the treaty, on the principal slaving ground south of the Equator. In proof of this view the following statement of facts is submitted.

In the month of December, 1849, the commander-in-chief of the British squadron, proceeded to Porto Praya, and informed the American Commodore, that a number of American slavers had for a long time been on the South Coast, where for three years previously there had been no American man-of-war to seize them. The "Perry" was accordingly *despatched* on that service, and in a few months was followed by the "John Adams;" and within eight months three American slavers were captured; our legal commerce, which had been annoyed by British cruisers, was protected; and our merchant vessels relieved from vexatious Custom House restrictions in the Portuguese provincial ports. This joint cruising was continued, "off and on," for a year or more; the American cruiser boarding every vessel under American colors, and the British examining her own vessels and those of the different nations with which her government was in treaty. Several French cruisers were also on the south coast. The result of these proceedings was, that the slave trade, not only in American, but also in other vessels, languished, in fact, became almost extinct. This may be seen from the following extracts of a letter, by Sir George Jackson—the British Commissioner, dated Loanda, 7th May, 1851.

"During the four years preceding your arrival (March, 1850) I did not see, and scarcely heard of a single American officer on this station. The Marion and Boxer did indeed, if I recollect right, anchor once or twice in this harbor, but they made no stay in these parts. What was the consequence? "The treaty of Washington proved almost a dead letter, as regarded one of the contracting parties. And the abuse of the American Flag became too notorious, in promoting and abetting the slave trade, to make it necessary for me to refer further to it—more particularly in addressing one who [has] witnessed that abuse when at its height.

"The zeal and activity displayed by yourself and brother officers, and the seizures which were the result of them, at once changed the face of things. The actual loss which the traffic sustained, and the dread of those further losses which they anticipated on seeing the U. S. Squadron prepared to confront them at those very haunts to which they had been accustomed to repair with impunity, struck terror into these miscreants, on both sides of the Atlantic. And from the date of those very opportune captures not a vessel illicitly assuming American colors has been seen on the coast. * * *

"The effect of what I have above stated has, as you know, for some time past, shown itself very sensibly at this place: money is exceedingly scarce—slaves hardly find purchasers. Failures of men who have hitherto figured as among the chief merchants of the city, have already occurred, and others are anticipated, and a general want of confidence prevails.

"We must not, however, allow ourselves to be deceived either by our own too sanguine expectations, or the interested representations of others. The enemy is only defeated, not subdued; on the slightest relaxation on our part, he would rally, and the work would have to be commenced *de novo*. * * *

"In this view it is, that I cannot too forcibly insist on the absolute necessity of the continuation of our naval exertions, which, so far from being diminished, ought as far as possible, I conceive, to be still further increased, till the hideous hydra shall be finally and forever destroyed. * * *

"It would not be becoming in me, in addressing an American citizen, to do more than to testify to the mischiefs occasioned by the system I have already alluded to, of granting *sea-letters*, but I should hope, upon due investigation, it would be found very practicable to deny such letters to vessels sailing to the coast of Africa, without at all interfering with the interests or freedom of licit trade."

See also in this connection a letter addressed to me by the Commander-in-Chief of the British Squadron, pp. 347 to 351, inclusive—"Africa and the American Flag."

It is evident from the above that the slave trade, as stated in the report of the committee on Foreign Relations, "was then (1848) in a state of unusual activity," was caused solely by the absence of the U. S. Squadron on the Southern Coast where the traffic was chiefly prosecuted. For when the U. S. Squadron appeared on that coast, and co-operated agreeably to the treaty stipulation with the English cruisers, the traffic was checked, and hence it is evident that in the suppression of this iniquitous commerce, there can be no effective substitute, either for the treaty of Washington, or for the presence of the African Squadron.

On this point, permit me to quote from the Official Report of Commander Lynch, which was published during the late session, by order of Congress.

"If we do not wish to be accused, and perhaps justly accused, of observing the letter and neglecting the spirit of our treaty stipulations with regard to the slave trade, we will substitute small but effective steamers for sailing vessels upon the African station. In the "John Adams," we were ten days in making the distance which could have been accomplished by a steamer in thirty-six hours.

"From the causes I have enumerated, our cruisers can visit very few places compared to the number that should be visited, and as the log-books will testify often remain long at their anchors, or make yet more lengthy passages to Madeira to recruit—a passage which under canvass alone, in the teeth of a trade wind, is often more prolonged and more wearing to the ship, than if she came directly home."

On the 17th July, 1852, Commodore Lavallette, then in command of the U. S. African Squadron, addressed a friend, thus:

"It is proposed, I understand, to withdraw the squadron from the Coast of Africa, and I believe upon the ground of the opinion that the efforts of the combined squadrons to suppress the slave trade have been a failure; that no good or important object has been effected, when on the contrary, the slave trade is completely checked and will be entirely suppressed by a continuance of a sufficient naval force on this coast. Let it be withdrawn, and I am certain that the slave trade will become as rife as ever it was, and the legitimate trade of the coast greatly injured. I trust that the squadron may not be withdrawn, but that it will be kept up, and instead of half a dozen sailing vessels being employed in this service, there may be sent to the station three or four steam vessels that will more effectually protect our commercial interests in this quarter, as well as more certainly suppress the slave trade."

Commodore Mayo, now in command of the African squadron, writes under date of 23d December, 1853:

"You are quite right in supposing that the withdrawal of the African Squadron would be attended with most injurious results.—Our trade on this coast would certainly be destroyed, our flag would be prostituted to the purposes of the slave trade, and the Liberian Colonies would lose the valuable influence with the presence of our ships of war exercises upon the minds of the natives.

"It is much to be deplored that the want of small steamers in our Navy deprives this squadron of the great modern improvement in naval equipments, for these calm seas are particularly adapted to steam navigation. I am of opinion that it is very essential that the flag ship at least should be a steamer."

The increase of commerce, and the advancement of Christian civilization, will undoubtedly, at no distant date, render a naval force for the suppression of the African slave trade unnecessary, but no power having extensive com-

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