front, or over the crupper behind, leaving its master in a situation not to be envied.

Unlike the mountain torrents and small rivers of other parts of the world, the Mississippi rises but slowly during these floods, continuing for several weeks to increase at the rate of about an inch in the day. When at its height, it undergoes little fluctuation for some days, and after this subsides as slowly as it rose. The usual duration of a flood is from four to six weeks, although, on some occasions, it is protracted to two months.

Every one knows how largely the idea of floods and cataclysms enters into the speculations of the geologist. If the streamlets of the European continent afford illustrations of the formation of strata, how much more must the Mississipipi, with its ever-shifting sand banks, its crumbling shores, its enormous masses of drift timber, the source of future beds of coal, its extensive and varied alluvial deposits, and its mighty mass of waters rolling sullenly along, like the flood of eternity!

DEBATE ON THE REPEAL OF THE FORCE BILL.

In Senate, Wednesday, April 9, 1834.

Remarks of Mr. CALHOUN, in the Senate of the United States, on the Bill to repeal the Force Act, delivered on the 9th of April, 1834.

I have, said Mr. Calhoun, introduced this bill from a deep conviction, that the act which it proposes to repeal is in its tendency subversive of our political institutions, and fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country; which I trust to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate, should I be so fortunate as to obtain a dispassionate and favorable hearing.

In resting the repeal on this ground, it is not my intention to avail myself of the objections to the details of the act, as repugnant as many of them are to the principles of our Government. In illustration of the truth of this assertion, I might select that provision which vests in the President, in certain cases, of which he is made the judge, the entire force of the country, civil, military and naval, with the implied power of pledging the public faith for whatever expenditure he may chose to incur in its application.—And to prove how dangerous it is to vest such extraordinary powers in the Executive, I might avail myself of the experience, which we have had in the last few months of the aspiring character of that department of the Government, and which has furnished conclusive evidence of the danger of vesting in it even a very limited discretion. It is not for me to judge of the propriety of the course, which the members of this body may think proper to pursue in reference to the question under consideration; but I must say, that I am at a loss to understand how any one, who regards as I do, the acts to which I have referred, as palpable usupartions of power, and as indicating on the part of the executive a dangerous spirit of aggrandisement, can vote against the bill under consideration, and thereby virtually vote to continue in the President, the extraordinary and dangerous power in question.

But it may be said, that the provision of the act, which confers this power will expire by its own limitation at the termination of the present session. It is true, it will then cease to be law; but it is no less true, that the precedent, unless the act be expunged from the statute book, will live forever, ready, on any pretext of future danger, to be quoted as an authority to confer on the Chief Magistrate, similar, or even more dangerous powers, if more dangerous can be devised. We live in an eventful period, and among other things, we have had, recently, some impressive lessons on the danger of precedents. To them immediately we owe the act which has caused the present calamitous and dangerous condition of the country; which has been defended, almost solely on the ground of precedents,—precedents almost unnoticed at the time; but, had they not existed, or had they been reversed at the time by Congress, the condition of the country would this day be far different from what it now is. With this knowledge of these facts, we must see that a bad precedent is as dangerous as the bad measure itself; and in some respects more so, as it may give rise to acts even worse than itself, as in the case to which I have alluded. In this view of the subject to refuse to vote against the repeal of the act, and thereby constitute a precedent to confer similar, or more dangerous powers hereafter, would be as dangerous as to vote for an act to vest permanently in the President the power in question.

But I pass over this and other objections, to the details, not much less formidable—I take a higher stand against the act—I object to the principle in which it originated—putting the details aside, on the ground, as I have stated, that they are subversive of our political institutions, and fatal in their tendency to the liberty and happiness of the country. Fortunately we are not left to conjecture or inference, as to what those principles are. It was openly proclaimed, both here and elsewhere; in the debates of this body and the proclamation and message of the President, in which the act originated, that the very basis on which it rests—the assumption on which only it could be supported was, that this Government had the final and conclusive right in the last resort, to judge of the extent of its powers, and that to execute its decision, it had the right to use all the means of the country, civil, military and fiscal, not only against individuals, or against the governments of the States, but against the States themselves, and all acting under their authority, whether in a legislative, executive or judicial capacity.

If farther evidence be required, as to the nature and character of the act, it will be found in the history of the events, in which it took its origin. It originated, as we all know, in a controvesy between this Government and the State of South Carolina, in reference to a power, which involved the question of the constitutionality of a protective tariff. I do not intend to give the history of this controversy; it is sufficient for my purpose to say, that the State, in maintenance of what she believed to be her unquestionable power, assumed the highest ground; she placed herself on her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this Confederacy, and made her opposition to the encroachments on her rights through a convention of the people, the only organ, by which, according to our conception, the sovereign will of a State can be immediately and directly pronounced. This Government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the State, assumed the right to trample upon the authority of the convention, and to look beyond the State to the individuals who composed it; not as forming a political community, but as a mere mass of insolated individuals, without political character or authority; and thus asserted in the strongest manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but that of overlooking, in a contest for power, the very existence of the State itself, and of recognizing in the assertion of what it might claim to be its power, no other authority whatever in the system but its own.

Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we are brought to the consideration of a question of the deepest import. Is an act which assumes such powers for this government, consistent with the nature and character of our political institutions?

It is not my intention in the discussion of this question, to open the debates of the last session. But in declining to renew that discuss on, I wish it to be distinctly understood, that I do so exclusively on the ground, that I do not feel myself justified in repeating arguments so recently advanced; and not on the ground, that there is the least abatement of confidence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bearing which they ought to have against the act. So far otherwise, time and reflection have but served to confirm me in the impression which I then entertained; and without repeating the arguments, I now avail myself in this discussion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to vindicate them against whatever assaults may be made upon them, come from what quarter they may. Without, then, reopening the discussion of the last session, on the elementary principles of our Government, which were then brought into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest and most common sense view of our political institutions, regarding them merely in a matter of fact point of view, in order to ascertain the parts, and relations which they bear to each other.

Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the first view, with the number and complexity of the parts—with the division, classification, and organization which pervades every part of the system. It is, in fact, *a system of government*, and these, in turn, are a system of departments—a system in which government bears the same relation to government, in reference to the whole, as departments do to departments, in reference to each particular government. As each government is made up of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, organized into one; so the system is made up of this government, and the State governments, in like manner, organized into one system. So, too, as the powers which constitute the respective governments, are divided and organized into departments, in like manner in the formation of the governments, their powers are classed into two distinct divisions; the one containing powers local and peculiar in their character, which the interests of the States require to be exercised by each State, through a separate government; the other containing those which are more general and comprehensive, and which can be best exercised in some uniform mode, through a common government. The former of these divisions constitute what, in our system, are known as the reserved powers, and are exercised by each State through its own seperate government. The latter are known as the delegated powers, and are exercised through this, the common government of the several States. This division of power into two parts, with distinct and independent governments, regularly organized into departments, legislative, executive, and judicial, to carry their respective parts into effect, constitutes the great striking and peculiar character of our system, without example in ancient or modern times; and may be regarded as the fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as constituting its great conservative principle.

If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another striking division, between the power of the people and that of the government—between that inherent, primitive, creative power, which resides exclusively in the people, and from which all authority is derived, and the delegated power or trust, conferred upon the government, to effect the object of their creation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and most important division. The people, instead of being united in one general community, are divided into twenty-four States, each forming distinct sovereign communities; and in which, seperately, the whole power of the system ultimately resides.

If we examine how this ultimate power is called into action, we shall find that its only organ is a primary assemblage of the people, known under the name of a convention, through which their sovereign will is announced; and by which governments are formed and organized. If we trace historically the exertion of this power, in the formation of the governments constituting our system, we shall find that originally, on the separation of the thirteen colonies from the crown of Great Britain, each State for itself, through its own conventions, formed separate Constitutions and governments, and that these governments, in turn, formed a league or confederacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the regulation of which, the States had a common interest. But this confederacy, proving incompetent for its object, was superceded by the present Constitution, which totally changed the character of the system. If we compare the mode of the adoption of this Constitution with that of the adoption of original constitutions of the several States, we shall find them precisely the same. In both, each State adopted the constitution through its own convention, by its separate act, for itself; and was only bound, in consequence of its own adoption, without reference to the adoption of any other State. The only point in which they can be distinguished is the mutual compact in which each State stipulated with the other to adopt it as a common Constitution. Thus regarded, this constitution is in fact the Constitution of each State. In Virginia, for instance, it is the Constitution of Virginia; and so too this Government and the laws which it enacts are, within the limits of the State, the Government and the laws of the State. It is in fact the Constitution and Government of the whole, because it is the Constitution and Government of each part; and not the Constitution and Government of the parts because it is of the whole. The system commences with the parts and ends with the whole. The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead of the whole being a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each State has two distinct Constitutions and Governments—a separate Constitution and Government instituted, as I have stated, to regulate the object in which each has a peculiar interest; and a general one to regulate the interests common to all, and binding by a common compact, the whole into one community, in which the separate and independent existence of each State, as a sovereign community, is preserved; instead of being fused into a common mass.

Such is our system; such are its parts, and such their relation to each other. I have stated no fact that can be questioned, nor have I omitted any which I am capable of perceiving. In reviewing the whole we must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by which all are blended into one, than we are by the number and complexity of the parts. I know of no system, in either respect ancient or modern, to be compared with it; and can compare it to nothing but that sublime and beautiful system of which our globe constitutes a part, and to which it bears, in many particulars, so striking a resemblace. In this system, this Government as we have seen, constitutes a part—a prominent, but a subordinate part, with defined, limited and restricted powers.

I now repeat the question, is the act which assumes for the Government, the right to interpret in the last resort, the extent of its powers, and to enforce its interpretation, against all other authority, consistent with our institutions? To state the question is to answer it. We might with equal propriety, ask whether a Government of unlimited power is consistent with one of enumerated and restricted powers. I say unlimited, for I would hold his understanding in low estimation, who can make, practically, any distinction between a Government of unlimited powers, one which has an unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it pleases; who does not see that to divide power and to give one of the parties the exclusive right to determine what share belongs to him, is to annihilate the division, and to vest the whole in him who possesses the right. It would be no less absurd than for one in private life to divide his property with another and vest in that other the absolute and unconditional right to determine the extent of his share; which would be in fact to give him the whole—nor could I think much more highly of the understanding of him who does not perceive that this exclusive right on the part of this Government, of determining the extent of its powers, necessarily destroys all distinction between reserved and delegated powers; and that it thus strikes a fatal blow, at that fundamental distribution of power, which lies at the bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable consequence destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional laws, making the latter to the full, as obligatory as the former; of which we had a remarkable example when the act proposed to be repealed, was before the Senate. It is well known, that the power in controversy between this Government and the State of South Carolina, had been pronounced to be unconstitutional, by the legislatures of most of the Southern States, and also by many of the members of this body; and yet there were instances however extraordinary it may appear, of members of the body voting to enforce an act which they believed to be unconstitutional, and that too at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a course must appear, it was the natural and legitimate consequence of the power, which the act assumed for this government; and illustrates, in the strongest manner imaginable the truth of what I have advanced. But to proceed. This unlimited riglit of judging, as to its powers not only destroys as I have stated all distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional acts, but merges in *this*; the very existence of the separate government of the States, by reducing them from that independent and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them in the system, to mere subordinate and dependent bodies, holding their power and existence at the mercy of this Government. It stops not here—it annihilates the States themselves. The right which it assumes of trampling upon the authority of a convention of the people of the States, the only organ through which the sovereignty of the States can exert itself, and to look beyond the States to the individuals, who compose them, and to treat them as entirely destitute of all polititical character or power, is in fact, to annihilate the States, and to transfer their sovereignty, and all their powers to this government.

If we now raise our eyes and direct them towards that once beautiful system, with all its various seperate, and independent parts, blended into one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change! All have disappeared; gone; absorbed; concentrated and consolidated in this Government; which is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the system, the sole and unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic majority.

Will it be tolerated, that I should ask whether an act which has caused so complete a revolution—which has entirely subverted our political system, as it emanated from the hands of its creators, and reared in its place one in every respect so different, must not, in its consequences, prove fatal to the liberty and the happiness of these States? Can it be necessary for me to prove that no other system that human ingenuity can devise, or imagination conceive, but that which this fatal act has subverted, can preserve the liberty or secure the happiness of the country? Need I show, that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to the mind of a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of government for a country of such vast extent, that should at once, possess sufficient power to hold the whole together, without at the same time proving fatal to liberty. There never existed an example before, of a free community spreading over such an extent of territory; and the ablest and profoundest thinkers, at the time, believed it to be utterly impracticable that there should be. Yet this difficult problem was solved—successfully solved, by the wise and sagacious men who framed our Constitution. No, it was above unaided human wisdom—above the sagacity of the most enlightened. It was the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances co-operating and leading the way to its formation; directed by that kind Providence, which has so often and so signally disposed events in our favor.

To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the apparently insuperable obstacle, which it presents, required that remarkable division, distribution and organization of power which, as I have stated, so remarkably distinguishes our system; and which serve as so many breakwaters to arrest the angry waves of power,—impelled by avarice and ambition; and which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken expanse would be resistless. Of this partition, and breaking up of power into seperate parts, the most remarkable division is that between the reserved and delegated powers which forms the basis on which this and the separate governments of the States are organized, as the great and primary departments of the system. It is this important division, which mainly gives that expansive character to our institutions, by means of which they have the capicity of being spread over the vast extent of our country, without exposing us on the one side to the danger of disunion; or on the other, to the loss of liberty. Without this happy device, the people of these States, after having achieved their independence, would have been compelled to resolve themselves into small and hostile communities, in despite of a common origin, a common language, and the common renown and glory acquired by their united wisdom and valor in the war of the revolution; or have submitted quietly to the yoke of despotic power as the only alternative.

In the place of this admirably contrived system, the act proposed to be repealed has, erected one great consolidated government. Can it be necessary for me to show, what must be the inevitable consequences?—need I prove that all consolidated governments—governments in which that power predominates (for such is their essence) are necessarily despotic, whether that power be yielded by the will of one man, or that of an absolute and unchecked majority? Need I demonstrate that it is on the contrary, the very essence of liberty, that the power should be so divided, distributed and organized, that one interest may check the other, so as to prevent the excessive action of the seperate interests of the community against each other; on the principle that organized power can only be checked by organized power.

The truth of these doctrines were fully understood at the time of the formation of this Constitution. It was then clearly foreseen and foretold, what must be the inevitable consequences of concentrating all the powers of the system in this government. Yes, we are in a state predicted; foretoid; prophecied from the beginning. All the calamities we have experienced, and those which are yet to come, are the result of the consolidating tendency of the government; and unless that tendency be arrested—unless we reverse our steps, all that have been foretold will certainly befall us—even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath; military despotism. To this fruitful source of woes, may be traced, that remarkable decay of public virtue; that rapid growth of corruption and subserviency; that decline of patriotism; that increase of faction; that tendency to anarchy, and finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one man, which so lamentably characterises times. Should there be any one, seeing, and acknowledging all these morbid, and dangerous symptoms, but should doubt, whether the disease is to be traced to the cause, which I have assigned, I would ask him to what other can it be attributed? There is no event; no, not in the political or moral world, more than in the physical, without an adequate cause. I would ask him does he attribute it to the people?—to their want of sufficient intelligence and virtue, for self-government? If the true cause may be traced to hem, very melancholy would be our situation; gloomy would be the prospect before us. If such be the fact, that our people are indeed incapable of self-government, I know of no people upon earth, with whom we might not desire to change condition. When the day comes, when this people shall be compelled to surrender self-government—a people so spirited and so long accustomed to liberty, it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood, such as has rarely, if ever been witnessed in any age or country; and, until compelled by irresistable evidence, so fearful a cause cannot be admitted.

Can it be attributed to the nature of our system of government? Shall we pronounce it radically defective, and incapable of effecting the objects for which it was created? If that be in truth the case, our situation would be in fact not much less calamitous than if attributable to the people. To what other system could we resort? to a confederation? That has already been tried, and has proved utterly inadequate. To consolidation? Reason and experience (as far as we have had experience) proclaims it to be the worst possible form. But if the cause be not in the people or the system, to what can it be attributed, but some misapprehension of the nature and character of our institutions, and consequent misdirection of their powers or functions? And if so, to what other misapprehension or misdirection, but that which directed our system towards consolidation, and consummated its movement in that direction in the act proposed to be repealed?—That such is the fact—that this is the true explanation of all the symptoms of decay and corruption, which I have enumerated, is in reality our only consolation—furnishes the only hope, that can be rationally entertained of extricating ourselves from our present calamity, and of averting the still greater, that are impending.

I know, that there are those, who take a different, but in my opinion a very superficial view of the cause of our difficulties. They attribute it exclusively to those who are in power, and see in the misconduct of Gen. Jackson the cause of all that has befallen us. That he has done much to aggravate the evil, I acknowledge with pain. I had my full share of responsibility in elevating him to power; and there once existed between us, friendly relations, personal and political, and I would rejoice had he so continued to conduct himself, as to advance the interests of the country, and his own reputation and fame. He certainly might have effected much good. He came into office under circumstances, and had a weight of popularity which placed much in his power, for good or for evil; but either from a want of a just comprehension of the duties attached to the situation, in which he was placed; or an indisposition to discharge them; or the improper influence and control of those who unfortunately for the country and for himself, have acquired through flattery and subserviency, an ascendancy over him, he has disappointed the hopes of his friends, and realized the predictions of his enemies. But the question recurs, how happens it, that he who has proved himself so illy qualified to fill the high station that he occupies was elected by the people? If it be attributed to a misapprehension of his qualifications, or to an undue gratitude for distinguished military services, which at times leads astray the most intelligent and virtuous people in the selection of rulers—how shall we explain his re-election, after he had actually proved himself so incompetent—after he had violated every pledge, which he had made previous to election; after he had disregarded the principles on which he had permitted his friends and partisans to place his elevation, and had outraged the feelings of the community by attempting to regulate the domestic intercourse and relations of society? Shall we say, that the feelings of gratitude for military services outweighed all this? or that the people with all this expense were incapable of forming a correct opinion of his conduct or character, or of understanding the tendency or the measures of his administration? To assert this, would be neither more nor less, than to assert, that they have neither the intelligence, nor the virtue for self-government; as the very criterion by which their capacity in that respect is tested, is their ability duly to appreciate the character and conduct of public rulers, and the true tendency of their public measures; and to admit their incapacity in that respect would in fact bring us back to the people as the cause.

To understand truly how tho distinguished individual now at the head of the nation was elevated to this exalted station in despite of his acknowleged defects in several respects, & how he has retained his power among an intelligent and patrictic people, notwithstanding all the objections to his administration that have been stated, we must elevate our views from the individual and his qualification and conduct, to the working of the system itself; by which only, we can come to a knowledge of the true cause of our present condition; how we have arrived at it, and by what means we can extricate ourselves from its dangers and difficulties. I do not deem it necessary in taking this view to go back, and trace the operation of our government from the commencement, or to point out the departure from its true principles from the beginning, with the evils thence resulting, however interesting and instructive the investigation might be. I might show, that from the first, beginning with the formation of the Constitution, there were two parties in the Convention; one in favor of a national, or what is the same thing, a consolidated Government; and the other in favor of the confederative principle; how the latter, from being in the minority at first gradually, and after a long struggle, gained the ascendency; and how the fortunate result of that ascendency, terminated in the establishment of that beautiful complex, federative system of Government, which I have attempted to explain.

I might show that the struggle between the two parties did not terminate with the adoption of the Constitution; that after it went into operation the national party gained the ascendency in the counsels of the nation, and that the result of that ascendency was to give an impulse to the Government, in the direction which their principles led, and from which it never afterwards recovered. I am far from attributing this to any sinister design. The party were not less distinguished for patriotism, than for abilities, and no doubt honestly intended to give the system a fair trial, but they would have been more than men, if their attachment, to their favorite plan had not biased their feeling and judgment. I (said Mr. C.) avail myself of the occasion to avow my high respect for both of the great parties which divided the country in its early history. They were both eminently honest and patriotic, and the preference which each gave to its respective views, resulted from a zealous attachment to the public interest. At that early period, before there was any experience as to the operation of the system, it is not suprising that one should believe that the danger was a tendency to anarchy, while the other believed it to be towards despotism; and that these different theoretical views should honestly have a decided influence on their public conduct.

I pass over the intermediate events; the reaction against the national, or, as it was then called, federal party—the elevation of Mr. Jefferson in consequence of that reaction in 1801—and the gradual departure (from the influence of power) of the republican party, from the principles which brought them into office—I come down, at once, to the year eighteen hundred and twenty-four, when a protective tariff was for the first time adopted; when the power to impose duties, granted for the purpose of raising revenue, was converted into an instrument of regulating, controlling, and organizing the entire capital and industry of the country, and placing them under the influence of this Government; and when the principles of consolidation gained an entire ascendency in both Houses of Congress. Its first fruit was to give a sectional action to the Government, and of course a sectional character to political parties—arraying the non-exporting States against the exporting, and the northern against the southern section.

It is my wish to speak of the events, to which I feel myself compelled to refer, in illustration of the practical operation of that consolidating tendency of the Government, which was consummated by the act proposed to be repealed, and which I believe to be the cause of all our evils, with the greatest possible moderation. I know how delicate a task it is to speak of recent political events, and of the actors concerned in them; and I would, on this occasion, gladly avoid so painful a duty, if I did not believe that truth and the public interest require it.—Without a full understanding of the events of this period, from '24 down to the present time, it is impossible that we can have a just knowlege of the cause of our present condition, or a clear perception of the means of remedying it. To avoid all personal feeling, I shall endeavor to recede, in imagination, a century from the present time, and from that distant position regard the events, to which I allude, in that spirit of philosophical inquiry, which an earnest seeker after truth, at so remote a day, may be supposed to be actuated. I feel I may be justified in speaking with the less reserve of these events, as the great question, which, during the greater part of the period, so deeply agitated the country, (the protective tariff) may now be considered as terminated in the adjustment of the last winter, never to be reagitated, as I trust; and of course, may be spoken of with the freedom of a passed event.

But to proceed with the narrative; the Presidential contest, which was terminated the next year, placed the Executive Department in the possession of the same interest that controlled the legislative; so that all departments of this Government were united in favour of that great interest. The successful termination of the election in favor of the individual then elevated to the Chief Magistracy, and for whom, I then and now, entertained kind feelings, may be attributed, in part, no doubt, to the predominance of the tariff interest; and may be considered as the first instance of the predominance of that interest in a presidential contest.

Let us pause at this point, (it is an important one) in order to survey the state of public affairs at that juncture. In casting our eyes over the scene, we find the country divided into two great hostile and sectional parties—placed in conflict on a question, believed to be on both sides of vital importance to their respective interests; and on the side of the weaker party, believed in addition, to involve a constitutional question of the greatest magnitude, and having a direct and important bearing on the duration of the liberty and Constitution of the country. In this conflict, we find both Houses of Congress with the Chief Magistrate, and of course the Government itself, on the side of the dominant interest, and identified with it, in principles and feelings. In this state of things, a great and solemn question, what ought to be done? was forced on the decision of the minority. Should we acquiesce quietly would be to subject the property and industry of an entire section of the country to an unlimited and indefinite exaction; as it was openly avowed, that the protective system could only be perfected, by being carried to the point of prohibition, on all articles of which a sufficient supply could be made or manufactured in the country. To submit under such circumstances, would have been according to our view of the subject, a gross derilection both of interest and duty. It was impossible. But how could the majority be successfully opposed, possessed as they were, of every Department of the Government? How, in this state of things, could the minority effect a change in their favor, through the ordinary operations of the Government? They could effect no favorable change in this, or the other House—the majority, in both, but too faithfully represented what their constitutents believed to be the interest of their section, to whom only, and not to us, they were responsible. The only branch of the government then on which the minority could act, and through which they could hope to effect a favorable change, was the Executive. The President is elected by a majority of the whole electoral votes, and of course, the minority has a weight in his election, in proportion to their number, and the unity of their voice. Here was all our hope, and to this point, all our efforts to effect a change were necessarily directed; but even here our power of acting with effect was limited to a narrow circle. It would have been hopeless to present a candidate openly and fully identified with our own interest. Defeat would have been the certain result; had his acknowledged qualifications for intelligence, experience and patriotism been ever so great. We were thus forced, by inevitable consequence,—a consequence neither to be avoided or resisted, to abandon the contest, or to select a candidate who, at best, was but a choice of evils; one whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful, on the subject which divided the two sections. However great the hazard, or the objections to such a selection, for such an office, it must be charged, not to us, but to that action of the system, which compelled us to make the choice—compelling us by that consolidating tendency which had drawn under the control of this Government, the local and reserved powers, belonging to the States separately; the exercise of which had necessarily given that direction to its action, and which created and placed in conflict the two great sectional, political parties.

But it was not sufficient, that the opinion of our candidate should not be fully in coincidence with our own. That alone could not be sufficient to ensure his success. It was necessary that he should have great *personal* popularity, distinct from political, to be in a word a successful Military Chieftain, which gives a popularity the most extensive, and least affected by political considerations and this was another fruit—a necessary fruit of consolidation. To these recommendations others must be added in order to conciliate the feelings of the minority—that he should be identified for instance with them in interest, possess the same property and pursue the same industry. These qualifications, all of which were made indispensible, by the juncture, pointed clearly to one man, and but one, General Jackson. There was however another circumstance which gave him great prominence and strength, and which greatly contributed to recommend him, as the opposing candidate. He had been defeated in the Presidential contest before the House of Representatives (though returned with the highest vote) under circumstances, which were supposed to involve a disregard of the public voice. I do not deem it necessary to enter into an inquiry, as to the principles which controlled the election, or as to the view of the actors in that scene. Many considerations doubtless governed, and among others the feelings of prominent individuals in reference to the candidates, and their opinion of their respective qualifications, besides the one to which I have alluded, that of giving the dominant interest that control over the Executive which they had over the legislative department.

These combined motives, as I have stated, pointed distinctly to General Jackson. He was selected as the candidate of the minority, and the canvass entered into with all that zeal which belonged to the magnitude of the stake, united with the consciousness of honest and patriotic purpose. The leading objects were to effect a great political reform and to arrest if posible what he believed to be a dangerous, and felt to be an oppressive action of the Government. It is true that the qualifications of the individual, thus necessarily selected, were believed to be, in many important particulars defective; that he lacked experience, extensive political information, and a command of temper, but it was believed, that his firmness of purpose and his natural sagacity, by calling to his aid the experience, the talents and patriotism of those who supported his claims, would compensate for these defects.

I do not deem it necessary to enter into a history of this interestrng and animated canvas, but there is one circumstance attending it; so striking; so full of instruction, and so illustrative of the point under consideration, that I cannot pass it in silence. The canvas soon ran into the great and absorbing question of the day; as all ordinary diseases run into the prevailing one. Those in power, sought to avail themselves of the popularity of the system with which they were identified. I speak it not in censure. It was natural, perhaps unavoidable, as connected with the morbid action of the Government. That portion of our allies, identified with the same interest, were, in like manner, and from the same motive and cause forced into a rivalry of zeal for the same interest. The result of these causes combined, with a monopolizing spirit of the protective system, was the tariff of 1828—that disastrous measure, which has brought so many calamities upon us, and put in peril the Union and liberty of the country. It poured millions into the treasury beyond even the most extravagant wants of the Government; and which, on the payment of the public debt caused that hazardous juncture, resulting from a large undisposable surplus revenue, which has spread such deep corruption in every direction.

This disastrous event, opened our eyes, (I mean myself and those immediately connected with me,) as to the full extent of the danger and oppression of the protective system, and the hazard of failing to effect the reform intended, through the election of General Jackson. With these disclosures, it became necessary to seek some other ultimate but more certain measure of protection. We turned to the Constitution to find the remedy. We directed a more diligent and careful scrutiny into its provsions, in order to ascertain fully the nature and character of our political system. We found that certain and effectual remedy, in that great fundamental division of the powers of the system, between this government and its independent co-departments—the seperate governments of the States, to be called into action; arrest the unconstitutional acts of this government, by the interposition of the State—the paramount source, from which as far as she is concerned, both governments derive their power. But in relying on this, as our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in the Presidential canvass; we still hoped that General Jackson, if elected, would effect the necessary reform, and thereby supercede the necessity for calling into action the sovereign authority of the State, which we were anxious to avoid. With these views, the two were pushed with equal zeal at the same time; which double operation commenced in the fall of 1828, but a few months after the passage of the tariff act of that year; and at the meeting of the legislature of the State, at the same period, a paper known as the South Carolina Exposition, was reported to that body, containing a full development, as well on the constitutional point, as the operation of the protective system; preparatory to a state of things which might eventually render the action of the State necessary, in order to protect her rights and interests and to stay a course of policy which we believed, would, if not arrested, prove destructive of liberty and the Constitution. This movement, on the part of the State, places beyond all controversy, the true character of the motives, which governed us in the Presidential canvass. We were not the mere partisans of the candidate we supported. We aimed at a far more exalted object than his election—the defence of the rights of the State, and the security of liberty and the Constitution. To this we held his election entirely subordinate. This we pursued unwarped by selfish or ambitious views.

The contest terminated in the elevation of him who now presides, but it soon became apparent that our apprehension, that we might be disappointed in the expected reform, was not without foundation. That occurred, which, we ought, perhaps, to have expected, and which under similar circumstances, has rarely failed to follow. He, who was elevated to power proved to be more solicitous to retain what he had acquired, than to fulfil the expectations of those, who had honestly contributed to his elevation, with a view to political reform. The tale may be readily told—not a promise fulfilled—not a measure adopted to correct the abuses of the system—not a step taken to arrest the progress of consolidation, and restore the conservative principles of our Government—not a look cast to the near approach of the payment of the public debt—nor an effort made to reduce gradually the duties, in order to prevent a surplus revenue, and to save the manufactories which had grown up under the protective system from the hazard of a shock caused by a sudden reduction of the duties. All were forgotten; and instead of attempting to control events, the Executive was only solicitous to occupy a position the most propitious to retain and increase his power. It required but little penetration to see that the position sought was a middle one between the contending parties; to be identified with no principle or policy, and to rely on the personal popularity of the man.

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