition the holding together states would be. It is not a very easy thing for a state that has a right to judge for itself how far it is bound to obedience, and that, on the contrary, individuals have not that right; two cases running parallel to each other. Was he, (Mr. H.) to reason himself into the belief that he, as a community, belonging to one State, had a right to resist laws which others obeyed—and, judging for himself, place himself upon his reserved rights?—And suppose that a class of individuals should be found carrying out this idea to a still more extensive extent, it might be productive of effects at which he did not dare to glance. They would be most horrible, but not so horrible as the idea that this Constitution should be broken up at the will of any of the states. What he would ask, had been our construction of the Constitution? He had endeavored to show, in the first place, that the people of the states could form a Constitution, and give to the states sufficient power. Truly, that they designed, and did, what he had done it.

He would now ask what had been the opinions of the large states as to the powers of the General Government? At the very first session of the first Congress this power was assumed in the great Judiciary bill for a final determination of all questions between the U. States and a state. The 25th section of that bill had been a standing law through all the different administrations of the government. It was passed in the Senate by a vote of 19 to 6—South Carolina being unanimously in its favor, and it passed the House of Representatives without a division. No attempt was made during the whole discussion of that bill to strike out the 25th section of it, which has been a standing law ever since. It was considered as the sheet anchor of the Constitution—that which was to hold us together eventually through all the storms of politics which might occur. Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, failed in their powerful attempts to resist the constitutionality of this section.—Why had not the section been repealed, if it was so unconstitutional? Congress dared not repeal it, for the repeal of that section would break up the Union.

It had been asked what was the necessity for this bill? What had South Carolina done? He could only answer that she had done this—she had done nothing more than repeal our laws, and to make it highly criminal to execute them.—She had repealed them in many points, as she showed by a reference to her acts. And she had also done a few other things. She had raised an army to carry on a contest against the U. States. This was easily shown. She had raised an army to enforce the execution of her own laws which have repealed the laws of the U. States, and, in doing this, she had not raised an army to carry on a contest with the U. States; it was a direct aggression.—He would adapt the law precisely to meet the case. The State of South Carolina would have no good reason to complain of the penalties prescribed by the laws of the U. States for violating their laws, were no greater than those which she has enacted for a violation of hers. There could be no great cruelty in this course. Mr. H. then read the lines and penalties imposed by the acts of South Carolina. He stated that the General Government was, by the provisions of these laws, placed in a situation where she was obliged to legislate so as to meet the whole case.

The gentleman from Kentucky said that the Federal Government had been unjust to South Carolina. This word brought up the whole question. He was not disposed to do injustice to any one, nor did he believe there was any ground for the declaration, that there had been any thing unjust done to South Carolina. We had also been told by the same gentleman that we must forgive as we hope to be forgiven. Now South Carolina instead of exhibiting any signs of repentance, had set herself in array against the U. States. And the Federal Government would set a bad example to the other States, if, without repentance on the part of South Carolina, they must forgive this hostility. As the case now stands the whole conciliation must come from one side.

Sir: I have done, continued Mr. H. [looking to the portrait of Washington, at the left of the door.] That portrait ought not to be here; it is a cruel admonition upon us, who have rejected his counsels and disregarded his precepts. It was, you recollect, difficult to gain admission—you at first placed it over the clock doorway; there it was looking down upon the revolving time; it was pale, languishing, and I thought it wept. It seemed to be reflecting upon the changes of the last thirty years. It was removed, and placed over the President's chair; still it cast a melancholy look at the clock. At length you have shoved it away to the left. I don't complain a fit emblem of our abandonment of his principles. Look! his lips appear to move, and he seems to say; what he once before said— "The unity of government which constitutes you one people, is also dear to you. It is justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence; the support of your tranquility at home, your honor abroad; of your safety, of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that from different causes and from different quarters, much pain will be taken, many artifices employed to weaken in your minds, the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress, against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively, (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your National Union to your collective and individual happiness, that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to speak of it as the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned, and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of any attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts of it. And further to add—O my children, were it for this I endure the privations, sufferings, and dangers, which give you national existence? Was it for this that I watched over your infant days with a parent's solicitude? Was it for this, I marked your growth to manhood with a parent's partiality? Oh what a fatal lesson have you given to the friends of liberty and humanity throughout the world!—Sir, I, who have flitted like the bird, from spray to spray, sometimes laughing, sometimes playing with the flowers of fancy, and now when then reasoning, you wind off as if somewhat "in the gloom,"—I cannot endure the reflection that this fair and perfect fabric of human wisdom, so fair and perfect that we would almost say, "the hand that made it is divine," should so soon dissolve, and "like the baseless fabric of a vision, leave not a wreck behind." The thought is horrible—can it be? I cannot give it up; I will nourish and cherish it, as a friend on his bed of death. I will watch its departing spirit with the most anxious solicitude, and, if I can, will lure it back to life. And after it is finally gone, I will observe its remains, and cast a longing, lingering look on each form and feature; impress them upon my heart, and stamp them upon the tablet of my memory; and I would cherish them as the memory of joys that are past, "pleasant and painful to the soul." No, sir, I will not despair: I will hope even against hope. Why should I distrust a kind and benignant Providence who planted us here, and has reared us up to what we are. I will believe that He who has so often made bare his arms in defence of the infant liberties of our country, will pardon and protect us still; that he who has long held these Stars in his own right hand, and walked so long in the midst of these, his golden candlesticks, will be our "cloud by day and pillar of fire by night," to guide and direct us in the path of constitutional freedom.

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tomical Cabinet, consisting of preparations in wax, valued at \$10,000; it was placed in the fifth story, and was consumed before any attempt could be made to rescue it. In the fourth story many curiosities were either totally destroyed by the fire, or greatly injured by a hasty removal. The third story was appropriated to the Gallery of Paintings.—These we are glad to learn, were nearly all saved, though some of them are injured or defaced. From the second story of the building, (the first floor of the Museum,) the articles were removed to a place of safety, but in a more or less damaged condition. Much of the goods from the stores on the ground floor were removed, but considerable loss was sustained here also. The fire originated in one of the chimneys of the Museum.

To make room for the following very interesting debate, we have been compelled to omit almost every thing else,—advertisements as well as other interesting matter,—intended for this paper. We feel confident, however, our readers will not regret the alternative.

TUESDAY, FEB. 12. IN SENATE.

MR. CLAY'S REVENUE BILL.

Mr. CLAY, according to notice given yesterday, asked leave to introduce the following bill for gradually reducing the duties on foreign articles to the revenue standard: "Be it enacted in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That, from and after the 30th day of September, 1833, in all cases where duties are imposed on foreign imports, by the act of the 14th day of July, 1832, entitled, "An act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports," or by any other act, shall exceed twenty per cent on the value thereof, one-tenth part of such excess shall be deducted; from and after the 30th day of September, 1835, another tenth part shall be deducted; from and after the 30th day of September, 1837, another tenth part shall be deducted; from and after the 30th day of September, 1839, another tenth part thereof shall be deducted; and from and after the 30th day of September, 1841, one half of the residue of such excess shall be deducted; and from and after the 30th day of September, 1842, the other half thereof shall be deducted.

Sec 2. And be it further enacted, That so much of the second section of the act of the 14th of July, 1832, as fixes the rate of duty on all milled and full-dressed cloth, known by the name of plains, kerseys, or kindred cottons, of which wool is the only material, the value whereof does not exceed thirty-five cents a square yard, at 5 per cent ad valorem, shall be and the same is hereby repealed; and the said article shall be subject to the same duty of fifty per cent as is provided by the said second section for other manufactures of wool, which duty shall be liable to the same deductions as are prescribed by the first section of this act.

Sec 3. And be it further enacted, That, until the 30th day of September, 1832, the duties imposed by existing laws, as modified by this act, shall remain and continue to be collected; and from and after the day last aforesaid, all duties upon imports shall be collected in ready money, and laid for the purpose of raising such revenue as may be necessary to a economical administration of the Government; and for that purpose, shall be equal upon all articles, according to their value, which are not by this act declared to be entitled to entry subsequent to the said 30th day of September, 1842, free of duty; and until otherwise directed by law, from and after the 30th day of September, 1842, such duties shall be at the rate of twenty per cent ad valorem; and from and after that day, all credits not allowed by law in the payment of duties, shall be and are hereby abolished. Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the passage of any law, in the event of war with any foreign power, for imposing such duties as may be deemed by Congress necessary to the prosecution of the said war.

Sec 4. And be it further enacted, That, in addition to the articles now exempted by the existing laws from the payment of duties, the following articles imported from and after the 30th day of September, 1833, and until the 30th day of September, 1842, shall also be admitted free of duty, to wit: bleached and unbleached linens, manufactured silk, or which silk shall be the component material of chief value, coming from this side of the Cape of Good Hope, and worsted stuffs, shawls, and other manufactures of silk and worsted.

Sec 5. And be it further enacted, That from and after the said 30th day of September, 1842, the following articles shall be admitted to entry, free from duty to wit: unmanufactured cotton, indigo, quercitron, opium, tin in plates and sheets, gum arabic, gum senegal, lac dye, madder, madder-root, turis and berries used in dyeing, saffron, nutmeg, wood or paste, allices, annatto, bergamot pitch, cochineal, camomile flowers, coriander seed, castor, chalk, corculus indicus, born plates for lanterns or horns, other horns and tinis, India rubber, unmanufactured ivory, juniper berries, musk, nuts of all kinds, oil of juniper, unmanufactured rattan and reeds, tortoise-shell, tinofin, shallac, vegetables used principally in dyeing and in composing dyes, weld and other articles employed chiefly for dyeing except bichromate of potash, prussiate of potash, chromate of potash, and nitrate of lead, quercitron, and laealic acids, and all other dyeing drugs, and materials for composing dyes.

Sec 6. And be it further enacted, That so much of the act of the 14th day of July, 1832, or of any other act, as is inconsistent with this act, shall be and the same is hereby repealed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as to prevent the passage, prior or subsequent to the 30th day of September, 1842, of any act or acts, from time to time, that may be necessary to detect, prevent, or punish evasions of the duties on imports imposed by law.

Mr. Clay alluded to his notice of yesterday, with regard to the introduction of his bill, and said he owed an apology for this proceeding, which was, that although it might not be strictly parliamentary—although it might not accord with the views of the Senate, he considered it justified by the present agitated condition of the country.

He said he had risen for no purpose of gratifying the audience—with no party or political views but from a sense of duty to his country in its present state of civil commotion. He had no desire of making an ambitious display of his powers; but he wished to give tranquility to the country. The face of the country exhibits a scene of great and growing prosperity; yet it cannot be disguised that there are great dissensions, disturbances, and divisions, such as it is impossible to quell, without pacific and accommodating measures; and an sure that this effort will therefore meet with a favorable reception, whether or not it

### EASTON, MD.

TUESDAY MORNING, FEB. 19, 1833.

We are indebted to the polite attention of Col. Emory, who left Annapolis on Sunday, for the Report of the Committee of the Senate, relative to the collision between the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company; and for the loan of the Baltimore American of the 15th inst. from which we are happy to learn that we were in error in stating, in our last, that the Farmers' and Merchants' Bank and the City Hotel, of Baltimore, were on fire.

The fire of Thursday morning, destroyed the fourth and fifth stories of Mr. Clark's building, in which the Museum was kept; the lower stories of the house, though much damaged by fire and water, were preserved. The greatest loss, sustained by the Museum, was the total destruction of the splendid Ana-