employ other depositories of the public money, is equally absolute and unqualified. Neither Congress nor the Secretary are required to give any reasons to the Bank—and if Congress were for reasons satisfactory to themselves, to pass a law, declaring that the notes of the Bank shall no longer be taken in payments to the United States, the President and Directors of the Bank would have no just ground of complaint that their "chartered rights" had been violated. Is the case now presented at all different in principle? Have they any just ground to complain that their "chartered rights" had been violated, by the act of the Secretary, in the removal of the deposites? The Bank charter is a contract between the *Government of the United States* and the Stockholders. To see that the Secretary of the Treasury acts from pure motives, and judge whether further legislation be not necessary on the subject, Congress, requires of him to report his reasons to them. This is an arrangement between the Legislative and Executive Departments of the Goverment who are jointly one party to the contract, with whose arrangement, the Bank, as the other party, has no concern. The Stockholders entered into the contract, in which the Goverment reserved the right to reject their notes, and discontinue their Bank as a depository, the one through Congress and the other through the Secretary of the Treasury, without assigning to them any reasons whatever. Whenever either of these powers is exercised by the agent to whom it has been reserved, no stipulation of the contract has been violated, and the Bank has no right to complain.

Not only was no stipulation made with the Bank that its notes should be received in payments to the United States, and that it should be employed as a depository of the public moneys, longer that it should be the pleasure of the government, but any contract of that sort on the part of the Government would have been indiscreet and improper. To have absolutely bartered away to a corporation, the high powers of both the Legislative and Executive departments, and left the government of the people absolutely dependent on a corporation of its own creation for the currency in which public dues should be paid, and the places in which the public moneys should be kept, would have been an assumption of power on the part of those who created the Bank charter, which the boldest advocates of a controlling power over the popular will, never dared to maintain. Many unforseen considerations, might render it expedient, if not indispensible to the preservation and protection, of the public interests, within a less period than twenty years, to sever the connection between the government and the Bank, and no Congress has yet been found so improvident as to transfer from the government the power to determine what currency it will or will not receive in payment of the public dues, and to select at will the depositories of the public funds; much less, have they imposed on the public authorities, and on Congress themselves, the degrading duty of giving reasons to a corporation, for measures they may deem essential to the interests of the people, the purity of the government, and the preservation of our invaluable institutions

The removal of the deposites by the Secretary of the Treasury from the Bank of the United States, so far from being an usurpation of a power belonging to Congress, actually restored to that body a power of which they had by the terms of the charter divested themselves. So far as regards Congress, the contract is *absolute*, that the deposites shall be made in the Bank of the United States, and no shadow of authoriy is reserved to them otherwise to "order and direct." Congress divested itself of all power of control over the deposites unless the Secretary should first issue his order for the removal. The exclusive power to issue such order was reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury, and but for his action; the deposites must have remained beyond the reach of Congress until the termination of the Bank charter. The moment they are out of the bank, by the order and direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, as provided in the charter, all the orginal power which Congress possessed over them, reverts to that body. They may by law direct their future disposition. If they think proper to relieve the executive from all responsibility for the safe keeping of the public funds, they may, by an act of legislation, designate the depositories in which they shall be kept. The power with which, in the opinion of the committee, congress should never have parted, has been restored to that body by the act of the Secretary, and it is not perceived upon what ground he can be charged with an usurpation of their powers, by an act which has essentially enlarged them.

In the section of the bank charter reserving to the Secretary of the Treasury the power over the deposits, it is not stated what reason may be sufficient to justify him in directing the money of the United States to be deposited in other banks. That they ought to be *good* and *honest* reasons, there can be no doubt. Before the Bank of the United States existed, he was equally bound to have such reasons for discharging one bank and employing another, as well as for all his other official acts. If they be not *honest*, he may be impeached by congress, or dismissed from office by the President. If they be not *good*, he may be overruled by a subsequent act of legislation, providing for their restoration, or designating some other place of deposite than that which he may have selected. But if they be both *honest* and *good*, the transaction should be at an end when they are reported to Congress.

It has recently been maintained in argument, that no reason but a want of safety can justify the removal of the deposites from the Bank of the United States; that the security of the public funds was the sole object which congress had in view; that having confidence in the bank, the act of charter directed the deposites to be made in it, but lest, at any time they should become insecure, they reserved to the Secretary of the Treasury the power of removing them, with a view solely to render them more secure; and that, for the same reason, he was required to assign his reasons to Congress whenever he did order the removal, that congress might review his act.

It is to be observed that the words of the bank charter recognizing the power of the Secretary to remove the deposites, do not define the reasons or circumstances which will authorize him to act; and the necessary inference is, that he may act, for any reasons, which to him may seem sufficient.

If want of safety was the only reason which could justify a removal of the deposites, why was the secretary required to report his reasons, at all? If there could be but one sufficient reason congress would have known it as well without being reported as with it; and if there could be but one reason why was it not so declared in the charter.

There are good grounds to believe that want of security was not the only, nor the chief reason in the minds of congress, when they required of the Secretary to assign the reasons of the act to them. Suppose it to be discovered by the Secretary, that the bank is in a tottering condition, and on the verge of stopping payment, what advantage would the government gain by a sudden withdrawal of its funds. Under the circumstances supposed, the first effect of such a measure would probably be, to compel the bank instantly to stop payment, and as a consequence, its notes would become fatally depreciated, but the bank charter requires that its notes shall be received in all payments to the United States, unless Congress shall by law otherwise direct. All the revenues would then be paid in their notes, however much they might be depreciated, for the secretary would have no authority to refuse them until Congress repealed the provision which required them to be received in payments to the United States. To remove the public funds, therefore, for want of safety, would be to depreciate the currency in which the accruing revenue must be received. Instead of having a deposite of good money in a *doubtful bank*, we might have one of *bad money in good banks*. The bank of the United States would be more likely to pay the warrants of the treasurer if the deposites were left in its possession, than it would pay its own notes, received in payment of revenue, if they were taken away.

Instead of removing the deposites in such a case, the public interest would require every practicable effort on the part of the treasury to sustain the credit of the bank, at least until Congress could repeal the provision which makes its notes a tender in all paymen s to the government. He would be a faithless Secretary who should deprecate the currency he is bound by law to receive in payment of public dues; & under pretence of putting the public funds already collected in a safe place, resort to a measure which would inevitably make the currency which he was bound to receive in payment of the accruing revenue in a great degree worthless.

But the contemporaneous and continued construction of the clause in the charter relative to the Secretary's reasons, even if the meaning of the words themselves was at all doubtful, is conclusive to show, not only that the Secretary possesses full power to order the removal but that it is his duty to do so for other reasons than the insecurity of the public funds.

On reference to the correspondence and documents connected with the Treasury Department, we find that Mr. Crawford, who was Secretary of the Treasury at the time the Bank went into operation, in sundry letters, distinctly asserted his power under the charter to cause the deposites of public money to be made in State Banks, for various reasons; and that he did actually exercise that power during the first year of the Bank's existence, reporting his reasons to Congress at the next session; and that he did again exercise it in the year 1818—on both of which occasions it was not contested by the Bank, and not called in question by Congress. We find that in 1819 the power was expressly asserted by a Committee of Congress, and by eminent members, in debate, without controversy; and that at a subsequent person (1824) when Mr. Crawford's arrangements with State Banks were called in question and investigated, it was declared by a Committee of the House of Representatives, that there was nothing in them in violation of law, or contrary to the usages of the Department.

The successors of Mr. Crawford in the Treasury Department, Mr. Rush and Mr. Ingham, have asserted the power, and it was admitted to exist for other purposes than the security of the public deposites by the Committee of Ways and Means of this House, as late as 1830.

The grounds on which it has been asserted the power may be exercised, have been to equalise the benefits resulting from the deposites among the banking community; to aid the State Bank in maintaining their credit; to induce them to resume specie payments; to prevent a pressure on their debtors; the refusal of the Bank of the United States to receive as cash the notes of Banks which it was deemed the interest of Government to receive from its debtors; the public convenience; the misconduct of the of its pecuniary power to produce injustice and oppression. These several grounds of action, suggested sometimes by the Secretary of the Treasury, sometimes by Committee of Congress or its members, as well in public documents as private correspondence, were never declared to be illegal or invalid even by the Bank itself; nor does it appear even to have been maintained or suggested, that the want of security was the only good reason for the action of the Secretary, until since the removal by order and direction of the present incumbent. The committee consider the point to clear, under the words of the law and the practice of the Government, to be now seriously called in question. Extracts of letters and reports are given in the appendix to this report, which fully establish the positions here asserted.

It has also been objected to the act of the Secretary, that conceding to him the power to remove the depositories, and to direct them to be placed in State Banks, that yet he had exceeded his authority in entering into contract with the new deposites, prescribing the terms of deposites and the duties and services which they should be required to perform for the Government, in consideration of the use of the public moneys.

The committee are of opinion that there is nothing in this objection. Money of the Unitsd States could not be placed in their keeping without a contract with them. If there was no written agreement, the law would imply one. It would imply a contract on the part of the deposite Bank to pay; and if they refused to pay, the United States might sue and recover the money.

If the Secretary, by depositing the money in a State Bank, may make an implied contract, by which the Bank would be bound to pay, surely he may make an express one. The objection, therefore, that he may not enter into a contract, although he has a right to deposite the money, is wholly untenable. If the State Banks are selected lawfully as agents, and their duties not defined by law, they must necessarily be defined by contract, and the United States have the same right to take care of their interests in this respect as an individual.

In making these contracts, the present Secretary has but followed the example of his predecessors, and has manifested an anxious care to protect the interests of the United States; and so far from being justly subject to censure, deserves rather to be commended for his vigilance, in guarding the public treasure as far as possible from danger of loss.

But suppose all that has been urged by those who rely upon this objection to be true, suppose the contracts to be in fact void; still the public money is not less secure in the State Banks, than it would have been if no contracts had been made. In any view, therefore, the committee are of opinion that the objection is utterly futile, and deserving of no consideration. It has been the constant practice of the Treasury to make such contracts with the Banks selected as the public depositories, examples of which may be found in official letters of Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Crawford, hereto annexed.

The committee are of opinion, therefore, that the Secretary possessed the power to issue his order for the removal of the deposites, and they are further of opinion that none of the chartered rights of the stockholders of the Bank have been violated by it.

The Bank in their memorial allege "that in consideration of a full equivalant, rendered by them in money and services, they were entitled to the custody of the public deposites." To this proposition the committee do not assent. It appears by the 20th section of the act of the charter, that the bonus of a million and a half of dollars was paid by the Bank in "consideration of the exclusive privileges and benefits conferred by this act upon the said Bank." This was the only money paid by the Bank to the United States; it was paid, not for the use of the public deposites, but for the exclusive privilege and benefit of banking conferred by the charter, and especially by the provision confained in the 21st section, viz.

"That no other bank shall be established by any future law of the United States, during the continuance of the corporation hereby created, for which the faith of the United States is hereby pledged."

The only services which the Bank stipulates to perfrom for the Government, are, "to perform the several and respective duties of the Commissioners of Loans for the several States, or of any one or more of them, whenever required by law," and to "give the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds from place to place, within the United States, or the territories thereof, and for distributing the same in payment of the public creditors, without charging commissions, or claiming allowance on account of difference of exchange.

It no where appears in the charter of the Bank that these services were to be performed by the Bank in consideration of the use of the public deposites; but if it did so appear, it is evident that, so soon as the deposites are withdrawn, the Bank, not having posession of the public funds, can no longer be required to perform those duties. The committee think it much more likely that the consideration for these services in the minds of those who enacted the Bank charter, was, that the United States agreed on their part to receive the notes or bills of the Bank in payment of the public revenue, thereby enabling the Bank to give general credit and circulation to their paper. Mr *Dallas*, the Secretary of the Treasury at the time the Bank charter was granted, in a letter addressed to the "Committee on the National Currency," dated the 24th of December 1815, confirms this opinion. In that letter Mr. Dallas states, "It is proposed that in addition to the usual privileges of a corporation, the notes of the National Bank shall be received in all payments to the United States, unless Congress shall hereafter otherwise provide by law; and that in addition to duties usually required from a corporation of this description, the National Bank shall be employed to receive, transfer, and distribute the public revenue, under the direction of the proper department." Congress adopted this suggestion of the Secretary, and hence we find, that by the 14th section of the Bank charter, Congress agree to receive the notes and bills of the Bank in payment of public dues, and by the 15th section immediately following the Bank stipulates to transfer and distribute the public funds from place to place, without charge to the United States. In the same letter, Mr. *Dallas* negatives the idea that the deposites constituted any part of the consideration either for the bonus or the services stipulated to be performed by the Bank. He states that "It is proposed that a bonus be paid to the government by the subscribers to the National Bank, in consideration of the emoluments to be derived from an exclusive charter, during a period of twenty years." This suggestion of Mr. *Secretary Dallas* was also adopted by Congress by a provision to that effect contained in the 20th section of the Bank charter before recited.

In the same letter, Mr. Dallas holds the following language in relation to the "deposites and the distribution of the public revenue," viz. "Independent of the bonus here proposed to be exacted, there are undoubtedly many public advantages to be drawn from the establishment of the National Bank; but (as far as case of the deposites and the distribution of the revenue) may be regarded in the light of equivalents, *not* for the monopoly of the charter, but for the reciprocal advantages of a fiscal connexion with the public Treasury." It thus clearly appears that the ground assumed by the Bank, that it had rendered "a full equivalent" in "money and services" for the use of the public deposites, is erroneous, and it is not sustained either by the Bank charter itself, or the opinion of the head of the Treasury Department—who furnished the plan and largely contributed to found the present Bank of the United States. Upon this ground, therefore, the committee think the Bank cannot justly complain, that any of the "chartered rights of the stockholders" have been violated by the late removal of the public deposites from its custody.

To be concluded.

FOR THE WHIG.

Mr. Mullikin,—I fear I shall exhaust your patience, but have a few more views to express relative to this would-be mistress of America. In my last communication, I endeavored, successfully I hope, to exhibit to public view the oppressive tyranny of this monster; for nothing less can I call her. You were also informed of her conduct, in sending a secret agent to England, to defeat the just payment of the United States debts. Now, sir, when the secret was discovered, by the publication of Messrs. Baring & Brothers' circular, what excuse did Biddle and his little self-created junto offer? First, they said they were fearful there was not money in bank to pay the debt; but it was proved there was. Then another subterfuge was offered, viz: that they wished to retain the money to extend their discounts to the merchants, to pay their duty bonds; but it was proved in lieu of extending their discounts, they had curtailed them in the cities where the bonds were principally due. Then this would not do. The third was that the Cholera would derange the trade of the country, when it is well known the Cholera had not made its appearance in Philadelphia, when it was determined to send their secret agent to England. Then here is another failure; here was adding insult to injury; substituting a lie for the truth. But stop, I am not done.—Who paid this agent for this noble and mighty nogotiation? I will tell you. Not the board of Directors, but the same secret exchange committee paid out of the revenue of the bank ten thousand dollars—for what? a laudible and praise-worthy mission? no; but to cheat our government out of her good name for punctuality in payment of her debts. The U. States owning one fifth part of the stock had of course to pay one fifth part of the expense, say two thousand dollars, to have her infamy spread abroad to the four quarters of the Globe, and to allow a high toned federalist to frolic awhile in France and England; for he expressly states in his letter to the President of the bank, after he has finished his frolicking in Paris, he will return home. This reminds me of two of John Q. Adams missions, when he was president.—One sent with despatches (Mr. Pleasants) dancing to the tune of some thousands, delivered them to the Captain of the ship to convey, while he steped over to England, to frolic. The other under the authority of that extravagant and perverse administration, to seek a Congress at Panama; but behold no congress was to be found. But little Jack fobbed the money, dancing to the tune of thousands, just like Jim Crow.

Every time he fobbed he fobbed just so.

Another great ailvantage to be derived from this monster in the shape of a bank, as is alledged, is a uniform currency, money which will pass in all parts of the world. Now reader has this been the fact? has not the mother bank in Philadelphia refused to take the paper other branches without discount; and will the Bank in Easton take the drafts of the Western branches? I think not. Again, did not the mother bank in Philadelphia some short time since, refuse to take a large sum on one of her branches, in the West, from a western merchant, a traveller? did not Mr. Biddle the president of the bank recommend said merchant to go to his brother, who was a broker to get his money discounted, which was done? then did not the broker take the same money and deposit it in the Bank? and did not a highly respectable gentleman in Easton get such information on his travels? Then away with the idea of a uniform currency.

The most unheard of torrent of abuse has been let loose from the flood-gates of the friends of the bank on Jackson, for removing the deposites. He has been accused of violating the constitution of the U. States; he has been stigmatised as a tyrant, despot, and spreader of false reports. But when the American people see and understand the corrupt proceedings of the bank, they will hail Jackson as the protector of their liberties, and feel grateful to themselves for selecting a man who had firmness enough to stand before the three headed monster. They will hand down to posterity the praises of the hero, who has repelled the hostile foe, and shed blessings on thousands unborn.—Yes, his memory will live in history, when the name of his traducers will only be remembered to be despised.

The friends of the bank say Jackson had no right to remove Mr. Duane. No idea can be more preposterous. For authority, I refer all such hard-headed, obstinate opponents to justice, and who oppose any thing which Jackson proposes, to Mr. Rush and Mr. Calhoun.—Both say he had the right. That the Secretary had a right to remove the deposites can be justified by the chatrer, viz: "That the deposites shall be made in the bank of the U. States unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary." Can there be stronger language penned: He has otherwise directed them, and justly, too, from the strongest evidence. But, say the friends of the bank, it was a contract—granted; and no one will deny but what there was a contract.—And what was the contract? Thus says the Secretary I will put my money in your bank, as long as you act an honest part, and I think there is safety in so doing; but when you attempt to violate the contract or charter between Congress and yourself, I will take away my money. Is there any thing unjust in that? Is the Secretary to suffer the public money to remain in the bank after he obtains satisfactory evidence of the misconduct of the bank? Suppose Mr. Hughlett was to make a Banker of A. Z. and deposit all his money with him who every person knew or thought to be as true and steady as the sun, moon and stars, and apparently safe, as a banker, and in some short time Mr. Hughlet was to discover, from introvertible testimony, that A. Z. every night frequented Mr. Lowe's tavern, there drank and gambled, and loaned out the money to bankrupts and gamblers, without security; was paying Graham and Mullikin thousands of dollars to print and circulate hand-bills, &c. to traduce him; spending thousands of dollars in sending an agent to Philadelphia and New York to transact his private business, and injure Mr. Hughlett's credit,—would not Mr. Hughlett be justifiable in withdrawing his funds from A. Z. although he had made a contract to let him have the use of his money as long as he had acted in that steady upright habit which was his custom? Then, Andrew Jackson was faithful to the people of the U. States for withdrawing the public money from such a gambling shop as the Bank of the U. States. In order to show the people, in addition to other inventions, they say the bonus of one million five hundred thousand dollars, paid by the bank, was in consideration of the deposites being made in the bank; when it is well known, and on record in the archives of Congress that Mr. Secretary Dallas, who I believe first proposed the bank in his report, expressly says the bonus to be in consideration of the exclusive privilege of a charter for 20 years—Mr. Calhoun who drafted the bill, had no section relative to the deposites, but engrafted one relative to the bonus, and the section relative to the deposites was introduced by Webster as an amendment, expressly to restrain the power of the bank (as he Webster was opposed to the bank and voted against it.) How can men advance such barefaced falsehoods, to deceive the people, and support a sinking mass of corruption? Farther, let me inquire of those gentlemen who are so desirous of spreading information before the public, why, and for what cause do the banks of Maryland pay a bonus to the State? is it because of the deposit her surplus funds in them to speculate on? or is it in consideration of the monopoly granted to them? It cannot be the former certainly; or if so, small must be the inducement—for if I mistake not the Treasurer stated some time past he had but three hundred dollars belonging to the State, and it would be called for before sun down. What has gone with the funds I cannot say, but suppose those wise ones know. But I should not be surprised if a federal bulletin was soon issued, attributing the decrease of our State funds to the present majority of the House of Delegates, or the withdrawing of the deposits from the U. States bank; for their imaginations are very fruitful. But, Mr. Mullikin, I am opposed to all banks, established on the prevailing mode of chartering, and am fully convinced that all banks are unjustifiable monopolies, and that the banking system is dangerous to the liberty and prosperity of this rising country. It tends to put in circulation a large quantity of spurious currency, calculated to raise and reduce property at its own will and desire; enables stock jobbers, brokers, and money changers to speculate on the rise and fall of stock, to the great injury of the fair and honest dealer, and fills your country with speculating, idle fellows and counterfeiters. Is it not in the recollection of many of your readers that the Legislature of Pennsylvania, during the administration of Governor Snyder, chartered forty Banks by one law, which was vetoed by the Governor, (for which he deserves to have a monument erected to his memory); but such were the enthusiastic views of the Legislature, the law passed by the constitutional vote of two thirds, and the whole 40 were put in operation. The consequence was, money was as plenty as blackberries; the population became speculators; land was in many instances up as high as three hundred dollars per acre. The honest old Dutchmen, who had made comfortable livings caught the fever, and entered the field of speculation; the banks began to stop payment; money became scarce; the honest farmer was caught in the net; all he bought, added to the first comfortable home, was sold by the Sheriff to pay the demands of the monopolising gentry who ran off with all the game. I am anxious and willing to allow the States all they are entitled to, and should be the last to detract from them, any rights and privileges they may possess; but I have always been of an opinion that no State in the Union has a right to incorporate a bank, and I am bold to call on the strongest friends the banks may have, to put a finger on any section or part of a section, in the constitution of Maryland, which will justify the charter of a bank. But the 39th article of the bill of rights, expressly forbids it, which says, "*all monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered.*" In this opinion I am supported by Daniel Webster, who, I suppose, will pass as current with the federalists as one of Biddle's bank notes: Much has been said relative to the distress in the country, and that the removal of the deposits is the cause of it. Was there ever a more wilful attempt to deceive the people? We all know the pocket nerve is a tender one, and well calculated to rouse the people; but I say the United States bank is the whole and sole cause of the distress. Are not the deposits put there for safe keeping, and liable to be drawn out at any hour in the year, to pay the demands of the government? Then can the bank be rendered less able to discount if the deposits are taken to pay debts or placed in any other bank? certainly not; she had no right to calculate to speculate on them. What has she done? she has stopped discounting, and is drawing all the gold and silver from the State Banks, which renders them less able, or fearful to discount; for she has declared herself able to break every bank in the Union. All this is done to force a renewal of her charter.—Let Congress decide the question and she will soon go on discounting. As she has the power to cause the distress now, cant she do the same twenty years to come, and twenty times if she pleases, should she have any favorite scheme to enforce? Then, may not our children have to endure the same distress should she ever be again disturbed? Are the people willing to entail such misery and distress on their children are they prepared to rivet the chains of aristocracy and oppresssion? I hope not; we have seen her power, and felt her influence; then in the name of liberty, let me call on the people to rise in her magisterial power—destroy the monster—and retain freedom for their posterity.

A PLAIN MAN.

Talbot county, March 4, 1834.

LEGISLATURE OF MARYLAND.

HOUSE OF DELEGATES.

UNION OF THE EASTERN SHORE COUNTIES TO DELAWARE.

Mr. Burchenal one day last week called up his resolutions, for taking the vote of the people of the Eastern Shore on this question.

Mr. Blackiston, as a test of the sense of the House, moved to refer the preamble and resolutions to the 1st of June.

Mr. Burchenal, hoped the house would not refer.—The proposition was innocent in itself, and as the people on some parts of the Eastern Shore had desired an opportunity for expression, he hoped the House would gratify them. He did not believe a majority was in favor on the contemplated union, but he thought it but fair to give them a hearing, as no expense could be incurred no draft was intended upon the treasury.

Mr. B. said he had no design to go into an argument on the merits of the subject—possibly his own views might not be in accordance with those of his constituents—in the form in which they were embodied, in the preamble and resolutions and with a view of consulting their will and wishes he had offered them; *for his own individual part*, he thought the striking local connection between all parts of the Eastern Shore, impressed by nature itself, was worthy of the consideration of every inhabitant of that Peninsula—By a general union they save much of the expenses incident to our present government, and especially those resulting from vast schemes of internal improvements in which the Eastern Shore could have no direct interest. According to his knowledge no farm on that whole shore was more than 16 or 18 miles from navigable water. For his part, he was tired of being called a pensioner, and of having it thrown up to Eastern Shoremen, that they need not care how many appropriations for internal improvements they passed, as the Western Shore paid all, &c. For one he would rather go and set up shop with Delaware than remain to listen to such language. Then the Western Shore could legislate for themselves. To use a coarse figure, he thought three true horses could pull more than five, if two be flawey or held back.

Mr. Blackistone hoped as the house had already evinced somewhat of its disposition upon the subject of projected Reforms, from another direction, it would not hesitate to place a prompt veto upon this project from our friends of the Eastern Shore. He was certain that though we might have now and then some of those little family jars, to which human society in its best form must always remain liable; yet we had lived too happily in the general to allow the integrity of the state to be for one moment put in question. For one, such was his attachment to the Eastern Shore, and to the Eastern Shore with whom he had been so long associated, that though every man upon that shore were to vote to leave us, he would still cling to them as brethren, and would not let them go.

Mr. Handy spoke for some time in opposition to the resolutions, and expressive of his attachment and devotion to the state as a whole people; a state, compared with our sister states of the union, certainly small enough already.

Mr. Franklin Smith made some remarks which Mr. Burchenal considered uncourteous, and to which he replied with considerable warmth. Mr. B. also expressed great pleasure at hearing the expression of attachment for the Eastern Shore, from the gentleman of St. Mary's (Mr. Blackistone). This might, however, be a suitable time to make professions. Mr. B. was fearful a direct tax might yet be required to pay the cost of internal improvements, which was always exclusively for the benefit of the Western Shore.

A call was now made for the question—on being taken by yeas and nays, only four votes appeared in favor of the resolutions.

NORFOLK, March 1.

DIABOLICAL MURDER.

A Coroner's Inquest was held yesterday morning over the body of a man about 35 years of age, who was found between 2 and 3 o'clock, lying in Little Water street, between Commerce street and Rothery's Lane, almost in a state of nudity. The person was identified as that of *Miners Cannon*, formerly assistant Engineer of the steam boat Pocahontas and Potomac, and lastly of the Lady of the Lake. The verdict of the Jury was that he came to his death by being stabbed by some person or persons unknown.

The examination of eight or nine witnesses by the Jury of Inquest, disclosed such positive and circumstantial evidence as led to an investigation by the Mayor, which resulted in the commitment of two individuals, viz: William Taylor, who has been some time trading in oysters between this place and New York in the sloop Dandy, and Abraham Houseman a carpenter by profession.

We understand that Alex. Brown, & Sons, of Baltimore, have purchased from the Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company, $500,000 of Maryland 5 per cent stock, at par, being the state subscription to the Washington Branch Road, and that the whole of the Rail Road from Baltimore to the city of Washington is, or will immediately be, put under contract, and that it is expected that in less than twelve months the Rail Road to the District of Columbia will be completed.

EASTON, MD.

SATURDAY, MARCH 15, 1834.

UNITED STATES BANK.—The following resolutions were on Wednesday introduced into the House of Delegates of Maryland, by our representative, Mr. SPENCER:—

The following preamble and resolutions were, on yesterday, introduced into the House of Delegates of this state and read.

WHEREAS, the sovereignty of each of these United States, rests in the people, and any expression of the sovereign will should emanate, as directly as possible, from the source of power. And whereas, the government of the U. States is a compact among sovereign states, to which certain powers are delegated by a written constitutional charter, and from which all powers are withheld which are not expressly granted, or necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly granted, we, the immediate representatives of the people of the state of Maryland, (one of the parties to the constitutional compact in the formation of the government of the United States,) feel ourselves justified, and indeed called upon to declare, what we believe to be the will of the people of Maryland in the existing struggle between the Bank and the government of the United States.

Therefore, by the House of Delegates of Maryland,

Resolved, That the power of Congress to incorporate the Bank of the U. States, if it be one of the powers granted to the general government, must be either so expressly declared in the constitution, or must be a power necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly granted.

Resolved, That no such power is expressly granted, unless it be expressed under the power "to coin money, and regulate the value thereof," which would be to make the word coin, and paper money, synonimous or controvertible terms, contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of our language: That if it be necessary to carry into effect the granted powers, it must be to enable the government to collect, keep safe, and disburse the revenue necessary for its support.

Resolved, That in the collection and safe keeping of the public revenue, the Bank of the U. States presents no advantages over well regulated State Banks; that it is only in disbursing the revenue by means of its multiplied branches throughout the Union, under the control of one head, by which domestic exchange is facilitated, that its advocates can support the plea of necessity, and justify its creation, under the constitution of the U. States; that however much it may promote the general welfare in restraining the issues of state corporations, how ever much it may facilitate foreign and domestic exchange, and thereby benefit the mercantile community, if its existence be not necessary, and indispensible to the safe and regular operations of the government, the act of Congress creating it, is, in the opinion of the House of Delegates of Maryland, a violation of the constitution of the United States, and absolutely null and void.

Resolved, That while we acknowledge the facilities afforded to the government by the Bank of the U. States, in the disbursement of the revenue, we do not admit that equal facilities cannot be obtained through the agency of well regulated State Banks, to which no constitutional objections can arise; and that the intention on the part of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, to give the State Banks a fair opportunity of showing whether or not they can effectually serve the general government, in the disbursement of the revenue, thereby to satisfy, if they be incapable, the constitutional scruples entertained by him, in common with a large portion of the people of the different states, merits the warmest approbation of the friends of state rights, and of a strict construction of the constitution of the U. States.

Resolved, That in the very capacity, in which the advocates of the Bank of the U. States see its greatest excellence, to wit, in its capacity to restrain & regulate the issues of State Banks the friends of State Rights see displayed the most odious of its unconstitutional deformities, as well as the most alarming of its powers:—a capacity, which, if Congress have the power to regulate the paper currency of the States, proves that they have transferred that power to an irresponsible corporation, if they have not, that they have thrown over the States a check, not known to the constitution, which may be exerted at the will of a few irresponsible individuals, to the total destruction of the monied institutions of the states, or through them, to the ruin of their citizens, and the subversion of their political institutions.

Resolved, That in the existing state of embarrassment into which the whole union is plunged, in the cries of distress from every quarter, which assail the representatives of the people, and the President of the U. States, in the memorials and petitions with which the desks of our representatives in Congress have been loaded, whether this embarrassment and distress be real or imaginary, whether they be the necessary consequences of the removal of the Government Deposites from the Bank of the U. States or not, we have proof, beyond the possibility of doubt, of the great and alarming power of this corporation, a power which, if brought to operate on the institutions and citizens of a single state would be able to control its elections, crush its institutions, or ruin its citizens.

Resolved, That although we believe the distress of the mercantile community, since the removal of the deposites from the Bank of the U. States, has been very extensive, yet we believe that the panic endeavored to be raised by the friends of that institution, has greatly added to the public excitement; that independent of the effort on the part of the Bank to operate on the public mind (by large curtailments of its discounts, and a simultaneous pressure on the State Banks,) and through that medium, on the representatives of the people in Congress, thereby to coerce its recharter, the removal of the Government Deposites would have produced no greater curtailment by that Bank in its discounts to individuals, than could have been easily supplied by the increased capacity of the Deposite Banks to extend their accommodations; that the distress and consternation which have been spread over the whole trading community, have been wholly the work of the Bank of the U. States, and its friends, not necessarily consequent on the removal of the deposites, but with the sole view of controling the operations of the government, and to prolong its own existence.

Resolved, That in calling the attention of Congress, at an early day after his election, to the unconstitutionality of the act creating, and to the extensive and dangerous powers of the Bank of the U. States, when, too, that institution was in the full tide of its popularity; in putting his veto upon the law renewing its charter, and thus placing himself in opposition to this powerful engine of the aristocracy of wealth in our country, our Chief Magistrate has given an example of firmness, patriotism, and devotion to the interests of his country, which has few parallels in the annals of nations; that if there existed at first, a difference of opinion amongst his friends in Maryland, in reference to the removal of the deposites, there now

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