John Calvert

EASTERN-SHORE WHIG AND PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE.

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NOTICE.

ALL persons having claims against the Estate of Benjamin Roe, late of Talbot county deceased, are hereby invited to exhibit their claims to Gouldsbery Price, Agent for Edward C. Harper.
Centreville, Feb. 16—march 19 3t*

CONSTABLE'S SALE.

BY virtue of two writs of Fieri Facias, to me directed, by Thomas C. Nicols, Esq., one at the instance and for the use of John L. Kerr, Executor of Rachel L. Kerr, deceased, and the other at the instance and for the use of Robert H. Rhodes, administrator of James Cain deceased, will be sold at the front door of the Court House, in the town of Easton on TUESDAY, the 2d day of April next, between the hours of 10 o'clock, A. M. and 4 o'clock, P. M., all the right and title of Andrew Cheezum of, in, and to, A PART OF A TRACT OF LAND, called *Pitt's Range*," containing 35 acres, more or less, situate, lying and being in Talbot county, near the Hole in-the wall, whereon the said Andrew Cheezum now resides, together with all and singular the improvements and appurtenances thereto belonging; taken to satisfy the aforesaid writs of Fi Fa. together with the interest and costs due and to become due thereon.
WM. BARNETT, Constable.
march 9 3w

Constable's Sale.

BY virtue of two writs of Fieri Facias to me directed, against Thomas Parrott, one at the suit of Charles L. Rhodes, use of Samuel H Benny, and the other at the suit of Annanias Gossage, use of Samuel H Benny, will be sold at the front door of the Court house in the town of Easton, on Saturday the 30th instant, between the hours of 10 o'clock, A. M. and 5 o'clock, P. M. of said day, the following property, viz. one House and Lot on the Point Road, where Scipio Danebury now lives, a small lot of ground adjoining the aforesaid lot, purchased by said Parrott, of John Bennett, Esq., all his interest of, in and to a lot of ground at Easton Point, on which John Goldsborough, Esq.'s house stands, also a Carriage House at Easton Point; all taken as the lands and tenements of Thomas Parrott, and will be sold for cash to satisfy the aforesaid fieri facias and the interest and cost due and to become due thereon. Attendance given by
JOSEPH GRAHAM, Constable.
march 9

SHERIFF'S SALE.

BY virtue of a venditioni exponas issued out of Talbot county Court and to me directed and delivered, by the Clerk thereof, against Joseph H. Sands and John Sands, at the suit of William Baker, will be sold on TUESDAY, the 9th day of April next, at the front door of the Court House, in the town of Easton, for cash, between the hours of 10 o'clock, A. M. and 5 o'clock P. M. of said day; all the right, title, interest, claim and estate, both in law and equity of Joseph H. Sands and John Sands, of, in and to, a farm or plantation, lying and being situate in the Chapel district, Talbot county, on which William Peckham now resides, and known as part of Collin Selby, and part of other tracts, containing three hundred and twenty five acres of land, more or less—Seized and taken as the lands and tenements of the aforesaid Joseph H. Sands and John Sands, and will be sold to pay and satisfy the aforesaid venditioni exponas, and the interest and cost due and to become due thereon.
Attendance by
J. M. FAULKNER, Shff.
mar 16

PUBLIC SALE.

WILL be sold at Public Sale on TUESDAY, the 2d of April, 1833, between the hours of 10 o'clock A. M. and 5 o'clock, P M. on the premises, the following property, belonging to Gerard T. Hopkins & Moore, of Baltimore, viz:

TWO HOUSES AND LOTS on Cabinet street, in the town of Easton; formerly the property of John Tomlinson.

ALSO,

ONE HOUSE AND LOT, on Port street in the town of Easton, formerly the property of Joseph Chain.

The terms of sale are: one third of the purchase money to be paid in hand, at the time of sale, one third in three months, and the remainder in six months from the day of sale, with interest on the two last payments, to be secured by bonds or notes with security to be approved by the subscriber. On the payment of the whole purchase money, good and sufficient deeds will be executed to the purchaser or purchasers. Attendence by
ISAAC ATKINSON, Agent.

N. B. Persons having claims against the subscriber will please present them at an early day, as I expect to leave the Eastern shore; and all persons indebted will please make immediate payment, or their accounts will be left in the hands of an agent for collection.
ISAAC ATKINSON.
Talbot county, March 16th, 1833.

LOT FOR SALE.

WILL be sold, at a low price, a LOT OF LAND, containing 9¾ acres, about one mile from the town of Easton. Apply to the editor of the Whig.
feb 12 w

Millinery and Mantua-making.
MRS. GIBBS,

NEXT door to Mr. James Willson's store, Washington Street, Easton, has just received in addition to her former stock, a large supply of
Bonnets, Ribbons & Fancy articles,
which she will dispose of on moderate terms.

MRS. GIBBS, greatful for past favours, invites her former customers, and friends to call and see her new assortment of FASHIONS and GOODS. Mrs. Gibbs flatters herself that by her attention to her business in all the varieties of MANTUA and MILLINERY, to please the public.

Mrs. Gibbs has and expects to keep constantly in her employment, two young Ladies from Baltimore, both experienced in the above branches. She also receives the latest fashions.
jan 5 w

ADVENTURERS ATTEND!
HURRA FOR SYLVESTER!

On last Thursday, we had the pleasure of selling to one of our patrons, (a gentleman of Baltimore) the Capital Prize of
5,000 DOLLARS,
In the Delaware and North Carolina Lottery, Class No. 6.

AGAIN TRIUMPHANT!!

In the Grand Consolidated Lottery, Class No. 5—Drawn one week since, we sold the Capital Prize of
3,389 DOLLARS,
To a Gentleman in Pennsylvania.
Also, in the New York Consolidated Lottery, Class No 3. drawn Feb. 6th, we sold Combination 14 62 56 $1000
" 14 31 62 $1000
Making 4 Grand Capital Prizes sold in the course of two weeks.

NEW YORK LOTTERY,
Class No. 5—to be drawn April 8d, 1833.—Sixty six number Lottery, 10 drawn ballots.
SPENDID CAPITALS
$40,000, 10,000, 5,100, 3,000, 2 of 1,000, &c.
Tickets $10. Lowest prize $12

MARYLAND STATE LOTTERY,
Class No. 6—to be drawn at Baltimore, on Saturday, March 30, 1833.
$20,000, Highest Prize.
20,000, 6,000, 2,500. 1,270, 10 of 1,00 100, of 500, &c.
Tickets 5$, shares in proportion.

☞Orders from any part of the U. States will receive the same attention as on personal application. When $10 and upwards are remitted, postage need not be paid.

SYLVESTER is regularly licensed by the several States in which he has offices, (at New York, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Nashville, and New Orleans;) thus all tickets issued from his office are genuine and guaranteed by the Managers.

**For capital prizes, orders from the country must be addressed to
S. J. SYLVESTER.
mar 2 Baltimore, Md.

BOOK AND STATIONERY STORE,
AT THE POST OFFICE, ADJOINING MR. LOWE'S HOTEL.

THE subscriber has opened an assortment of BOOKS and STATIONERY, which he will endeavor to perfect in a few days, and invites his friends and the public to give him a call. At his store may now be had, among others,

Blair's Antient History	Ruddiman's Latin Grammar
Tytler's History	Euclid's Elements
Goldsmith's Rome	Keith on the Globes
Goldsmith's Greece	McIntyre on the Globes
Grinshaw's England	Paradise Lost
Tooke's Pantheon	Blair's Lectures
Bonnycastle's Algebra	Worcester's Geography and Atlas
Griesbach's Greek Testament	Adams' do. do.
Wilson's do. do.	Academical Reader
Greek Exercises	Introduction to do.
Huthinson's Xenophon	English Reader
Horace Delphini	Introduction to do.
Vilgil	Sequel to do.
Sullust	English Grammars
Cæsar	Spelling Books
Græca Minora	Gough, Pike, Jess and Bennett's Arithmetic, &c. &c.
Græca Majora	
Smart's Cicero	
Clarke's Homer	
Viri Romæ	
Historia Sacra	
Muir's Syntax	

Also, Slates, Pencils Paper, Blank Books, Lead Pencils, &c.
EDWARD MULLIKIN.
July 10

For Annapolis and Easton.

The Steam Boat MARYLAND will leave Baltimore on Friday morning the 1st March, at seven o'clock, from the lower end Dugan's wharf, for Annapolis and Easton, by Castle Haven, and return next day, leaving Easton at seven o'clock, for Castle Haven and Annapolis.

She will make a trip once a week to the Eastern Shore, until further notice.

N. B. All baggage at the risk of the owner or owners. LEM'L. G. TAYLOR.

P. S. Monday at seven o'clock for Annapo-
feb 26

SHANNONDALE.

This full blood horse, being in fine stud condition, will stand in Talbot county the ensuing season, which will commence on Tuesday, 26th of March, instant, on which day he will be in Easton

—*TERMS*—

$6 the Spring's chance; $12 to ensure; and $3 the single leap.

Particulars will be given in future advertisements. JAMES BARTLETT.
March 16

WAS COMMITTED to the jail of Baltimore city and county on the 22d day of February 1833, by Thomas Bailey, Esq. a Justice of the Peace in and for the city of Baltimore, as a runaway, a colored woman who calls herself ANN MARIA JOHNSON; says she belongs to Jonathan Forrester, living near Mr. Nathan Tudrow's mill in Harford country. Said colored woman is about 16 years of age, 5 feet 3¾ inches high; had on when committed, a blue calico frock, yellow shawl and green striped handkerchief on her head, yarn stockings and old pair of shoes.

The owner of the above described colored woman is requested to come forward prove property, pay charges, and take her away, otherwise she will be discharged according to law. D. W. HUDSON, Warden
Balt. City & County Jail
march 5—12

SPEECH OF MR WEBSTER,
of Massachusetts,

In reply to Mr. Calhoun's Speech, on the Bill "further to provide for the collection of duties on imports."

The gentleman of South Carolina, has admonished us to be mindful of the opinions of those who shall come after us.—We must take our chance, sir, as to the light in which posterity may regard us. I do not decline its judgment, nor withhold myself from its scrutiny. Feeling that I am performing my public duty with singleness of heart, and to the best of my ability, I fearlessly trust myself to the country, now and hereafter, and leave both my motives and my character to its decisions.

The gentleman has terminated his speech in a tone of threat and defiance towards this bill, even should it become a law of the land, altogether unusual in the halls of congress. But I shall not suffer myself to be excited into warmth, by his denunciation of the measure which I support. Among the feelings which at this moment fill my breast, not the least of which is that of regret at the position in which the gentleman has placed himself. Sir, he does do himself no justice. The cause which he has espoused finds no basis in the constitution, no succour from public sympathy, no cheering from a patriotic community. He has no foothold on which to stand—while he might display the powers of his acknowledged talents. Every thing beneath his foot is hollow and treacherous. He is like a strong man struggling in a morass; every effort to extricate himself, only sinks him deeper and deeper. And I fear the resemblance may be carried still further; I fear that no friend can safely come to his relief, that no one can approach near enough to hold out a helping hand, without danger of going down himself, also, into the bottomless depths of this Serbonian bog.

The honorable gentleman has declared that on the decision of the question now in debate, may depend the cause of liberty itself. I am of the same opinion; but then, sir, the liberty which I think is staked on the contest, is not political liberty, in any general and undefined character, but our own, well understood, and long enjoyed American liberty.

Sir, I love liberty no less ardently than the gentleman, in whatever form she may have appeared in the progress of human history. As exhibited in the master states of antiquity, as breaking out again from amidst the darkness of the middle ages, in modern Europe, she has, always and every where, charms for me. Yes, sir it is our own liberty, guarded by constitutions and secured by union; it is that liberty which is our paternal inheritance, it is our established, dear bought, peculiar American liberty, to which I am chiefly devoted, and the cause of which I now mean, to the utmost of my power, to maintain and defend.

Mr. President, if I considered the constitutional question now before us, as doubtful as it is important, and if I supposed that its decision, either in the Senate or by the country, was likely to be in any degree influenced by the manner in which I might now discuss it, this would be to me a moment of deep solicitude.—Such a moment has once existed. There has been a time, when, rising in this place, on the same question, I felt, I must confess, that something for good or evil to the constitution of the country, might depend on an effort of mine. But circumstances are changed. Since that day, sir, the public opinion has become awakened to this great question; it has grasped it, it has reasoned upon it, as becomes an intelligent and patriotic community, & has settled it, or now seems in the progress of settling it, by an authority which none can disobey—the authority of the people themselves.

I shall not, Mr President, follow the gentleman, step by step, through the course of his speech. Much of what he has said, he has deemed necessary to the just explanation and defence of his political character and conduct. On this, I shall offer no comment. Much, too, has consisted of philosophical remark upon the general nature of political liberty, and the history of the institutions; and of other topics, so general in their nature, as to possess, in my opinion, only a remote bearing on the immediate subject of this debate.

But the gentleman's speech, made some days ago, upon introducing his resolutions themselves, and parts of the speech now just concluded, may probably be justly regarded as containing the whole South Carolina doctrine. That doctrine it is my purpose, now to examine, and to compare it with the constitution of the United States. I shall not consent, sir, to make any new constitution, or to establish any other form of Government. I will no undertake to say what a constitution for these United States ought to be. That question the people have decided for themselves, and I shall take the instrument as they have established it, and shall endeavor to maintain it, in its plain sense and meaning, against opinions and notions which, in my judgment, threaten its subversion.

The resolutions introduced by the gentleman were apparently drawn up with care, and brought forward upon deliberation. I shall not be in danger, therefore, of misunderstanding him, or those who agree with him, if I proceed at once to these resolutions, and consider them as an authentic statement of those opinions, upon the great constitutional question, by which the recent proceedings in South Carolina are attempted to be justified.

These resolutions are three in number. The third seems intended to enumerate, and to deny, the several opinions expressed in the President's proclamation, respecting the nature and powers of this Government. Of this third resolution, I propose, at present, to take no particular notice.

The two first resolutions of the honorable member affirm these propositions, viz:

1. That the political system, under which we live, and under which Congress is now assembled, is a compact, to which the people of the several States, as separate and sovereign communities, are the parties.

2. That these sovereign parties have a right to judge, each for itself, of any alleged violation of the constitution by Congress; and, in case of such violation, to choose, each, for itself, its own mode and measure of redress.

It is true, Sir, that the honorable member calls this a "constitutional" compact; but still he affirms it to be a compact between sovereign States. What precise meaning, then, does he attach to the term constitutional? When applied to compacts between sovereign States, the term constitutional affixes to that word compact no definite idea. Were we to hear of a constitutional league or treaty between England and France, or a constitutional convention between Austria and Russia, we should not understand what could be intended by such a league, such a treaty, or such a convention. In these connexions, the word is void of all meaning; and yet, sir, it is easy, quite easy, to see why the honorable gentleman has used it in these resolutions. He cannot open the book, and look upon our written frame of Government, without seeing that it is called a constitution. This may well be appalling to him. It threatens his whole doctrine of compact, and its darling derivatives, nullification and secession, with instant confutation. Because, if he admits our instrument of Government to be a constitution, then, for that very reason, it is not a compact between sovereign Powers, being things essentially unlike in their very natures, and incapable of ever being the same. Yet the word constitution is on the very front of the instrument. He cannot overlook it. He seeks, therefore, to compromise the matter, and to sink all the substantial sense of the word, while he retains a resemblance of its sound. He introduces a new word of his own, viz: compact, as importing the principal idea, and designed to play the principal part, and degrades constitution into an insignificant, idle epithet, attached to compact. The whole then stands as a "constitutional compact!" And in this way he hopes to pass off a plausible gloss, as satisfying the words of the instrument; but he will find himself disappointed. Sir, I must say to the honorable gentleman, that, in our American political grammar, CONSTITUTION is a noun substantive; it imports a distinct and clear idea, of itself; and it is not to be turned into a poor, ambiguous, senseless, unmeaning adjective, for the purpose of accommodating any new set of political notions. Sir, we reject his new rules of syntax altogether. We will not give up our forms of political speech to the grammarians of the school of nullification. By the constitution, we mean not "constitutional compact," but, simply and directly, the constitution, the fundamental law; and if there be one word in the language, which the people of the United States understand, this is that word. We know no more of a constitutional compact between sovereign Powers, than we know of a constitutional indenture of co partnership, a constitutional deed of conveyance, or a constitutional bill of exchange. But we know what the constitution is; we know what the plainly written fundamental law is; we know what the bond of our Union, and the security of our liberties is; and we mean to maintain and to defend it, in its plain sense and unsophisticated meaning.

The sense of the gentleman's proposition, therefore, is not at all affected, one way or the other, by the use of his word. The proposition still is, that our system of Government is but a compact between the people of separate and sovereign States.

Was it Mirabeau, Mr. President, or what other master of the human passions, who has told us that words are things? They are indeed things, and things of mighty influence, not only in addresses to the passions, and high-wrought feelings of mankind, but in the discussion of legal and political questions also; because a just conclusion is often avoided, or a false one reached, by the adroit substitution of one phrase, or one word, for another. Of this we have, I think, another example in the resolutions before us.

The first resolution declares that the people of the several States "acceded" to the constitution, or to the constitutional compact, as it is called. This word "accede," not found either in the constitution itself, or in the ratification of it by any one of the States, has been chosen for us here, doubtless not without a well considered purpose.

The natural converse of accession is secession; and therefore, when it is stated that the people of the States acceded to the Union, it may be more plausibly argued that they may secede from it. If, in adopting the constitution, nothing was done but acceding to a compact, nothing would seem necessary, in order to break it up, but to secede from the same compact. But the term is wholly out of place. Accession, as a word applied to political associations, implies coming into a league, treaty, or confederacy, by one hitherto a stranger to it; and secession implies departing from such league or confederacy. The people of the United States have used no such form of expression, in establishing the present Government.—They do not say that they accede to a league, but they declare that they ordain and establish a constitution. Such are the very words of the instrument itself; and in all the States, without an exception, the language used by their conventions was, that they "ratified the constitution;" some of them employing the additional words "assented to" and "adopted," but all of them "ratifying."—There is more importance than may, at first sight, appear, in the introduction of this new word by the honorable mover of these resolutions. Its adoption and use are indispensable to maintain those premises, from which his main conclusion is to be afterwards drawn. But before showing that, allow me to remark, that his phraseology tends to keep out of sight the just view of our previous political history, as well as to suggest wrong ideas as to what was actually done when the present constitution was agreed to. In 1789, and before the constitution was adopted, the United States had already been in a Union, more or less close, for fifteen years. At least as far back as the meeting of the first Congress, in 1774, they had been, in some measure, and to some rational purpose, united together. Before the confederation of 1781, they had declared independence jointly, and carried on the war jointly, both by sea and land; and this, not as separate States, but as one people. When therefore, they formed that confederation, and adopted its articles as articles of perpetual union, they did not come together for the first time; and, therefore, they did not speak of the States, as acceding to the confederation, although it was a league, and nothing but a league, and rested on nothing but plighted faith for its performance.—Yet, even then, the States were not strangers to each other; there was a bond of union already subsisting between them; they were associated, United States; and the object of the confederation was to make a stronger and better bond of union. Their representatives deliberated together on these proposed articles of confederation, and, being authorized by their respective States, finally "ratified and confirmed" them. Inasmuch as they were already in union, they did not speak of acceding to the new articles of confederation, but of ratifying and confirming them; and this language was not used inadvertently, because in the same instrument, accession is used in its proper sense, when applied to Canada, which was altogether a stranger to the existing Union. "Canada," says the 11th article, "acceding to this confederation, and joining in the measures of the U. States, shall be admitted into the Union."

Having thus used the terms ratify and confirm, even in regard to the old confederation, it would have been strange, indeed, if the people of the United States, after its formation, and when they came to establish the present constitution, had spoken of the States, as acceding to this constitution. Such language would have been ill suited to the occasion. It would have implied an existing separation or disunion among the States, such as has never existed since 1774. No such language, therefore, was used. The language actually employed is, adopt, ratify, ordain, establish.

Therefore, sir, since any State, before she can prove her right to dissolve the Union, must show her authority to undo what has been done, no State is at liberty to secede, on the ground that she and other States have done nothing but accede. She must show that she has a right to reverse what has been ordained, to unsettle and overthrow what has been established, to reject what the people have adopted, and to break up what they have ratified; because these are the terms which express the transactions which have actually taken place. In other words, she must show her right to make a revolution.

If, Mr. President, in drawing these resolutions, the honorable member had confined himself to the use of constitutional language, there would have been a wide and awful hiatus between his premises and conclusions. Leaving out the words compact and accession, which are not constitutional modes of expression, and stating the matter precisely as the truth is, his first resolution would have affirmed that the People of the several States ratified this Constitution, or form of Government. These are the very words of S Carolina herself, in her own act of ratification. Let, then, his first resolution tell the exact truth; let it state the fact, precisely as it exists; let it say that the people of the several States ratified a Constitution, or form of Government; and then, sir, what will become of his inference in his second resolution, which is in these words, viz: "that, as in all other cases of compact, among sovereign parties, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress?" It is obvious, is it not, sir, that this conclusion requires for its support, quite other premises; it requires premises which speak of accession and of compact between the sovereign Powers, and without such premises, it is altogether unmeaning.

Mr. President, if the honorable member will truly state what the people did in forming this constitution, and then state what they must do if they would now undo what they then did, he will unavoidably state a case of revolution. Let us see if it not be so. He must state, in the first place, that the people of the several States adopted and ratified this Constitution, or form of Government; and, in the next place, he must state that they have a right to undo this; that is to say, they have a right to discard the form of Government which they have adopted, and to break up the constitution they have ratified. Now, sir, this is neither more nor less than saying that they have a right to make a revolution. To reject an established Government, to break up a political constitution, is revolution.

I deny that any man can state, accurately, what was done by the people, in establishing the present constitution, and then state accurately, what the people, or any part of them, must now do to get rid of its obligations, without stating an undeniable case of the overthrow of Government. I admit, of course, that the people may, if they choose, overthrow the Government. But, then, that is revolution. The doctrine now contended is, that by nullification or secession, the obligations and authority of the Government may be set aside or rejected, without revolution. But that is what I deny; and what I say is, that no man can state the case with historical accuracy, and in constitutional language, without showing that the honourable gentleman's right, as asserted in his conclusion, is a revolutionary right merely; that it does not and cannot exist, under the constitution, or agreeably to the constitution, but can come into existence only when the constitution is overthrown. This is the reason, sir, which makes it necessary to abandon the use of constitutional language for a new vocabulary, and to substitute, in the place of plain historical facts, a series of assumptions. This is the reason why it is necessary to give new names to things, to speak of the constitution, not as a constitution, but as a compact, and of the ratification by the people, not as ratifications, but as acts of accession.

Sir, I intend to hold the gentleman to the written record. In the discussion of a constitutional question, I intend to impose upon him the restraints of constitutional language. The people have ordained a constitution; can they reject it without revolution? They have established a form of Government; can they overthrow it without revolution? These are the true questions.

Allow me now, Mr. President, to inquire further into the extent of the propositions contained in the resolutions, and their necessary consequences.

Where sovereign communities are parties, there is no essential difference between a compact, a confederation and a league. They all equally rest on the plighted faith of the sovereign parties—A league or confederacy, is but a subsisting or continuing treaty.

The gentleman's resolutions then, affirm, in effect, that these twenty-four United States are held together only by a subsisting treaty, resting for its fulfilment and continuance on no inherent power of its own, but on the plighted faith of each State; or in other words, that out Union is but a league and as a consequence from this proposition, they further affirm, that as sovereigns are subject to no superior power, the States must decide, each for itself, of any alleged violation of the league, and if such violation be supposed to have occurred, each may adopt any mode or measure of redress which it shall think proper.

Other consequences naturally follow, too, from the main proposition. If a league between sovereign powers have no limitation as to the time of its duration, and contain nothing making it perpetual, it subsists only during the good pleasure of the parties, although no violation be complained of. If, in the opinion of either party, it be violated, such party may say that he will no longer fulfil its obligations on his part, but will consider the whole league or compact at an end, although it might be one of its stipulations that it should be perpetual.—Upon this principle, the Congress of the United States, in 1798, declared null and void the treaty of alliance between the United States and France, though it professed to be a perpetual alliance.

If the violation of the league be accompanied with serious injuries, the suffering party, being sole jugde of his own mode and measure of redress, has a right to indemnify himself by reprisals on the offending members of the league; and reprisals, if the circumstances of the case require it, may be followed by direct, avowed, and public war.

The necessary import of the resolutions, therefore, is, that the United States are connected only by a league; that it is in the good pleasure of every State to decide how long she will choose to remain a member of this league; that any State may determine the extent of her own obligations under it, and accept or reject what shall be decided by the whole; that she may also determine whether her rights have been violated, what is the extent of the injury done her, and what mode and measure of redress her wrongs may make it fit and expedient for her to adopt. The result of the whole is, that any State may secede at pleasure; that any State may resist a law which she herself may choose to say exceeds the power of Congress; and that, as a sove-

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