sponsibility, when it is legally established, is a pure national institution, a purely internal regulation, and can never be used as an argument in the intercourse which governments hold with each other. If it were otherwise, and if we were disposed, after the example of Mr. Livingston, to carry the argument to its extreme consequences, it might be maintained that the President of the United States has the right, provided it be in a Message to congress, to foreign nations the most odious acts, the most perverse intentions; to hold them up publicly to the animadversion of the world, without these governments or these nations having the right to manifest the slightest resentment, since, according to this very strange doctrine, they would not even be allowed to take official notice of it.

To state such a doctrine, is to refute it.

However, sir, we do not wish to exaggerate any thing. Mr. Livingston is perfectly right when he says that the cause which he supports, is, in a general sense, common to all free countries:—That all Governments founded on the division of power, and on the publicity of debates, have an interest in repelling, on the part of foreign powers, any interference with the communications which the Prince and his Ministers in constitutional Monarchies, and in republics the magistrates entrusted with the executive power, are called upon to make to the Legislature. And this is the reason, as Mr. Livingston very judiciously observes, that in France and in England, the language of the royal speeches is so reserved in every thing that concerns foreign relations; and it is the same motive, as you will observe, Sir, to the Cabinet of Washington that has directed the conduct of France in relation to the Message of President Jackson.—If the expressions contained in that Message had been inserted in a proclamation, or any other act of the executive power of the Union, we would at once have called for an explanation. Out of respect for the very nature of the act, the French Government deemed it a duty to manifest the sentiments it felt on that occasion, by instantly recalling its Minister, and stating in a communication the motives for that recall; but it did not ask for explanations; it was contented to expect them from the justice of the Government of the United States, and from the ancient friendship of the American nation, not doubting that the Government of the United States would appreciate the difference in such cases, between answering an interpellation and preventing by a spontaneous determination, by explanations readily *offered*, a misunderstanding always to be regretted.

The amendment of the Chamber of Deputies is conceived in the same spirit of reserve and conciliation. It does not make it the duty of the French Government to ask for explanations; it merely supposes they will receive them.

We were not mistaken, Sir, in believing that the government of the United States would appreciate that difference, since Mr. Livingston, as he himself observes, hastened as early as the 29th of January last, when the Message of President Jackson had been only known a few days, to offer us explanations at great length, of every passage of that Message which treated of the relations between the United States and France; and since, that step and the explanations contained in his note of the 29th of January have received, as he informs us by his note of the 25th of April, the entire approbation of the President.

Mr. Livingston was not astonished that those explanations, as long as they were presented only upon his personal responsibility, did not produce upon us the effect he intended; but he supposes that being now clothed with the approbation of the President, they must satisfy all that the nicest sense of national honor could desire.

He therefore makes it a point in his note of the 25th, to repeat and to develope them, in the hope that the French Government by examining them anew, under the impression that they had become the expression of the sentiments of the President, would deem them sufficient. He is so much the more anxious to impart to us his own conviction on this subject, as he deems it impossible for the Government of the United States to go any farther. He even seems to be apprehensive that future events which he need not specify, designating thereby no doubt the adoption of the amendment of the Chamber of Deputies by the other two branches of the Government, may hereafter render improper any allusion to explanations presented under the influence of different circumstances.

We sincerely wish, sir, not to add to the difficulties of the situation in which the two countries are respectively placed. The question of date, to which Mr. Livingston seems, in this case, to attach an importance which it belongs not to us to appreciate, does not in any way alter either the nature or the extent of the duties which are prescribed to us. If satisfaction had really been given to the just susceptibility of the French Nation as early as the twenty ninth of January, (the date of Mr. Livingston's first note,) and therefore previous to the adoption of the amendment under consideration by the Chamber of Deputies, or as early as the 27th of April, (the date of Mr. Livingston's 2d note,) that is to say, before the adoption of this same amendment by the other two branches of the Legislature, we would be sincerely gratified. The more the Government of the U. S. would have shown a willingness to explain itself, the more we should be ourselves disposed to find the explanations satisfactory, and to view the solicitude of that Government as a testimony in favor of the intentions which had dictated the Message of the President.

We will simply observe, before we proceed: First, That even supposing the explanations, given by the note of the 29th of January, to have been such as we might have wished them, they were on the 18th of April, the day of the passage of the amendment in the Chamber of Deputies, nothing more than the simple expression of the personal sentiments of Mr. Livingston. This is an observation which did not escape his notice.

We will also observe that by the publication of Mr. Livingston's correspondence, the Government of the U. S. has exerted against him such a feeling of irritation, that it would have been out of our power, even supposing that we had considered that correspondence as containing nothing but what was right and proper, to avail ourselves of a document bearing his signature, to repel in one or the other of the Chambers the amendment under consideration.

I will now proceed to the examination of the explanations which have been offered to us.

Mr. Livingston is right in thinking that our objections to the Message of the President are confined to these two points.

1st. The Message impeaches the good faith of his Majesty's Government.

2d. It contains a threat to secure the execution of the treaty by the fear of reprisals.

It is indeed under this double point of view that the Message of President Jackson excited in France the greatest indignation. The Cabinet of Washington will readily admit that if the allegation were true, the indignation would be just. No Government, no people, would for one moment bear without itself either to the direct or indirect imputation of a want of good faith, or the idea of an other Government or another people endeavoring to obtain from it through menace, what could only be granted by it to justice. It must equally be admitted that when the impression produced by the appearance of any document is general, when that impression if felt, not only by the whole nation whom the document concerns, but even by foreigners, by uninterested people, by persons the least disposed to take a part in the contest, the very universality of that impression *is* a sufficient evidence against the general tenor of the document.

If we examine in detail the Message of the President of the United Stetas, (I mean that part of it which relates to the relations between the United States and France) it will possibly be found that passing successively from phrase to phrase, none will be met with that cannot bear an interpretation more or less plausible; none, of which, strictly speaking, it cannot be said that it is a simple expose of such or such a fact true in itself, or the assertion of such or such a right which no one contests, or the performance of such or such an obligation imposed on the President by the very nature of his functions. There will certainly be found several in which the idea of impeaching the good faith of the French Government, or of acting upon it through menace or intimidation, is more or less disavowed.

Yet when the whole succession of facts is taken into view; when we perceive the care which seems to have been taken to present them in an unfavorable light, without making allowance for circumstances which explained them, without paying any regard to considerations which the government of the U. States itself had previously admitted; when we see at the end of this uninterrupted series of allegations, which have the appearance of wrongs, for the sole reason that they are made to rest on isolated and incomplete statements, the unexpected proposition, the extreme proposition to say the least, to seize upon French property, it is impossible at first view, it is even difficult after reflection, to escape the thought that all this part of the Message had been written for the double purpose stated above.

It is not so, however; at least we hope it is not.

But to banish entirely such and idea, what would be necessary? Nothing but what is very simple. We do not here contend about this or that phrase, this or that allegation, this or that expression; we contend about the intention itself, which has dictated that part of the Message. If it be true that the President of the United States, in presenting to Congress a statement of the facts connected with the Treaty of the 4th July, had no intention to cast any doubt on the good faith of the French government; if it be true that the President of the United States in proposing to Congress to decree the seizure *by force of* arms of French property, had not the intention to assume with regard to France a menacing attitude, we cannot see how he could find any difficulty in declaring it.

Is such a declaration really contained in Mr. Livingston's note addressed to the French government on the 29th January, or in that which the same Minister left at his departure on the 27th of April?

We would be equally at a loss to affirm or to deny it;—and for this reason it is evident that neither the one nor the other can be considered sufficient. The note of the 29th January is intended to discuss, contradictorily with the French government, the correctness of facts asserted in the message of President Jackson. It is intended to prove that the view taken by him of these facts is at least plausible. It is in the midst of this long disquisition that two or three phrases are incidentally thrown out, on the just confidence which the government of the U. States has always entertained in the sincerity of the French government; confidence which Mr. Livingston had always made it a duty to foster, and which, according to him, is not in contradiction with any of the ideas or allegations expressed in the Message. The note of the 25th of April, is chiefly intended to make an indirect and anticipated examination of the amendment introduced by the Chamber of Deputies.—While upon this examination, and with a view to prove that any demand for explanations would in future be useless in fact and inadmissible in principle, Mr. Livingston refers to testimony given by him in his first note, to the good faith of the French government; he refers to subsequent sanction given by the President to the contents of that note; he dwells on the paragraph of the Message of the President, in which all idea of threat is, he says, expressly disavowed.

You will easily conceive, Sir, and the Cabinet of Washington will, we think, understand it also, that such phrases incidentally inserted in documents, the purport and tenor of which are polemical, and surrounded, in some measure, by details of a controversy which is besides not always free from bitterness; cannot dispel sufficiently the impression produced by the perusal of the Message, nor strike the mind as would the same idea expressed in terms simple, positive, direct and unaccompanied by any recriminations concerning facts or incidents no longer of any importance. Such is the motive, which, among many others has placed the French Government in the impossibility of acceding to the wish expressed by Mr. Livingston towards the conclusion of his note of the 25th of April, by *declaring* (to the Chamber of Peers probably) *that previous explanations given by the Minister of the U. States and subsequently approved by the President, had satisfied it*

The impression produced by the perusal of the Message was deep. It was so in France; in Europe, and even in the United States; the debates in Congress and public notoriety sufficiently prove the fact. Under the weight of this impression, the French Government did not hesitate to place itself in a situation to meet the engagement contracted in the name of France. In pausing there for the present, and waiting for the fulfilment of those engagements to be claimed or expecting them to be claimed, in terms consistent with the regard which is its due, it is not afraid of being accused, nor France which it represents of being accused, of *appreciating national honor by any number of millions which it could withhold as a compensation for an injury offered to it*. Mr Livingston is the first to repel such an idea. Far from it, the French Government will consider as a fortunate day, the one in which it will be able to deliver up honorably the trust that lies in its hands; but each state has duties to perform towards itself, each situation has its exigencies.—Mr. Livingston objects to the idea of seeing the President of the United States give a new testimony to the good faith of the French Government, lest such a step, reasonable and just in itself, should not appear to be exclusively dictated by justice and by reason. He will not be astonished if the French Government, on its side, attaches an equal importance to show that in acknowledging openly a legitimate debt, and declaring itself ready to discharge it, it has exclusively consulted reason and justice.

You are authorized, Sir, to read the present despatch to Mr Forsyth, and if he desires, let him take a copy of it.

Accept, Sir, &c. &c.
(Signed) V. BROGLE

From the Globe.

THE DUC DE BROGLIE'S LETTER.

It will be seen that Mr. Pageot, before leaving our shores, has given publicity to the French Minister's letter. This paper, no being addressed to our Government, could not be responded to by a direct communication to the French authorities. The French Executive —by the recall of his representative, Mr. Serurier, and by the express declaration of one of the members of his Cabinet to the Chambers, that he had closed all direct diplomatique communication between *the Governments*— had given the world to understand, that the intercourse thereafter to be held would not be immediate and official; as between the Heads of the Governments. The letter to Mr. Pageot, therefore, was informal—was a circuitous intimation of the expectations of France. It was to be considered by him, a private, a confidential communication, of which the American Administration might avail itself, if it deemed proper to approach an adjustment of our difficulties. It will not be said, we presume, by any American, that after the door of direct communication had been closed between the French and American Executive, *by the former*, that the latter should have condescended to make a communication to Mr. Pageot, and attempted to satisfy him, by groping through the indefinite letter of the Duke de Broglie for an idea of the apology, which, it now appears, was to be tendered as a condition precedent to the payment of the indemnity. If this sacrifice of the dignity of the Chief Magistrate of the Union had been resolved upon, we now see from the Duke's voluntary declaration to Mr. Barton, when the inquiry was made as to his determination about the payment of the indemnity, that it would not have been held sufficient. No informal, verbal explanation, such as the intercourse between Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Pageot alone permitted —nothing even which Mr. Forsyth could have addressed in writing informally to Mr. Pageot, in reference to his informal communication, would have been received as adequate. We now see from the note of the Duke de Broglie to Mr. Barton, that nothing short of an explicit declaration of confidence in the good faith of the French Government, and a disavowal of an intention to menace that Government, on the part of the United States, "ADDRESSING ITS RECLAMATION TO US (the French Government) OFFICIALLY IN WRITING," and accompanied with the sorrowful assurance, "THAT IT REGRETS THIS MISUNDERSTANDING," would have sufficed.—And what a figure would our Republic have made in the eyes of the world, if, in addition to the express disavowal of the Message which it is pretended contains the menace—if, in addition to Mr. Livingston's first letter of 29th January, 1835, approved by the President, stating *that the sincerity of the French Government was not doubted, and that no menace was intended*—it in addition to Mr. Livingston's letter of the 25th of April last to the Duke de Broglie, reiterating the assurances of the first—communicating the President's approbation of its explanations—and repeating them—it, in addition to all this, the President had consented to repeat these explanations to the French Charge d'Affaires, what would have been the posture of our government if it had repeated them in vain? That they must have been repeated in vain is now clear. Nothing but a direct communication of *regrets, officially and in writing*, to a government which had closed, on its part, all direct diplomatic intercourse with us, would have been received, and of they had been tendered in the conversation had by Mr. Pageot with Mr. Forsyth, it is apparent that the Charge must have declined considering them as sufficient. He would have said, my instructions give me to understand *that your explanations and the express on of your regrets must be addressed to my government officially and in writing*

The President of the United States, as appears from his message, wisely resolved to take no part in the semi-official, subordinate game of diplomacy proposed to him. He has no art but simple honesty—he seeks no end which may not be attained by plain and sound dealing. For all the courtesy reported to him as contained in the paper of the Duc de Broglie to Mr. Pageot, Mr. Forsyth was authorized to return courtesy. Mr. Forsyth heard it read with the utmost complaisance—but as it was not addressed to him he could not respond to it; and as he could not respond to it, he did not request a copy—but at the same time assured Mr. Pageot "that any direct communication from him as the representative of the King's government to me (Mr. Forsyth,) embracing the contents of this despatch, &c. would receive an early and just consideration." Mr. Pageot, it seems, declined this overture, because, doubtless, he was instructed not to open the direct diplomatic intercourse between the two Governments, which had been closed by the King's order. But if the Duc de Broglie's object in having the contents of his letter to Mr. Pageot made known to this Government were only to have it understood, that "*It did not ask for explanations; it was contented to expect them from the justice of the Government of the United States, and from the ancient friendship of the American nation, not doubting that the Government of the United States would appreciate the difference in such cases, between answering an interpellation, and preventing, by a spontaneous determination, by explanations readily offered, a misunderstanding always to be regretted*"—has not this object been attained? Has not the President, in justice to his misconceived mes age, and from a regard to truth, in his last message, (a message delivered long since the French Minister said he would not *ask* for explantions, but hoped they would *readily be offered*,) declared, "*The conception that it was my intention to menace or insult the Government of France, is as unfounded as the attempt to extort from the fears of that nation what her sense of justice may deny, would be vain and ridiculous!*" Has he not said, also, in the same message, that Mr. Livingston, in his letter of the 25th of January, "*had repeated the disavowal contained in the Message* itself of any intention to intimidate by menace"—that "*he truly declared that it contained, and was intended to contain, no charge of ill faith against the King of the French!*" And does he not conclude by saying, that this direct and clear declaration had "*his full approbation.*"

If, then, a simple correction of the misconception of the French public was all that the French Chambers sought by their proviso, or the Minister by his letter, they have it. They have nothing to do but to look into the same vehicle wherein they found the cause of offence, to find an absolute denial of which alone it was supposed to consist. The intention is disavowed—the whole object is explained, and every pretext of menace to the nation or personal insult to the King is dissipated.

But is there not reason to believe that the Duc de Broglie had something else in view in his letter, than obtaining "a spontaneous" correction of the misunderstanding growing out of the general impression made by the Message? He says of this paper:

"If we examine in detail the Message of the President of the United States, (I mean that part of it which relates to the relations between the United States and France,) it will possibly be found, that passing successively from phrase to phrase, none will be met with that cannot bear an interpretation more or less plausible; none, of which, strictly speaking, it cannot be said that it is a simple expose of such a fact, true in itself, or the assertion of such or such a right, which no one contests, or the performance of such or such an obligation, imposed on the President by the very nature of his functions. There will certainly be found several in which the idea of impeaching the good faith of the French Government, or of acting upon it through menace or intimidation, is more or less disavowed."

Here the Duke admits that there is nothing in the *phrases—facts*—or *assertions* of the Message, not reconcileable to propriety—and after saying that a contrary supposition is not to be indulged—saying that "it is not so, or at least we hope it is not so," he adds:

"But to banish entirely such an idea, what would be necessary? Nothing but what is very simple. We do not here contend about this or that phrase, this or that allegation, this or that expression; we contend about the intention itself, which has dictated that part of the Message. If it be true that the President of the United States, in presenting to Congress a statement of the facts connected with the treaty of the 4th July, had no intention to cast any daubt on the good faith of the French Government; if it be true that the President of the United States, in proposing to Congress to decree the seizure by force of arms of French property, had not the intention to assume with regard to France a menacing attitude, we cannot see how he could find any difficulty in declaring it."

Well, he has declared it—declared officially, and in the same form and in the same sort of paper in which the menacing attitude was supposed to be discovered—and now we learn through the voluntary communication of the French minister to Mr. Barton, that something else was expected.

That something else was expected is evident too, from the use which Mr. Pageot had made of the Duke's letter. He has seen the President's message, and knows that it contains all that is necessary to correct the misunderstanding of the first message; but it does not recognise the right of the French Government to interfer in our domestic councils, or the right to hold the nation responsible for the recommendation of an act by one of its functionaries, which could only be sanctioned by the Legislative power, and thus made to operate on foreign Powers. It does not express sorrow, regret, or contrition. It is not addressed by Andrew Jackson to Louis Philippe officially, in writing—although, it seems, all this is required, yet nothing like it is to be found in the Duke's letter. That letter if it had been merely designed *privately and confidentially* to communicate to the American Executive what would be acceptable to France, would have explained itself fully. But it seems not to have been intended, merely as an intimation, informal, but full and frank, to enable those for whose eye it was intended to measure the whole scope of its author's aim—on the contrary, it appears to be an artful diplomatic paper, intended to disguise the real object of its author, and meant to operate on the American people—not the American Executive. Why did Mr. Pageot, instead of leaving this paper after it was read by him to the Secretary of State to have its salutary influence upon the American Administration, impart the contents of this confidential despatch to the enemies of the Administration? Why was this document put into the hands of a Senator, and made the text for the opposition in that body, and the theme of its editorial organ, on which to predicate a charge against the Government of having rejected pacific overtures?

When Mr. Pageot first communicated this paper *to us*, we considered it as a paper designed to propitiate by the courtesy and kind temper displayed in certain portions of it, a conciliatory feeling among those desirous of seeing the Administration disembarrassed of the difficulties produced by the failure of France to comply with the treaty. But when we found that Mr. Pageot had committed his counsels to those who had produced the false impression with regard to the first message of which the French Ministry complained—when we found that the French Government insisted upon a species of explanation not hinted at in the private letter of the Duke, which Mr. Pageot was busy in making public, and perverting to the purpose of deceiving some into the belief, that the French feeling was altogether pacific, when in fact, the French Government had resolved on requiring what it knew upon the authority of Mr. Livingston's letter, as approved by the President, was altogether inadmissible—and when, lastly, we find Mr. Pageot on the eve of his departure, publishing this letter as an appeal to the American people, we cannot doubt that it is the object now, however it was at first intended, to make this letter a cover for the hostile designs meditated by France, and a sort of shelter for the opposition in this country—those at least, who will consent to become the allies of France

MIDDLEBURY FREE PRESS.

This paper, which is edited by EDWARDS D. BARBER, Esq. is characterized by a spirit of candor, justice, and liberality, which ranks well with the talent and zeal with which it is conducted. Mr. Barber certainly is a man of first-rate talent, learning, and respectability, and notwithstanding his Antimasonry, is at heart a good Democrat. Antimasonry is certainly in one sense, Democracy—but when its ends—its views and designs are perverted to advance the cause of such aspiring demagogues, and hollow-hearted politicians as William Slade, the magic of the Antimasonic name and character, degenerates to mere "sounding brass and tinkling cymball." Benjamin F. Hallett, of the Boston Advocate, E. D. Barber, of the Middlebury Free Press, and Mr. Eaton, of the Danville Star, are Democratic Antimasons, and can never be whipped into the heartless traces of that most aristocratic tory party, which ever sustained royalty, now *soi disant* Whigs. Daniel Webster is a Federalist, Wm. H. Harrison was an advocate of the alien and sedition laws, and Wm. Slade is following in their wake; therefore, such men can never find fellowship with the BARBERS, the EATONS, and the HALLETTS. We make a few extracts from the *Free Press*.

GEN. HARRISON AND ANTIMASONRY.

"We have heretofore expressed our opinion of Gen. Harrison as a candidate for the Presidency, and in the expression of that opinion subjected ourselves to a reproof from a distinguished correspondent. We then avowed ourselves entirely opposed to his support, as a man in no way qualified for the distinguished station to which he aspired, and our opinions remain not only unaltered but confirmed by reflection. Neither the reasoning of our correspondent "*Justice*," nor a consideration of the services and talents of the individual, were suffered to produce in our minds any conviction of his fitness for the Chief Magistracy of the nation. As an antimason, however, we had no reason to be partial towards him, which we should not have had independent of the question of antimasonry. After the promulgation of his letter and the unequivocal expression of the leading antimasonic newspapers, in Pennsylvania and in this State, against his nomination by the antimasonic party, we had supposed that the danger and futility of such a step by any portion of our party were foreseen and would be shunned. But such, it seems, has not been the case. The recent Antimasonic State Convention in Pennsylvania, in opposition and in defiance to the expressed wishes and remonstrances from their brethren in other States, have not only nominated Gen. Harrison for President, but have also resolved that it is inexpedient to hold a National Antimasonic Convention. This rash course on the part of our friends in Pennsylvania is fraught with destruction to the Antimasonic party as a national organization. We do not see, indeed, but it puts an end to the organization—for, however strong the Antimasons of Pennsylvania may feel in their predilections for Gen. Harrison, and in their anticipations for his success in that State, there is, in our minds, not the least prospect of his carrying a single electoral vote of the Union—not even that of Ohio, the State in which he resides. In Vermont he has no strength among any party. As an Antimason he has no claims upon the affection or principles of our citizens. As a man of commanding powers, extensive attainments and great experience as a statesman, he is immeasurably behind any of the other candidates now prominently before the public. In all the great qualities which should raise him to the high station of Chief Magistrate of this Republic, he is either lamentably deficient, or has never had the good fortune to make them known.—*Democratic Statesman.*

EASTON, MD.

SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 1836.

DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES.

FOR PRESIDENT,

MARTIN VAN BUREN,

OF NEW YORK.

FOR VICE PRESIDENT,

RICHARD M. JOHNSON,

OF KENTUCKY.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

"Anti-Calomel" shall apper on Tuesday. "Phœbe" we must decline—her production is two *masculine*; more care and attention probably would entitle it to an insertion.

☞The Western Mail due yesterday was prevented from crossing the Bay by the ice.

We have seen it intimated that the Committees will make no report on the recommendation of the President's Special Message of a non-intercourse, until they learn the reception of the December Message in France.

THE LETTER.

We lay before our readers this morning the Letter of the Duke de Broglie, first Minister of France, to M. Pageot, Charge de Affairs of that Government to this Country. We can not perceive in it a spirit of conciliation, unless the means of the apology demand d have that tendency. In perusing it we confess we were sadly disappointed, and experienced other feeling than that of indignation at the assumptions set forth by the author. Possibly it may meet with some favor from a portion of the opposition, but we are sure, notwithstanding the Senate to back it withal, that the people generally will view this effort of dictation on the part of France in its true light, and applaud the course the President has adopted in relation to it. France will not certainly be justified in her conduct even by the most determined of the enemies of the administration, and all must frankly admit it is full time that the patience of our Government was exhausted. Years have been spent in fruitless negotiation, and when at last the treaty was finally ratified, France by a shallow pretext evades the solemn responsibility imposed upon her by it, and demands of this Government, a "*reclamation officially in writing*" that the President did not intend menace to her by language used in his Message to the American Congress,—for which we conceive, he is not responsible to any foreign power. He cannot without compromitting his dignity make reparation for what France is pleased to construe into menace, and every body knows that is what he will never do.

The letter, we unhesitatingly say, with deference to the opinions of those who may not agree with us, betrays a spirit of dictation unworthy the American people's notice, for whom no doubt it has been especially gotten up, and the President was to have been made the mere instrument of the wily and anomalous diplomacy of the First Minister. Did he suppose the President would, after so many explanations that ought to have been satisfactory, condescend to notice an unofficial and informal letter of great length, to con it over to find the *mode* and *manner* in which he could make a *satisfactory* apology—a humiliating apology—when no sufficient cause existed to authorize it? The scheme was a bad one, and has been deservedly ineffectual. It is not says the Duke, any particular phrase, allegation, or expression, that offends. Oh! no, it is the *intention* which dictated the message that they take umbrage at. It is a constructive insult drawn from it by the French Executive. The right of such construction, by a foreign power, of our domestic matters, is rightly questioned, and the President is justifiable in meeting it as he has done.

The President in his Message of last December sanctions Mr. Livingston's explanation, and accedes to the assurance given to the Duke de Broglie by him,—that the sincerity of the French Government was not doubted, and that no menaces were intended. And further:

"Has not the President, in justice to his misconceived message, and from a regard to truth, in his last message, (a message delivered long since the French Minister said he would not ask for explanation, but hoped they would *readily be offered*,) declared: "*The conception that it was my intention to menace or insult the Government of France, is as unfounded as the attempt to extort from the fears of that nation what her sense of justice may deny, would be vain and ridiculous!*" Has he not said, also, in the message, that Mr. Livingston, in his letter of the 25th of January, "*had repeated the disavowal contained in the Message* itself of any intention to intimidate by menace"—that "*he truly declared that it contained, and was intended to contain, no charge of ill faith against the King of the French!*" And does he not conclude by saying, this direct and clear declaration had "*his full approbation.*"

If all this cannot soothe their very acute feelings of national honor, or quiet their apprehensions of any intended threat, they will receive nothing more. If France forgets the justice she owes to us, and the patience with which we have waited for her to mete it out, she will never find us bending to her footstool of power to supplicate for what she justly owes us. If we go to war upon *etiquette*, France is the aggressor—if we go to war to sustain the sacred faith of treaties, she also is the aggressor; and if we go to war upon the principles of justice, or upon either, or all of those points, let us remember the sentiment that animated us in avenging our grievances with Brittain: "millions for defence but not a cent for tribute."

As we have before said we repeat it again, we deprecate a war and its consequent evils; but we cannot sit with folded arms and look quietly on, and see our national dignity and independence laughed to scorn, and treated with contumely. The spirit of our forefathers forbid it; liberty and justice forbid it; and should it become requesite we have the assurance of one fact, that the people of the United States will show themselves the ready and able defenders of the rights and dignity of their country.

That is not always good in the maw that is sweet in the mouth, is an old saying applicable to the Whig party. If inconsistency were not a ruling principle with them—and the only principle for which they are distinguished—they certainly would play quits with their old *chums*, and become frank and honest in their political sentiments. How can the enthusiastic admirer of Daniel Webster, yield his preferences to such a man as Gen. Harrison, who possesses not one of those peculiar qualifications that they have so zealously contended flitted Webster for the Presidency? Why are the eloquent powers of a Clay, and the Herculean talents of a Calhoun, made subservient to those of a White or a Harrison? Is it that their political degeneracy have made them no longer available, and to present them to the people would be certain defeat? Aye, that is the cause. They yield their preferences to secure their interests.

In this state they have played a shrewd game; but they have at length been forced to present their candidate, after enjoying the support of the entire opposition at the last fall elections, and thereby securing the election of their candidates. The scene is now changed—they have not White, Clay, Webster, Harrison, Calhoun, and all the rest, to harp upon—they have picked their man, and we owe them "one" as Dr. Ollapod says, which we will pay them next fall with compound interest. The wand of the Magician, which makes them wince, will hustle the Imps from their dominion of power, and regenerate Maryland in the coming contest.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

The Whigs are truly unfortunate—they catch it on every side; and to their credit be it said, they bear it with Christian fortitude.—On the eve of the meeting of the Whig Convention of this State, the zealous friends of Webster were knocked all aback by his antimasonic letter purposely denouncing secret associations, to gain the affections of the antimasonic convention of Pennsylvania, thereby to secure his nomination for the Presidency. The letter failed there—and broke him down in Maryland.

Now comes the unkindest cut of all. Mr. Adams has denounced the unjustifiable course pursued by the opposition in the Senate in refusing the three millions appropriation, asked for last session to put our country in a state of defence. He quotes the words of Webster used by him at that time, that he would oppose the bill if "the guns of the enemy were battering against the walls of the Capitol," and said Mr. Adams, there was "one other step left for him to take, and that he could easily do, *go over to the enemy.*"

This gave rise to a spontaneous burst of applause agreeably to the Baltimore Chronicle's Correspondent. The Speaker immediately called for order. This indecorous act as he styles it on the part of the Van Buren members, the fastidious letter writer highly reprobates.—Now mark his *consistency*, he finds much to admire and applaud in Mr. Wise, whom he tells us himself refused to be called to order by the chair, in the same debate. He aims his venom at the head of a man who stands as far above its reach, as he is secure from such pitiless attacks. We are not the apologists of Mr. Adams, but his talents are an acquisition at any time when properly applied.

Greek meeting Greek.—James Watson Webb of the Courier & Enquirer, has knocked down James Gordon Bennet of the Herald. And so the fracas ended with but a contusion on the head of the letter;

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