more than about 18000 fit for the service of the Feild. To this may be added the remainder of the Sixteen Battalions mounting to about 1000—

Unless the principal part of the force be composed of Men regularly organized and on the continuance of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be attempted. The Militia are too precarious a dependance to justify such an attempt where they form a material part of the plan. Militia cannot have the necessary habits for the consistency either for an assault or a siege. To employ them essentially we should run a risque of being abandonned in the most critical moments. The expence and the consumption of provisions and stores (which we are bound by every motive to oeconomise) will be very considerably increased. As we should not be able to keep the same Body in the feild, during the whole Campaign, we should a great part of the time have a double set of Men to pay and feed — those in actual service — those on the march to relieve them returning home when relieved. The operations of husbandry will suffer in proportion —

The mode by draft is I am persuaded the only effectacious one to obtain men — it appears to me certain that it is the only one to obtain them in time, nor can the period now have appointed for bringing them into the feild be delayed without defeating the object. I have little doubt, that at any